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Abstract
In the early 1990s, a set of market oriented reforms was introduced into health care 
systems of the UK and Sweden, two exemplary cases of the reliance on planned 
budgeting and integrated provision of services. In the pursuit of increased efficiency, 
several County Councils in Sweden have followed public competition model while in the 
UK internal market reforms were introduced. It was expected, that the separation of 
functions of planners and purchasers from those of providers, would achieve higher 
allocative efficiency but it would also enhance users’ satisfaction with care.
This thesis used cataract surgery as a case study to trace the impact of competition 
among providers and the separation of purchasers’ functions from the former on the set 
of selected indicators: choice, information, quality, responsiveness and efficiency.
Qualitative research methods were employed to record the perception of changes of 
those indicators for patients, primary care providers, eye surgeons, managers and 
purchasers. A set of open ended and standardised questionnaires was designed to elicit 
the views of all actors involved and to measure the likely transformations. These data 
were then compared with quantitative figures obtained from hospital registers and 
national league tables where numbers of operations performed as day/inpatient cases, 
prices for service and waiting times for the first specialist appointment and cataract 
surgery were examined. Four study sites from outer London and the only existing large 
provider of eye services to Stockholm County Council were selected and used for the 
purpose of international comparison.
The analysis of the data showed that the quasi-market reforms have resulted in a change 
of the attitude of secondary providers, which had some positive influence on quality of 
care expressed in reduction of waiting times at the outpatients’ department and as 
tailored appointments for the surgery. Some improvements in the amount and type of 
information given to purchasers and patients could be detected, although as far as direct 
users were concerned, the demand for it has not been fully satisfied.
However, the impact on choice available to patients and purchasers alike seemed to be 
adverse, an effect that was particularly strong in the UK case and which was precisely 
the opposite of what reforms proclaimed. This was partly a result of disincentives 
introduced by the reforms but it also reflected the ambivalence that patients had towards 
enacting their choices. Another finding was that General Practitioners were on the whole 
poorly informed about the changes and were unable to comment on many of the issues 
asked. This raises questions about the uncritical endorsement of vast responsibilities into 
the hands of intermediaries alongside the recent changes of the NHS.
Responsiveness measured as changes in the waiting times for the first specialist 
appointment and for the cataract surgery itself showed an uneven trend. Both decreased 
in the short-term and then increased to the pre-reform levels after this issue ceased to be 
the priority on the governments’ agendas, implying that these short lived effects must 
have been rather a result of specific interventions and not the consequence of the 
market’s work. It was also demonstrated that those providers who successfully 
responded to the market incentives and delivered services of high quality efficiently, were 
also more keen to shift to the technologies with cost-saving potential. However, there was 
no clear evidence of the impact of those changes on the prices of service despite the 
increases in the numbers of operations.
The overall conclusions are that market reforms even in its modest form were hardly 
allowed to work and when they worked they did not always produce what theory 
predicted. This was a result of the half-hearted belief in their effectiveness, the lack of 
clarity in policy formulation and conflicting objectives being pursued simultaneously, 
which possibly explains why most respondent groups could not see any major changes.
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I. BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many countries in Europe faced the problem of the escalating cost of health care 
expenditure during the 1960s and 1970s. However, only the protracted period of 
slow economic growth combined with inflation in health costs in the 1980s, 
known as “stagflation", prompted most of them to embark on a search for 
different ways of improving the efficiency of health care delivery. This trend was 
seen in the UK and Sweden, and also in many other countries throughout the 
world.
Market-oriented reforms introducing competition into both the demand and 
supply side (New Zealand and part of the Netherlands), and internal market 
reforms dealing only with improving efficiency of supply, were introduced during 
this period (in the UK and Sweden). In each case, the reforms adopted reflected 
the traditions and aspirations of the country. Thus, for example, in the UK it 
resulted in a centrally initiated and directed large scale overhaul of the system, 
while in Sweden different models of public competition were introduced in a 
limited way at the regional level.
The health care systems of the UK and Sweden were chosen for the purpose of 
this comparative analysis, because they share a number of common features, 
both when their vertically integrated structures are examined, and when the 
strengths and weaknesses resulting from these are considered. In addition, the 
solutions proposed for overcoming the deficiencies of their systems, while not 
being identical, follow a similar market-oriented pattern.
In both cases, the reforms can be summarised as the rejection of the model of 
rational planning in social policy, present throughout most of the time during their 
post-war history, on the grounds of its limitations in achieving micro-efficiency 
gains and in meeting the increasing expectations of its users. Thus the top-down 
bureaucratic structure was deemed as too inflexible to promote the systems’
15
responsiveness to the population's needs and the command economy was 
recognised as creating obvious disincentives in terms of enhancing providers’ 
productivity. But did these market-oriented reforms in the UK and Sweden bring 
about the desired outcomes? Did they increase the responsiveness and 
efficiency of the health care systems concerned? It is these questions that this 
thesis, in a small way, attempts to answer.
1.1 Research Question
The fundamental research question that this study considers is: what was the 
impact of the internal market reforms in the UK and Sweden on a set of 
indicators related to explicit criteria used to evaluate the redesign of the system 
such as choice, information, quality, responsiveness and efficiency.
All of these criteria are important. First, the availability of choice and information 
are essential conditions for both quasi- and full internal markets to work properly 
(Le Grand and Bartlett, Chapter Two, 1993). If there is no choice, there can be 
no competition and, hence, little incentive to increase efficiency, quality or 
responsiveness. If there is little information, purchasers and users will be in a 
poor position to judge quality, and hence, again, incentives for improvements will 
be blunted. In addition, they are worthy and welcome outcomes in and of 
themselves because they empower patients and may also be regarded as 
broader aspects of the quality of care (Ovretveit, 1992; Maxwell, 1990).
Second, quality standards are important in controlling undesirable effects, which 
may result from public services being provided in a market environment. From 
the start of the reforms, fears were raised that the likely micro-efficiency gains 
could be achieved only at the expense of quality of care (Boufford, 1993; Le 
Grand et al 1994; Roberts, 1995). “Quality” in health care is, of course, 
enormously difficult to define and for the purpose of this study, it was necessary 
to narrow to a range of possible interpretations of the concept. Accordingly 
quality was defined primarily in "process” terms: specifically, in terms of changes 
in satisfaction with the technical aspects of care, changes in waiting times at
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outpatients' clinics, some aspects of information, and changes in the attitudes of 
providers.
Third, responsiveness to users’ needs is seen as an important attribute of 
modem health care systems whose absence in the pre-existing health care 
systems of both the UK and Sweden created dissatisfaction and which reforms 
aimed to address. Changes in the waiting times for both cataract surgery and the 
first specialist appointment were used as a proxy measure of responsiveness to 
patients’ needs on the assumption that waiting times must represent some 
estimate of the need for service provision.
Fourth, the above changes were interpreted in the context of efficiency gains that 
might have been achieved, and an attempt was made to outline the trade-offs 
involved with other policies that were simultaneously being pursued. The search 
for higher efficiency was arguably the most important driving force behind the 
reforms in both countries and it justifies its central role against which the other 
indicators are considered in this evaluation.
Reforms’ impact on equity, which is possibly the second most important objective 
of publicly financed health care systems, is not addressed in this study. This is 
because of two reasons. First, improving equity was not the intention of the 
reforms in the UK; to the contrary as one researcher noted it “was conspicuously 
absent from the reforms agenda" (Whitehead, 1992). In Sweden the government 
was more preoccupied with maintaining the equity but there were no specific 
references on how reforms could affect it.
Second, the attempt to measure the differences in waiting times for cataract 
between fund-holders’ and non fund-holders’ patients, produced results that were 
inconclusive despite the anecdotal evidence of the alleged negative impact, 
which came mostly from the health professionals interviewed in this study. For 
these reasons and for the matter of space equity is not part of this study.
It was also decided that the outcomes of the reforms were to be measured using 
the example of cataract surgery as a tracer condition. Cataract surgery is a
17
procedure well suited to reflecting the likely changes in delivery of service that 
could be attributed to the reforms. Cataract surgery is an elective procedure, with 
increasing worldwide demand and relatively well-established effectiveness 
(Williams et al, 1994). It was also widely used by market supporters as one of the 
cases that would illustrate the likely gains that could accrue in the aftermath of 
the introduction of the reforms.
Furthermore, the choice of this particular service was also influenced by the fact 
that the diffusion of certain technologies, which resulted in efficiency gains, such 
as day-case surgery, might have been significantly speeded up by the 
organisational incentives brought about by the reforms.
The principal methodology involved qualitative interviews. The views of the main 
participants, such as the health professionals, purchasers, managers and 
patients, were sought in order to draw conclusions on the impact of the reforms. 
Observations from each perspective - professional, patient or organisation of the 
service under assessment - were made. These observations were broken down 
into components. Each perspective concentrated on some further sub­
components, which attempted to capture the specific perception of the key 
players in the system, reflecting the different priorities attached by the observer 
and the objectives of their assessment.
1.2 Addressing gaps in previous research
This study attempted to address some of the gaps in these aspects of health 
care delivery which, while considered important, have been very little evaluated, 
if at all. These concerned, primarily, the likely changes in the level of choice and 
information and the changes in attitude of the main actors. The study's focus on 
these aspects of care is justified, because they represent the values that users 
increasingly expect health services to deliver, and also because the markets are 
seen as instrumental in bringing about these differences.
A particular service was used to serve as the tracer condition to illustrate some 
effects of the market-oriented reforms on the set of indicators selected. Cataract
18
surgery was used as a case study for the evaluation of the reforms, and it was 
hoped that it would provide an insight into an area that was relatively under- 
researched. There was little published research that provided evidence of the 
impact of the changes introduced into specific treatments. An additional aspect 
this study attempts to address by means of an international comparison was the 
response to a similar set of reforms introduced into distinct cultural environments, 
which shared a number of common characteristics in the pre-reform organisation 
of their systems and in the type of reforms adopted.
Despite the limitations involved in international comparisons, important 
conclusions about the interrelation between the different elements of chosen 
policies, the methods of their implementation and their final outcome, as well as 
internal and external determinants of their success, could be reached. Also, quite 
often the context of international comparisons that allows for a better 
understanding of the specific features of each system and of the factors that led 
to their establishment, may also help to explain their individual differences.
1.3  Plan of the thesis
The thesis is divided into four major parts. Part I provides background information 
and outlines the purpose and scope of the research. Chapter Two compares the 
similarities and differences of the pre-reform health care systems of the UK and 
Sweden and briefly outlines the design and objectives of the reforms in both 
countries. Chapter Three discusses the concepts and framework of the indicators 
that were selected to show the market’s impact and attempts to provide some 
justification for their use. Chapter Four summarises previous attempts to evaluate 
market-oriented reforms revealed in the literature and identifies the existing gaps 
in research. Some of these, such as the relative absence of evaluations dealing 
with particular services, and also the limited number of international 
comparisons, are addressed in this study.
Part II provides the research methodology of the study and Part III its results. 
Chapter Five presents the research methodology, including a detailed description
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of the sample, the procedures and the tools used. The methodological limitations 
of the project are also discussed here.
Part III of this thesis is concerned with data analysis and the presentation of 
results with regard to all indicators (where their different aspects are highlighted) 
and the perspectives of all involved actors. Chapter Six presents the results of 
the research with respect to choice, Chapter Seven aspects of information, 
Chapter Eight aspects of quality, Chapter Nine aspects of responsiveness and 
Chapter Ten aspects of efficiency. In each case, a comparative analysis between 
the UK and Sweden is carried out. The analysis is densely interspersed with 
large amount of quotations and consists of a fairly detailed reference to the 
material from transcribed interviews. For a quick review of the principal results 
the reader should refer to the end of each chapter.
The final part of the thesis, Part IV, consists of Chapter Eleven, which is devoted 
to an interpretation of the findings and Chapter Twelve, which concludes the 
thesis and delineates some of the policy implications that could be drawn from 
the results. Chapter Twelve also presents some recommendations as to how the 
lessons from the experience of market -oriented reforms might be incorporated in 
future developments in the UK and Sweden.
The appendixes consist of tables summarising the research methodology 
(Appendix I) the questionnaires used (Appendix II) and characteristics of the 
samples of respondents (Appendix III). The detailed findings of the audit on 
clinical outcomes in hospital P in the UK are presented in Annex I, and indicators 
of clinical outcomes used in Sweden in Annex II. The copy of publications that 
have so far resulted from this research project can be found in Annex III.
20
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part discusses the health 
care systems of the UK and Sweden. It provides some background information 
and serves as a justification for their selection for the purpose of this comparison. 
In the second part, the rationale for the introduction of the reforms is outlined and 
the major points of content of the reforms, in both the UK and Sweden, are 
presented.
2.1 Health care systems in the UK and Sweden
The health care systems of the UK and Sweden were chosen for comparison in 
this study, as they share a number of common features in their pre-existing 
structure and in the content of the reforms introduced in the late 1980s (the UK) 
and the early 1990s (Sweden). Despite important similarities, the differences in 
historical origin and organisational aspects of the two systems have determined 
the model of reforms adopted in each case; they would also eventually shape the 
outcome of the reforms.
2.1.1 Similarities and Differences
The principles behind the inception of both health systems and their organisation 
of health care were similar in many respects. These were almost equally mirrored 
in their achievements and also in the problems and challenges they faced. For a 
long time, both countries served as model health care systems - to be emulated 
in many less developed and developing countries. Their success was 
internationally recognized when the social, demographic and clinical dimensions 
of the performance of the systems were taken into account. Both countries 
perform relatively well in international comparisons where conventional
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indicators, such as life expectancy at birth for females and males, infant mortality 
rate per 1,000 live births, and low weight at birth for hospital deliveries, are used 
(See Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Life expectancy, infant mortality and low weight at birth in selected OECD 
countries, 1997__________________________________________________________
Life expectancy 
at birth -  
Females 
(Years)
Life expectancy 
at birth -  Males 
(Years)
Infant mortality 
rate/1000 
live births
Low weight at 
birth Hospital 
deliveries (%)
Australia 80.9 75.0 5.7 6.3°
Canada 81.3 75.3 6.0 —
Czech Republic 76.9 70.0 7.7 6.0*
Denmark 77.8 72.5 5.5 5 .2 *
Finland 80.2 72.8 4.0 4.1
France 81.9 73.9 5.0 6.2
Germany 79.5 73.0 5.3 6.1
Ireland 78.5 72.9 6.3 —
Iceland 80.6 76.4 6.1 3.2*
Italy 80.8 74.4 6.2 6. O'*
Japan 82.8 76.4 4.3 7 . r
Netherlands 80.4 74.6 5.5 - -
Norway 80.8 74.8 4.0 5.3
Poland 76.4 67.6 13.6 7.96
Portugal 78.6 71.5 7.4 6.0
Spain 81.2 73.2 5.5 5.46
Sweden 81.0 76.7 4.0 4.4
Switzerland 81.7 74.3 5.0 5.2-
United Kingdom 79.5b 74.36 5.9 7.0-
United States 79.2 72.5 8.0 7.26
b1996
Source: OECD Health Data 99
The table demonstrates that, overall, Sweden’s outcomes are superior to many 
and among the best of the industrialized countries. On the whole they, can 
indeed only be compared to those of Japan that has higher life expectancy for 
females than Sweden which is even a little bit lower than in Switzerland and 
Spain. The UK’s outcomes, on the other hand, are comparable to those of Italy 
and the Netherlands, but are slightly worse than the indicators of some countries 
with a lower income, such as Spain, and also of some countries with a higher
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income, such as Germany. In addition to a weaker performance when compared 
to most Scandinavian countries (except for Denmark), the UK's overall indicators 
are also worse than those of Canada, Australia and Switzerland and most of the 
indicators for France; but they are better than the outcomes of Ireland, the United 
States and Portugal.
There are three principal areas of similarity. First, the health care systems of both 
the UK and Sweden shared the characteristic of being relatively cost-effective, 
although a different amount of GDP was spent on health care in each case. The 
UK devoted, and still devotes, a lower percentage of GDP to its health care 
expenditure than Sweden - around 6.7% and 8.4% respectively; although this 
persists, whether expressed in real prices or purchasing parities, it is not as great 
as it used to be (Getzen et al, 1991; Schieber et al, 1993; OCED, 1999).
For instance during the 1970s Sweden and the UK occupied the second and 
fifteenth place in spending among the OECD countries which in the late 1990s 
was respectively the twelve and eighteenth. Similarly there is a tendency towards 
a narrowing the gap in the percentage of GDP that was devoted to health care in 
the 1970s and 1990s, which for Sweden increased only from 7.1% to 8.4% but 
for the UK the increase was from 4.5% to 6.7% (for details, see Table 2.2 and 
Table 2.3).
Table 2.2 Total expenditure on health per capita (PPP in US$) and as % of GDP in 
the UK and Sweden in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995 and their ranking against other 
OCED countries
1970 1980 1990 1997
Sweden 458 (7.1%) 1145 (9.4%) 1571 (8.8%) 1762 (8.4%)
United 296 (4.5%) 848 (5.6%) 1042 (6.0%) 1391 (6.7%)
Kingdom
Ranking in 2 and 15 2 and 20 7 and 18 12 and 18
comparison 
with OCED (respectively) (respectively) (respectively) (respectively)
countries
Source: OECD Health Data 99
The international comparisons that relate spending to the outcomes of health 
care have been questioned and criticised, especially because, apart from the
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usual problem of the reliability of data and the same indictors being measured 
differently (Rublee and Schneider, 1991), there is another equally fundamental 
problem. This relates to the use of non-standardised and internationally agreed 
definitions of different components of health (Schieber et al, 1993). In this case, 
the significant reduction of the difference in the amounts spent, which has 
occurred during recent years between the two countries, reflects wider economic 
trends and corresponds with Sweden’s decline in economic growth. It also 
confirms what has been known for quite a long time, that spending on health care 
is strongly correlated with the size of GDP, and also more importantly, with the 
pace of economic growth (Newhouse, 1977; Parkin et al, 1987; Hakansson, 
1999).
Nonetheless, there are also less obvious reasons that may influence this 
outcome. In Sweden, for example, the dramatic reduction in spending which 
occurred from 1990 to 1995 and which, according to the data presented, may be 
as high as 1% of GDP, has coincided with the shift of social care from the county 
councils to the municipal government, introduced in 1992, known as the Adel 
reform (named after the minister that passed it).
Thus, by not appearing on the balance sheets of the county councils, whose 
principal responsibility is the financing and provision of health services to their 
populations, it is also no longer calculated as part of health care expenditure. In 
reality, however, if the amount subtracted from spending on social care is added 
to what is currently spent on health, the figures demonstrate that there has been 
no great curtailment in the money devoted to health (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3 Spending on health care in Sweden in the years 1990-1996, including 
adjustment for the consequences of the Adel reform_________________________
Year of 
measurement
Expressed as 
current prices (in 
bln SEK)
Expressed as fixed 
costs (in bln SEK)
Expressed as the 
percentage of 
GDP
1990 119 119 8.8
1991 125 118 8.7
1992 112 103 7.8
1993 114 103 7.9
1994 118 102 7.7
1995 123 102 7.5
1996 128 101 7.6
1996* 145 114 8.6
‘ Including the amount spent on social care, which after the Adel reform is in not 
calculated as health care expenditure
Source: Eckerlund et al (1998), Socialstyrelsen (National Board of Health and Welfare)
Although both systems are financed from a single source, there are, 
nevertheless, some differences in this respect between the two countries. The 
UK's health care is almost solely financed out of general taxation, while in 
Sweden a large proportion of health care expenditure is covered through a 
regionally determined level of taxation. In both systems, however, strong control 
of overall spending was one of their predominant features, which in the UK was, 
and still is, decided at the central government level, while in Sweden it is 
determined by the various regional governments.
Success in controlling the overall cost of health care is widely attributed to the 
mode of financing of the health care system (Abel-Smith, 1992a). Another factor, 
also seen as contributing to the relative cost-effectiveness of a health system's 
delivery, are the incentives for health professionals reflected in the methods of 
remuneration (Barr, 1992). In both countries, these are characterised by the 
absence of third party payments and/or fee-for-service provision, which is known 
to place inflationary pressures on health care expenditure (Evans, 1974; Abel- 
Smith, 1992a; Abel-Smith, 1992b) and rely on payment methods that are 
predominantly salary-based.
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The second similarity is in their low administrative costs when compared to other 
industrialized countries (the USA being the most extreme example), which 
enable most of the resources to be spent on direct care for patients (Ham, 1993; 
OECD, 1994). This could probably be regarded as a result of the relative 
centralisation of decision-making in health care delivery (either by regional or 
central government) resulting in vertical integration that is a characteristic of 
some publicly funded and operated health systems (Anell, 1996). The absence of 
a competitive environment, which, in itself, creates a multiplicity of agents and 
intermediaries in the contracting and commissioning procedures, might have also 
contributed to the efficiency of the systems.
Third, the concept of equity is an important component pertaining to the 
philosophy of both systems (Whitehead, 1994a; Whitehead, 1994b; Garpenby, 
1992; Berleen et al, 1994). In this respect they are quite favourably placed in the 
context of international comparisons and are, by most criteria, evaluated as 
providing relatively equitable access to comprehensive services. However, when 
regarding the concern for equity, important distinctions that exist between the two 
countries have to be taken into account for a better understanding of the system. 
These, together with some other key differences, are analysed below and 
summarized in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Key features of the two health systems: the UK and Sweden
UNITED KINGDOM SWEDEN
MAIN SOURCE OF FINANCE: central MAIN SOURCE OF FINANCE:
taxation Local taxation
ORGANISATION ORGANISATION
highly centralized decentralised to the County level
REFERRALS TO HOSPITALS - tightly REFERRALS TO HOSPITALS -
controlled by primary care doctors largely uncontrolled, patients’ self­
referrals common
SPENDING AS % OF GDP - app. SPENDING AS % OF GDP - app.
6.0% 8.0%
HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH OUTCOMES
Very good Excellent
EQUITY OF ACCESS EQUITY OF ACCESS
very high very high
SATISFACTION OF USERS -  high SATISFACTION OF USERS - very
high
Source: Various (Ham, 1993, Le Grand, 1994; Saltman, 1990) compiled by the 
author
26
When discussing the differences, one of the most important is the pronounced 
contrast in the perception of the equity concept and the place it occupies in the policy 
agendas of the two countries. While in the UK it is more often declared as a political 
statement, in Sweden it seems to be more a case of actively sought policy, and this 
is reflected in agendas of each government (Garpenby, 1992; Berleen et al, 1994; 
Bergman, 1994). Thus, in Sweden there is an absence of major political overtones 
attached, in contrast to the UK where, equity seems to be an important concern and 
a subject of debates while the expression of equity or even equality as a policy goal 
is carefully omitted. There are also some further differences, which have their 
foundations in the inception of the system and in the political origins of the idea.
In the UK, equity can be undoubtedly regarded as one of the founding principles of 
the NHS, and it has shaped and justified the broad vision and scope of the system. 
Its roots, as explained by Klein, can be sought in the long nurtured social 
expectations which, before 1948, were not properly reflected in the health care 
system of the country, and which the NHS came to fulfill (Klein, 1989). Klein regards 
the origin of the NHS as the result of political boldness that was eventually diluted by 
a series of political compromises (Klein, 1995), one may argue also with respect to 
its dedication to equity.
The same does not seem to hold true for Sweden, where there is a longer and more 
continuous tradition of commitment to equity principles. In this context, the Swedish 
health care system should be viewed more as the final result of incremental 
advancements in social policy, which have been taking place over the last century 
(Garpenby, 1992; Rhenberg, 1990; Culyer, 1991).
In addition, as a large trans-national comparative study demonstrated the 
implications for the equity of access may not be the same in both countries. One 
of the criteria used in this study, in which both the UK and Sweden were 
included, measured the income-related inequalities that were expressed as self­
assessed health. It demonstrated that, although in all countries there were 
inequalities in health care in favour of higher income groups, these were most 
pronounced in the UK and least pronounced in Sweden (van Doorslaer et al, 
1993).
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Even more of a contrast is the kind and degree of commitment to democratic 
participation that is present in each system. In the case of Sweden, there is a 
long and strong tradition of local participation as a result of the decentralised 
structure of the decision-making processes (Garpenby, 1992; Rhenberg, 1990). 
This is retained and developed further in more than one of the models of reforms 
and even more in the proposals preceding the actual introduction of the reforms 
where elected city councilors were considered as the only purchasers of health 
care services (Anell et al, 1993).
By contrast, the UK can be characterised by policy-making based on negotiation 
among representatives of different pressure groups carried out at the central 
level and then only followed by direct participation at many other levels, including 
local ones, whose influence is much more diffuse (Jones and Cavannagh, 1991). 
This probably becomes more clearly illustrated through examining the position 
that health care reforms occupy in the political discussion in both countries.
As pointed out by Garpenby in Sweden, reforming health care has. so far. never 
been an issue for national debate whether in parliament or during electoral 
campaigning (Garpenby, 1992), probably because all the power, in terms of 
managing and financing health care, is delegated to the regional governments. In 
the UK, by contrast, any major restructuring of the NHS constitutes a highly 
sensitive topic on each government’s agenda and is a subject of public debate. 
At the end it is usually negotiated through a long process, involving different 
representatives and pressure groups (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Jones and 
Cavannagh, 1991).
Also, the pace of the reforms and the way that they were implemented in both 
countries highlights important differences that are typical of the UK and Sweden. 
In the case of the former, the initiative came from central government and was 
aimed at nothing less than the wholesale redesign of the system. This was 
clearly demonstrated when arguably rather simplistic market mechanisms were 
phased into complex and intricate environments throughout the country, without 
any previous experience or evidence of their chances of success or failure. The 
anticipated changes were dressed up in rhetoric and were heavily charged with
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political overtones, which often obscured the real content of the intended 
reforms.
In Sweden, in the true spirit of decentralised decision-making, twelve counties 
gradually adopted different types of market-oriented reforms between 1991 and 
1995; this roughly constituted half of the total number of counties (for details, see 
Fig. 2.1). Their initial introduction was on a limited scale, which allowed for 
evaluation and modifications where needed. The set of reforms was not uniform 
either, varying from quite radical arrangements (Dalama) to cautious experiments 
with elements that suited local needs (Stockholm, Bohus). Also, the Swedish 
policy makers were not reluctant to learn from the experience of others, including 
British academics and politicians, which according to some might even have 
seriously influenced the policy choices adopted (Whitehead et al, 1997).
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Figure 2.1 Counties in Sweden that have adopted different forms of market- 
oriented reforms (coloured and shaded) from SPRI
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The other distinct feature of the two systems is the organisation of primary health 
care delivery. The British system has a well-functioning GP ‘gate- keeping’ 
device, which, in fact, constitutes the backbone of the NHS and contributes 
highly to its efficiency (Glennerster et al, 1994a; Glennerster et al, 1994b). The 
Swedish system, together with a number of other European countries like 
France, Germany and Belgium, allows patients to refer themselves for specialist 
care at their own discretion (Abel-Smith, 1992a; Giraud 1992). However, despite 
the relatively lesser importance attached to the primary care gate-keeping function in 
Sweden, primary care network schemes operate in the health care centres, with 
multidisciplinary staff employed to secure provision of a comprehensive range of 
primary care services.
This explains why the particular model of market-orientated health care reforms 
that gave a unique power to family doctors, enabling them to become competing 
health care providers and purchasers at the same time, was implemented only in 
the UK, despite the similar proposals being voiced in Sweden. What was 
suggested in the latteris case would, according to some researchers, have 
largely resembled the GP fund-holding scheme if implemented (Le Grand, 1993; 
Rhenberg, 1990). There were also others who thought that the experiment in 
Dalama County, where general practitioners were given more power, with the 
purpose of ultimately assisting city councilors in decision-making processes, was 
already a movement in this direction (Glennerster et al, 1994b).
2.2 Market-oriented reforms in the UK and Sweden
The search for higher efficiency, prompted by an apparently limitless increase in 
demand for health care, has been a driving force behind the changes introduced 
into many health care systems during the last decade (Abel-Smith, 1992b; 
Bennett, 1991; Hurst, 1991; OECD, 1992; Glennerster and Le Grand, 1995). In 
the case of publicly operated health systems, such as those in the UK and 
Sweden, this reform process has often been initiated as organisational 
restructuring, aimed primarily at achieving better value for money and promoting 
users’ satisfaction with the health care service. Global trends and internal fiscal 
pressures had led to the realisation that provision of health care, in respect of its
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efficiency, responsiveness and choice, were in need of improvement, both in the 
UK and Sweden.
2.2.1 Rationale of the reforms
The common features of the pre-reform systems in both the UK and Sweden 
were public financing and ownership of production, coupled with central planning 
of the delivery of services. Although their respective structures produced 
remarkable achievements, whether measured in terms of health care indicators, 
universality and equity of access, or technical efficiency (Saltman, 1994), at the 
same time, they were subject to persistent criticism for their poor management 
and low responsiveness to the needs and wants of users (Enthoven, 1985). As 
market proponents argued, the very same payment methods that kept the cost of 
the system down had, at the same time, acted as disincentives for increasing 
productivity and improving quality of the care provided (Enthoven, 1985; 
Enthoven, 1988).
Set against the strengths of both health care systems, a number of commonly 
shared weaknesses became increasingly apparent. These shortcomings and the 
shift in the public mood in favour of the market's potential were the factors that 
created an environment conducive to change and which eventually found their 
way on to the reforms’ agendas. Although the reforms reflected a perception that 
seemed principally confined to interventions aimed at a micro-efficiency level, the 
organisational changes intended for correcting pre-existing deficiencies had also, 
in fact, diffuse effects at the macro-level, expressed in both economic and social 
terms.
As a result, the reformers intentionally or unintentionally prompted a whole-scale 
shake up of the welfare state philosophy that had formed the foundations of the 
systems. According to the categorization of the reform processes, proposed by 
Ham, the UK, together with Israel and New Zealand, followed a 'big bang' reform, 
while Sweden pursued its own bottom-up and an incremental path of reform 
(Ham, 1997). This typology in a way confirms that, regardless of the approaches 
to the processes of the reforms and the different mechanisms of their initiation,
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the content of the reforms chosen was quite similar despite the differences in 
expectations placed upon them.
The internal problems that were at the root of the restructuring of the health 
systems in both countries were the existence of long waiting lists for some hospital 
procedures (mostly for elective surgery), a lack of patient choice and 
responsiveness, as well as evidence of inefficiency in the use of resources which 
was loudly articulated in the UK (Ham, 1993).
One of the best-documented examples was the huge variation in operating rates 
among consultants in the UK. Cataract surgery, used as the tracer condition in 
this study, illustrated this phenomenon: the differences in operating rates were as 
much as three times between the bottom and the top values (Drummond et al, 
1991). This was amplified even further when variations in length of stay and 
operating rates per 100,000 resident populations, between different providers 
units in the same area for the same procedure, were examined. For instance, a 
study examining the rates of cataract surgery in the Southwest Thames Region, 
found that operating rates among consultant eye surgeons varied by as much as 
three times (Williams et al, 1993).
Similar evidence from Sweden suggested that there were variations in operating 
rates between different regions of the country. Not only were huge differences 
reported in the use of procedures but also were significant differences in waiting 
times between urban and rural areas and between the Southern and Northern parts 
of the country (Eckerlund et al, 1992; Swedish Ophthalmology Association 
Registers, 1993,1994,1995). In Sweden, the waiting times, although not as long the 
British ones, contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with system’s performance, 
and the conservative government saw it as an important issue to be addressed.
The unmet demand for cataract surgery in both countries, which was estimated 
at 65,000 cases awaiting surgery in 1991 in the UK (Thomas et al, 1992) and to 
50,900 patients on waiting lists in 1991 in Sweden (a similar figure despite the 
enormous difference in population) prompted the debate towards the search for 
more effective ways of service provision. The culprit, in the latter case, was found
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to be the low productivity and measures reflected in the reforms' agenda were 
primarily aimed at tackling this problem (Charpentier and Samuelson, 1994).
All these happened against the backdrop of the realisation that long waiting lists were 
not necessarily a true reflection of demand for care (Frankel, 1991); in fact many 
questioned the direct relation between the two. For example Goldacre et al suggested 
that there is little correlation between increased throughput and the length of waiting lists 
in case of cataract surgery (Goldacre et al, 1987). Others found that the way that lists 
were constructed and updated did not reflect the real number of people in need of the 
particular service (Davidge et al, 1987; Radical Statistics Group, 1992).
Furthermore, poor co-ordination between primary and secondary care units and a 
relatively low priority attached to primary health care, were important factors 
prompting the re-examination of the systems. Poor co-ordination was not only 
apparent for different tiers of health care but also for social care in the UK, and 
between health and social forms of insurance in Sweden. Meanwhile, the 
services remained traditionally too much hospital-oriented despite the differences 
existing between the two countries. In the UK, this was demonstrated, among 
others, in the King’s Fund report devoted to this issue, which advocated for a 
shift in priorities and resources allocation in favour of primary care in the London 
area.
Despite the many political statements about commitments to the promotion of 
primary care proffered at different times, the ultimate proof of the honesty of 
politicians’ intentions, as reflected in resources allocated for the cause they 
championed, was invariably modest. When examining the pattern of the resource 
allocations for different tiers of care, it could be legitimately doubted whether primary 
health care had ever constituted a real priority in the health policy agenda in either of 
the two countries.
Analysing these factors and ranking them according to their priority, the long 
waiting-lists phenomenon seemed to be an important preoccupation on policy 
makers’ minds, although the users’ reaction to this was less known. These were 
the source of lasting embarrassment for the liberally-minded government in the UK
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whose image was tarnished by the evidence of unresponsive services being 
tolerated at the heart of the public sector, something skillfully exploited by the media 
and the political opposition. For example, in 1986 over 600,000 patients were on 
waiting lists in the UK, a quarter of whom remained there for more than a year 
(Davidge et al, 1987). Again in the UK, in 1986 the waiting time for a first 
appointment with a specialist consultant was around 16 weeks (Goldacre et al,
1987). The liberal government astutely recognized it as a sign of inefficiency 
resulting from lack of incentives.
In Sweden, long waiting lists for elective procedures also constituted a serious 
problem that resulted in dissatisfaction among users and pointed at the system’s 
low productivity. Although the rates of cataract surgery of 4.5 operations per 
1,000 inhabitants were among the highest in the world (Courtney, 1992; Desai, 
1993), there were long waits in County Council owned hospitals in which, in 
1992, 92% of all cataract operations were performed (Lundstrom et al, 1996). 
During the time of the UK’s reforms, in Sweden a conservative government came 
to power in the early 1990s, after a long monopoly presence of the socialists in 
office. Possibly following the UK’s suit and in reflection of the Zeitgeist, it made 
introducing more consumerism into health care (by offering choices to patients) 
and creating a service that would be more responsive to the users’ needs as 
some of its aims.
Consequently, and apart from systemic causes there was also a range of factors 
influencing and shaping the form of the response to internal challenges. The 
roots of these should be sought in the wider changes that were either outside the 
health sector or outside the internal affairs of each country or both. Thus the 
convergence in the timing of the response and the form of the major restructuring 
of the health care systems of the industrialised world (Ham, 1990), without being 
solely confined to it (World Bank, 1987; World Bank, 1993), was, to an important 
degree, conditioned by global events.
These were primarily related to the major political changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which were precipitated by a complete failure of the alternative 
economic models and which resulted in a unanimous consensus about the
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superiority of the market economy as the most efficient way of delivery for both 
economic and social goods.
Coincidentally, while Enthoven laid the framework for changes in Western 
Europe, the first experiment with a purchaser-provider split actually took place in 
Leningrad and other places in the Soviet Union (Hakansson et al, 1989, 
Hakansson et al, 1991). This was conducted as part of the wider attempt by 
Gorbachev’s administration to use incentives for stimulating performance of the 
ossified economy and, in 1988, experiments with new methods of payment for 
hospitals and fund-holding for primary care providers were already being tried 
within the framework of "new economic mechanism" (Sheiman, 1994; Fotaki, 
1999).
Another important factor in the search for efficient ways of providing services that 
had been traditionally confined to the domain of the state, was the economic 
slowdown that was present in most of the developed countries for at least a 
decade. The use of market means to improve efficiency, responsiveness and the 
quality of services provided, but also to assert the users’ autonomy, was a part of 
a broader trend present in other spheres of social policy. This was especially 
evident in the UK and it led some of the researchers there to define it as the 
revolution in social policy (Bartlett et al, 1998).
2.2.2 Objectives o f the market-oriented reforms
The promotion of effective services of high, or at least acceptable, quality 
reflected in users’ satisfaction, produced and allocated in a more efficient 
manner, became a priority issue for policy-makers in the UK (by the end of the 
1980s) and in Sweden (at the beginning of the 1990s). They believed that the 
introduction of market elements into health care would enhance efficiency and 
would simultaneously tackle the main shortcomings of the former systems, such 
as rigidity, bureaucracy and unresponsiveness. Therefore, it was decided to 
introduce market forces in such a way as to achieve the complex task of 
stimulating organisational innovation within the publicly planned and financed
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health systems, without sacrificing overall cost control or equity of access (Ham, 
1997). The reasons why the reforms were introduced are outlined in Box 2.1.
Box 2.1 Rationale for the introduction of pro-market reforms in the UK and Sweden
In the United Kingdom
❖ Maximising efficiency of service delivery within given budgetary constraints
❖ Tackling the issue of low responsiveness to patients’ needs
❖ Stimulating patients’ and buyers’ choice
❖ Improving accountability 
In Sweden
❖ Introducing efficiency incentives while increasing productivity
❖ Answering the need for implementation of systematic cost containment 
mechanisms
❖ Responding to the demand for more personalised services
Source: Various (Ham, 1993, Le Grand, 1994; Saltman, 1990) compiled by the author
In the early 1990s, governments in both countries decided that these objectives 
were best served by the incorporation of market elements into the existing 
framework of public ownership and financing. In both cases, a transformation of 
integrated systems of budgetary control into pluralistic contractual arrangements, 
based on purchaser-provider exchange, was used as means to achieve it (Le 
Grand et al, 1993; Ham, 1997; Saltman and van Otter, 1992a).
The reliance on market features, manifested in the introduction of competitive 
incentives for stimulating micro-efficiency of production and freedom of choice in 
the allocation of resources, was determined by the policy-makers’ belief in their 
proven suitability and superiority to the structures that they replaced. The pre- 
reform organisation of these two health systems, involving a command-led, top- 
down systems of production and delivery of services owned by the central (UK) 
or regional government (Counties in Sweden), were regarded as ineffective, 
costly and inadequate (Enthoven, 1985; Anell, 1995).
The introduction of a competitive market ethos into health care delivery was 
expected to realize efficiency gains, improve choice and increase users’
37
satisfaction with health care delivery. The central government in the UK and the 
regional governments in Sweden would, nevertheless, still retain control over 
policy decision-making. It could be argued that this was an attempt to reconcile 
the traditional public health system goals, such as, for example, universality of 
access, with the potential virtues and gains that the market might deliver.
Over the same period, many countries have attempted different experiments in 
terms of separating purchasers and providers as a means of improving efficiency 
on their supply side, although, in some cases, competition was also used to 
create an alternative financing structures within a predominantly publicly funded 
system. This, for example, was the gist of the reforms introduced in New Zealand 
and of those that were planned in the Netherlands during the late 1980s and at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Many countries, however, including the two that are 
the principal source of concern in this study, decided to maintain a single source 
of finance and directed their efforts at influencing supply side mechanisms, by 
means of other sets of changes introduced simultaneously with market reforms.
One of the most important structural reorganizations in the UK were the 
strengthening of the managerial orientation of the NHS that preceded the internal 
market reforms, which were the first attempt to held the medical profession 
accountable for the decisions related to the utilisation of resources (Reiman,
1988). The other important change that followed the introduction of the 
purchaser-provider split in the UK were the definition of priorities in the form of 
public health targets through the document published by the government"Health 
of the Nation” (DoH, 1991b), and more closely related to the spirit of the reforms, 
the formulation of the entitlements of patients in "The Patient’s Charter" (DoH, 
1991a; DoH, 1995b).
In Sweden, the shifts that occurred simultaneously were quite significant and 
were tightly linked to the purchaser-provider split introduced into many counties 
including Stockholm. The pivotal change was the establishment of the care 
guarantee for four and half (only cataract surgery in ophthalmology) surgical 
specialties initially, which outlined an explicit time frame for provision of certain 
services. Another change that facilitated the shift of the so called “social patients”
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from the hospitals to nursing homes was the separation of financing between 
hospitals and the former, which was known as Adel reform. The set of reforms 
that were introduced in the UK and Sweden, alongside the market reforms, some 
of which could have had synergy effects on the health care reforms, are outlined 
in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5 Health reforms introduced in the UK and Sweden in the late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s
Sweden Main points of reforms United Kingdom Main points o f reforms
Adel Reform 
(1992)
Shift of responsibilities for financing and 
provision of social care from regions 
(county councils) to the municipalities
Griffith's reform 
(1983)
Introduction of the concept of professional 
management and financial accountability into 
the health service
Family doctor
reform
(1992)
Family doctors are qualified general 
practitioners who can be freely chosen 
by patients, with money following their 
choices regardless of the patients’ 
residence or catchment area
White Paper Working for 
Patients (1989) 
Implemented in 1991 
(Market reform)
Creation of two types of purchasers, HAs and 
GPFHs, who contract competing providers for 
services for their population Introduction of 
GP fund-holding scheme 
Freedom of choice to choose GP 
Hospitals become trusts
Minimum waiting
guarantee
(1992)
No patient has to wait for more than 
three months for the treatment (for five 
procedures initially then extended to all 
ranges of treatment)
White Paper Health of the 
Nation (1991)
Targets for national health policy and the 
time-frame for their achievement are set 
Consolidation and co-operation is proposed to 
achieve health policy goals
Changes in the
payment
methods
Performance-based payment using DRG 
instead of budgeting
Internal pricing instead of free use of 
prices
The Patient’s Charter 
(1991)
No waiting time longer than 18 months for 
elective procedures
No waiting time for the first specialist 
appointment beyond defined limits 
No waiting time at the outpatients’ clinics 
beyond 30 min.
Right to information and second opinion 
Setting out of the procedure for complaints
Purchaser 
provider split 
(1992)
(Market reform)
New forms of financing and organisation 
Purchasing committees formulate 
requirements for the service provided to 
their population and conclude contracts 
with the providers
Freedom of 
choice of 
provider (1992)
Choice of primary care providers and 
wide range of specialist services from 
public or private sector
Source: Various (DoH, 1989; 1991, 1995; Griffith, 1983; Berleen etal 1994; Hakansson etal; 1997; Hakansson, 1999) compiled by the author
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Despite the introduction of market reforms, however, in all cases, including the 
UK and Sweden, state regulation turned out to be more indispensable than ever 
(Gustafsson, 1995; Klein, 1995). On the one hand, it was necessary in order to 
maintain the systems’ compatibility with the overall strategic goals of public 
health policy. These could broadly be defined as securing a position in which 
consumption of health services is sustained at socially desirable levels, it is 
relatively equitably distributed, and the principle of allocative efficiency is 
maintained.
On the other hand, regulation acted as a safeguard, ensuring that the reforms 
complied with the overall framework of policies aiming at macro-economic 
stability. In short, its purpose was to correct for the “market failure” (McGuire et 
al, 1987) which can occur when public goods are attempted to be freely traded, 
just as, conversely, the introduction of market-oriented reforms into publicly 
operated welfare systems was to correct for government failure, resulting from its 
position as a monopolistic provider (Le Grand, 1995; Snower, 1993).
Arguably, the policy choices incorporated in the health care reforms in the UK 
and Sweden also reflected wider trends, such as economic retrenchment and 
decreased confidence concerning the effectiveness of central planning, although 
modified and shaped by the political traditions of each country (Garpenby, 1992; 
Anell, 1995, Ham et al 1994). Therefore, the attempt at introducing planned or 
managed markets into health care took the form of internal or quasi-markets in 
Britain (Le Grand et al, 1993; Le Grand et al, 1994) while the public competition 
model was followed in Sweden (Saltman and van Otter, 1992a; Saltman and van 
Otter, 1992b). This was an example of how global trends were mediated by the 
national state policies or in another words how the macro-effects of changes 
beyond the control of a single country were modified by the middle level 
transformations such as national policy making according to Mohan (Mohan,
1996).
According to Saltman and van Otter, the internal market constitutes an example 
of a regulated market where competition takes place between agents in an 
internal environment that is publicly operated, regulated and monitored by central
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government. Public competition model on the other hand, is an example of a 
planned market where external agents compete with each other and regulation is 
at the responsibility of publicly elected boards operating on the local level 
(Saltman and van Otter, 1992b).
2.2.3 Content of the reforms
On the organisational level, the reforms resulted in a split between the roles of 
providers of secondary care (hospitals and health centres) and those of 
purchasers (County Councils in Sweden, and District Health Authorities and the 
fund-holding General Practitioners in the UK). Large provider units were given 
the option of changing their status from government-administered organisations 
to self-managed competitive entities and renaming themselves as trusts (the UK) 
or, occasionally, limited companies (Sweden).
Primary care doctors were also given opportunities to participate in the 
restructuring of the system. Thus, in the UK, general practices which fulfilled 
certain criteria (appropriate size of the patients' list and adequate premises) 
became holders and managers of the budget designated for their patients, on 
behalf of whom they would purchase elective care and by whom they could be 
freely chosen (Glennerster et al, 1994a). Those who enrolled in this scheme 
were given explicit incentives (the freedom and the means to purchase elective 
care for their patients, together with the possibility of reinvesting any surplus of 
their budget within the practice) to provide the best quality of care for their 
patients within their own practice capacities, and also to choose for them the best 
deals from competing secondary care providers (see Box 2.2).
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Box 2.2 Key features of the reforms in the UK -  the internal market model
1. Separating of the functions of  the providers of services:
• Hospitals
• and primary care doctors 
from buyers:
• The District Health Authorities, which allocated money both to primary care 
doctors and to hospitals
• and primary care doctors, acting as budget-holders, buying elective services 
from hospitals on behalf o f their patients(up to a given amount). The surplus could 
be retained and reinvested freely for patients care.
2. Introduction of competition among providers:
• Hospitals (self-managed trusts) have to win contracts from the District Health 
Authorities and primary care doctors act as budget-holders
• Primary care doctors have to attract patients
3. Freedom of choice for buyers but also for patients - “the money follows the 
patient”_______  __________________
Sources: various (Le Grand, 1994; Glennerster et al, 1994a; DoH, 1989a) compiled by 
the author
In Sweden, whilst fund-holding experiments were implemented to a very limited 
degree, the free choice of a family doctor constituted a welcome novelty 
(Saltman, 1990; Rhenberg, 1997). The free choice of provider was to be applied 
to all levels of care in Sweden (see Box 2.3), but only at the primary care level in 
the UK, where maintaining the already efficient and well-established gate- 
keeping role performed by General Practitioners was seen as a priority 
(Glennerster et al, 1994a; Glennerster et al, 1994b).
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Box 2.3 Key features of the reforms in Sweden - the public competition model
1. Different forms of purchaser-provider split take place in half of the 26 Counties 
(regions)
2. Competition between providers (which may or may not be self-managed) in 
public care delivery and, occasionally in the private system, is encouraged
3. County Councils monitor the delivery o f "care agreements" with providers 
within set DRG prices and quality specifications
4. Change of control system over providers: global budgets replaced by 
prospective payments to stimulate productivity
5. In many regions, a scheme of the freely chosen family doctor is established, 
one of whose main duties is to refer patients to hospitals
Sources: various (Saltman and Van Otter, 1992a; Berleen et al, 1994) compiled by the 
author
These models were first proposed by Enthoven for the UK, and were 
subsequently modified and then adopted under the NHS and Community Care 
Act of 1990 (Enthoven, 1985). The experiments with market elements introduced 
in Sweden drew, to various degrees, on the theory of public competition as well 
as on Enthoven’s model of the "mixed" or "managed market".
In both countries, an internationally influenced and politically informed design 
process was attempted, on the macro- and the micro-scale, only in the UK this 
was tried on a national level, while in Sweden it was left to the discretion of the 
regions. In the latter case, initially only the counties of Dalarna and Stockholm 
responded, but gradually different forms of the purchaser-provider split were 
introduced by many other County Councils.
This was first done at the system level, where selected market-type incentives 
aimed at improving the performance of the system were introduced within the 
framework of public accountability (Saltman and Van Otter, 1992a). 
Simultaneous changes on the institutional level were centred on devising an 
organisational scheme through which the "planned market" would come to life. In 
Stockholm, this involved a separation of purchasers and providers whose 
exchange was based on contracts, which was quite incomplete and illusory,
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however, as the latter were in most if not all the cases owned by the former. The 
whole system operated under the aegis of a powerful HSN (Central Political 
Body), which had vast responsibilities and extensive powers (see Fig. 2.2).
Figure 2.2 The structure of the Stockholm Model
HSN Central 
Political 
Board
Care ContractsDistricts of 
Medical Services 
(County Councils)
Hospitals
Population Contracts Production Plans
Co-operation
Agreements
Primary Care 
Geriatrics
Specialist
Clinics
Source: Jonsson, R. (1994) Stockholm County Council
The role of the HSN was to set the rules, which involved needs assessment of 
the hospitals’ network and/or personnel, and licensing, including medical 
accreditation. The former function was shared with a professional body (The 
National Board for Health and Welfare). The HSN also assessed the financial 
viability of the firms that intended to operate in the market. It was involved in the 
“products’ definition” and in setting prices using the DRG system, which also 
meant negotiations with providers and the setting of budgetary ceilings. It 
allocated resources to the purchasers on the basis of an index that was 
calculated using size, age, sex and socio-economic status indicators. At the 
same time, the HSN was responsible for issuing planning and strategic 
directives, in accordance with the defined priorities.
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Despite their limitations, the promise of these changes in both countries was 
considerable. Health planners at the District Health Authorities and County 
Councils could, for the first time, focus exclusively on identifying and meeting the 
needs of their populations and on using their purchasing power to shape the 
provision of services accordingly. For Health Authorities to fulfill their new role in 
an adequate manner, they had to become involved in activities such as 
appraising service options, specifying a chosen pattern of service provision, 
placing contracts and monitoring the provision of contracted services. Most 
importantly, they would eventually have to assess the impact of health service 
activities on the health status of their populations.
Patients were to be given support to act as informed consumers and to choose 
providers, which through their exposure to competition, were, in turn, given 
incentives to provide higher quality services and responsive care. Thus, in 
Sweden, they were, for the first time, to act as informed customers/users, with 
money following their choices (Anell, 1995; Rhenberg, 1997). In the UK, this role 
was assigned either to the Health Authorities or to the primary care providers 
known as GP fund-holders, who were regarded as the patients’ closest and best 
informed representatives (Glennerster et al, 1994a; Glennerster et al, 1994b; 
Ham, 1997).
The implementation of the set of market-orientated reforms in the British NHS is 
seen as the first successful attempt at shifting power away from the doctors, the 
most powerful group of health professionals, into the hands of the purchasers 
(Klein, 1995). As the freedom of decision-making of the latter was, in turn, 
significantly curtailed, and as they are largely subordinate to the NHS 
Management Executive and the Department of Health, this, in the UK’s case, 
meant a transfer of power to central government. What happened in Sweden, 
though, was quite different, because decentralised decision-making at the county 
councils’ level would not allow for even limited centralisation. Yet the set of 
market-oriented reforms introduced at the beginning of 1990s, according to some 
authors, constituted the first attempt of national health policy formulation 
(Garpenby, 1992).
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2 .3 . Conclusions
The UK and Sweden, two countries with integrated systems of financing and 
provision of health care and conspicuous examples of reliance on planned 
budgeting, have, for similar reasons, embarked on the course of market-oriented 
reforms. These were to stimulate competition at the supply level and to enhance 
productivity (in Sweden) and efficiency (in the UK), while improving some 
aspects of the quality of care and enhancing responsiveness to users’ needs and 
wants (in both countries).
The analysis presented in this chapter has demonstrated that two countries 
sharing important similarities in their structure, philosophy and values pertaining 
to their health systems, while yet retaining distinct characteristics of their own, 
opted for a set of comparable tools for achieving goals that were not dissimilar. It 
was also argued that the outcomes in each case are likely to reflect the also the 
differences in policy-making and political culture, in addition to the universality 
and generic attributes that are often associated with market instruments. This 
outline has also provided the background information for positioning the purpose 
and scope of this evaluation.
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CHAPTER 3 
INDICATORS OF THE MARKET’S IMPACT AND 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR USE
As was argued in previous chapters, the market-oriented reforms in Sweden and 
the UK were aimed at achieving a wider choice for patients in service delivery, an 
increased level of responsiveness to their needs and greater efficiency often 
expressed as better value for money. In this chapter, the meaning of each of 
these objectives is explained with the focus placed on separating out the political 
overtones and translating the objectives into workable research definitions. In 
addition, to the purported objectives declared by the reformers, it was decided 
that other parameters needed to be included such as the impact of the reforms 
on information and quality of health care delivery so as to delineate fully the 
consequences of the reforms. The comprehensive set of indicators used for 
measuring the reform’s impact, using a tracer-condition service, is presented in 
Table 1 of the Appendix I.
In the first part of this chapter, the essential preconditions for the market to 
operate are briefly outlined. This is followed by a presentation of the selected 
indicators, which sets out the background and justifies their use for the purpose 
of measuring the market’s impact.
3.1 The pre-requisites of markets in health care
This part examines the theoretical preconditions that must exist in the market 
environment to enable it to work effectively. In both the UK and Sweden, reforms 
introduced planned markets in an attempt to combine the best elements of two 
worlds: efficiency and equity. These planned markets are positioned in the mid­
point of the continuum, which ranges from pure, neo-classical, private markets 
for health care to the models in which health care provision is part of the planned 
economy. However, the pre-requisites that are analysed below are essential for 
either pure or quasi markets if they are to deliver efficient results within given 
quality specifications.
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The first essential condition deals with competition. This must exist on both the 
demand and supply sides and it is usually secured by a sufficient number of 
providers and purchasers. However, economies of scale favour comparatively 
large units of providers and purchasers at the expense of the number of players. 
That this is a problem in the case of health care is supported by evidence from 
the literature, at least for the American market where the large HMO-type 
providers operate (Propper, 1992). The trend for health authorities and hospitals 
to merge has already been seen in both the UK and Sweden, with consequent 
problems in establishing mutually beneficial arrangements often at the expense 
of quality and the price of services provided to the user.
Second, if competition is to be promoted, free entry and exit from the market or at 
least the possibility of participating without the high costs that restrict entry, must 
realistically exist. This means that markets must be contestable and must 
stimulate efficient behaviour by at least posing the threat of competition (Le 
Grand and Bartlett, Chapter Two, 1993; Roberts, 1989; Roberts, 1993). The 
evidence drawn from examining providers’ behaviour in the USA has shown that 
new players are prevented from entry to the market by the existing providers, 
who are in a privileged position and therefore capture a bigger share of the 
market (Propper, 1992).
The reasons for this barrier to entry are again related to the size of the incumbent 
providers and the high capital costs that are required during the initial stages of 
investment. In this way, an environment for monopoly/oligopoly conditions on the 
providers’ side is created, which, when coupled with monopsony/oligopsony on 
the purchaser’s side, can lead to bilateral arrangements at the expense of 
efficiency and quality (Propper, 1992; Roberts, 1989). In the case of geographic 
isolation quality can also be affected by the natural monopoly phenomenon - 
always a plausible possibility in health care provision.
Third, for a competitive market in health care, one of the most crucial factors is 
an improvement in the supply of information about the cost and outcomes of 
services; information that must be accessible to all the parties involved: users, 
purchasers and decision makers. However, securing a free flow of information is
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not an easily attainable goal in health service provision (indeed, if it can be 
attained at all). This is due to the peculiarities of health care as a commodity and 
to the asymmetry of information between purchaser and provider, which operates 
to the disadvantage of the former (Evans, 1974).
Fourth, transactions costs have to be low. This may conflict with the investment 
for attaining better information as well as for monitoring the quality of service. As 
predicted by Le Grand and Bartlett, General Practitioners will usually have lower 
ex-post and higher ex-ante costs, which are the expenditure incurred before and 
after the transaction respectively. In contrast, the ratio of the ex-ante to ex-post 
costs for collective purchasers is most likely be the reverse of the former (Le 
Grand and Bartlett, Chapter Two, 1993). There are also problems related to the 
increased costs that are, at least initially, required for the implementation of the 
reforms, as has been the case for the British NHS during its continuous reform 
process. In addition, constant increases in the cost of operating the system can 
be expected, because of the contracting and commissioning procedures, which 
by their nature are not cheap (Hutton, 1993).
Fifth, in any market self-interest is one of the motivating forces. Given the 
peculiarities of health care as a commodity, the impact of imperfect information 
and the ill established criteria for quality control pose the risk that the whole 
system might be permeated by crude self-interest. While the relevant agents 
must be motivated to respond to market incentives, this motivation may cause 
problems if other conditions for a successful market are not fulfilled (Roberts, 
1993). For instance, where there is poor information, unscrupulous providers 
may engage in opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975). This could then not 
only lead to greater and unintended inequalities, but also to social inefficiency 
which would be the precise opposite of the goals originally intended by the 
reformers.
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3.2 The indicators selected and justification for their use
This section outlines the framework for an analysis of the concepts of choice, 
information, quality, responsiveness, equity and efficiency, in order to validate 
their use for tracing the changes resulting from market-oriented reforms. It also 
provides a detailed discussion of how different aspects of each of these 
indicators were adopted and used for measurement of the market’s impact.
3.2.1 Choice -  concept and framework
The importance of choice based on appropriate information, the underlying 
precondition for effective choice, as a feature of health systems, derives from two 
sources. It has its origins in the application of the industrial model of Total Quality 
Management to health services (Berwick, 1992) and also has its roots in the 
consumers’ movement (Winkler, 1987). It is usually presented in the context of 
market liberalism and is thus associated with the political and economic mode of 
thought known as neo-classical libertarianism.
The introduction of market features into the wider public sector (Glennerster et al, 
1995; Le Grand et al, 1993) and, in this case, into the health care service of the 
UK and Sweden, was also viewed by many (Garpenby, 1992; Gustafsson, 1995; 
Ovretveit, 1994a) as the result of a resurgence of conservative ideology. The 
prominent features of this philosophy, such as property rights, individual freedom 
and personal responsibility (manifested in a strong reliance on the private 
provision of services, competition and freedom of choice as opposed to 
collectivist values such as equity and the supremacy of community-defined 
needs) were rediscovered and relied upon as a broad policy framework.
This return to conservative ideology may well prove the case when the origin of 
the implementation of the quasi-markets is traced since it reflects the decisions of 
the respective liberal-minded governments of the day. Nonetheless, the notion of 
users’ autonomy, which underpins the market philosophy, also derives from the 
theory of the social rights of citizenship (Marshall, 1950; Alinsky, 1960).
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According to this theory, policy imperatives aimed at the promotion of the 
concept of the well informed patient, who is able to choose from a range of 
available alternatives, are not necessarily bound to serve the individualistic 
attributes of an increasingly business minded society (Gustafsson, 1995; 
Ovretveit, 1994a).
In this context, the expansion of patients’ rights in choosing the providers of 
services could also be used to reinforce the true empowerment of citizens, if 
properly linked to their direct participation in the decision-making processes 
(Saltman, 1994a; Winkler, 1987). As elaborated by Saltman, this extension of 
choice may involve influence over modalities of treatment and higher 
accountability by providers and by those acting on the patients’ behalf for 
budgetary allocation; it may also extend to their participation in election of health- 
related politicians (Saltman, 1994a).
There is also another conceptual problem often manifested as an artificial 
dichotomy of two, mutually exclusive concepts: those of choice and citizen 
participation. In libertarian philosophy, the ultimate consequence of choice is 
manifested by ‘exit’ from the system, while citizen participation is an expression 
of ‘voice’ and implies some acceptance of the rules of the system with an attempt 
geared towards changing them from within. This derives from Hirschman’s 
conceptual analysis, which considered exit and voice as antithesis of each other. 
He argued that choice (exit within the publicly financed and provided services) 
was possible only at the margins of the system (for those who could pay and 
usually also the articulate ones). If fully exercised it could lead to diminishing the 
elements of voice in the system (Hirschman, 1970).
However, this analysis is valid only in a collectivist mindset as Skidelsky correctly 
remarked. He pointed out that the articulate users have not only the ability to 
exercise their power by means of exit but tend even more often to capture a 
public monopoly for their own needs (Skidelsky, 1995). The latter is supported by 
empirical evidence that Goodin and Le Grand have presented in his early work 
by demonstrating the middle classes’ aptitude and ability in obtaining more 
benefits from the NHS (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987) which was even more
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visible when contrasted with the prevalent inequalities for those who might have 
higher needs (The Black Report, 1982).
Thus the division between citizens’ participation as a means of democratising a 
system regarded as a public utility that is driven by users’ needs and choice 
being a manifestation of the consumers’ sovereignty relegated to the sphere of 
wants appears to be a relatively linear construct (Calnan et al, 1998). This is 
because it reflects only the traditional political concepts that used to underpin the 
philosophies of the health care systems and fails to capture the complexities 
involved in the concept of choice and its specific dynamics within the health care 
context. Arguably it also fails to take into account the expectations of users that 
might have occurred in recent years.
The view argued here lends support to the proposition put forward by Saltman 
who regarded choice not as a necessary expression of consumerism but as a 
means for increasing the democratic participation by the users (Saltman, 1992). 
It is suggested here, that examples from different health care systems imply that 
citizen participation (voice) and individual choice (exit) are complementary, rather 
than alternative, modes of ensuring citizens’ influence over health services.
When analysing the content of some of the typologies suggested by researchers 
who have attempted to categorise the degree of empowerment given to users in 
different systems, one is confronted by overlaps between the concepts of choice 
and participation. According to these typologies, the means of empowerment 
range from mild to strong measures. These measures involve moral persuasion 
expressed in complaint procedures and appeals; gradually increase to freedom 
of choice of the physician and the insurer as well as the modalities of treatment 
given to users. They are at their strongest when users have control, either 
delegated or direct, over the resources spent on health (Amstein, 1966; Saltman, 
1994a).
If the British and Swedish pre-reform systems are positioned within this typology, 
only the weakest elements in the form of moral persuasion can be found in the 
former, while the Swedish system seems to empower citizens significantly by
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enabling them to elect local politicians responsible for the health decisions. 
However, doubts have been expressed as to how far decentralized decision­
making promoted direct participation in reality. The evidence suggests that when 
this happened at regional (Sweden) or even at municipal level (Finland) power 
was still retained in the hands of the administrators (Vienonen, 1994).
On the other hand, the example of granting citizens free choice between 
competing sickness funds in health insurance systems (Israel, Germany) has 
spawned new legal, institutional and political frameworks, as well as significant 
interest group activity, all aimed at increasing public input into the processes of 
health policy-making and implementation (Chinitz, 1995). The question put 
forward by Chinitz when analysing these developments, is whether the 
development of multiple avenues for citizen involvement represents disarray or a 
healthy social learning process regarding the running of the health system. The 
conclusion expressed is a cautious optimism that the latter is the case and 
suggests directions for public policy in order to encourage this outcome (Chinitz, 
1995).
Therefore, the freedom of choice of provider (with all its consequences for 
resource allocation) that was introduced into integrated, publicly funded systems 
and initiated by market oriented reforms, seems to constitute an attempt to 
combine the best of the two approaches in practice. In other words, market 
elements can be used to strengthen the voice element in the system and, 
through enhancing direct participation in decision-making at an individual level, to 
increase the accountability of elected politicians and, ultimately, to provide more 
democratic legitimacy to the governance processes in health care systems.
However, later on some of the defendants of choice in health care have argued 
that individual choice is not an adequate policy objective as it could prove to be 
highly destructive if taken away from the broader context of the institutional 
guidance and regulatory framework and have disastrous effect on growth of 
health care costs (Saltman, 1999).
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Choice as an indicator of the impact of the reforms
Choice is the ultimate objective in the set of reforms promoted by libertarians 
whose theories profoundly influenced the policies adopted by the conservative 
governments of both countries. According to these beliefs, choice is best served 
through the development of the concept of the consumer. As with the other 
concepts, the notion of the consumer/user exercising choice is differently 
translated according to the reality and tradition of each respective health care 
system.
In the UK, the collective approach, which is traditionally associated with the NHS, 
has arguably continued unchanged despite the market rhetoric and the adoption 
of the concept of consumerism. It appears as if the policy makers were hesitant 
about using market means to further their aims in full and, as a consequence, 
have conveyed the message of a half-hearted belief in the market’s effectiveness 
as the sole means of achieving those aims.
In addition, the values that underpin solidarity are at odds with self-interest and 
the individualistic mentality that the proponents of the reforms seemed to be 
advocating as a means for increasing the operational effectiveness of the system 
and the result is an attempt to reconcile two mutually exclusive sets of values. 
The tension created is clearly reflected, for example, in the way in which a 
measure of “democratisation” aimed at users was introduced into the system, 
with health professionals and managers being urged, by means of administrative 
measures, to take users’ views into account (Joule, 1993).
Another example of diluting the principle of consumers’ sovereignty is the issue 
of patient choice, which is seen as being best promoted by intermediaries such 
as the General Practitioner fund-holders or the managers of the reformed District 
Health Authorities. As a result, there is little or no space for individual decisions 
to be left to the patients. In addition, for the UK patients the place of residence 
seems in most cases to determine who will represent them in these decisions 
hardly linking up with the concept of patient choice. It is also accepted that no 
health care reforms addressed the issue of patients’ choice of different forms of
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treatment although this can be very important for some patients (Ovretveit, 
1994a).
In Sweden, the majority of the models of public competition that were discussed 
prior to the introduction of the reforms advocated the direct involvement of users 
in exercising choice. This is in stark opposition to the delegation of decision 
making to agents, which has always been used in the UK and continues to be the 
case in the reformed NHS (Saltman and Van Otter, 1992b; Saltman, 1990). Even 
in Sweden, though, proposals have been voiced for replacing patients’ direct 
control, a relatively well-entrenched feature of the Swedish health care system, 
by emulating the British example of General Practitioner fund-holders acting as 
informed intermediaries on patients’ behalf.
The different aspects of choice for the selected service can be regarded as an 
important indicator of the market’s effectiveness and, for this reason; the study 
adopted a two-pronged approach. First, it was aimed at eliciting patients’ points 
of view, reflecting their needs and preferences, which might be different from 
those of other actors, thereby providing a more thorough insight into the concept 
of choice. Second, in the UK in particular the extent of choice that is given to 
patients by their closest intermediaries, the General Practitioner fund-holders, 
who were regarded as the most flexible decision-makers able to promote the 
choices of their patients, was also measured in order to assess how far this was 
happening in reality. The latter was attempted through an examination of the 
changes in the degree of choice available to patients in the pre and post-reform 
periods in such aspects of care as the choice of primary care provider and the 
choice of the hospital site to which they were referred for surgery.
3.2.2 Information -  concept and framework
The role that information plays in health care services provision is multifold. First, 
if health care is assumed to possess some characteristics of a commodity that 
can be exchanged in a regulated market environment, information about the 
service’s specifications is essential. For users and/or buyers to exercise effective 
choice, the provision of sufficient and good quality information is a precondition
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that must be fulfilled. Informed choice is one of the market mechanisms that 
secures technical and allocative efficiency and brings about utility gains to users.
Second, despite the multitude of models of gaining information, which may or 
may not be based on the previous experience of service, the key aspect is how 
to protect consumers from providers’ opportunistic behaviour. In order to secure 
provision of reliable information, means for documentation and reporting back on 
the quality of services offered are required. This, on the one hand entails that 
patients must be guaranteed the right of access to information about the quality 
of the service and, on the other hand, that the service providers are obliged to 
document and publish relevant information. Third, the ultimate and arguably the 
most worthwhile purpose, that provision of appropriate information could and 
should serve, is the empowerment of users through enabling them to make an 
intelligent use of health care systems.
The last conviction rests on the belief that users are also important co-producers 
of care. As long as the quality of the ever-growing number of health services is 
not adequately documented and the results are not made available in plain and 
comprehensible language to citizens, consumers can hardly be expected to 
make more meaningful and effective use of what is offered to them. One such 
example is the poor quality of hospitals and of doctors in private practice, which 
is one of the best-kept secrets in many countries where it exists alongside the 
usually predominant, publicly owned system (Badura, 1999).
Yet the question of greatest concern to patients who decide to seek care outside 
the public health system is where to find appropriate high quality services. They 
and their families can rely on little support in their attempts to find answers from 
within the health system. For this to be achieved, changes in communication 
techniques between users and professionals and the health care system in its 
entirety are not sufficient, as there is a need for more structural change to effect 
fundamental shift in power to the user (Ovretveit, 1994b; Silverman, 1987).
Most recently, there seems to be unanimous agreement in most industrialised 
countries on the need to shift the relationship to one of partnership instead of the
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paternalism that pertained to most aspects of health care provision so far. The 
impetus for change has been motivated by several considerations: clinical, 
financial and political.
First, it has increasingly been recognised that if the core therapeutic processes 
are to be successful, patients’ active participation is needed in addition to 
evidence-based procedures and highly qualified professionals with adequate 
experience. It has been proven that, not only does the involvement of users’ in 
their course of treatment have a positive effects on its outcomes, the mere 
possession of information about it does as well: it increases compliance but also 
speeds up recovery (Stewart, 1995; Balas et al, 1996).
Second, when patients are fully informed about the risks involved in procedures 
and their preferences are taken into account, the number of procedures, 
especially interventions, is lower; so are the costs involved, both in terms of 
direct expense and in terms of those resulting from litigation (Richards, 1998). 
Finally, patients are increasingly less prepared to tolerate provision of information 
that is “excessive, clumsy and bent” as noted in one of the BMJ’s editorials (BMJ,
1997). They are becoming more and more interested in different forms of 
participation in their treatment, which they see as a means of asserting their 
autonomy.
For many years, both the politicians involved and the third-party payers have 
failed to take any serious interest in this matter even though the problem of 
asymmetry of information between the providers, purchasers and/or users has 
been a well known phenomenon from the 1970s (Evans, 1974). This has been 
the case despite the fact that differences in the perceptions and perspectives of 
users and professionals, and difficulties in communication arising from these, are 
well documented (Luker et al, 1995; Luker et al, 1996).
There have also been numerous views expressed as to the role of health 
professionals (mainly doctors) in cultivating and fostering this phenomenon, 
which eventually became accepted as an inherent attribute of health service 
provision. In addition, the imbalance of power between the profession, on the one
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side, and the users and payers on the other, was the very factor that constrained 
the possibility of change, because it served the interests of the profession. Some 
authors thought that this, together with the assumption that medical ethics were 
the best device for safeguarding quality, of care might also be a manifestation of 
protectionism by the profession because of their unprecedented ability to erect 
powerful barriers that restricted entry into the market. This was precisely the 
thesis that was first argued in a seminal paper by Arrow (Arrow, 1963).
It was this unchecked power and the lack of accountability of the profession for 
the rapidly growing share of public resources devoted to health on the one hand, 
and the tremendous variation in practice and outcomes of care on the other, 
which led to the questioning of the supremacy of professional authority. The 
growing scepticism started from the areas traditionally considered as more 
peripheral such as health care management and the efficiency of health service 
provision, but gradually came to involve all matters of health, including the most 
sacred taboos of clinical practice (Reiman, 1988, Klein, 1995).
Information as an indicator o f the impact o f reforms
The market place requires good and usable information for the consumer/user if 
it is to work properly. Thus, processes for attaining better information were 
promoted through various initiatives, with service providers being made 
responsible for correcting the asymmetry of information between the patient and 
the professional (McNicol, 1992). One of the measures aimed at its achievement 
was the delegation of the role of purchasers to suitable agents or intermediaries, 
such as, for example the GP fund-holders in the UK.
The reforms also highlighted the need for improved information on costs and 
outcomes and mechanisms were put in place accordingly. One such measure 
was the attempt by the NHS to produce information on costs by speciality 
from1988. Since the introduction of the internal market, all clinical work at 
hospitals, and all clinical work by GP fund-holders and all extra contractual 
referrals have also been priced on the basis of the episode of care. In Sweden, a
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system of costing services using the modified Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) 
was devised, known in Sweden as the KOKS system.
As a result of the reforms, the collective type of purchasers in the UK and 
Sweden were to be, respectively, the District Health Authorities and county 
councillors. Individual purchasers in the form of GP fund-holders were introduced 
only in the UK. Primary care providers in Sweden would have played the same 
role as the fund-holding General Practitioners in the UK had a similar model been 
adopted (Glennerster et al, 1994a; Glennerster et al, 1994b). The determining 
factor in deciding on their suitability, especially in the case of Sweden, was the 
possession of appropriate information about patients’ needs and the capability of 
assessing the outcome of treatment and care procedures.
The newly created purchasers’ schemes in both countries (fund-holders in the 
UK and house or family doctors in Sweden) were expected to correct the existing 
imperfections of information supply. The assumptions on which these 
expectations rested were two-fold: first, that if purchasers were given financial 
incentives to attract patients, their number would be sufficient to make 
competition work. Second, because General Practitioners were the best-informed 
representatives of the patients, they would be automatically predisposed to act 
not only as judges, but also as promoters, of the quality of care received by their 
patients.
As a consequence, General Practitioners in the UK, and less so the primary 
providers in Sweden were to be responsible, at least in theory, for diminishing the 
imperfection of information supply. The collective purchasing agents were not to 
be excluded from this process either. The new role of the reformed Health 
Authorities was to assess the health needs of their populations, for which 
relevant information would also be required.
Traditionally, health professionals have acted as agents for the patients. This 
element seems to be heavily retained in health systems, underpinned by 
collectivist values in welfare provision, such as, for example, the NHS in the UK. 
On the contrary, in countries with a health insurance system, patients are
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formally treated like autonomous market partners. Traditionally, patients have the 
right to choose their physician as long as the physician has a contract with the 
social health insurance system. In addition, patients have the right to full 
information from their physician and also have the right of access to their own 
medical history. However, in reality even in these systems patients are not better 
informed than those in other health systems, nor are they independent partners 
in the system; they seem to need agents who can decide and act in their interest.
In spite or maybe because of this, this principal agent relation is heavily 
questioned in the current debates within the insurance-based systems. For 
example, in Germany the sickness funds increasingly act as purchasers of 
services and by doing so are trying to take on the role of the patient's agent. In 
the German hospital system, the federal states ("Bundeslander") also act as 
agents.
Some believe that patients' interests are probably best served by independent 
patients' organisations. Community Health Councils in the UK are a diluted 
version of these organisations and were set up to deal with the democratic deficit 
in the British health care system. The most prominent example of this trend is the 
case of the Netherlands where the patients’ organizations play a strong role and 
are equal partners enjoying support from the government.
In other European Union countries the representatives of self-help groups, 
independent consumer societies and independent counseling centres are seen to 
be capable of offering assistance and form the nucleus of patients’ organizations. 
However, it is not fully clear how the observed tendency of shifting the vote from 
health professionals towards health insurance or less often to the patients’ 
organisations will develop which might be one of the causes of tension in the 
system (Badura, 1999).
This research examines the effectiveness of incentives introduced into the 
system by a means of reforms stimulating the activity on the side of the patients’ 
agents (mainly GPs in the UK) to obtain and use information for the benefit of 
their patients. Information provided to patients about procedures or the options
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concerning their treatment (given to them by providers such as primary care 
doctors and hospital units) were examined. The information was tested against 
the views of other participants in the system, especially, the providers, and their 
perception of the type and quality of information was compared with that of the 
users. Finally, conclusions were drawn about the changes that could be 
attributable to the reforms in the context of the perspectives of the different 
actors.
3.2.3 Quality of care -  concept and framework
Quality is a multi-dimensional concept with a number of meanings that may be 
differently highlighted according to the purpose of its use (Ovretveit, 1992; SPRI's 
Report, 1990). It is, therefore, important to define clearly the perspectives 
adopted. The essential precondition, before assessing the quality of health care, 
is to define the meaning of the term “quality” itself, as has been repeatedly 
stressed by Donabedian (Donabedian, 1966; Donabedian, 1980).
As often happens in practice, concepts that are underpinned by value-laden 
judgements become muddled with generalities, making the task of handling them 
for any concrete, evaluative purpose unmanageable. At first, the concept of 
quality in terms of care seemed to be quite similarly treated by health care 
practitioners and academics alike (Brook, 1973). The recognition that it was 
difficult to define quality in terms of a single attribute, or even as a catalogue of 
functionally related attributes, led to the establishment of a comprehensive 
platform for assessment.
Different views were put forward as to what dimensions and perspectives might 
be regarded as inherent parts of a broader concept of quality of care, some of 
them extending to all-encompassing notions and some referring to elusive 
concepts of need, equity and accessibility (Maxwell, 1992), According to others, 
efficiency defined as "fully meeting requirements at the lowest cost" should 
constitute the foundation of a comprehensive quality model (Overtveit, 1992). 
Quality is defined by International Standard Organisation norms as "the degree to 
which all characteristics of a product, process or service meet the requirements 
that originate from the goal of use" (ISO, 1991).
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Many concepts of quality are concerned with efficacy, effectiveness and 
appropriateness. The first is viewed as the ability of a health care service to 
produce the desired outcome in a defined population under ideal conditions, and 
the second as the extent to which the same outcome can be achieved under 
usual conditions where skills and resources are different from the experimental 
ones. These two dimensions form the foundation on which quality standards are 
established and correspond with the technical or operational notion of quality.
The third is appropriateness, which basically equals health gain, where the 
expected health benefits exceed the expected negative consequences by a 
sufficiently wide margin to make the procedure worthwhile (Buchan, 1993; Butler, 
1994). This aspect of quality is still treated more as a research question and not 
used as a policy making instrument in health care services in Europe, possibly 
with the exception of the Netherlands, where it is implemented to some extent 
(Buchan, 1992). Coulter et al argued that the lack of scientific evidence on which 
to base the decisions about the appropriateness of treatments is one of the main 
factors responsible for this situation (Coulter et al, 1995).
It is accepted that there are several definitions of quality, or several variants of 
the single definition, and each of them is legitimate and valid in its appropriate 
context. One of the fundamental, and most widely accepted, definitions and 
systems for assessing quality of care is that provided by Donabedian 
(Donabedian, 1966; Donabedian 1980). It is based on the measurement of 
structure (defined as broad mix of inputs), process (the way the activity is carried 
out) and outcome of care (the results of the former two) using as an example the 
initial condition of service (see Fig 3.1).
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STRUCTURE PROCESS OUTCOME
IN IT IA L  CONDITION
Figure 3.1 Quality stages according to Donabedian (Donabedian, 1966)
However, the classic production model where this concept originated has only a 
limited application for health care provision. This is mainly due to the difficulties 
encountered when establishing a relationship between the structural mix of 
inputs and the outcomes that result from carrying out a health care related 
activity; the difficulties arise because of the number of influences related to the 
processes of care (Donabedian, 1966; Ovretveit, 1992).
Quality is not necessarily an analysis of activity but a comparison with something 
else, which could be another similar activity or an identical one; it is a multi­
dimensional issue (Caiman, 1992; Donabedian, 1980). Even in the early 
analytical studies in the quality literature, the views of practitioners, consumers, 
administrators and policy-makers were given equal attention (Donabedian, 
1966). This useful division (including the points of view of all parties involved in 
defining quality) was also adopted for the evaluation purposes of this study (Fig. 
3.2).
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Figure 3.2 Different perspectives when service outcom es are evaluated
Quality as regarded by patients
Acceptability of the service, expressed in technical, social and cultural terms is 
probably the first consideration for patients and also for staff Relevance or 
responsiveness understood as catering primarily for the needs of the patient and 
not of health professionals, is probably the patients’ second consideration. 
Information about the components of treatment, likely outcomes and the form in 
which the patient can use it, is another area for consideration, as is respect for 
patients choice, based on adequate information for enabling them to make 
decisions about treatments.
Technical competence or the quality of the process itself and the improvement of 
the methods of measurement, ensuring confidence about the outcome, is equally 
important. Cost-effectiveness, seen from the social viewpoint and regarded, as 
the involvement of the wider public in choices about the type and level of 
provision of health services could also be an issue of interest to patients. Users 
of services, apart from being patients, are at in the same time taxpayers and 
indirect contributors to the funding of health care.
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Quality as regarded by health professionals
Health care professionals are traditionally taught an individualistic logic, which 
has its historical roots in the doctrine of empiricism on which scientific inquiry is 
based (Russell et al, 1992). This individualistic logic is, moreover, buttressed by 
the notion of absolute clinical freedom traditionally entrusted to doctors who then 
use medical ethics to safeguard the quality of care. It is argued that the former 
might have been invented not only to counteract the inherent market failure that 
occurs when health care is traded as a commodity but also as a barrier to limit 
entry into the market (Arrow, 1963).
For these and other reasons doctors and other health-related professionals are 
accustomed to acting in isolation. It means that the concept of quality is also not 
immune from the fragmentation that is characteristic of complex and labour- 
intensive systems like the health care system. As a result, more often than not, 
health care professionals usually equate the concept of quality with clinical 
efficacy/effectiveness.
Quality as regarded by funders/direct payers
Efficiency is the most important consideration for funders, which is expressed as a 
preoccupation with targeting scarce resources to the most worthwhile activities. 
These are usually defined as the capacity to benefit most, when viewed from both 
a societal and medical point of view. It also deals with determining the appropriate 
level of provision of a particular intervention but less so with the appropriateness of 
the services despite the widespread evidence that a high percentage of 
inappropriate interventions in the health care provision (Chassin et al, 1987; Chassin 
et al, 1989). Care is also made inappropriate through failure to adopt interventions 
with demonstrated effectiveness (Sheldon et al, 1993).
Although quality is considered as a matter of primary importance, on which decision­
making about services should be made, it has been argued that health care policy is
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being deflected towards simple issues such as the most efficient financing systems 
and cost-containment (Maynard, 1993a). Some argue that if procedures of proven 
appropriateness/effectiveness had been adopted, there would probably be no need 
for implicit or explicit rationing (Frankel, 1991; Frankel and West, 1993; Maynard, 
1993a). Coulter et al put forward a hypothesis that until the appropriateness of 
treatments and a more universally accepted concept of need is established it will be 
difficult to incorporate these aspects of care into the decision making processes and 
purchasing activities (Coulter et al, 1995).
The organisational concept o f quality
In the 1980s, the concept of quality broadened from professional activities 
towards including the organisation of care at the institutional level, the 
performance of specific departments extending to the integration of 
consumers'/patients’ preferences and choices. It was also redirected from merely 
improving quality towards assessing and assuring it, which was described by 
Reiman as the era of assessment and accountability (Reiman, 1988).
Some of the proposed initiatives as to how to achieve the quality objective in the 
UK were included in the Department of Health’s recommendations, that formed 
part of the White Paper and initiated the 1991 market reforms (DoH, 1989a). 
These could be briefly outlined as the introduction of continuous postgraduate 
education, a quality assurance system for all health professionals and the 
introduction of the-medical audit. Another measure was work on guidelines and 
care protocols, which were expected to develop into anticipated recovery 
pathways and purchasing protocols and accreditation for all levels of 
specialisation for all categories of health professionals.
Quality as regarded by the government
The government’s role is even broader than that of the funders’. Traditionally, it 
was concerned more with taking measures that would in the first instance, assure 
provision of high quality care and not necessarily with the assessment of the 
quality of the care itself (Casparie, 1993).
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The means that are available to each government may differ in the extent of its 
executive power over health issues. Nevertheless, they basically include the 
same broad tools such as legislation, regulation of the provision of health care 
facilities, planning and financing. A government's objectives, moreover, while 
overlapping with those of the founders in terms of financing, especially when the 
source of finance is general taxation, are also oriented towards assuring the 
safety of health care intervention both for the users and for the health 
professionals. This must also be regarded as being within the framework of the 
environmental perspective.
Accessibility, both in terms of geographical access and equity of access for 
different socio-economic groups, is another of a government’s concerns. 
Availability of information is also an aspect of access. This is because it has been 
proven that access to health care is related to socio-economic and educational 
status (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; O’Donnell et al, 1991), which is also what 
makes access one of the objectives of a more global approach to quality.
Finally, a government needs to secure compatibility of a chosen health policy 
with the overall framework of macroeconomic stability. It is known that social and 
health policy both follow the general trends of a country's economy, whether the 
trend is of rapid growth or recession, thus serving as one of the tools and a 
counter-vailing power in balancing the economy through retrenchments in social 
policy spending (Culyer, 1991; McGuire et al, 1987).
Quality as an indicator o f the impact o f reforms
Although White Paper has stated that competition would drive up quality (DoH, 
1989), quality of care itself was not regarded directly as one of the objectives of 
the reforms but in the words of Donabedian, "quality, while not being a primary 
goal of the reforms, comes rather in a guise of value for money” (Baker, 1993). It 
can be found, to some extent, in all the other components of the reforms that 
were articulated and it was for this reason incorporated as one of the key 
indicators for evaluating their impact.
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While recognising the important implications that all factors have on the quality of 
care delivery in general, the perspective adopted here is modest in scope and 
uses the above only as a broad framework for interpretation of the results of this 
study. These are primarily concerned with the changes in attitude of the health 
professionals and adoption of more user-friendly forms of service provision, such 
as reducing waiting time at outpatients’ department and some aspects of service 
provision that would increase patients’ well being (i.e. setting a date for an 
operation).
It can be argued that, in addition to the traditional players in health care, patients 
are uniquely well placed to assess most if not all aspects of care especially when 
they have had previous experience of good care. This can even be extended to 
the technical aspects of the quality of care and can be defined by what is 
accomplished and not by what is simply done (Donabedian, 1992). It can in 
addition, serve as a useful source for providing information about public priorities 
and the public perception of the services (Richardson et al, 1993). It also enables 
conclusions to be drawn on how far the direct objectives of the reforms, such as 
responsiveness to need and increased choice for the patient, have been fulfilled 
in practical terms. Hence in this study, patients’ views and their satisfaction level 
with different aspects of service were elicited.
3.2.4 Responsiveness -  concept and framework
Another proclaimed objective of the reforms was to enhance responsiveness to 
patients’ needs. In the UK, this was promoted in part by empowering the General 
Practitioners, who were seen as spokespersons on behalf of the patient 
(Glennerster et al, 1995; Matsagannis et al, 1993). The role of the District Health 
Authorities was also radically changed: their new (and sole) responsibility was to 
organise provision of health services in accordance with the assessed needs of 
their populations.
In Sweden, the earliest reforms were implemented in Stockholm and in Dala 
County, where city councilors, the elected local politicians, were given a higher 
profile in the role of representing their population on health care issues. The
69
innovation in the form of a more active role that was given to primary health care 
providers in the Dala County experiment was still aimed at increasing their 
advisory role by providing inputs to the decisions that were to be made by the 
county councilors. This solution also had its proponents in the UK (Graffy et al,
1994).
Waiting times for access to hospital, either for specialist consultation and/or the 
performance of an elective procedure (diagnostic and/or surgical), have a long 
history within the publicly operated and funded health care systems. 
Explanations for their genesis and persistence were sought in economic, 
organisational and sociological theories alike. Economists argued that, in the 
absence of pricing mechanisms and zero cost at the point of use of services, 
demand was bound to outstrip any reasonably defined level of supply (Cullis and 
Jones, 1983; Cullis, 1985).
In this context, waiting lists were considered to be a desirable rationing tool for 
distributing limited resources, as they would ensure access to services for those 
who might benefit most. Thus social considerations were, in this context, closely 
related to equity-creating conditions, fulfilling both objectives at the same time. 
However, in practice this theoretical tenet seemed to have several imperfections. 
Waiting lists reflected rather large geographical differentiations (Davidge et al, 
1987; McPherson et al 1981; Williams et al 1993) including both inter- (Goldacre 
et al, 1987; McPherson et al, 1981) and intra-specialty practice variations 
(Drummond et al, 1991; Williams et al, 1993). There was considerable doubt 
whether they contributed to the principle of equity.
The other main argument for the inevitability of waiting lists in publicly provided 
health systems put forward by economists dealt with the lack of efficiency in the 
allocation of resources and the perverse effects of incentives resulting in technical 
inefficiency; the latter according to many is inherent in non-market systems. This has 
been the subject of vigorous and lengthy debate on the desirability and optimal level 
of the state involvement in the provision of public goods.
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The evidence available suggested that pure market provision of health care in the 
form of private insurance leads to the “invisibility” of waiting lists. However, some 
doubted whether their real measure was not correctly expressed, as the uninsured 
were not included on them (Cullis et al, 1985). Others argued against pure market on 
the grounds of social inefficiency, which would be created through the denial of an 
appropriate level of services to a significant part of the population (Saltman, 1994b). 
In essence, this was an argument supporting pleas for greater equity.
Whatever the efficiency merits or demerits of the sole reliance on a pure market 
or on state provision of health care, these seemed not to apply to the social 
insurance model with universal entitlements to care and non-existence of waiting 
lists, as could be seen in the example of Germany. The success of the latter 
could be attributed to the different incentives for providers present in the 
compulsory health insurance systems reflected in remuneration schemes 
(Schwartz & Busse, 1997) but also pointed towards differences in the level of 
supply, manifested in higher manpower and activity rates (McPherson et al 1981) 
which according to some has provided an incentive to oversupply services 
(Freeman, 1998).
The role of allocative mechanisms and, in particular, the reimbursement system 
in promoting or, in the case of rigidly planned health systems, impeding technical 
efficiency is widely accepted. Yet the positive relationship between the level of 
funding and related inputs and the success of systems in dealing with demand, 
and furthermore, in meeting health care needs within a reasonably defined level, 
is much less acknowledged.
On the other hand, waiting lists were, and still are thought to be a characteristic 
of health systems where the allocation of resources is unrelated to productivity 
and the incentives, which would stimulate it. Examples from European pre-reform 
systems, such as Sweden (Charpentier and Samuelson, 1994), and the UK 
(Frankel & West, 1993) and elsewhere in the world, as in New Zealand (Buchan, 
1993) to mention but few, seem to confirm this conventional wisdom. The effects 
of the incentives must not be overestimated, though, and need to be 
disentangled from the effects that are the result of a greater amount of resources
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devoted to this purpose, which is characteristic of most of the insurance-based 
systems in Western Europe (OECD, 1999).
Changes in waiting times  -  an indicator o f the impact o f the reforms on 
responsiveness
The NHS review that began in 1988 was, to an important degree, prompted by a 
response to widely exposed individual, and usually extreme, cases of waiting 
times (Dixon, 1998). The government of the day committed itself, in a highly 
publicised undertaking, to abandoning the culture that fostered and supported the 
acceptability of waiting list mentality within the NHS. As things were at that time, 
the requirement to deliver high standard professional services was contradicted 
by perverse incentives for upholding them because they were perceived as 
necessary for securing not only funding but also reputation. It was argued that 
the purchaser/provider split would reconcile the conflicting objectives and that the 
disincentives for maintaining long waiting lists by specialist providers would 
cease to exist.
In addition, power for influencing providers’ behaviour was decentralised into the 
hands of individual (GP fund-holders) and collective purchasers (District Health 
Authorities). A similar situation was developing in Sweden, where the politicians 
of the County Council of Stockholm decided to provide a health care guarantee, 
initially for the five elective surgical procedures for which waiting times were 
demonstrably the longest. In this context, the quasi-market reforms in the UK and 
Sweden were both directed at changes on the supply side (Maynard, 1993a; 
Rhenberg 1997) while maintaining the predominantly public and single source of 
funding which seemed to be in line with these concepts.
At the same time, views were expressed that the interpretation of waiting times 
could not be relegated solely to the demand side as the traditional approach to 
this issue had suggested (Goldacre et al, 1987; Cullis et al 1983), and that it had 
to be sought on the supply side (Iverson, 1993) and the factors related to 
professional decisions (Morgan et al, 1987). It is beyond the scope of this study, 
however, to provide further elaboration on the complexity and
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comprehensiveness of issues involved in the persistence, succinctly labelled the 
“perdurance", of the waiting list phenomenon (Frankel and West, 1993) and to 
examine closely the validity of these claims.
What is attempted in this research is to discover whether or not the decrease of 
waiting times advocated by the market proponents for elective procedures - like 
for example cataract surgery actually took place in practice and how significant 
were the changes. These were analysed in the context of efficiency gains and 
their impact on quality. Following the analysis of evidence, some explanations of 
the changes, which have taken place, is proposed (see Chapter Eleven, 
Discussion).
In addition, this study looks into the phenomenon of waiting for treatment and the 
presence or absence of incentives promoting organisational innovation within the 
system. The aim was to evaluate the impact of improvements on the dynamics of 
waiting times that might have occurred on the micro-efficiency level. The internal 
market reforms, which were aimed at achieving higher allocative and technical 
efficiency, are thus well suited to an examination of the validity of this claim.
More specifically, changes in waiting times, from before and after period of the 
reforms were used as the main indicator of responsiveness to patients’ needs 
and as one of the indicators of change in service delivery. Responsiveness to 
need, expressed as changes in waiting times, was, for the purpose of this study, 
based on the assumption that, if properly measured, the level of unmet demand 
could be regarded as a proxy for need. A further assumption was that it could be 
relatively safely employed as a proxy to measure the unmet demand, one of the 
commonly accepted definitions of need (Bradshaw, 1972).
The limitations of waiting lists, such as the inaccuracy of registers (Davidge et al, 
1987; Goldacre et al, 1987), and perverse incentives for keeping them long 
(Beech et al, 1992) were taken into account, to counteract the many arguments 
raised against the correlation of the length of waiting lists with the unmet need. 
Despite these reservations, the length of the waiting lists was used as the 
substitute and/or tracer of demand. Waiting times, that are usually expressed as
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figures on waiting lists, are the only available indicators of the demand and need 
for cataract surgery (Williams et al, 1992; Williams et al, 1994). Bearing these 
reservations in mind, meaningful conclusions about responsiveness to need may 
be inferred following an analysis of changes in waiting times.
3. 2.5 Efficiency  -  concept and framework
The set of quasi-market reforms introduced in the UK in 1991 and in Sweden in 
1992 had achieving improvements in the efficiency of service delivery as its most 
important aim. This concept of efficiency encompasses both technical and 
allocative efficiency. The former meant either the decrease of the cost of inputs 
for a given outcome or the increase of outputs produced at the same cost (this 
notion of efficiency derives its origins from the industrial production process). The 
latter should occur when the benefits gained from the use of given resources are 
maximised and it is more often used within the domain of public policy. Although 
it was not explicitly articulated in government manifestos, either in the UK or in 
Sweden, it could be assumed that the purpose of the reforms were to tackle both 
aspects of efficiency.
Until now, the efficiency issue has been addressed by purchasing authorities in 
terms of activity indicators (throughput or volume/cost ratio). Even in such a 
narrowly defined concept of efficiency, a considerable uncertainty about the 
amount of care purchased in comparison to the previous year and, in 
consequence uncertainty about the so-called efficiency outcomes, was 
widespread (Appleby, 1994; Epstein, 1990). The evidence provided served as a 
sufficient argument for developing a concept of efficiency in a more pertinent and 
relevant manner and for establishing adequate systems for monitoring its 
development.
During the late 1980s, the focus was placed on introducing policies and methods 
that would contain the rapidly growing expenditure of health care. These 
developments had to deal with demographic trends and the increased availability of
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biomedical technology, as well as the increases in real income (Barr, 1992; OECD, 
1985). The factors that were responsible for the growth of the real cost of health care 
provision during the 1970s and 1980s were largely beyond the control of national 
health policy makers, either in the UK, Sweden or in any other health care system. It 
was also increasingly recognised that the only power government had to influence 
the rise in the cost of health care in practice, was by making choices and an explicit 
setting of priorities that would be based on evidence of the procedures (Dixon et al, 
1991; Heginbothom, 1992; Maynard, 1993a).
Therefore a distinction between efficiency and cost containment is seen as a 
necessary one to be made. Although they may under some circumstances 
overlap, conceptually they constitute a different level of approach. While cost 
containment is a rather straightforward policy, which is largely related in a linear 
way to its aim, efficiency can be interpreted at many levels and, in some cases, 
may even contradict the former. That is probably why some health economists do 
not consider that cost containment can itself serve as a sensible policy goal and, 
for this reason, argue that it should not be considered as a driving force of the 
reforms, at least in the British case (Barr, 1992; Culyer, 1991).
Efficiency as an indicator o f the impact o f the reforms
The notion of efficiency was formulated only at a relatively late stage as a direct 
objective of the reforms in the UK. It initially took the form of a demand for and 
pursuit of greater public accountability in the use of resources and choices made 
in the health care services, before being articulated as a search for greater 
efficiency later. This pressure was mainly directed towards the medical 
professionals who were regarded as commanding and deploying resources 
according to their own priorities, and it was initially manifested in the introduction 
of control over the medical body in the form of external management (Griffiths, 
1983).
By contrast, in Sweden the central aim of the reforms, which had begun to take 
shape already in the early 1980s (Health Act 1982), was to align financial 
responsibility with operational control (Saltman and Van Otter, 1992b). This was 
again placed within the responsibility of elected councilors, whose most important
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responsibility, for which they were directly accountable to their constituencies, 
was the performance of the County’s health system.
When the attainment of greater efficiency was eventually defined as an explicit 
goal of the reforms, the introduction of a market ethos into health care was 
proposed as the means of achieving it. This reflected the renewed confidence in 
the beliefs of the neo-classical school that internal competition among providers 
would result in better management of the existing capital resources, which would, 
in turn create higher productivity gains. In order to achieve a more effective 
structural mix, both primary and secondary health care providers were given 
performance-related incentives.
In the UK in lieu of the performance-related incentives, a fund-holding scheme 
was proposed for general practitioners and trust status was offered to hospitals, 
which wanted to participate in the scheme. Thus, the concept of at least two 
types of purchaser was developed, one being the District Health Authorities and 
the other the GP fund-holders. There was an apparent departure from the neo­
classical model of a private market for health care that was reflected in extensive 
regulation and which was carried out in a strictly centralized manner in the UK in 
contrast to a more decentralized fashion in Sweden, though the option of 
introducing a central regulatory body was also extensively discussed in the latter 
case.
This study is concerned with the aspects of quality, choice, information and 
responsiveness that might have been influenced by the reforms and their links to 
efficiency. Efficiency is one of the indicators of the market impact and it is 
therefore examined for at least two reasons. First, it is important to ascertain 
whether improvements in quality, choice, information and equity were achieved 
at the expense of efficiency or vice versa, if at all. As Propper et al suggests, in 
her reference to the USA’s health market purchasers, those who do not face hard 
budget constraints tend to compete on quality rather than on price, which 
nevertheless results in higher costs (Propper et al, 1998).
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Second, there were also arguments voiced whether reforms driven by efficiency 
considerations would, if they were successful, have a positive or rather negative 
effect on the quality of care. In short, there seemed to be a disagreement as to 
the impact on different aspects of quality, which was voiced in the aftermath of 
the introduction of the reforms in both countries.
Some claimed that the efficient provision of care would have a positive spillover 
effect and argued that it should, in fact, be considered as one of broader 
dimensions of the quality of care concept (Overtveit, 1992; Ovretveit, 1994b). 
Others thought that the priority given to budgetary considerations by the General 
Practitioner fund-holders might not only lead to under-referral and under- 
treatment but also to a conflict of interest between trusts (Keeley, 1993). These, 
taken together, could, in turn, adversely affect the continuity of patients’ care 
(Wall, 1994).
The potential conflicts between efficiency and other objectives such as freedom 
of choice were identified already at an early stage and, accordingly, efficiency 
was used as a benchmark for the reforms’ internal coherence. While all the 
detailed aspects and links between quality, choice, information and equity, on the 
one hand, and efficiency, on the other hand, were not investigated in this 
research, any changes that took place were interpreted in the context of the 
efficiency incentives introduced by the reform process.
For the purpose of this study, efficiency was measured as comparison of activity 
indicators and their relation to the cost of the service and to the clinical outcomes 
in selected providers’ units. This enabled the drawing of conclusions on changes 
in efficiency and the links between efficiency the other objectives of the reforms. 
Also the adoption of cost effective procedures and in this case the shift to day 
care surgery as a likely result of pro-market reforms was investigated.
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3.3 Conclusions
The discussion of indicators selected for examining the impact that the reforms 
had on concepts, which best reflected the spirit and aspirations of changes 
introduced, demonstrated how difficult, and sometimes impossible was the task 
of identifying measures for capturing these transformations. This was on the one 
hand, due to the complexity and compound meanings as well as the subjective 
and intangible nature of the goals that reformers aimed to further (such as were 
for example choice and quality).
An added difficulty in isolating particular effects was, on the other hand, caused 
by the close links and interdependency between some of the objectives of the 
reforms (choice and information is one such example). However, the conflicting 
character of the intended changes (increasing choice simultaneously with 
efficiency) complicated the task of identifying their impact yet further.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPACT OF THE REFORMS AS REVEALED IN
THE LITERATURE
In this chapter, the presentation of evidence of the impact of market-oriented 
reforms in the UK and Sweden follows the sequence of the indicators selected. 
The discussion of the findings, as revealed in the literature, is preceded by an 
outline of the constraints and limitations that the majority of evaluation studies 
face, including this one.
Market experiments introduced into planned health care systems, and their 
consequences for the transformation of health care provision, have attracted a 
great amount of interest from researchers, policy makers, the media, and even 
the wider public. The different effects of the reforms have been examined, with 
some of their aspects being at the centre of evaluation and debate, and others 
being virtually ignored. The former tendency is well illustrated by the numerous 
studies devoted to the effects of the General Practitioners’ fund-holding scheme 
in the UK and its impact on the efficiency of care provision, on prescribing 
patterns and on equity of access. In Sweden, there was a similar focus on 
assessing productivity and efficiency gains, quality aspects accruing from the 
introduction of the Stockholm Model, and the purchaser-provider split reforms in 
general.
On the other hand, the reforms’ effects on other important innovations introduced 
by means of market mechanisms, which may spell a transformation in the 
empowerment of users as a result of additional choice and information given to 
patients and purchasers, have attracted relatively less attention. Surprisingly, 
aspects of responsiveness and also the redefinition of the roles of the main 
actors, and the changes in their attitude expected to accrue from the new set of
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incentives, were not given much prominence in the evaluators’ agendas either. 
This may result from the fact that it was much easier to measure the most 
straightforward indicators and leave in the shadows those that matter equally or 
more, but which are less likely to be enumerated.
On the whole, however, there have been few systematic approaches to 
assessing comprehensive aspects of the reforms in the manner of a controlled 
study. Most of the studies, which have been completed in the UK, were either 
pieces of indirect research based on a review of existing literature, which was 
useful for identifying gaps in research but provided little hard evidence, or were 
retrospective descriptions and case studies. Very few used prospective 
methodology and even fewer included control groups for the purpose of 
comparison. In Sweden, the situation was similar, and a reliance on surveys of 
attitudes and evaluations within the area of gray literature was even more 
prominent. These were used for quite superficial purposes and, in the main, 
formed a vast body of non-refereed publications. The reasons for these 
limitations are discussed in more detail below.
4.1 Problems with the evaluation
A substantial body of evaluation research was accumulated during the several 
years that followed the implementation of the internal market reforms in the UK in 
1991. Despite this, however, most of the evaluations conducted were fraught with 
a number of methodological problems. These are mostly related to the mode in 
which the reforms were introduced, but also to their content. In the case of the 
former, the main difficulty was the non-existence of comparable data from before 
the period of the reforms, against which to compare the performance of the 
reformed system. So, for example, there was a lack of reliable data on costs and 
prices of services before the reforms; and of course, there was no previous 
experience with purchasing schemes.
A further difficulty was also created by the purposeful obstruction of access for 
independent evaluators, which, according to many, was typical of the period 
preceding the implementation of the reforms and of the early stages of the
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reforms (Dixon, 1998; Le Grand et al, 1998). In addition, the pace and the way 
that the changes were introduced transformed some structural aspects of service 
provision, making evaluation downright impossible or biased. For example, the 
massive change in the role of purchasers that occurred, without leaving control 
groups for the purposes of comparison, and the positive selection of participants, 
which happened at an early stage of the reforms (and was done on a voluntary 
basis), illustrates the difficulty of the task involved.
Meanwhile, in Sweden, even fewer attempts entailing systematic work have been 
made to measure the effects of the model(s). Although there have been many 
follow-up studies and evaluations of the effects of the market models in the 
Swedish health care system, very few were scientific in their approach and even 
fewer were grounded on proper evidence. Many of these evaluations were 
ordered by politicians of the county councils and were inevitably tainted by the 
political orientation of those who needed straightforward proofs of the reforms' 
success or failure, in order to support broader political agendas. This meant that 
the effects attributed to the different models of the reforms were not always 
based on solid empirical evidence.
The market experiment in Stockholm County Council was a notable exception in 
this respect. The effects of this experiment have been continuously studied and 
evaluated by independent researchers and auditors, and the results have been 
presented to the responsible politicians and administrators at the county council. 
These evaluations have given important feedback to the policy makers and also 
prompted subsequent modifications in the Stockholm model. But even in this 
case they were hastily discontinued after the ascension of Social Democrats and 
the explanation proffered was that there was no more interest in this matter.
The effects, or absence of effects revealed in the literature were derived from 
many different evaluations of purchaser-provider models in the Swedish health 
care system. One preliminary conclusion to be made is that the separation of the 
effects of the models from the effects of other developments in the health care 
system, that took place concurrently, proved even more difficult than in the UK’s 
case. One reason for this was the degree of regional discretion in the
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implementation of the reforms and the different time frames in which they were 
introduced in the separate county councils.
Besides this, in both countries there was a lack of reflection before the reforms 
were introduced, which impacted upon the ability to conduct proper evaluation 
afterwards (Dixon, 1998; Hakansson et al, 1997). Even when the effects of the 
reforms were investigated, there were only a few studies, which employed a 
systematic approach and, in most cases, only the short-term effects were the 
subject of evaluation.
Too many studies in both countries were preoccupied with the analysis of 
theoretical assumptions and too few provided evidence from direct research. The 
latter was especially pronounced in the first years of the implementation of the 
reforms. Many used methodologies that dealt only with simple surveys of the 
attitudes of different respondent groups. Studies that adopted a longitudinal 
approach and attempted to examine changes over time were few.
Last, but not least, was the problem of the confounding effects resulting from 
changes that happened simultaneously or directly beforehand, and which, while 
not being related to the particular set of reforms that this study examines, 
affected various aspects of care that the quasi-market reforms aimed to address. 
These confounding factors were linked both to other health and social care 
reforms and also to wider economic, technological and even social and political 
changes.
A set of important reforms that were simultaneously introduced had synergy 
effects with the objectives that the reforms sought to address. Additional 
difficulties arose from the fact that it was almost impossible to distinguish some 
reforms from others that might have been introduced earlier (UK and Sweden), 
simultaneously (Sweden) or soon after the reforms (UK and Sweden). The Adel 
reform of 1992 in Sweden, under which the responsibility for social care was 
shifted to the municipalities' budgets, led to a decrease in lengths of stay as well 
as to a decrease in the number of beds and was one of the most prominent 
examples of these effects.
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Finally, the conflicting character of some of the important aspects of the reforms 
colluded with the aim of the evaluation at some of its stages, making the task of 
attributing specific effects to particular policies even more difficult. For instance 
the wider adoption of the cost-effective procedures such as the day care surgery 
could have been prompted by the incentives introduced by the reforms but their 
widespread diffusion could also be a result of the technological progress, which 
happened in the same time.
4.2 Choice
There are very few empirical studies examining the impact of the reforms on 
different aspects of choice and their relation with quality and/or efficiency in 
health care provision. The preliminary evaluation of reforms conducted in both 
countries (Mahon et al, 1994; Jones et al, 1994; Mays et al, 1996a; Anell, 1995; 
Anell, 1996; Rhenberg, 1997) provided some indications of their likely 
implications. One of the first studies conducted in the UK investigated the 
consequences of the reforms on the choice of hospital by patients and GPs for 
four specialties (Mahon et al, 1994). The findings from this piece of direct 
research conducted with samples of patients (approximately 300) and GPs in the 
UK found that, at the early stages of the implementation of the reforms, there 
was very little change in the choices exercised by either patients or GPs.
This view was also supported by the results of another study, where the 
evaluation of the reforms’ effectiveness in promoting different quality aspects, 
including the choice of the hospital, involved a sample of elderly patients. Here 
again, no visible difference in patients’ choice between 1990 and 1992 was 
observed, although some improvements in information provision were reported 
(Jones et al, 1994).
Moreover, as has been suggested by some preliminary studies evaluating the 
change in patients' and General Practitioners' choices that resulted from the 
reforms, there was potential for conflict between the differing objectives of 
reforms (Mahon et al, 1994). Mahon, in her research, stressed that the increased 
choice given to General Practitioner fund-holders in the market environment
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might have been chiefly driven by efficiency considerations, which might not fully 
correspond with patients’ choice if their preferences were to be taken fully into 
account (Mahon et al, 1994).
On the other hand, the first attempts at evaluating the fund-holding scheme and 
its impact on choice in the UK produced contradictory results. One group of 
researchers claimed evident improvements in choice and information, not only for 
the agents but also for their patients (Glennerster et al, 1994a; Glennerster et al, 
1994b; Matsagannis et al, 1993) while other studies were less conclusive (Audit 
Commission, 1996; Dixon et al, 1996, Mays et al, 1996a). Another study, 
conducted at the early stage of the introduction of the reforms, which reviewed 
the practice patterns of 19 GPs in 10 fund-holding practices in the Northern 
Region of the UK, found no changes in the choice given to patients (Newton et 
al, 1993).
Similar evidence was provided by Swedish researchers, of whom a majority 
pointed out the conflicting nature of the reforms' objectives, expressed as 
increasing efficiency while promoting patients’ choice (Anell, 1996; Rhenberg, 
1997). These points were further elaborated in this study when analysing the 
effects of the reforms (for more details see the discussion section in Chapter 
Eleven). The outcomes of the Swedish reforms in stimulating patients’ direct 
choice of both family doctors and secondary care providers (which, in some 
counties, also extended to the private sector), notwithstanding the geographical 
variations present (Anell, 1996), were more apparent.
In another study by Anell and Svarvar, it was reported that the freedom of choice 
for patients was quite significant in the areas with a high concentration of 
specialist facilities, which in some cases extended even across the boundaries of 
county councils, as was the case in Western Sweden. They nonetheless 
concluded that patients seemed to be making little use of it, as they preferred to 
be referred within their neighborhood (Anell and Svarvar, 1993).
Further evidence for patients’ preference for closer and more familiar 
surroundings was presented in a Swedish study examining the changes in
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waiting times that resulted from the reforms and introduced a care guarantee. It 
conceded that patients who were offered choices under the care guarantee, and 
could receive treatment at an alternative site, preferred instead to wait a bit 
longer instead of moving elsewhere (Hanning, 1996). Meanwhile, Rhenberg 
reported that currently in Sweden, the increase in patients’ choice is responsible 
for 2-5% of total resource allocation (Rhenberg, 1997), which, however, remains 
to be substantiated by hard evidence.
On the whole, it seems that all the models of the purchaser-provider split 
introduced in different county councils in Sweden have implied a greater freedom 
of choice than any previous arrangements that existed in the Swedish health 
system. Besides introducing these models, the Swedish government also tried to 
increase freedom of choice by supporting private initiatives and establishing a 
system of family or house doctors who could be freely chosen by the patients, 
which sometimes appeared to be a confounding factor for the research 
hypothesis that this study examines.
Most studies pointed out some visible effects on the patients' influence and 
freedom of choice as their opportunity to choose a medical provider increased. 
Some studies have shown, however, that there have been no substantial 
changes in the consumption patterns after the introduction of the purchaser- 
provider models and the new government policies (Anell, 1996; Dahlstrom & 
Ramstrom, 1994); however, this claim is not unanimously supported (Jonsson, 
1994; Bruce and Jonsson, 1996; Hakansson, 1999). Some others have 
hypothesised that the insufficient exercise of choice,- wherever it occurred, could 
be due to a lack of information and knowledge about the new options (Anell, 
1996; Bergman, 1998).
Researchers from both the UK and Sweden have acknowledged that the reforms 
were not followed by the creation of structures that would provide information on 
the availability of options to users. It was argued in both countries that the latter 
might have led to the underutilisation of their potential in making choices happen 
(Anell, 1996; Mays et al, 1996a). Recent research, conducted with a sample of 
2,000 interviewees in Sweden, which although not directly related to market
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reforms, provided some insight into the factors that influence patients’ choices in 
different topics. These were found to be strongly dependent on age and 
educational status (Anell et al, 1997).
4.3 Information
Surprisingly, there has been very little investigation of the changes in the 
information aspects provided to both patients and purchasers. Yet the 
enhancement of information about service standards and specifications, while 
not being an explicit objective of the reforms in either of the two countries, is an 
indispensable tool for the market’s success, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
a desirable outcome, considered by many to be a quality indicator in its own right 
(Ovreveit, 1992). In defiance of the national policy commitments to providing 
patients with relevant and appropriate information expressed in “The Patients’ 
Charter’’ (DoH, 1991a; DoH, 1995b), surveys reveal that lack of information is the 
most common complaint voiced by patients in the UK (Bruster et al, 1994; 
Calnan et al, 1994; Stizia and Wood, 1997).
As there is no proper evaluation of the impact of the reforms on changes in 
quality and type of information provided, the evidence supplied was only indirect 
and inferred from studies that dealt with information aspects. One such was a 
study conducted by the King’s Fund Institute in the UK, which aimed to assess 
the quality of written information provided to patients across a range of different 
specialties during the middle of the 1990s when the reforms were well 
embedded, although it was not directly concerned with the market reforms.
The findings of this research confirmed that the majority of patients wanted 
information about treatment options, even if they did not wish to be involved in 
decision-making about their treatments; but they usually did not receive it 
(Coulter et al, 1998). The study also acknowledged that the quality of written 
information provided was quite poor when measured against the patients’ 
expectations and needs. There was, for example, very little information on a 
treatment's risks and side effects; the coverage of treatment options and
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effectiveness was incomplete or missed out altogether; and uncertainties were 
ignored or glossed over (Coulter et al, 1998).
There are a few examples, which provide some evidence of improvements for at 
least one type of purchasers: the General Practitioner fund-holders in the UK. 
These claim that they were able to obtain better information from the providers, 
which, it was assumed, meant better information for patients (Glennerster, 1994; 
Glennerster et al, 1994a). Another study, conducted at an early stage of the 
implementation of the reforms and which examined the choices and information 
given to the elderly in the UK, indicated that some improvement in information 
provision had appeared without differentiating whether this concerned fund­
holders’ or non fund-holders’ patients (Jones et al, 1994).
There is no published study dealing directly or indirectly with information aspects 
in relation to the market-oriented reforms of the Stockholm Model or any similar 
set of reforms for Sweden in general. However, there are some indirect 
indications that health care personnel experienced some form of stronger 
consumer orientation, which are provided in reports by Anell and Svarvar, but 
without any further reference to its consequences in terms of information aspects 
(Anell and Svarvar, 1993). Also the most recent evidence while in essence being 
critical towards reforms’ impact on professional autonomy supports the former 
claim (Forsberg, 1998; Forsberg et al, 1999).
4.4 Quality
The improvements in the quality of care that should accrue from the introduction 
of market incentives were one of the proclaimed objectives of policy makers in 
the UK. Nonetheless, studies examining improvements in quality did not provide 
decisive evidence that any major improvements occurred in reality. The reasons 
for this are multiple and relate both to difficulties in defining relevant and 
measurable quality indicators, and to the fact that some of the available 
indicators, such as waiting times, were made unreliable through being used as 
targets by the government for assessing providers’ performance (Mulligan, 1998) 
while and some authors claimed that the rigid and mechanistic nature of the
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standards set around professional divisions played an important role too 
(Ovretveit, 1994b).
It may also be the case, however, that there were only very small or indiscernible 
improvements which quantitative indicators could not detect. On the other hand, 
even when qualitative changes could be ascertained, their direct link with a 
particular set of reforms could not be easily established, not least because of 
simultaneously occurring changes, which confounded the results.
In Sweden, the situation was similar, where several slightly divergent dimensions 
of quality existed. For example, Anell referred to the use of the accessibility to 
care perceived by patients and purchasers as a quality indicator (Anell, 1995). In 
addition, he pointed out elsewhere that reforms aimed at planned markets have 
themselves created new quality strategies (Anell, 1996). The most recently 
published research from Sweden infers that pro-market reforms had a negative 
impact on quality because they introduced disruptions in working environment 
and seriously eroded professional autonomy (Forsberg, 1998; Forsberg et al, 
1999).
Also, the methods used for evaluation - too often relying on surveys of the 
opinions of health professionals - are difficult in terms of extracting conclusive 
evidence, as the views and opinions may not always coincide with what originally 
took place. While, for example, the majority of health professionals seem to 
perceive changes happening, they frequently refer to their own impressions and 
consequences for themselves, which is not unimportant but can supply quite 
unclear and often contradictory view on the impact of the reforms on the quality 
of care.
The evidence on aspects considered as explicit quality indicators in this study, 
from both the UK and Sweden, is presented below. These are concerned with 
the waiting times, attitude of providers to patients and quality of information.
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4.4.1 Waiting times for a specialist service, including waiting time at 
the outpatients’ clinics
Most UK studies which were aimed at measuring quantitative aspects of quality, 
such as, for example, changes in waiting times, found that both collective 
purchasers and GP fund-holders used the leverage of their newly acquired power 
to decrease the length of waiting times for elective procedures. This was, 
however, more marked in the case of the latter, and fund-holders were seen as 
more capable purchasers in obtaining improvements in quality of care for their 
patients, expressed, amongst other things, as a decrease in waiting times (Bain, 
1991; Bain, 1992; Glennerster et al, 1994a; Dowling, 1997; Goodwin, 1998).
They also proved to have a greater ability to attract on-site services from 
specialists (Macrae Todd, 1993; Consumer’s Association, 1995a; Gillam et al,
1995). Other researchers expressed doubts as to whether the latter development 
necessarily furthered the quality of care, as it was unproven and little evaluated 
(Maynard and Bloor, 1995; Kerrison and Comey, 1998; Harris, 1997).
In addition, the review of the literature on fund-holding examined by Coulter in 
1995, concluded that that the improvements in efficiency, responsiveness and 
quality that were claimed to have been achieved by fund-holders, could not be 
substantiated by hard evidence (Coulter, 1995a). Most recent findings seem to 
disprove these early conclusions and provide evidence that fund-holders were 
proven at least to be better and more flexible purchasers (Goodwin, 1998).
Very few studies examined the impact of the reforms on changes in the attitude 
of providers and/or purchasers, and their adoption of more user-friendly 
approach towards patients, although some studies acknowledged that the 
communication between fund-holders and providers improved substantially 
(Wisley, 1993; Cornell, 1996; National Audit Office, 1994). It was uncertain, 
however, that apart from shorter waiting times any other tangible gains occurred, 
and it was even less certain that these occurred for patients or how patients 
regarded them. For example, Howie et al demonstrated that patients of six fund-
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holding practices in Scotland were found to be slightly less satisfied with the 
scheme than before (Howie et al, 1994).
Another study, which examined the views of patients on the importance of the 
minimum waiting times at the outpatients’ clinic in one of Oxford’s hospitals, 
found that patients attached less value to the 30 minutes standard set in “The 
Patient’s Charter”, if this implied insufficient time for consultation with the doctor 
(Ulahannan, 1997). Some other authors have also criticised this exclusive focus 
on waiting time as being centrally originated and for ignoring less quantitative 
aspects, which may be of greater importance to patients (Lorentzon et al, 1996; 
Hart, 1996).
Charpentier and Samuelson in Sweden found a significant reduction in waiting 
times during the first two years of the Stockholm Model’s implementation 
(Charpentier and Samuelson, 1999). But this was probably influenced by a 
variety of other factors, such as economic retrenchment, the introduction of the 
reforms, which had similar incentives for reducing the length of stay in hospitals, 
and the impact of medical technology (Anell, 1996; Brommels, 1995).
4.4.2 Changes in the attitude of providers -  adoption of a user- 
friendly approach
Another perspective on changes in quality was inferred through satisfaction 
surveys which, while known not to be an easy subject for interpretation, nor for 
the drawing of straightforward conclusions, nonetheless provided some 
indications about perceptions of improvements in quality by patients and some 
other respondent groups. Thus, for example, the evaluation of the Integrated 
Purchasing Project in Berkshire seemed to produce more satisfaction than the 
control group of traditional schemes from neighbouring practices (Walsh et al,
1997). Nonetheless, the familiar problem of bias introduced by the criteria on the 
basis of which the pilot itself was selected, applies to this study, just as it applied 
to the evaluation of the results from fund-holding practices during the early 
stages of their implementation.
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A more recent review of the evidence of the market’s impact, conducted by one 
of the King’s Fund teams, attempted to interpret the results on satisfaction with 
the NHS, conducted by the British Social Attitudes Survey for over a decade. 
Their cautious conclusion was that people's satisfaction is less correlated with 
any results produced by the internal market reforms and more with the public’s 
perception of how sufficiently the NHS is funded and by the difference that this 
increased funding makes in reality (Le Grand et al, 1998). This hypothesis seems 
to be confirmed by another study referred to by other authors who were part of 
the same working group (Mulligan and Judge, 1997).
In Sweden, opinions about the effects of the purchaser-provider split on the 
quality of care reveal on the whole that there is no proof of quality being 
decisively impaired, but they are not unanimous in this assertion. This is strongly 
related to the anxieties preceding the introduction of the reforms, when fears that 
productivity or efficiency gains could be achieved only at the expense of the 
quality of care were loudly articulated.
Nonetheless, the internal organisation of the health care institutions has been 
more affected by the purchaser-provider split. Many hospitals and health 
authorities have been reorganised in a more “business-like" fashion (Axelsson, 
1998b). They have to continue their high quality professional work, but they also 
have to take the economic aspects of their decisions into consideration. The role 
of the health care professionals, as providers of care, has meant that they cannot 
take their patients for granted, since there is a market where every participant is 
measured and judged.
One of the expected effects resulting from economic incentives being put to work 
was the reduction of the length of stay in hospital, which is what happened in 
reality. This, on the one hand, allowed for increases in productivity, but at the 
same time many physicians were doubtful about its effects on the quality of care. 
One study concluded that there was no clear indication that quality had 
deteriorated as a consequence of the implementation of the Stockholm model 
(Dahlstrom & Ramstrom, 1994), without, however, defining what was included in 
the concept of quality referred to. More recently Forsberg et al measured the
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impact of decreases in length of stay and earlier discharges on quality of care 
and concluded that strong positive correlation between the two existed. However, 
again a convincing and unambiguous quality definition was absent (Forsberg et 
al, 1999).
At the same time, researchers cautioned against the uncritical acceptance of the 
results evaluated in quality studies, pointing out the multiple concepts and 
indicators that are used for this purpose (Anell, 1996). There were few 
evaluations that looked into more specific aspects of care, however. A repeated 
cross-sectional study, for example, reported that physicians in Stockholm felt that 
economic incentives affected their work in such a way that the quality of the 
encounter between them and the patients had decreased (Forsberg, 1998). Also, 
the problem of early discharge and its concomitant impact on the quality of care 
was reported in at least two studies, in which respondents linked it to the 
efficiency pressures introduced by the Stockholm Model (Forsberg et al, 1994).
4.4.3 Quality in terms of information provided in contracts
Contrary to evidence coming from Sweden, numerous studies in the UK found 
that the contracting processes made explicit the need for a definition of quality 
standards and also indicated that they had become more widely used by 
purchasers. Carruthers et al studied three Health Authorities and found that they 
had introduced quality standards into their contracts, which derived from the 
Effective Health Care Bulletins (Carruthers et al, 1995).
Frater and Dixon evaluated the use of effectiveness criteria in quality 
specifications as they were defined by the same publications, produced by the 
UK Clearing House on Health Outcomes. They found that approximately 60% of 
Health Authorities used some form of quality standards in their contracts, which 
were not necessarily effectiveness-based, and that less than 20% linked them to 
financial incentives (Frater and Dixon, 1994).
Coulter, on the other hand, demonstrated that both collective purchasers and 
fund-holders adopted quality specifications in their contracts as routine practice
92
(Coulter 1995b). However, the Audit Commission’s study looking at the purchase 
of specialist activities found that, while Health Authorities were still the best 
purchasers of those services, their information on quality nonetheless remained 
poor (Audit Commission, 1997). Gill argued that the quality standards used in the 
contracts were not really meaningful, as they were predominantly aimed at 
capturing relatively unimportant and measurable indicators (Gill, 1993).
Some claimed that fund-holding has been instrumental in producing a shift in the 
quality of care delivery by influencing the organisational process of contracting 
and improving the information flow, which, according to them, also had a positive 
spill-over effect on non fund-holders (Corney, 1994; McAvoy 1993; Abel-Smith, et 
al 1995). However, there is no study comparing, in any systematic manner, fund­
holder and non-fund-holder contracts as to the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the quality specifications.
There is no proper evaluation of the impact of the purchaser-provider split on the 
quality of information received by patients conducted in either of the two 
countries. Some anecdotal evidence and indications that shifts in patients’ 
orientation and the demand for more information had been positively influenced 
by market-orientated reforms, exists in Sweden (Hakansson et al, 1997; 
Axelsson, 1998b). A study aimed at assessing the written information given to 
patients, which was conducted by the Kings’ Fund Institute in the UK, while not 
directly related to the reforms, confirmed the view that patients’ needs were not 
being met with respect to the provision of information (Coulter et al, 1998).
4.5 Responsiveness
The reduction of waiting times, whether expressed as waiting times for elective 
procedures or for a first specialist appointment or as extremely long waiting 
times, were the highest priority on the UK’s government’s agenda at the 
beginning of the 1990s and found expression in “The Patients’ Charter” and 
several Waiting List Initiatives. After a certain point in time, it was seen as the 
ultimate test of the reforms' success, or, more plausibly, “the government’s
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success", which also manifested itself in the annual publication of national league 
tables that evaluated the performance of providers across the country on the 
basis of a combination of different waiting times. The government had been 
eager, from the early days of the implementation of the reforms, to demonstrate 
its success in this respect, which occasionally even resulted in the 
misrepresentation of data (Radical Statistics Health Group, 1992; Radical 
Statistics Health Group, 1995).
In addition, even when decreases in waiting times really did occur, according to 
many they could be hardly ascribed to the “Working for Patients” reforms 
introduced in 1991. As Hamblin has pointed out, the waiting list initiatives and 
increased funding that was made available for this purpose had already started in 
1987 and continued in parallel with the reforms until 1995 (Hamblin, 1998). 
Hamblin et al also found that there were reductions in average waiting times and 
especially in very long waiting times, notably during the first years of reforms.
The end result, however, was that average waiting times in the 1990s were, on 
the whole, similar to those of the 1960s and 1970s (Hamblin et al, 1998). Le 
Grand et al explained the real reduction in waiting times occurred for 100,000 
patients between 1991-1995; these, however, were compensated for by the 
additional referral of 1 million patients in the same period, which kept the average 
waiting times constant (Le Grand, 1998).
The heated debate in the UK over whether fund-holders would fulfil the 
expectations placed on them and become more responsive providers of services 
to their patients, which meant that they would also need to become effective 
purchasers, was also reflected in researchers' interest. Many of them focused on 
evaluations of fund-holders’ success in performing these functions with respect to 
reducing waiting times, amongst others. This was demonstrated in a few studies, 
most of which found that fund-holders’ patients, in fact, had shorter waiting times 
when they were compared with non fund-holders patients. Dowling demonstrated 
this, using West Sussex Health Authority as an example (Dowling, 1997).
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A study by Kimmerling and Kinnear conducted in one Health Authority on a 
sample of eleven fund-holding practices and 22 non fund-holding practices acting 
as a control group, found that the patients of the former were referred much more 
quickly than those of the latter (Kimmerling and Kinnear, 1996). However, 
Peeke’s conclusion from examining fund-holding practices in Oxford area did not 
support this view, as, according to his/her findings, there was no evidence of 
shorter waiting times for hospital treatment as far as fund-holder patients were 
concerned (Peeke, 1993).
As in the UK, a simultaneous initiative in Sweden, aimed at reducing waiting 
times for some elective procedures and known as care guarantee, was 
introduced together with additional funds that were made available for this 
purpose (Federation of County Councils, 1993). This, while producing evident 
results, confounded the effects of the organisational changes and incentives 
introduced by means of the reforms, which were dependent upon extra funds 
flowing. It resulted in a sharp decrease in the waiting lists for specialised care at 
the beginning of the 1990s, most of all in the area covered by Stockholm County 
Council, but it was difficult to know how much of that was explained by the 
purchaser-provider split.
Some researchers claimed that most of the decrease in the waiting lists took 
place before the Stockholm model was introduced and it was mostly due to 
actions undertaken by the national government (Axelsson, 1999). In 1991, extra 
funds from national sources had already been allocated to the county councils in 
order to shorten the waiting lists for elective surgery, and, in 1992, the 
government introduced a guarantee of a three months' maximum waiting time for 
twelve elective procedures.
Moreover, in 1992, the responsibility for the care of the elderly was transferred to 
the municipalities, which meant that hospital beds became free. The importance 
of these actions is also shown by the fact that waiting lists and long waiting times 
have reappeared since the waiting time guarantee was taken away (Bergman, 
1998). Yet, studies by Jonsson and Bruce and Jonsson suggest that there were 
some forms of market mechanisms operating along the way which were clearly
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responsible for increases in efficiency that, amongst other things, manifested 
itself in a decrease in waiting times (Jonsson, 1994; Bruce and Jonsson, 1996). 
This evidence is discussed at length below (Chapter Ten, Efficiency).
However, when analysing the dynamics of the changes in waiting times, it has to 
be noted that the incentives introduced by the market-orientated reforms to 
under-report, or misreport, the actual length of waiting times might also be put in 
operation. Providers in both the UK and Sweden wished to be seen as effective 
and competent in order to maintain their position in the market, which might have 
led to an undesirable effect on how reporting of the decreases happened in 
reality. For example, Appleby suggested that providers, in their attempt to meet 
the waiting time targets established by the government, might lengthen the 
waiting periods before putting patients on the waiting list in the first place 
(Appleby, 1994).
4.6. Efficiency
The drive for increased efficiency was one of the main reasons for resorting to 
market mechanisms by the governments, which believed in the superior capacity 
of the market to deliver this objective. The evidence, as revealed in the literature, 
indicates that an overall increase in efficiency is apparent, even after deducting 
higher administrative and management costs, both in the UK (Le Grand et al,
1998) and in Sweden (Anell, 1996; Hakansson etal; 1997). In the latter case, this 
is even more strongly supported by the reversal of the gains in productivity and 
the lengthening of waiting times to the pre-existing situation, when the market 
mechanisms became blunted (Charpentier and Samuelson, 1999).
In the UK, similar changes in policy and a shift from “competition” to “co­
operation”, which mirrored the political convictions of the incoming government, 
occurred two years later than it did in Sweden. It is, therefore, still too early to 
obtain evidence on the effects of these movements on efficiency and other 
indicators of service effectiveness.
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Nonetheless, it has to be stated that the problem of the attributability of changes 
only to the quasi-market reforms per se is a question that can hardly be 
answered in positive and unequivocal terms, as it would be impossible to design 
a study that would control for all the factors that might have impacted upon the 
already changing environment.
However, what some studies attempted to assert, by presenting relevant 
evidence, was that the reforms applied the needed and decisive leverage that 
was represented by the shift in paradigm under which care could be effectively 
delivered in integrated systems. This also facilitated and enabled the eventual 
integration of all the similar effects originating from different sources where 
changes were simultaneously occurring, to produce auspicious outcomes 
whenever they took place (Anell 1996).
For example, this type of evidence was supplied by two Swedish studies which 
found that the overall volume of services provided had increased significantly in 
the county councils that decided to use market mechanisms to improve their 
care. Thus, in these county councils, the volume of care went up by 75% in the 
first two years of reforms, in contrast to a 25% increase in Kronoberg county 
council, which was more traditionally managed (Jonsson, 1994; Jonsson, 1994 
cited in Anell 1996; Bruce & Jonsson, 1996; Hakansson et al, 1997).
4.6.1 Throughput and cost of services -  productive efficiency
This increase in the UK was visible both when measured by the so called Cost 
Weighted Efficiency Index (CWEI), which referred to the specialist providers’ 
performance, and when other separate indicators such as, for example, the 
prescribing patterns of fund-holders were concerned. The increases in efficiency, 
however, expressed as CWEI, have to be taken with a degree of caution.
Appleby and Little have warned against its failure to include any other activity 
than that measured by Komer data, which impeded innovation but also included 
non-recurrent costs, thus distorting financial calculations. They also questioned 
the accuracy of data used in all these calculations (Appleby and Little, 1992).
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Raftery et al reported after surveying the Health Authorities’ contracts that the 
tetter's claimed efficiency index skewed the service provision towards acute 
services because these could be better reflected in activity rates (Raftery et al,
1994).
In a study of the effects of NHS reforms on hospital efficiency, Soderlund et al 
found real productivity gains during the period 1991-94 for trusts when they were 
compared with directly managed units in England. However, the same study also 
demonstrated, that some hospitals became intentionally less productive shortly 
before obtaining trust status, so as to be able to look more efficient under the 
new arrangements by comparison (Soderlund et al, 1997).
In reports by the NHS Executive analysing the activity data increases in the 
number of patients treated were claimed (NHS Executive, 1994; NHS Executive
1995). However doubts were raised whether patients or Finished Consultant 
Episodes had been counted, since the former tended to inflate the activity data 
(Clarke and McKee, 1992; Radical Statistics Health Group, 1992; Seng et al, 
1993).
An overwhelming impression of many researchers was the degree to which the 
trusts' freedom to use even these modest market mechanisms to achieve higher 
efficiency was curtailed. Thus, although conditions for competition to take off 
existed already in 1991/92, according to Appleby (Appleby, 1994). Propper found 
that in reality it did not take place, as bilateral monopolies between purchasers 
and providers replaced it (Propper, 1995).
Other researchers pointed at restrictive financial regimes, which punished 
efficient providers (Adams, 1995), skewing the provision towards incentives for 
performing activities instead of "watchful waiting" which could be more 
appropriate but was not rewarded by reimbursement methods (Sheldon & 
Borowitz, 1993). Also, the negative impact of charges for capital on choice, 
quality and equity was discussed (Shaoul, 1996), as was the curtailment of the 
proposed trusts' freedom, which impacted upon the effectiveness of their 
operations (Caines, 1994).
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The evidence for likely efficiency gains achieved by General Practitioner fund­
holders is mixed, as there were studies which claimed that such gains were 
achieved with respect to the prescribing patterns, for example (Glennerster et al, 
1994a; Robinson, 1996; Bain et al 1993; Bradlow & Coulter, 1993;), and some 
other efficiency gains (Bain et al, 1992;). Fund-holders' more efficient prescribing 
patterns and their increased ability to halt the pace of the rise in prescribing costs 
was further established by several studies (National Audit Office, 1994; Rafferty 
et al, 1997; Gosden and Torgerson, 1997). The explanations proffered were 
different.
Fund-holders, according to some, were keener to prescribe generics (National 
Audit Office, 1994; Gosden and Torgerson, 1997; Wilson et al, 1995) and to 
reduce the volume of prescriptions (Howie et al, 1995) or were more cautious in 
adopting new and expensive drugs (Audit Commission, 1995). A few, somewhat 
over-enthusiastically, claimed this to be the proof of the market’s success (Le 
Grand et al, 1998).
There is also evidence to the contrary. Thus Coulter reviewing the literature on 
fund-holding, concluded two years later that claims that fund-holding had 
improved efficiency, amongst other things, could not be substantiated (Coulter, 
1995a); this was also supported by the early findings of Petchy (Petchy, 1993). 
Another staunch supporter of the scheme, in his co-authored work, agreed that 
any efficiency in prescribing which had been achieved, was perhaps due to more 
generous funding of fund-holders’ practices (Dixon & Glennerster, 1995).
It may also be explained by the fact that initial enthusiasm about fund-holding’s 
potential to bring about significant efficiency gains withered as the reforms 
progressed. However, it is hard to use the same argument to defend Petchy’s 
views on the same subject, especially since, in his later review of literature, it is 
stated that very few reliable conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature 
on fund-holding (Petchy, 1995).
According to others, the gains, even where they appeared, were not maintained 
for a long time (Robinson, 1996; Stewart-Brown et al, 1995). Keeley asserted
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that overall fundholding did not succeed in containing the rise in prescription 
costs over time in general practice, nor did it succeed in reducing the use of 
expensive specialist services (Keeley, 1997). If anything, the cost of 
ophthalmology services provided on site at fund-holders' premises were found to 
be three times higher than when they were provided at a hospital’ s eye unit 
(Gillam et al, 1995).
Several authors who looked into the issue of efficiency at any stage of the 
reforms, conceded that, overall, tangible changes (except for, possibly, 
prescribing costs) have either not happened at all (Healey & Reid, 1994; Howie 
et al, 1993), have been very small, or have been more apparent in the early 
stages of the reforms (Harris & Scrivener, 1996). However, the most recent and 
strongest evidence seems to support GPs' ability to achieve sustainable gains 
expressed in terms of lower prescribing costs demonstrated by fund-holders 
(Goodwin, 1998).
In Sweden, one of the main reasons for introducing the purchaser-provider split 
in health care was to increase the productivity of the health care system and to 
contain its rising costs. For this purpose, the purchasers were to carry all the 
costs and the hospitals would be paid according to fixed contracts. When the 
Stockholm County Council started to pay hospitals using the DRG performance 
based system in 1992, as reported by Hakansson et al, there was a quite 
dramatic rise in productivity, manifested in increases for some elective 
procedures ranging from 50-70%. Thus, for example, the number of hip 
replacement and coronary heart operations both increased by 50%, while the 
number of cataract operations increased by as much as 70%. Meanwhile, the 
number of people appearing on waiting lists for elective procedures, for which a 
care guarantee was provided, decreased by 30% (Hakansson et al, 1997).
Bruce and Jonsson discussed the evidence of higher efficiency that was present 
in 14 counties, at least at the initial stages of their experimentation with different 
forms of pro-market reforms, as compared to those counties who decided against 
experimentation. They found increases in productivity, attributed to increased
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output, in three quarters and to decreases in costs in one quarter (Bruce & 
Jonsson, 1996).
Yet, the impression from the subsequent stages of the reforms, expressed in 
several evaluation studies that have assessed the reform models and compared 
'reform' counties with 'traditional' ones, surprisingly revealed no differences in 
terms of cost-effectiveness and increased productivity. One plausible 
explanation, proposed by Brommels, was that the economic recession that 
coincided with the reforms forced all counties to take drastic managerial action, 
regardless of their governance systems (Brommels, 1995). There were also 
views that the reforms introduced by means of the Stockholm Model were 
anyway very much “a game within the family", as no real separation ever took 
place (Axelsson, 1998a; personal communication).
Some other later studies confirmed, however, that increases in productivity and 
efficiency appeared to be the main achievement of the Stockholm model. This 
happened because of the elimination of the fixed budget, which created clear 
economic incentives and an increased awareness of costs across all the 
structures in the health care organisation. It seemed, also, that the performance- 
based reimbursement system put pressure on health service providers to deliver 
efficient care.
In Stockholm County Council, one study has shown that the productivity of the 
hospital services increased by 20% between 1990 and 1993 (Diderichsen, 1995). 
Another study reported that physicians had learnt that every single decision 
affects the financial situation of their clinical departments. They had abandoned 
certain tests and certain types of treatment because the possible benefits did not 
warrant the costs (Forsberg, 1998). Another result was a reduction in the length 
of stay in most hospitals (Anell, 1996).
However, the increased productivity coupled with the freedom of choice that was 
introduced by the national government cancelled out the cost containment 
objectives. Patients could choose service providers independently of what 
contracts their local purchasers had made on their behalf, which left the
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purchasers without any strong instrument of cost control. At the same time, as 
the productivity of the hospitals increased, while the DRG-based prices did not 
decrease, there were strong upward pressures, which led to an overall increase 
in costs (Diderichsen, 1995).
As predicted by economic theory (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993), administrative 
costs also increased as a result of the contracting procedures (Axelsson, 1998b). 
In Stockholm, these increasing costs forced the county council to impose 
quantity-related ceilings on payment levels and to lower the DRG prices. These 
changes in the rules and prices diminished the cost increases, but it did not save 
the county councils from running into serious deficits (Hakansson, 1999); at the 
same time, according to many they had also “drastically diminished the trust in 
the system” (Whitehead et al, 1997; Forsberg et al, 1999).
4.6.2 Structural changes -  efficiency implications
There is no doubt, however, that the incentives which stimulated the efficient 
provision of care have also led to numerous changes in the structure and 
organisation of care. In the UK, this has been manifested as a speedy and more 
widespread introduction of cost-saving technologies, not confined to trusts alone 
(Smee, 1995), and in the shift of some forms of care provision into primary care 
settings (Redmayane et al, 1995). The latter has been especially marked in fund- 
holding practices (Bailey et al, 1993; Macrae Todd, 1993; Gillam et al, 1995).
Similarly, in Stockholm County Council, two hospitals were closed down and one 
of the remaining hospitals was privatised. One study reported that, after the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split, the number of hospital beds in 
Sweden fell by more than one third (Essinger, 1997). There is some additional 
evidence of important structural changes that have led to a reduction in the 
numbers of health service personnel by as much as 40% of the original number 
(Hakansson, 1999). Many hospitals had to close down or merge as a result of the 
reduction in the number of beds and these developments were not unique for the 
county councils with purchaser-provider splits. Similar changes also took place in
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other county councils as a result of increasing problems in the Swedish 
economy.
Some authors argue that the important lesson, learned particularly by the 
metropolitan areas in Sweden, was that the quasi-market forces created by the 
purchaser-provider split could not correct for all structural imbalances in the 
service provision system (Brommels, 1995). Anell provides an explanation for 
this as being the result of the realisation of excess capacity in terms of facilities, 
which could not be sustained during a prolonged economic recession, and which 
was manifested in the policies of early retirement and dismissals (Anell, 1995; 
Anell 1996).
This predictably had an impact on staff morale and on the increase in stress at 
the workplace, which was acknowledged in a few studies, which examined this 
issue (Charpentier and Samuleson, 1996; Forsberg, 1998). But whether this 
would happen as quickly and effectively and whether it would have such a 
dramatic impact on the dynamics of health care provision in Sweden without the 
competitive incentives introduced remains an open question.
The role of the politicians as purchasers of care on the other hand, has meant 
that they can concentrate on policy issues and represent the interests of their 
citizens, but with an increase in responsibility and cost consciousness. Studies 
from Sweden have shown that the politicians assess their new roles as positive 
and stimulating, while the health professionals and the administrators see their 
new roles as stressful and problematic (Petersson, 1994; Petersson, 1995).
In addition, stronger management capacities were built into the system. For 
example managers in the UK according to one study felt they had more freedom 
in taking decisions (Traynor, 1995). Also, the roles of the administrators in the UK 
have changed greatly, since they have been divided between working either on 
the purchaser or on the provider side of the organisation. A National Survey of 
Directors of Public Health conducted by Marks found them being convinced that 
the trusts’ status brings improvements in health and in a repeated survey the
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majority also thought it meets the needs of the population (Marks, 1995a; Marks, 
1995b).
Although, in Sweden there were no empirical studies to confirm a similar view, 
there were claims of a strong development of service management in the 
Swedish health care system since the 1980’s and the purchaser-provider split 
strengthened this development yet further (Axelsson, 1998b). The change of the 
provider role on the other hand, is best illustrated by the most recent 
development where a previously county council owned hospital became 
privatised. After it quickly responded to the set of incentives introduced by the 
Stockholm Model by obtaining the status of a limited company and appointing 
professional managers it managed to turn the benefits accruing from the pilot 
status granted to it by the county council to its advantage.
4.6.3 Clinical Outcomes
In the UK, there seemed to be no published research, which attempted to use the 
outcomes of care as quality indicators and to measure them in relation to 
changes produced by the reforms. This reflected their rare use as quality 
specifications and their almost total absence from contracts.
A few evaluations conducted in Sweden, while not aimed directly at measuring 
outcomes, were more specific. Thus, in a study from Stockholm, 17% of 
physicians reported that they felt a pressure to reduce the length of stay in post­
operative and intensive care units due to economic reasons and thought that this 
change in the discharge pattern had led to the deterioration of the quality of care 
(Forsberg & Calltorp, 1994). Forsberg and Calltorp stated that these specialists 
thought that patients were often discharged too soon as a result of the Stockholm 
model (Forsberg et al, 1994; Anell, 1996).
This view was also supported by a study conducted with general practitioners 
and nurses who conceded that the elderly, aged over 70, were discharged too 
early after the Adel Reform (Socialstyrelsen, 1995) and more so after the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split (Norrbom, 1994 cited in Anell, 1996).
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However, when the readmissions at seven and 30 days were examined, no 
confirmation of their increase could be ascertained, at least at the aggregate 
level (Stockholm County Councils, 1993). Despite this, however, it is possible 
that specific problems may have been recognised at the single hospital level, 
which might also have affected the perception of the users (Anell, 1996).
Another study, which seems to support this hypothesis, argued that the 
development of a number of injuries in health care, and the assessment of the 
general public, warrants the opinion of a real deterioration in the quality of care 
as a consequence of the Stockholm model (Back & Goijer, 1994). However, what 
became evident beyond any doubt through these evaluation studies was the lack 
of a system for describing qualitative changes. This, according to some, 
encouraged the work on the development of quality standards (Hakansson et al, 
1997).
4.6.4 The impact of reforms on introduction of cost saving 
technologies
The forces that encourage or impede technological development and its adoption 
are multiple and interact with each other on many levels (Geijlins et al, 1994). It is 
widely recognised, however, that positive or negative payment incentives have a 
significant impact on the adoption of new technologies (Steinberg et al, 1993); 
this may even result in the phasing out of procedures of proven clinical value, 
when their cost is not reimbursed by a third party payer (Kane et al, 1989). 
However, the planned health care systems of the UK and Sweden, with their 
production of services regulated often at sub-optimal levels, had been facing the 
reverse problem, that of under-provision of services, manifested in long waiting 
lists (Frankel and West, 1993).
This was especially visible in the UK’s case, where adverse incentives 
incorporated in the funding system (with budgets being allocated to providers on 
the basis of the previous year's spending patterns and not related to productivity) 
had led to impediments in diffusion and insufficient adoption of effective 
technologies (Beech et al, 1992). It was, therefore, expected that, with changes
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in the reimbursement system introduced by internal market reforms, technologies 
contributing to meeting contract specifications and/or enhancing providers’ 
competitive position in the market, would be more widely adopted (Beech et al,
1992).
There is little research on these aspects of the impact of the reforms, except for 
evidence provided by Smee that there was no difference in the rates of day 
cases, for example, between trusts and Directly Managed Units in 1994 (Smee,
1995). Another view presented in an unpublished MD thesis, which examined the 
diffusion of innovation using the example of three procedures, was that 
purchasers used very little of their leverage to affect these developments, which 
were in most cases, in the hands of the providers (Rosen, 1996). No equivalent 
published work is known to exist for Sweden.
4.7. Conclusions
The conclusions from this review of available evidence are summarised in Table 
4.1. The overall impression is that, despite the many evaluations examining the 
impact of the market-oriented reforms in both the UK and Sweden, important 
questions remained unanswered. This is possibly because the complexity and 
intangible nature of some of the reforms’ objectives rendering them a difficult 
subject for evaluation; but it may also arise from difficulties resulting from the 
politicised atmosphere surrounding the reforms, which, in turn, produced 
assessments that were not altogether unbiased and not always rigorously 
performed. This seemed to be the picture at least at the initial stage after their 
implementation, in both the UK and Sweden, although today many better quality 
evaluations exist.
In what follows, this study makes a contribution to this evaluation picture, using 
the case study of a particular service to examine the impact of the reforms in the 
framework of an international comparison, which is rather scarce in the literature 
on the subject. Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, it 
also aims to examine the views and perceptions of most of the actors involved, 
on a set of indicators considered to be the reforms’ key objectives, such as 
choice, responsiveness, quality and efficiency.
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Table 4.1 Effects of the pro-market reforms in Sweden and the UK as revealed in the literature
Indicator United Kingdom Sweden
Freedom of choice -  
Patient's influence
• No increases in choice for patients and purchasers in some 
cases even less
• Fund-holders do not seem to offer significantly more 
choices to their patients
• Patients’ opportunity to choose medical provider has 
increased
• There is a conflict between freedom of choice and the 
possibility of cost control
Information • No research directed at this evaluation.
• Indirect evidence suggests that the changes are minute
• No evidence apart from anecdotal indications about 
patients demanding more information
Quality- Patients’ 
orientation
•  No evidence of quality being significantly reduced or 
increased
• New developments for fund-holders’ patients which may 
imply higher quality but as yet unproven (outreach clinics)
• Satisfaction with service higher in first years of reforms but 
maybe related to increased funding
• There is no overwhelming evidence of quality being 
decisively impaired
• Indications about too early discharges with possibly 
negative impact on quality
• The lack of a system for describing qualitative changes 
have been exposed
• The development of quality work has been encouraged
Responsiveness to 
need -  waiting times
• Average waiting times and very long waits have decreased 
but waiting times on the whole have remained unchanged
• Incentives for misreporting the actual waiting times
• Waiting times have impressively decreased during the first 
two years of reforms which may also be related to other 
factors
• Waiting times reappeared after blunting market incentives 
and reducing money
Productivity, Efficiency 
and the Impact o f 
Technology
•  Clear efficiency gains for trusts even if higher management 
and administrative costs are deducted
• Freedom of trusts to achieve the potential efficiency gains 
is curtailed
• Evidence on GPFH efficiency gains is mixed and even 
when it happens it may be due to more generous funding
• The structural changes leading to efficiency are mostly an 
effect of spending cuts and new medical technology
• A certain reallocation of resources from hospital care to 
primary care
Source: Various referred to in the preceding chapter and compiled by the author
II METHODS
CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the research methodology. It explains how the 
methodological framework was used to address the research question on the 
one hand and to isolate the effects and factors that may confound with it on the 
other. The first part justifies the use of cataract surgery as a tracer condition by 
discussing the criteria used for its selection. The second and third parts are 
devoted to the discussion of general and service specific methodological 
considerations respectively and conclude by outlining methodological constraints. 
The fourth part provides a detailed description of the sample characteristics, time 
frame and tools used for investigating the main aspects of the selected 
indicators.
5.1 Selection of cataract surgery as a tracer condition
An evaluation of the impact of reforms on the range of concepts often regarded 
as elusive implied trade-offs between the depth of evaluation and its 
comprehensiveness, which is reflected in the set of indicators used (for details 
see Annex I, Table 1). The other decision was to use one single service 
combining the criteria of clinical effectiveness with features suitable for tracing 
the organisational changes attributable to reforms. It had to be a common 
procedure, easy to perform and measure, experiencing high levels of demand 
and be representative of a case study for reform. The criteria on the basis of 
which the particular intervention was chosen and used for examining the impact 
of reforms are analysed below.
5.1.1 Criteria used for service selection
Several parameters were taken into account when selecting cataract surgery as 
a tracer condition for the purposes of this study. The foremost concern was that 
reforms must have produced readily apparent recommendations for this 
particular service. Indeed, many of the initial changes were focused on elective
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care and cataract surgery was one of the examples of procedures commonly 
referred to for illustrating the potential advantages of the internal market (Mahon 
et al, 1994).
The other two criteria were considered on purely methodological grounds. The 
compliance with the recommendations of reforms that could be proved by 
reviewing hospital's clinical records was one of them. This in the case of cataract 
surgery was relatively easy to fulfill. The aggregate data on throughput such as 
the number of operations performed both as day care and inpatient cases and 
their prices could be obtained from departmental records. It was also assumed 
that data intended for process indicators such as the number of waiting patients 
for the operation and the first appointment would exist and will be made available 
by most of the hospitals. However, this was rarely the case. In order to obtain 
some information on clinical outcomes audit data of an indicative sample of 
patients of the pilot site were analysed.
Also the procedure needed to affect enough patients to permit the development 
of a feasible sampling frame. This criterion could be easily fulfilled with respect to 
the cataract surgery because of the high prevalence of lens opacification 
(blurring) in the general population, which is commonly known as cataract. This 
led to the increased demand for surgery that restores vision by replacing the 
obscured lens with an intra-ocular lens implant (Williams et al, 1992; Batterbury 
et al, 1991). The widespread use of the treatment procedure was seen as the 
facilitating factor in the process of data collection, which was also confirmed in 
reality.
5.1.2 Cataract surgery and its suitability for measuring the impact of 
the reforms
Cataracts are the leading cause of blindness, and especially avoidable blindness, 
both in the developed and even more so in the developing world. This makes 
cataract surgery one of the most commonly performed surgical procedures 
worldwide (Bernth-Petersen, 1986; Steinberg et al, 1991; WHO, 1989). Age- 
related cataract extraction constitutes the main workload of ophthalmic services
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(Courtney, 1992; Salive et al, 1990) and formed the bulk of ophthalmic waiting 
lists in the UK (Davidge et al, 1987; Goldacre et al, 1987) and Sweden 
(Glennerster et al, 1992; Federation of Swedish County Councils, 1993) during 
the pre-reform period. It is predicted that the growing numbers of elderly patients 
will increase the demand for this intervention significantly, which will have clear 
implications for resources. It may also become the 'case-in-point,' illustrating the 
priorities for health services that will be increasingly set by purchasers and 
decision makers (Williams et al, 1994; Mason et al, 1993).
Cataract surgery is also an intervention of proven and high rehabilitative 
effectiveness, which has been established through measurement of clinical 
outcomes such as visual functioning index combined with improvement in visual 
acuity, quantitative assessment of rehabilitation and analysis of outcome 
predictions (Bemth-Petersen, 1982; Bemth-Petersen, 1986). The clinical 
effectiveness also corresponds to high utility values that patients derive from the 
impact on their health status accruing from this procedure (Drummond, 1988; 
Torrance et al, 1982). Consequently, pertinent and valid outcomes, expressed 
both in clinical terms and functional health status, can be relatively easily 
identified (Torrance et al, 1982).
When a proper cost-benefit analysis was conducted it proved, moreover, that 
monetary benefits exceeded costs by a sufficiently wide margin, making the 
procedure worthwhile, even without taking into account the intangible benefits of 
increased sight (Drummond, 1988; Drummond et al, 1991). A few attempts to 
apply cost-effectiveness types of economic evaluation and to consider the cost of 
competing alternatives were also performed. They were aimed at measuring and 
comparing the costs and effects of alternatives such as surgery and non-surgical 
options, the costs and outcomes of day care versus inpatient care (Davies et al, 
1987; Perceival et al, 1992), and the costs of private and public hospital 
treatment based on the length of stay variations (Clayton et al, 1989). Cataract 
surgery proved to be a relatively cost-effective procedure throughout all these 
measurements.
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A large cross-national project initiated by the American PORT (Patient Outcome 
Research Team) aiming, among other targets, at measuring the costs associated 
with alternative strategies for the treatment of cataracts and defining the 
appropriate level of care for different categories of patients has recently been 
concluded (Salive et al, 1990). The results of the study on the range of outcomes 
of cataract surgery serve as a useful tool, highlighting the extent of coincidence 
of clinical outcomes with functional ones.
Cataract surgery is also a good subject for measuring patients’ satisfaction and 
the self-assessed outcomes of care. This can be inferred from the interesting 
results yielded by studies that applied questionnaire methods in order to elicit 
patients’ views on various aspects of cataract surgery (Davies et al, 1992; Lowe 
et al, 1991). They demonstrated high levels of satisfaction with the outcomes of 
surgery and the care given at all stages, especially when it was combined with 
the continuity aspect (Lowe et al, 1991; Lowe et al, 1992). The results of surveys 
looking into patients’ preferences, regarding day care versus inpatient care, 
showed an overwhelming preference in favor of day surgery. This choice was 
significant even when some inconvenience involving traveling had to be incurred 
(Davies et al, 1992; Perceival et al, 1992; Strong et al, 1991).
There are also a few general points of concern, which have to be discussed.
First, there was little evidence on the relative benefit, when it was not simply 
compared with other elective procedures, but when it was applied to different 
case mix-groups of patients that underwent cataract surgery. There was also 
uncertainty about the appropriate level of treatment and there was little 
information as to when and for whom the maximum benefit would be achieved 
when applying this otherwise cost-beneficial procedure (Drummond, 1988; 
Drummond et al, 1991).
Second, the clinical outcomes depend on a range of factors. They relate to the 
surgical-indicators, complications, the type of correction that is required, as well 
as the individual patients’ characteristics that involved the pre-existing co­
pathology of the eye, the medication taken and, more generally, the social
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circumstances. In addition, the clinical outcomes are measured as post-operative 
improvements in visual acuity in relation to the rates of post-operative 
complications. In order to apply the functional status measurements, there is a 
need to reorient them towards examining the extent of congruency between 
those two types of outcomes (Williams et al, 1992; Williams et al, 1994).
Third, the problem of a high level of variations that may be unjustified on clinical, 
epidemiological or any other evidence-based grounds is also apparent in this 
case. This not only refers to differences in surgical rates among metropolitan 
areas but also extends to the management approaches that are chosen by 
respective ophthalmic clinics and surgeons throughout all the various phases 
(preoperative, intra-operative and post-operative) of care (Williams et al, 1992; 
Williams et al, 1994). This may be regarded as reflecting the global problem of 
tremendous uncertainty that is inherent in medical practice (Eddy, 1984). 
However, uncertainty at the collective level does not necessarily indicate that an 
individual physician will be uncertain about the appropriate practice they use as 
pointed out by Giraud (Giraud, 1992).
The implications for the service selected start at the very first stage when a 
variability of indications for surgery, accruing from the lack of universally 
accepted standards, occurs. This in consequence determines the number of 
cases that are primarily categorised as qualified to benefit from the surgery, 
which is too often based on variable and arbitrary criteria. Furthermore, progress 
in surgical techniques and improved outcomes of surgery have undoubtedly 
influenced the threshold at which surgery is offered, which might exacerbate the 
variations in practice even further.
Finally, significant changes in surgical methods for cataract extraction, which 
have occurred since the introduction of microsurgical techniques and intra-ocular 
lens implants, have most certainly influenced the indications for surgery 
themselves. Consequently the adopted techniques, which by no means follow a 
universal pattern, determine the number of cases that undergo cataract surgery 
(Courtney, 1992; Williams, 1992). More recent developments, such as the shift to 
day care surgery (Perceival et al, 1992; Thomas et al, 1992; Watts et al, 1988)
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and more advanced surgical techniques (including phacoemulsification and post­
operative visual correction) mean that the total number of cataract operations 
performed must have increased yet further.
5.2 Methodological considerations
The next sections dicusses the set of methodological considerations dealing with 
the service selected and also discusses the general methodological constraints 
related to the problems encountered in the process of outcome measurement. It 
also raises the issues concerned with the counterfactual evidence, where it 
explaines how the changes that occurred simultaneously were disentagled from 
the effects of the reforms per se. In its final part, it dicusses the methodological 
contraints accruing from the sample characteristics, the problems with 
generalisability of the case study and the limitations that are involved in the 
international comparisons.
5.2.1 General considerations
There are some methodological issues that raise important general 
considerations regardless of the type of service and/or outcomes that are 
evaluated. The initial problem encountered in evaluating any type of health 
outcome resulting from health care intervention is a conceptual one. There are 
several components of the definition of health outcomes, but the degree of 
attributability of each causal factor that is part of the process is still incomplete 
(Long et al, 1993a; Long et al, 1993b; Shanks et al, 1993). Therefore, the health 
care effects of any type of process, both within and outside of the health service, 
on health perse  have to be recognised at the beginning of the evaluation. In an 
attempt to formulate a research question the first step is to specify them and then 
to establish in which way each of them has contributed to the final result.
The first issue was to decide between outcomes and process indicators that 
should become subject of our measurement. For the purpose of this study 
process indicators were chosen over outcomes because they were still very
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rudimentary and incomplete when this study was designed. Although in the past 
few years the emphasis has been on building outcome measurement into the 
routine clinical management of departments and hospitals in the UK, this was 
attempted through the identification of outcome measures based mainly on the 
existing data.
Both before the introduction of the reforms and at their early stages of 
implementation, British purchasers had been using activity outcomes for 
assessing the quality of the services they demanded, supplemented by specific 
audit activities (Fitzpatrick et al, 1992; Shanks et al, 1993). They were usually 
conducted under the banner of evaluating the targets of the "Health of the 
Nation,” but later on also tried to follow the recommendations of the “The 
Patient's Charter" (DoH, 1991b; DoH 1991a; DoH, 1995a), which dealt with 
process and not outcome indicators though.
Those measurements in the UK were basically derived from performance 
indicators that were promulgated by the Department of Health. They were 
predominantly focused on resource input and cost/volume (throughput), as well 
as process indicators such as waiting time for referral and waiting time on 
admission, length of stay and waiting time for the elective procedure itself.
There were also attempts to link the processes to the outcomes by using 
indicators such as 'Consultant Completed Episodes’, which included the concept 
of continuity of care and the necessity for readmission after the procedure was 
completed. In Sweden there were no routine procedures for measuring outcomes 
as such during the pre-reform period and even after the reforms the performance 
indicators that were increasingly used at the initial stage of the Stockholm Model 
were expressed in terms of productivity measures (Jonsson et al, 1994).
Outcome measurement is an important objective in its own right. When 
clarification of the causes and effects is not feasible, recognising and measuring 
an outcome that serves as a meaningful indicator of the change should always 
be attempted even if the underlying causes remain only partially identified as is 
quite often the case in health care, (Shanks et al, 1993).
115
For measuring outcomes in terms of quality of life, functional indicators dealing 
with aspects such as utility derived from the use of particular service are often 
used. Those measures were not applied in this study, as it was not deemed 
feasible to examine them in a ‘before and after1 period. The methodological 
complexity of the task is related to the lack of specific questionnaires, limited 
applicability of the existing generic ones and problems associated with devising 
special ones for this purpose as it has been stressed in the relevant literature 
(Schumacher et al, 1991).
A number of life-oriented indicators, such as mortality rates and avoidable 
premature mortality, are not regarded as sensitive measures of quality of care, 
given the variety of factors that these types of outcome may be correlated with. In 
particular, they cannot be used for cataract surgery at all, as this condition does 
not result in death, neither does it fall into the category of avoidable mortality. 
Moreover, even when considering morbidity indicators such as prevalence rates, 
their usefulness becomes increasingly limited because of changing patterns of 
diseases, diffusion of new medical technologies and the increased range of 
treatment options (Morris et al, 1993). Consequently, in this study the focus was 
not on these types of indicators.
It is generally argued that the clinical, functional and patient satisfaction 
outcomes used as indicators in the evaluation studies should be critically 
appraised with regards to a number of aspects (Bardsley et al, 1992; Fitzpatrick 
et al, 1992). These are primarily concerned with their internal validity, reliability, 
variability and comprehensibility. They also refer to the definitions of variables 
and outcomes, their measurement and eventual quality of data, the treatment of 
confounders and the sample selection, and the statistical power of instruments 
used.
Furthermore, the clear specification of the hypothesis and methods of the data 
analysis before inspections of the results is crucial. In addition, external validity 
or, in another words, the generalisability of results is equally important and needs 
to be tested, as it is also important to perform an analysis of its sensitivity and 
responsiveness to change. The latter can be defined as the ability to detect
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relatively small but significant clinical changes in the condition over time. Finally, 
the instruments’ capacity to produce the same results if reapplied to the same 
situation needs to be assured.
5. 2.2 Service specific methodoiogical considerations
Apart from the general methodological considerations, there are also a number of 
serious practical difficulties that arise for any healthcare service chosen for 
outcome measurement, which were identified by the UK Clearing House on 
Health Outcomes (Long et al, 1993a; Long et al 1993b). An explanation of how 
the requirements were fulfilled for the selected service used in this study follows:
Clear definition o f the treatment episode
A cataract is a focal or diffuse opacification (blurring) of the transparent lens or its 
enclosing membrane, which interferes with the transmission and refraction of 
light rays within the eye. This results in diminution of vision, which is due to the 
scattering of the light within the lens, which leads to the impairment of the 
focusing of images in the retina (Hart, 1992) (see Fig. 5.1). Moreover, the 
cataract can predispose the patient to other conditions of ocular co-pathology or 
delay the diagnosis of other potentially treatable conditions (i.e. diabetic 
retinopathy).
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Figure 5.1 Diagram m atic section of the human eye
(Adapted after Hart, 1992 "Adler s physiology o f  the eye ")
Surgery is currently the only method of treatment for a cataract with non-invasive 
treatment being a subject of research investigation, though no conclusive results 
have so far been achieved (Cheng, 1987; Kador, 1983). The therapy available for 
restoring blurred vision involves extraction of the opacified (hazy) lens, and is 
usually followed by Intraocular Lens Implantation (IOL). The development of IOL 
has been of considerable assistance in increasing both the acceptability and 
ease of the procedure and the quality of outcome. The most recently applied 
techniques, such as phacoemulsificaton and post-operative visual correction, will 
probably improve this process even more (Williams et al, 1994).
The period of data collection must be long enough
This is to ensure that all relevant effects will appear or that a sufficiently large 
sample can be studied. The cataract surgery is performed on 1.2 bln 
beneficiaries of the Medicare in the United States annually (Steinberg et al,
1993). The surgery rates performed each year in the UK vary from 100 to 250 
per 100.000 of the resident population in different areas of the country (Williams 
et al, 1993) and are also relatively high. These are at even higher rate for 
Sweden (between 250 to 400 per 100.000 of residents) (Swedish Association of
118
Ophthalmologists 1993-95; Federation of County Councils; 1993; Eckerlund etal,
1992) making it an easy subject for data collection for the purpose of this study.
5.2.3 Problems of counter!actual evidence
In designing the methodology, it was necessary to establish which of the 
changes simultaneously occurring outside the reforms’ framework contributed to 
their aims. Two aspects were considered.
First, the increase in resources that may have smoothed the way for the reforms, 
giving a false impression of the perceived efficiency gains, (as different sources 
suggested) was the case in Britain (Radical Statistical Health Group, 1992; 
Butler, 1994). In Sweden a similar situation occurred. For instance, it was quite 
difficult to ascertain whether many observed increases in efficiency and reduction 
in waiting lists for elective surgery could be attributed to the organisational 
changes brought by public competition alone or whether this was the result of a 
significant increase in the resources that were deployed (Federation of County 
Councils, 1993). This was one of the limitations that had to be accounted for.
Second, for any positive or negative conclusion as to quality and efficiency of 
production resulting from reforms, the counterfactual evidence of what could 
otherwise have happened, had reforms not interfered with the course of action, 
also had to be tackled. Such was the impact, for example, of organisational 
changes stimulated by the market reforms, and the advances in adoption of 
technological innovation for example day care surgery and/or 
phacoemulsification techniques. Day care cataract surgery, a highly cost- 
effective procedure, (Davies et al, 1987; Perceival et al, 1992) and of probably 
even higher quality than conventional method, if patient satisfaction is taken into 
account, (Loewe et al, 1991; Loewe et al, 1992) was well suited to meet these 
requirements.
It was known that changes in medical technology (including a shift to day care 
surgery) had an impact on the increase in the number of operations performed. 
One of the hypotheses of this study dealt with the role of the reforms in the
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process of speeding up the adoption of cost-effective procedures. If this was the 
case, it meant that the effects of diffusion of medical technology on quality or 
efficiency of care delivery could not be easily dissociated from the impact of the 
reforms, because they were introduced concurrently. In order to detect the extent 
to which these arrangements were a result of the reforms and how much were 
they due to other independent factors the following questions were rigorously 
examined:
Did the reforms stimulate change where nothing else would have 
otherwise happened?
This probably was the most difficult question to answer as it was largely confined 
to the sphere of pure speculation. The only way of attempting it would be to 
employ theoretical predictions and analyse the trends that existed previously. 
Even then any confidence about the validity of conclusions would be limited. This 
problem was addressed by probing the views and perception of all groups of 
respondents who were asked to comment on the dynamics of different aspects of 
the service in the periods before and after the reforms.
Did the reforms accelerate changes that were already under way?
Some of the results stimulated by means of reforms, which are of particular 
relevance to this service such as the expansion of day care surgery, might have 
been happening simultaneously. However, as can be inferred from the literature, 
at the same time the rates of cataract day surgery for Britain were significantly 
lower than those of other industrialised countries (Davies et al, 1987; Perceival et 
al, 1992; Thomas et al, 1992; Williams et al, 1992). What this study argues, is 
that reforms introduced incentives criteria for efficient producers thereby 
stimulating them to find new ways of less costly delivery of care of acceptable or 
higher quality such as day care surgery for example.
The argument that reforms prompted a more widespread use of day case 
surgery, while being plausible for the UK, was not equally relevant for Sweden as 
its rate was comparable to the trends in other industrialised countries (Davies et
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al, 1987; Effective Care Bulletin, 1996). It was certainly less relevant for the 
Stockholm area where 80% of cataract cases were already performed as day 
cases at the beginning of the 1980s and were widely applied throughout the 
1990s, a fact that placed Sweden in a very high position in comparisons with 
other OECD countries when rates of day care surgery performed were measured 
(see Table 5.1). For this reason, the evaluation of the effect of the reforms on the 
adoption of day care, was mainly restricted to the UK.
Table 5.1 Day care surgery in selected OECD countries in years 1994-96
Country Year of 
measurement
Percentage of operatio 
performed as day care 
procedures
USA 1994 93%
Sweden 1996 88%
Canada 1995/96 76%
New Zealand 1995 58%
The Netherlands 1995 58%
United Kingdom 1995 46%
Denmark 1995 41%
Belgium 1995 39%
Ireland 1994 38%
Australia 1996 35%
Finland 1995 32%
Luxembourg 1995 19%
OCED 49%
Source: OECD Health Data (1997)
Did the research question address an area with a great need for change, and 
which was likely to be influenced by reforms or was it an area in which quality of 
service and level o f satisfaction were already high?
It is difficult to ascertain whether quality of service provision in case of cataract surgery 
was universal or whether satisfaction was equally high except for the proven benefits 
and utility that patients could derive from the procedure. However, it is also known that 
long waiting lists for some elective procedures including cataract were one of the
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commonly quoted examples in the debates concerning unmet need and the usefulness 
of market incentives in tackling this issue (Maynard, 1993b; Hutton, 1993).
In 1991 people awaiting cataract surgery in the UK and Sweden were over 50.000 in 
each country respectively, although the threshold for cataract operations in Sweden is 
much lower. It is set explicitly and not left to the discretion of the clinicians as it is in the 
UK. It was in this context that cataract surgery was considered to be an area where the 
likely implications on quality of care could be demonstrated. It was also expected that the 
reforms were likely to have a positive influence on enhancing the responsiveness of 
health care system that would manifest in higher throughput and decreases in waiting 
times.
5.2.4 Methodological constraints
Constraints related to the service and the sample’s characteristics
The generalisability of the results may to some degree be constrained by the 
type of service selected, which, although justified both on the grounds of its 
relevance to reforms and also its representativeness for health services, may still 
pose some problems. These relate to the age of users, the high specialism 
involved in the service modalities and the size of the sample.
The most significant limitation relates to the age factor of patients, which is one of 
the important respondent groups. The national audit on clinical outcomes for 
cataract surgery, conducted on behalf of the Royal College of Ophthalmologists, 
has shown that the mean age for men undergoing cataract surgery is 75.9 years 
and for women 76.8 years (Courtney, 1992). Although these figures were not 
exactly confirmed in the sample of this study, the overall age related limitations 
apply here too.
In the case of choice this may for example be reflected in patient priorities when 
choosing the location of the hospital for their operation. Moreover, their 
expectations of service may be quite different from those of other age groups, 
brought up outside the framework that created a universal healthcare service
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such as the NHS example, which may in turn introduce bias into their responses 
on quality evaluation. Finally, age related frailty and dependency on public 
services could constrain them from expressing views that may sound critical.
On the other hand, the importance of this age group, which is already significant, 
is likely to grow even more so in the near future (Jones et al, 1994; Hakansson, 
1998). This is primarily because of the sheer size of the elderly population, 
which, by the year 2020, may be as high as 25% of the total population (for 
details see Fig. 5.2) for countries like Japan. But also in the case of both the UK 
and Sweden this rise during the same period is quite significant although more 
stable. It is projected that for Sweden it will increase more than two and a half 
times reaching something less than 20% while for the UK it will be below 15%, 
again reaching almost the double value in 2020 of what it were in the 1950s (for 
details see Fig.5.2).
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Another limitation relates to the use of a highly specialised service for measuring 
patients’ choice for example where the technical complexity involved may 
intimidate them and impede their choices from being fully expressed. High 
specialism of the service may also create additional difficulties in proper 
understanding and relating to the information provided.
The third constraint relates to the problems of limitations in the generalisability of 
results encountered when researching a case study. Additional difficulties are 
unearthed when the methodology used relates strongly on qualitative techniques 
because it limits the size of sample significantly thus increasing the errors of bias. 
This held for all samples but was especially relevant when an attempt was made 
to compare the reactions of General Practitioners fund-holders with non fund­
holders, which was restricted by the total number of GPs and fund-holding 
respondents in particular that were interviewed in study sites of this research.
On the other hand, the purpose of a case study, investigated by means of 
qualitative methods is to provide a deeper understanding into the causes and 
highlight the underlying layers and factors that determine the final outcomes of 
specific policies and which can research by means of qualitative interviews 
(Britten 1995; Baum, 1995).
Purpose for conducting international comparisons and their limitations
International comparisons provide an important source of information against 
which the performance of the specific health system can be measured. They can 
also provide insight into the different solutions for common and/or similar 
problems, which acquire an additional weight in the age of rapid change and 
globalisation with less space for separate policies (Ranade, 1998). However, 
these so far are also fraught with many problems that mainly relate to the 
absence of common standards and variable quality of data. As a result different 
things are measured or the same things are measured differently and compared 
against each other (Schieber et al, 1991; Schieber et al, 1993). This leads quite 
often to significant inaccuracies that are involved in these comparisons.
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Figure 5.2 Actual and projected proportion of the elderly to the total population.
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Source: Hakansson (1998) Health Economics of Dementia. John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Another limitation relates to the use of a highly specialised service for measuring 
patients’ choice for example where the technical complexity involved may 
intimidate them and impede their choices from being fully expressed. High 
specialism of the service may also create additional difficulties in proper 
understanding and relating to the information provided.
The third constraint relates to the problems of limitations in the generalisability of 
results encountered when researching a case study. Additional difficulties are 
unearthed when the methodology used relates strongly on qualitative techniques 
because it limits the size of sample significantly thus increasing the errors of bias. 
This held for all samples but was especially relevant when an attempt was made 
to compare the reactions of General Practitioners fund-holders with non fund­
holders, which was restricted by the total number of GPs and fund-holding 
respondents in particular that were interviewed in study sites of this research.
On the other hand, the purpose of a case study, investigated by means of 
qualitative methods is to provide a deeper understanding into the causes and 
highlight the underlying layers and factors that determine the final outcomes of 
specific policies and which can research by means of qualitative interviews 
(Britten 1995; Baum, 1995).
Purpose for conducting international comparisons and their limitations
International comparisons provide an important source of information against 
which the performance of the specific health system can be measured. They can 
also provide insight into the different solutions for common and/or similar 
problems, which acquire an additional weight in the age of rapid change and 
globalisation with less space for separate policies (Ranade, 1998). However, 
these so far are also fraught with many problems that mainly relate to the 
absence of common standards and variable quality of data. As a result different 
things are measured or the same things are measured differently and compared 
against each other (Schieber et al, 1991; Schieber et al, 1993). This leads quite 
often to significant inaccuracies that are involved in these comparisons.
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On the whole however, if these limitations are taken into account it can be a 
rewarding and worthwhile exercise because it provides unique information on the 
different approaches and solutions to similar problems. It can reduce uncertainty 
and by dissemination of good practice it can serve as an input to policy making. 
Also different countries with similar conditions, such as for instance, income, can 
compare their performance with their peer group.
5.3 Detailed methodology
In this section the details of the methodological framework are outlined. It was 
designed to tackle successfully the problems of measurement of the impact of 
pro-market’s policies on the set of selected indicators, while isolating effects that 
were unrelated to reforms. The instruments applied for this purpose are 
presented below. The next section expounds on the criteria used for choosing 
the study sites, the time scale and characteristics of the samples and the ways 
used for constructing the questionnaires.
5.3.1 Methodological framework used
This section presents a review of available outcome and process measurements 
for cataract surgery with the characteristics that may serve as proxies for 
outcomes. These concern the choice of processes versus outcomes, which is 
based on the availability of the former and discussion of the reasons that led to 
the preference of qualitative methodology. In addition the rationale for using the 
perspective of the different actors is outlined in the section presenting the 
detailed methodology.
Processes and outcomes for cataract surgery
Clinical outcomes for cataract surgery are measured as the change in pre and 
post-operative visual acuity expressed in the Snellen scale with the improvement 
in vision of 6/12 being considered as a satisfactory outcome. However, as has 
been suggested, the indications for surgery increasingly follow the trend of
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operating at an earlier stage, which may also change the notion of improvement 
of visual acuity (Batterbury et al 1991; Williams et al, 1992; Williams et al, 1994). 
Pre and post-operative visual acuity is also correlated to risk factors such as 
coexisting ocular pathology (i.e. diabetic retinopathy, glaucoma, and iritis).
On the other hand, process based outcome measures such as relapses, 
readmission rates and complications are of limited relevance to cataract surgery, 
because if the operation is not successful, for whatever reason, it cannot be 
performed again, thus making a relapse a non-applicable process-based 
outcome indicator. Also, readmissions for complications after cataract surgery 
are quite often found to be in reality related to other conditions common in the 
elderly (Cox et al, 1998). Thus readmission rates for conditions related to 
operative or post-operative complications (that may be immediate or distant, 
manifesting after three months period), while being more meaningful, are rarely 
considered as sensitive outcome indicators.
The type of complications and their frequency is closely related to the surgical 
technique (Acheson et al, 1988; Cheng, 1987; OCTET I, 1986), as well as 
anaesthesia (Davies et al, 1897), and it is obviously correlated with co-existing 
ocular pathology (Perceival et al, 1992; Davies et al; 1987; Desai, 1993). 
Complication rates may occur in all the stages of the surgical procedure, such 
the intra-operative stage, which may result in vitreous loss and tears of the 
posterior capsula. During the immediate post-operative period, (next day) iris 
prolapse and high intraocular pressure are most likely to happen and in the first 
post-operative period (one week) retina detachment and central macular oedema 
are the most common complications (Courtney, 1992; Desai, 1993).
If these complications are used for the purpose of measurement they would also 
have to be correlated with factors outlined above and would also need to be 
adjusted for surgical techniques such as phacoemulsifcation and extracapsular 
extraction with intraocular lens implantation.
For the purpose of this study, a small audit was conducted at the pilot site where 
the case notes of 53 patients, operated on during a two month period in 1996,
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were examined with reference to clinical outcomes and complication rates. These 
were then examined as regards their correlation with the surgeon’s grade and 
surgical technique used. This small study was aimed at testing the links (if any) 
between the technique used (the conventional extra-capsular extraction or the 
newest phacoemulsification small incision technique) and the operating 
surgeon’s grade (consultant, service grade or trainee) with clinical outcomes and 
complication rates (for details see Annex I).
The assumption was that the organisational changes and incentives to perform 
efficiently, introduced by market-oriented reforms would stimulate innovation, 
contributing to the attainment of these objectives. In other words, they would be 
responsible for the adoption of technologies and the other inputs including the 
skill mix of the team.
Qualitative versus quantitative methods
It was decided that for the purpose of this study a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies should be used to capture the range of phenomena 
occurring for different indicators employed in this study. It has been recognized 
that such a mix best reflects the complexity involved in evaluating public health 
issues despite the tendency to follow the artificial dichotomy approach in 
considering quantitative-qualitative methods and the limited application of the 
combined approach which in health service research is still much too common 
(Baum, 1995).
This on the one hand, happens because the quantitative methodology with its too 
strong reliance on statistical methods that imply straightforward causality, deeply 
rooted in the positivist tradition of medical science, appears to be hopelessly 
reductionist in the view it provides of health issues (Holman, 1993; Silverman,
1993). On the other hand, qualitative techniques were until recently regarded as 
being too “soft,” and thus not capable of providing real evidence, which might 
have been largely influenced by the quality of their design that was not always 
high (Mays et al, 1996b).
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While this contradiction is essentially a discourse between positivism and 
interactionism that belongs to the realm of epistemology, the tendency to 
combine these two different approaches and to acquire deeper and more 
comprehensive understanding of issues involved in healthcare is increasingly 
common in the health policy arena (Mays et al, 1996b; McKinlay, 1993; Baum, 
1995). This is because while quantitative tools can be best used for drawing the 
broad picture of facts and problems contained in a given subject, qualitative 
methods can highlight the underlying causes and reasons providing an answer 
why these occur in the first place (Silverman, 1993; Mays et al, 1996b; Britten,
1995). In addition, this plurality of methods, which is reflected in their 
combination, helps to delineate the boundaries of the general approach and bring 
the importance of individual factors into context (Baum, 1995).
In this study qualitative research methods were primarily relied upon in 
conducting the interviews with all respondent groups. Some respondent groups, 
such as patients, were randomly selected, but for some other groups purposive 
sampling techniques were used. Interviews with patients’ samples were 
conducted using the structured and semi-structured questionnaire and less and 
no in-depth interviews were applied to a lesser degree. This was determined by 
the nature and the scope of questions asked of patients, which were relatively 
limited when compared to the multiple aspects of the same issues that were 
raised with other respondents. The size of sample in the former case also acted 
as a limiting factor in performing the full scale in depth interviews with all 
concerned.
On the contrary, a combination of semi-structured and in depth interviews was 
chiefly relied upon when quizzing consultant eye surgeons, General 
Practitioners, managers and purchasers (for details see Appendix II). The 
method used was that issues that were investigated for patients as the first 
respondent group were examined in the form of open-ended questions, but the 
key concepts, identified in an aide memoire were then probed in depth (see 
below section 5.4). In order to assure uniformity of style and comparability of 
results, the same person conducted all interviews.
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Qualitative methods were used for content analysis of the transcribed interviews 
and textual analysis for examining the quality specifications and arrangements 
devised to monitor it. These were contained in the contracts that collective 
purchasers (Districit Health Authorities in the UK and County Councils in 
Sweden) had concluded with specialist providers. Quantitative methodology was 
used for identifying the correlations between outcomes and complication rates on 
the one hand, and surgical techniques and surgeons grades on the other.
Statistical analysis was performed to identify whether the changes in the 
numbers of day care procedures performed in the earlier period had any 
significance. In addition, changes in the dynamics of the length of waiting lists 
(for surgery and the first specialist appointment), using both departmental data 
and those recorded in the national league tables, were analysed, partly using 
statistical methods.
The use of the computer programme NUD*IST version 4 as an aid for analyzing 
the interview data was also explored but it was decided that the analysis of data 
manually was the preferred option. I found that the programme was good at 
producing rudimentary links; but it missed important fragments from the interview 
excerpts that were relevant but not directly linked to the identified categories. 
Surprisingly, the large amount of data proved to be easier and more flexibly 
managed using manual processing rather when they were input into software 
programme.
Analysis of the data on waiting times and changes in the rates of day care 
surgery was performed using the statistical tools of the Excel programme 
ToolPak.
The context of the UK national policy documents ("Working for Patients”, 1989; 
“Promoting Better Health”, 1989; “Health of the Nation", 1989; “The Patient’s 
Charter, 1991; “The Patient’s Charter and You”, 1995) and the NHS 
Management Executive documents were analysed with the view to consider how 
institutional framework pertaining at the time impacted upon the individuals’ 
behaviour and the indicators that this study considered.
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Examining the perspectives o f different actors
The general condition that should be fulfilled by a measurement of activity is its 
relevance and its potential ability to be used by the different levels of health 
services. It was decided to use the same set of indicators and to examine their 
effects on the service from different levels and viewpoints. A modified welfare 
model developed and tested in the Stockholm area by Charpentier and 
Samuelson was used (Charpentier and Samuelson, 1994) to evaluate the effects 
of reforms on different aspects of care in the selected service. This implied that 
the variables of care such as quality, efficiency, choice, information and others 
were the inputs coming from the patients' perspective as well as from health care 
professionals, managers and purchasers.
For this purpose interviews with ophthalmic consultants, general practitioners, 
managers and patients were conducted in order to elicit their views with respect 
to the impact of reforms on chosen aspects of healthcare in both countries. In 
addition, the views of contracting directors of purchasing agencies on the quality 
were sought. The attempt was to replicate the same set of questions especially 
the ones that dealt with key aspects of care under investigation, which was 
reflected in the respective questionnaires (see Appendix II). Not all the examined 
aspects could be repeated in the same way for all the groups of respondents nor 
was the ratio between the structured and open-ended questions the same. An 
outline of the similarities and differences in the ways the same concepts were 
used for different groups of respondents is presented in Table 2 of the Appendix 
I.
Interviews with patients, for example, were oriented towards exploring their 
attitudes to changes, but also towards revealing their level of satisfaction with the 
services that were offered to them by the selected provider units before and after 
the reforms. Structured and semi-structured questionnaires were consequently 
used. Interviews with patients were focused on investigating the process of 
choice (type and extent), satisfaction with given information, changes in some 
aspects of waiting times, the perceived effectiveness of the operation, the 
attitude of the staff and overall satisfaction with the service.
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Consultant eye surgeons and General Practitioners were also questioned on the 
dynamics and effects of change, in addition to addressing the same issues as in 
the case of patients. These were related to issues such as the changes in the 
ethos of providers and the working environment, the impact on equity and the 
ability of providers to participate and influence the service. The effectiveness of 
the reforms in promoting their proclaimed aims and their interrelation with other 
simultaneously happening events were also researched. For example, the 
diffusion of technology and how this contributed to quality and efficiency 
outcomes, in addition to the increased funding, were investigated.
Semi-structured interviews and in-depth interviews were used for probing their 
views and recording their interpretation. Managers were asked about their 
perception of the changes and their contribution in shaping provider's new role in 
the internal market environment. Purchasers were quizzed with respect to their 
perspective on changes, including aspects of choice and information, but more 
importantly on the way providers responded to their needs (and their patients’ 
needs by extension). They were also questioned about the standards and 
specifications of services they used.
5.3.2 Development of the structured and semi-structured 
questionnaire
This study focused on a few aspects of perceptions of changes in the service and 
their evaluation of those changes. Only the ones that were most relevant to the 
selected service were investigated in full awareness of all the limitations and 
implications for the comprehensiveness of evaluation that this approach might 
preclude. However, it was not deemed feasible, nor was it the aim of the study, to 
simply record patient satisfaction oriented outcomes that could be performed by 
means of a survey.
The reasons for this concern are, on the one hand, conceptual, but also relate to 
the limitations of the survey itself. The former is connected to the notion of 
satisfaction, which is a multidimensional issue and there is so far no widely 
accepted unitary concept to underpin it (Carr-Hill, 1992). There have been some
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notable attempts in this field such as the development of a standardised 
questionnaire for evaluating patient satisfaction with day care surgery (Black et 
al, 1993a; Black et al, 1993b).
The major difficulty encountered when conducting surveys of satisfaction (and 
one that is not solely confined to these circumstances however) is the reluctance 
of patients to express dissatisfaction. In British studies, for example, this leads to 
a typical level of satisfaction response rates of up to 80-90% (Baker et al, 1992; 
Boufford et al, 1992; Carr-Hill, 1992). This can be overcome, to some extent, 
through the development of questionnaires where questions are modified to 
encourage a wide range of replies, as well as through differentiating categories 
that express moderate levels of satisfaction, or even more radically by actively 
seeking dissatisfaction (Carr-Hill, 1992).
This problem was not entirely eliminated, though, even with the fully confidential 
face to face interviews that this study used, but the impression is that it was 
significantly improved despite (or maybe because of) the foreign origin of the 
interviewer. In terms of the sample of respondents questioned in this study, this 
problem may be partly explained by the age-related dependency on the service 
that many patients perceive, which makes them fearful of expressing negative 
opinions. Another explanation was connected to the respondents’ educational 
and socio-economic status that may or may not be conducive to articulation of 
criticism.
There were also several other conditions that had to be fulfilled in the 
questionnaire’s design. The questionnaire had to be assessed with regard to its 
ability to secure findings that were meaningful. Content validity and face/criterion 
validity were tested through pilot work with patients. Construct validity was 
difficult to gauge because it is known to be the least easy to establish due to the 
lack of universal standards for satisfaction (Boufford, 1992). The questionnaire 
that was designed and used in addition to being valid and reliable had also to 
include questions about specific aspects of care, as they are considered to be 
less ambiguous and more sensitive than general questions (Black et al, 1993a;
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Black et al, 1993b). Open-ended questions were included to aid the interpretation 
of the responses of the preceding questions.
A low rate of response and bias in the overall results had to be anticipated and 
counteracted. In order to prevent this phenomenon, the co-operation of the 
consultant involved in the treatment was sought, and it is likely it had a positive 
influence on response rates from patients as only 15% of respondents declined 
to participate in the study. Maintaining the register of all patients that were invited 
to participate in the interviews was seen as an important part of the procedure to 
allow for assessing any non-responder bias in relation to the study site.
The questionnaire developed for the purpose of this study took its inspiration 
from a similar one applied for examining the impact of the Stockholm Model by 
Charpentier and Samuleson, (Charpentier and Samuleson, 1993) elements of 
which were used as a matrix for further work, with adjustments made to reflect 
the objectives of this research. It was divided into sections corresponding to the 
set of selected indicators. Each of the sections consisted of sub-divisions, which 
comprised several questions dealing with different aspects of each concept being 
investigated.
The strategy was to start the interview on each subject with a structured question 
(with types of possible answers listed), to continue with open-ended questions 
and to conclude with in-depth probing of some of the key aspects that were 
considered crucial to the research hypothesis. The attempt was to replicate the 
questionnaire as much as possible across the board of respondent groups, 
however, the specific insight that each group possessed had also to be 
accounted for in the questionnaires (for details see Appendix II). The analysis of 
the pilot project’s results was used for a slight redrafting of the questionnaires 
and modifications to the aide memoire (for details see below section 5.4).
5.3.3 Description of the study sites
A limited number of sites from the area of outer London that fulfilled the criteria of 
both diversity and representativeness, and the specialist eye hospital from the
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County Council of Stockholm were selected for the study. In the UK, four hospital 
sites were chosen (including the pilot site) from the area of outer London. One 
was a typical teaching hospital (coded as T) from inner city London, which 
covered areas of diversity and difference in the level of affluence. The other was 
an associated teaching hospital NHS Trust in the South London area, which, on 
the whole, covered an area of deprivation, but also had pockets of relative wealth 
(coded as S).
The third was a district NHS Trust hospital in the North London area, whose eye 
services at least could not successfully respond to new organizational 
environment and had in effect been negatively impacted by its trust status (coded 
as U). Its ophthalmic services had been closed down and moved to other sites 
and it was decided that the hospital should become a community hospital. It was 
situated in a middle-class and traditionally wealthy area.
The pilot study was conducted in a hospital in West London (coded as P). 
Although reforms were adopted by the hospital, there were no changes in the 
eye unit until 1995/96. Only then was it decided that the new eye unit would be 
re-established on the site of the old one, which was not unrelated, however, to 
changes happening in the other study site U, as the team of consultants who left 
it were hired by the hospital P.
This choice was based on the consideration of the fact that a diverse range of 
hospitals needed to be selected to represent the differences in hospital status 
(teaching, district and associated teaching), and to cover a wide range of 
populations served, including inner city and suburban areas with different socio­
economic statuses. The difference in the level of specialisation in terms of 
performing cataract surgery was also considered (including aspects such as use 
of day care surgery and the likely difference in the number of cases performed in 
the pre-reform period).
The diversity in the study sites selected was seen as important for examining and 
comparing the responses of different units to the same set of policies, and only 
hospitals that opted for a trust status were included in this study.
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Hospital T is a typical teaching hospital with old traditions and priorities, oriented 
towards postgraduate education, and, for this reason, might not be expected to 
react in the same manner as a typical district hospital to the competitive 
pressures accruing from the reforms it decided to follow. It was assumed that it 
could not be compared in terms of throughput, for example, with a district 
hospital such as unit U or S. Yet, the effects of reforms on the teaching hospital 
could not be disregarded because of the role it had to play in the health care 
system and the scheme of continuous postgraduate education.
Another assumption was that it could also be slower in adopting the newest 
techniques such as day care surgery because this would, in its case, require 
more rigorous trials before it being fully introduced. On the other hand, these 
constraints were less likely to hold for hospital S, which, while having an 
associated teaching hospital status, was at the same time an enthusiastic 
follower of innovation and of the reforms. Its experiments with day care surgery, 
for example, had already started at the very beginning of the 1990s.
In addition, it was relevant to investigate the reasons for the closure of the eye 
department in hospital U, which had occurred in the context of the reforms, 
though it had a seemingly high throughput and had followed a similar course of 
action in adopting reforms as the other units of the study. The investigation could 
lead to the identification of those factors introduced by the new arrangements 
that were conducive for this development and precipitated its final outcome.
Finally, hospitals’ willingness to participate in the study was not an unimportant 
factor influencing this choice as it was appreciated it would ensure access to 
information and co-operation during the data collection stages of the project. The 
last was enabled either through the researcher’s personal or family contacts.
In the case of Sweden it was decided that two or three hospitals from the area of 
Stockholm County Council would ideally serve the purpose of this research, both 
because of its size and its relatively early adoption of experiments with a 
purchaser-provider split and performance based payment systems. Stockholm
136
County Council is the largest and probably the most diverse county in the 
country, though it is not strictly comparable with the area of Outer London.
Following, and according to some influenced by the UK reforms (Whitehead et al, 
1997), Stockholm has also separated the functions of buyers of services from 
those who deliver them, replaced its traditional control over the budget with 
payment for services made on the basis of the DRG system and simultaneously 
gave more freedom of choice of provider to the patients (Charpentier and 
Samuelson, 1994).
However the eye units of three major hospitals merged into one specialist eye 
hospital (hereafter referred to as K) in 1992, which, while not being directly 
related to the reforms, was a manifestation of the pending changes. The 
influential players captured the gist of the time expressed as need for change in 
the field of health, which made this merger possible. This specialist eye hospital 
has since that point dominated the market, only leaving a niche for small private 
clinics to divide among themselves. It was decided that the study site in 
Stockholm County Council could, by definition, only be located in this hospital.
The participation of all hospitals was agreed with consultants, managers and 
purchasers and all were very keen to co-operate. Approval for conducting the 
research in the teaching hospital (T), which was an essential precondition, was 
obtained after the examination of a detailed research proposal by the ethical 
committee, comprising of 17 members of the trust.
5.3.4 Time scale,  size and the characteristics of the sample
It is not a proper before and after study although two periods chosen for 
comparison refer to pre and post reform intervals in time. The first period used for 
measurement was the immediate one before the reforms’ introduction beginning 
in 1991 in the UK and 1992 in Sweden, which coincided with the respective time 
that reforms were adopted in both countries. The second one is the period of four 
to five years after the reforms and it refers to the years 1995 and 1996. This was 
considered to be a sufficient time for a follow up evaluation as some stability
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within the system would have been achieved after the first phase of enthusiasm 
or rejection had subsided.
The selection of patients was random, in an average week during three different 
periods of time (February/March 1995, June/July 1995, and January/February
1996) representative of regular levels of productive activity. Two periods were 
avoided -  the immediate one before the end of the financial year due to a 
possible lack of resources and the possible bias reflected in respondents’ spirits. 
The period immediately following the beginning of the new financial year was 
also avoided because the relative abundance of money may have introduced a 
positive “optimistic” bias.
A three-week period was a sufficient time for extracting the sample of 
approximately 15 to 20 patients from each hospital. If the number of operations 
performed in the UK varies between providers from 100-250/per 100,000 
residents/year, as was known to be the case at the time when the study was 
initiated in autumn 1993, (Williams et al, 1992; Williams et al, 1993) then the 
number of patients operated on should average 30-35 per provider/per period. A 
figure of 20 should be reached after the percentage of patients “missed” for 
whatever reason is calculated (usually around 15-20%). In Sweden’s case the 
throughput of the specialist eye hospital was much higher and a period of one 
and half weeks in November 1995 was used for conducting all interviews with 
patients.
All patients who were present for post-operative assessment were asked about 
their willingness to participate in the study under conditions of full anonymity. The 
aggregate number of all patients interviewed was n=81 of which 52 were from the 
UK (including the pilot sample) and 29 were from Sweden.
In addition, General Practitioners from the three study areas in the UK (n=16), of 
which approximately 25% were fund-holders (4 out of 16), were also asked to 
participate in the study. In Sweden, our sample of primary care providers (n=5) 
was composed of three family doctors from two health centres, one private 
general practitioner and one non-surgical grade ophthalmologist. The
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representatives of purchasers (contracting managers, quality managers, and 
public health doctors n=9) from the respective Health Authorities in Outer London 
and the Western District of the County Council of Stockholm (n=6) were asked 
their views on the relevant issues, as were the managers and/or the executives 
of the respective provider units in both the UK (n= 5) and Sweden (n=3).
For identifying General Practitioners in the UK, complete registers provided by 
the Family Health Service Authorities of the respective areas (named H, I, N) 
were used, and all GPs listed were contacted in alphabetical order. In Stockholm, 
the County Council representatives were asked for assistance in providing a list 
of respective primary care providers (for details see Appendix III).
All consultant eye surgeons from the UK hospitals and senior eye surgeons from 
the Swedish hospital were asked, and agreed to be included in the study. 
Consultant eye surgeons and senior grades of ophthalmic surgeons working in 
the above units (n=13 in the UK and n=5 in Sweden) were interviewed (for details 
see Appendix III).
The response rate of patients was quite high in both countries (82% in the UK 
and 88% in Sweden). However, a significant number of General Practitioners 
(especially in the UK) seemed quite unwilling to devote any of their time to this 
research project. It was particularly high in the inner city area where those willing 
to participate represented a very modest 12% of all GPs registered. In two other 
suburban areas the respective figures ranged between 35-40%. This could 
possibly be explained by the low priority they attached to this research project, in 
the context of the time pressure they continuously face. Moreover, the specificity 
of working conditions in particular areas with transient a population may also 
have played a role.
In order to assure uniformity of style, all interviews were taken by the same 
person throughout 1995 and at the beginning of 1996. The pilot study was 
conducted in November 1994 and its results were used as input in the final draft 
of the questionnaire, while some of the new elements were also included in the 
aide memoire (for details see the section below).
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5.4 Measuring the market’s impact using selected 
indicators
The essential question from a methodological point of view was how to identify 
the best way of measuring the impact of internal market reforms and how to 
define the indicators that would best capture this impact. What were the most 
important functions of this impact and from which perspective are they seen as 
important?
A combination of process and outcome (including some clinical) indicators that 
were relevant to the selected service (cataract surgery) was used for testing the 
research hypothesis of this study. These dealt with greater efficiency, 
responsiveness to needs and more choice. In addition, some other aspects that 
economic analysis predicted would be affected by reforms such as information 
and quality of healthcare delivery were included as indicators of market impact. 
In short, the concepts incorporated into the set of selected indicators were linked 
to respective governments’ statements about the expected outcomes of the 
reforms. These were applied to the tracer condition to examine whether the 
expected changes in healthcare delivery were happening in reality (for details 
see Table 1, Annex I).
5.4.1 Choice
Different aspects of the choices given to the users of services were measured 
through the structured and semi-structured patient questionnaires, where the gist 
of questions asked was (for more details see Appendix II):
❖ Whether they were given a choice with regard to the preferred provider 
unit (i.e. with shorter waiting times or using different procedures) by the GPs, and 
i f  this choice was expressed, was it respected by the GPs?
❖ Were patients encouraged to choose the preferred form of procedure (i.e. 
local or general anaesthesia, day care or inpatient stay if  there was felt to be a 
lack o f adequate support at home)?
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General Practitioners, fund-holders and purchasers from the District Health 
Authorities of the respective areas were also interviewed. Interviewing 
techniques that were regarded as being more meaningful for an understanding of 
the perception of interviewees, thus open ended and in-depth interviews were 
employed. In addition to the questions asked of patients, they aimed to find out:
❖ The change in the degree of choice in contracting provider available to
them
❖ Changes in the criteria on which they based their choices
♦> GP fund-holders were asked as to whether they gave preferences to
treatment of cataract surgery in comparison with what they did before the reforms
When concerning the other actors such as consultant eye surgeons their views 
on choices given to them by purchasers were explored and as in the case of 
General Practitioners the presence or absence of the elements of choice in their 
relationships with providers was investigated. Managers were asked to provide 
the organisational viewpoint on changes in choices offered from the providers' 
perspective and the purchasers were quizzed on their impressions of changes in 
choices available to users.
5.4.2 Information
Again patients were asked a series of questions which were replicated for all the 
respondent groups using the respective methods for each group. These were the 
following:
❖ Were the patients given sufficient information by the specialist provider 
units regarding the procedure itself and the availability o f its different options and 
the likelihood of side effects?
♦> Who gave the information (senior/junior doctors or nurses) ?
♦> Was the information given in oral and/or written form and how was it rated
by patients?
❖ Were patients informed about the date o f the operation sufficiently in 
advance to make arrangements?
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5.4.3 Quality -  processes and outcomes
The concept of quality concentrated on selected clinical outcomes and processes 
that mostly served as proxies for quality indicators. For this purpose, quality 
indicators were designed along the following aspects of care:
❖ Promptness of service received measured as waiting times at the 
outpatient's department
❖ Changes in the attitude of health providers (primary and specialist)
♦> Changes in the orientation of information (type and form) provided to the
users
5.4.4 Responsiveness - waiting times
A measurement of waiting times was used for establishing the changes in 
responsiveness to unmet need expressed as demand. Changes in waiting times 
for surgery and the first specialist appointment were measured through extracting 
data from hospital records on both waiting times for elective surgery and the 
specialist appointment, and relating them to national figures (for indication and 
comparative purposes only). Also the interviews with all groups of respondents 
including patients, assisted in understanding the dynamic of change. Waiting 
times for the first specialist appointment and the surgery itself were also 
measured.
5.4.5 Efficiency
Hospital activity data and hospital operation registers were used to extract the 
number of operations in selected periods. These were also used for comparing 
the changes in prices throughout the period of reforms. In some cases, the prices 
of cataract surgery were not available and in this case an attempt was made to 
calculate them in order to draw conclusions on efficiency gains observed. Clinical 
outcomes were measured by means of a small study conducted on the site of our 
pilot hospital in order to relate them to the potential efficiency gains acquired at 
the same unit. The aspects investigated were the following:
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❖ Has the number o f operations performed increased in relation to prices 
for services over the years o f reforms’ implementation?
❖ Could the efficiency gains be influenced by the changes in the skill-mix or 
other means o f input substitution?
❖ What was the role o f cost-effective technologies in this process?
All these factors had to be specified for their associations with the organisational 
changes and incentives introduced by internal market reforms. As outlined 
previously potential gains in efficiency may have had an adverse impact on 
quality both in technical terms and as a broader concept incorporating 
satisfaction, choice and responsiveness.
It was also assumed that advances in surgical techniques and organisational 
changes brought about the efficiency outcomes in case of cataract surgery. 
However, the adoption of more cost-effective procedures such as the shift to day 
care that was deemed to be more efficient and acceptable than inpatient care 
(Strong et al 1991; Perceival et al, 1992) could be attributed to the reforms’ 
introduction or to be a result of other changes that were occurring 
simultaneously.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to provide the justification for selection of cataract 
surgery to serve as a tracer condition of the impact of the market reforms on 
selected indicators. Theses dealt with choice, information, quality, 
responsiveness and efficiency. They were chosen on the grounds of their 
relevance, appropriateness, and representativeness of the changes that reforms 
were to bring about. Cataract surgery fulfilled well the criteria of being a 
representative case study, illustrating the effects of reforms, because it is both 
frequently performed and an important procedure in terms of the benefits yielded.
This study was designed as an assessment of the changes occurring after 
reforms with respect to these indicators. However, in most of the cases it was not
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possible to examine the changes in before and after the reform period as the 
data on a number of aspects that this study examined did not exist for the period 
before the reforms. In this case the perception of changes by main participants 
was recorded.
The methodology selected was principally based on qualitative techniques, which 
included interviews with all groups of participants: patients, primary care 
providers, eye surgeons, hospital managers and purchasers. It also involved an 
international comparison between two countries whose pre-reform health care 
systems and the changes introduced after the reforms were similar.
There were methodological limitations that mainly related to the age of the one 
group of participants, the patients, the use of process instead of outcome 
indicators and the need for providing counterfactual evidence for changes that 
were simultaneously occurring and distinguishing of them from the effects of the 
reforms. Despite these constraints the methodology chosen was expected to 
yield promising results and contribute to the knowledge on the consequences of 
market incentives for health care delivery in publicly provided and financed health 
care systems.
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III. RESULTS:
DATA PRESENTATION AND 
ANALYSIS
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Foreword to Part III
Part III of this thesis is concerned with data analysis and the presentation of 
results with regard to all indicators (where their different aspects are highlighted) 
and the perspectives of all involved actors. The result is that analysis is densely 
interspersed with large amount of quotations and consists of a fairly detailed 
reference to the material from transcribed interviews. This while providing 
substance and evidence to the results of analysis also contributes to the 
substantial length of most chapters. In order to make manageable their length 
and enhance the accessibility of data presented, each paragraph is summarized 
with key findings where many of them are illustrated by tables and graphs. For a 
quick review of the principal results the reader should refer to the end of each 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
CHOICE
In this chapter, the analysis of changes in different aspects of choice as 
perceived by the different actors - patients, doctors (primary care and eye 
surgeons), mangers and purchasers - is presented. Respondent groups were 
asked about the availability of choice over the modalities of treatment (local 
versus general anaesthesia and day care versus inpatient care); about the 
possibility of registering with a GP of their choice in the UK and a family doctor of 
their choice in Sweden; and about their power to obtain referral to a particular 
hospital in which to have an operation.
Furthermore, patients’ willingness to participate in choices and their view of the 
limitations (if any) of professional involvement in decision-making was traced by 
means of additional questions. This was decided after a pilot study had been 
conducted and it was aimed at acquiring greater unde'rstanding of patients’ 
attitudes towards involvement in choices regarding their treatment.
In addition, in cases where only a few GP fund-holders were represented, the 
original question used was modified to include the possibility of choice in a 
hypothetical form. When more than one factor was mentioned, patients were 
asked to specify which was the single most important factor, although all parts of 
the answer were taken into account.
6.1. Interviews with all groups of respondents 
PATIENTS’ VIEWS
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6.1.1 Was ch o ice  o v e r the  p roced u re  g ive n ?
ENGLAND
The answers received were diametrically different in four study sites, which 
seemed to reflect the differences in policy adopted by the eye departments 
examined. Thus, at pilot site P (n=7), only one patient reported the absence of 
any form of choice. Three patients said they had choice concerning day care and 
the form of anaesthesia, one patient reported that choice only existed in respect 
to the former and yet another two patients claimed it applied to the latter.
By contrast, in S (n=18), all the patients’ replies pointed in one direction. While 
detailed information about the ease of the procedure (day care surgery under 
local anaesthesia) was given, they were, at the same time, strongly encouraged 
to follow the only available form of treatment. All patients in this group, 
representing the majority of respondents, expressed views that they were 
strongly encouraged to opt for a day care procedure performed under local 
anaesthesia, and persuasion was achieved through making this option as 
attractive as possible. It turned out, in reality, that they were not asked about their 
preferences, as there was no information about alternative options, which was 
succinctly outlined by one of the patients as:
"They will ask a few questions, but they already know what is to be done and it 
was usually they who said what they thought you should have. ”
Only three patients felt they were given some choice (see Figure 6.1). One of 
them said s/he had full choice, pointing out at the significant difference s/he was 
experiencing currently in comparison to her/his treatment in the past. Eventually, 
though, the overwhelming majority of respondents seemed to be satisfied with 
the outcome. A few of them added that when they had felt anxious, they had 
been able to ask further questions until their worries had been resolved, which 
was seen as a positive feature.
In U, only four patients of the total sample (n=15) regarded positively the aspects 
of choice they were offered in terms of day care versus inpatient stay, and local 
anaesthesia versus general anaesthesia (hereafter referred to as L.A. and G.A.
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respectively) (see Figure 6.1). A few patients considered that they had been 
given some choice. However, their answers suggest, rather, that they were 
strongly encouraged to accept what the doctor thought was best for them. For 
example:
“It was suggested that I should have L.A. because I would get a check-up earlier 
in the morning (8 a.m.).”
Figure 6.1. Availability of choice regarding the 
modalities of treatment among different eye units 
in the UK (patients' views)
Unit S Unit U Unit T Unit P
(n=18) (n=15) (n=12) (n=7)
Quite few opinions from U confirmed the health professionals’ attitude and their 
attempts to convince patients to follow certain modes of therapy, which were also 
reported by the overwhelming majority of patients in sample S. One third of the 
total sample (five out of fifteen) claimed to have been persuaded that they had 
better have L.A. on the grounds of medical indications (the reasons referred to 
were mainly circulatory and respiratory problems). Interestingly, all the patients of 
this group were convinced that the question of choice was not relevant to their 
cases.
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In unit T (n=12) the first group of patients (five) felt that choice had been given to 
them in all, or in the most important, aspects of care. They were mildly positive 
about it, without demonstrating any strong feelings for or against the choices that 
had been offered to them (see Figure 6.2). In any case the conclusion to be 
drawn, it is that they were rather reluctant to make use of them. The following 
comments sums up their attitude:
7  left the decision to the doctor and it eventually came out as a mutual 
agreement".
The second group represented patients (six) who were not given enough choice 
and felt stronger about the lack of it. Patients also referred to the persuasive 
efforts made by the health professionals to get things done their way.
SWEDEN
In unit K, a definite majority of patients (sixteen out of 29) denied that choice was 
ever given to them. They justified and explained its lack in various ways such as, 
7 already knew the procedure", or, 7 did not ask for it as it was a specialist 
hospital", and also 7  could not influence it because I didn’t know what would 
happen so I had to trust my doctor."
Only eight patients out of the total sample (n=29) were positive about the choices 
that had been offered to them. Their strongly affirmative comments ranged from 
those of a more general nature, such as, “the choice over the procedure was 
fantastic, a very good service", to more specific examples of how this choice was 
perceived:
“Yes, I felt that I was trusted with respect to my ability to choose."
Interestingly, the possibility of opting out of the treatment altogether was also 
referred to as one of the aspects of choice by some patients. There were also 
views that referred to choice which, in reality, pointed rather more towards 
information aspects and the joint decision making process, than towards choice 
perse, such as, 7 could ask questions but decisions were taken together".
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A second group of patients (six out of 29) expressed their uncertainty about the 
choices offered and either did not answer the question at all (three) or expressed 
their belief that they had only been moderately involved in choices over the 
modalities of treatment. However, there were also comments which did not 
simply imply a lack of choice but indicated that the whole concept was missing, 
such as, for example:
“I do not know how to answer this question"; "I did not think it was a matter of 
choice".
6.1.2 Would you like to have had more choice over your treatment? 
ENGLAND
In unit S, there were only three patients who claimed to be satisfied with the 
amount of choice they were given. Thus, two-thirds of patients (thirteen out of 
eighteen) expressed the desire to be involved in choices over all the aspects of 
treatment, which in their view should be based on information given by medical 
staff. The involvement in decision making of the latter was still seen as very 
important, though.
Only two patients opted out altogether from the possibility of being involved in 
choice over the forms of treatment because, “what the doctor says is law". This 
was a matter of upbringing that did not allow for a asking questions and 
suggesting to the doctor what to do” as one of the respondents explained while 
adding “the younger generation is more demanding in this respect.”
Another patient, on the other hand, expressed a totally opposite view, pointing
out the inherent inconsistencies between the NHS structure and patient choice,
for which, in his/her view, there was no place in the system:
“The reforms could not have had any impact on this issue since it is the hospitals 
of the area that choose the patients, who, in fact, have no other option but to rely 
on what they are offered by the hospitals.”
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A bigger group of patients from unit U (eight out of fifteen) was also interested in 
having more choice. After closer examination, however, their responses often 
pointed more towards information aspects rather than to choice itself.
Even when patients asked for more involvement in the different aspects of 
treatment, this was very often expressed in very general and vague terms. 
Characteristically, one of patients said, 7 would like to have had more choice but 
I am not sure I understand what it means." There were also a few more specific 
statements referring to "more convenient time for the operation" and “not having 
a junior performing the operation for the first time under L.A.”
In T, a larger group representing over half the number of patients (seven) did not 
think they would like an increase in the amount of choice in reference to any 
aspect of care. The main reason proffered was that they either did not feel 
competent or secure enough to make choices, or that they were already satisfied 
with what was offered. Four patients explicitly declared that they would have liked 
more choice, though not all of them specified what should be involved in this. 
There were also few specific examples such as “more choice over going home" 
as well as “more choice and more explanation as it lessens the fear and gives 
reassurance that everything will go well."
SWEDEN
By contrast, the overwhelming majority of patients (21 out of 29) felt that their 
needs had been satisfied as far as choice was concerned and they therefore did 
not have any additional requirements for it (see Table 6.2). The explanation given 
by them was that the choice provided had been sufficient. Other respondents 
stated that there was no point in them seeking more choice because it was 
perceived as being the health professionals’ exclusive domain. Despite the fact 
that, by general acclaim, not too much choice existed, the impression given was 
that only a few patients would welcome changes in this area (five).
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There were patients (four) who thought that there was no room for choice as far 
as this specific procedure was concerned as, “the choices and decisions belong 
to the professionals”. Some patients seem even annoyed or surprised:
7 did not ask for choice but for help with my sight. ”
"I am surprised by the question; the patient should trust the doctor.”
A significantly smaller group (five out of 29) spoke out in favour of choice (see 
Table 6.2). but even in these cases, it was not always very clear what patients 
meant by it. Only one patient was explicit in what s/he wanted which was more 
discussion about the choice of lens to replace the original blurred one. Two other 
patients said that they were for choice in principle, but they were happy with what 
had happened to them. Another liked the idea of choice as a virtue in itself, which 
reflected her/his general attitude of being a person who liked to take decisions. It 
seemed that at lest two thirds of all those opting for choice had rather referred to 
the unfulfilled need for better information.
One patient demanded to be paid for participation in the different research 
programmes carried out by the hospital after s/he had consented to them. S/he 
felt did not have enough choice, which s/he explained as being a result of 
belonging to a generation "which is not used to asking for too much”, adding, 
“even when I dared to ask questions, they were not answered. ”
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6.1.3 How fa r shou ld  health p ro fess iona ls  be invo lve d  in the 
dec is ions about yo u r treatment?
ENGLAND
The majority of patients in sample S (twelve out of eighteen) thought that it was 
primarily the doctors’ responsibility to make decisions about the treatment, but 
the degree of the desirable involvement varied. Most patients said that doctors 
knew best and everything regarding treatment should be left to them. Others 
understood that it was not easy for doctors to give full choice to patients and yet 
others said that they would not mind the eventual decision being taken by 
doctors, but that information about the treatment was essential. Three patients 
clearly stated their wishes for deeper involvement in choices, but without 
providing further details.
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Similarly, the majority of patients in T (eight out of twelve) were perfectly happy 
for choices and decisions about their treatment to be taken by the professionals, 
by which they usually meant doctors. Respondents felt that doctors were best 
placed to perform this task. This is confirmed by comments like:
7 am happy for the doctors to make the choices, as it is their field o f expertise.” 
"Forme, it is up to doctors to decide; doctors are in a position to know better."
Even when respondents did not clearly assert the superiority of the profession’s 
view over their own judgment, they still did not object to their primary role in 
decision-making:
7 have nothing against the doctors taking the decisions, as they are qualified to 
do so."
Only two patients expressed the view that it might not be sufficient if only 
professionals made all the decisions on behalf of the patients but, again, this was 
generally and vaguely expressed as, "more choice for the patient."
By contrast, six patients from unit U also expressed their explicit views on the 
preferred degree of involvement in decision making by both patients and doctors 
and nurses. The professionals should, in their view, be confined to dealing "only 
with purely medical issues.” In the same time, they thought that health 
professionals should be more focused on their advisory role and on the provision 
of information (i.e. more details about what, when and why something was going 
to happen).
SWEDEN
Fourteen patients in K thought that choices and decision-making over the 
modalities of treatment definitely belonged to the health professionals’ domain. 
The justification provided referred to patients’ limited specialist knowledge and, 
consequently, their inability to understand the issues involved. Further 
elaboration pointed towards patients’ lack of capacity (real or perceived) and, 
possibly, also to an unwillingness to break through the barrier of specialism. This 
is reflected in the following comments:
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“Elderly patients may not be in a mental condition to understand." 
uThe doctor should definitely decide. This is not an area for amateurs/'
7 do not feel how I could be part o f it, not in the case o f a specialist disease ."
For most patients represented in this group (nine), choices and decisions were 
seen as an exclusive part of the health professionals' job description, which gave 
them the exclusive ability to deal with each and every aspect of treatment. In 
short, the most common and prevalent views could be summarised as, 7eave it 
to the specialists". It is tempting to speculate that the latter may either be caused 
by difficulties involved in obtaining information, or by the increased responsibility 
this would entail, or by a combination of both.
The second groups of patients (five out of 29) were those who liked to have 
some involvement but rarely referred to details and who did not wish to take the 
decisions themselves. Their views pointed towards a desire to have more options 
and illustrated patients’ cautious and ambivalent view on involvement in choices, 
which occasionally resulted in contradictions such as the following, 7  want to 
decide myself, to have choice, but not to be involved too much".
The third group consisted of those who clearly stated their will to make choices 
and to be part of the decision making process. However, they represented less 
than one-third of all respondents (eight out of 29). Furthermore, few of patients in 
this group (three) already felt that this condition had been fulfilled in their case 
and only one patient was openly dissatisfied with the existing possibilities for 
exercising choice.
One the other hand, there were a very few respondents who were prepared to 
take the risks that their decisions might carry. One of them said, 7 want to be part 
of it, even if it implies some risks forme", and another felt, 7 trust the doctors, but 
I want to be a part o f it". Another wanted his/her right to consent to the treatment 
reserved, and, for another, choice was an indispensable dimension of the 
patient’s function:
“If I had not been part of it, I could not have been a patient".
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6.1.4 Can you exercise choice more now because of the NHS 
reforms and “The Patients Charter” in the UK, the Stockhoim Model 
and the introduction of the ‘house doctor’ in Sweden than you could 
before?
ENGLAND
The answer to this question varied significantly among different eye departments. 
There were diverse views expressed as to the impact of changes in the NHS and 
the introduction of “The Patient’s Charter* on patients’ feeling of empowerment 
and ability to act upon the choices offered.
In the case of P, patients’ responses ranged between a marginal impact (three) 
and no change at all (four). In S, more than one third of patients interviewed 
(seven) had never heard about “The Patient’s Charter” and nothing, or almost 
nothing, about the reforms, so the question didn’t seem relevant to them. Of the 
remaining two thirds, none could see a big difference, except for one patient. 
S/he said:
7 could see a real difference, because if nowadays I do not want something to be 
done to me, I have the right to oppose it, whereas, before, I would not even have 
had a chance to ask why things happened."
Also in unit S, three people had heard about “The Patient’s Charter”, but had a 
very imprecise or vague idea of its content, because they had not read it. The 
largest group of patients (eight out of eighteen) voiced uncertainty over whether 
this document had made any significant difference and whether it had contributed 
to their capacity to exercise choices. One of them elaborated further, pointing out 
that:
“It is a useful document for some people to know they could use, if  need be, and 
that the hospital’s management will take notice of it.”
Three other respondents also agreed that it was good to have such a document 
outlining the rights of the patient, especially for those who have a limited 
experience of the NHS as it: “was useful to have written clearly what a patient 
might expect from the service."
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Another patient was doubtful as to whether a person using the service would get 
any feedback, while someone else, referring to the age factor, commented on 
how this limited the patient’s voice.
A third group of patients, representing less than one fourth of the total sample 
(four out of eighteen), saw significant changes resulting from the reforms and the 
introduction of “The Patient’s Charter”. Those mainly referred to were the 
decrease in waiting times and a kinder and more caring attitude on the part of the 
personnel. One patient pointed out the ability to express a view and the 
significant difference that this represented with the past. Still, s/he was not be 
able to identify this as being a definite result of the reforms or of “The Patient’s 
Charter” , as it could also be ascribed to the different team, hospital and other 
factors. One patient pointed out that
“Before, information had been kept secret and patients had been given no 
access to his/her own notes, while, today, this attitude had changed”.
In U, the situation was similar, as approximately half the number of patients 
(seven out of fifteen) had never heard about “The Patient’s Charter" or about 
changes in the NHS, or had very vague idea of what they were all about. 
Consequently, they were not in a position to comment on the likely impact of 
changes on the level of choice that may have resulted from the reforms. One 
patient said s/he would not know where to get “The Patient's Charter" from, while 
another, who had heard about it, found it too confusing.
Another group of patients in unit U, which consisted of six patients, was more 
aware of the reforms and of “The Patient’s Charter”, but held a negative opinion 
about the tetter's impact on choice and, more generally, on the quality of care. 
There were also much more critical voices, referring to it as “a lot of rubbish" and 
“good, but meaningless propaganda, not acting upon the substance ”. Another 
respondent thought:
“It is all a gimmick, because a lot of resources are required to provide what is in 
the Charter."
Only two patients thought that the reforms and “The Patient’s Charter", in 
particular, gave them more rights.
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Similarly, in T two thirds of the respondents (eight) had not seen any discernible 
difference resulting from the introduction of “The Patient’s Charter* and the 
reforms, and most of them claimed there had been no any changes at all. The 
clarifications provided were either that there was already high satisfaction with 
the existing service or that, where empowerment had occurred, it could have 
been due to other reasons, such as, for example, patient’s familiarity with the 
environment. Some patients were not sure about the Charter’s impact and could 
not comment on its usefulness.
There were others who thought “The Charter” an entirely inappropriate device for
the purpose it was meant to serve because th e "relationship between doctor and
patient is all about trust", acknowledging, meanwhile, that “this was good, though,
for the pressure groups”. Someone else commented on the discrepancy between
the reforms that were proclaimed and the resource constraints that limited their
effective implementation and even the adverse “boomerang effect” this could
have on patients who, in theory, were to be empowered:
“They do not have the money to do 75% of what is there, and if  the patient takes 
too literally what is written in it, s/he is labelled as a trouble maker."
However, someone pointed at the importance of its existence, which s/he could 
assert without even reading it: 7 know it is in black and white and, if  something 
happens, people can use it.” The person who, in fact, made use of it recounted 
her/his evidence of its usefulness:
“I feel definitely more in a position to exercise my choice, nowadays. I myself 
used the "Charter” to complain about an impossible nurse. The correspondence 
was very slow, and I had to go back to the same ward many times, which 
horrified me, but the nurse apologised, for she had received a letter. ”
SWEDEN
A slight majority of patients (seventeen out of 29) felt that they were definitively 
more in a position to exercise choice (see Table 6.3). In addition, a few others felt 
that, while no major change had taken place, there was a positive difference 
(three). Almost all of them (with the exception of one who, while admitting 
significant changes in his/her empowerment level, did not relate it to the reforms) 
ascribed them to the introduction of the Stockholm Model, of which many of them 
were aware.
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Figure 6. 3. The  im pact o f the re fo rm s on the  
choice  of hosp ita l or p r im ary  care  p ro v id e r
in the UK and Sw ed en  (p a t ie n ts ’ v iew s)
Do not 
know/C an 
not  answer
The single factor mentioned by most of the respondents in this group (twelve) 
was the ability to choose a family doctor - or 'house doctor1 as s/he is called in 
Sweden. This was a new scheme for a generalist primary care provider, 
introduced concurrently with the provider-purchaser split in Sweden.
A few patients reported changing from a private doctor to a house doctor as soon 
as the choice of doctor became available through this scheme. Almost all of them 
experienced a higher level of satisfaction with the new situation, mainly because 
they had formerly had no other option of having a personal relationship with a 
doctor of their choice, except by going private. Changing to a house doctor was 
not necessarily related to dissatisfaction with the previous scheme or to 
satisfaction with the present. In some cases, patients plainly made use of 
increased opportunities, which was generally acknowledged. For example, one 
reported that, although s/he had had difficulties getting the doctor she wanted:
”1 was given an option to change the doctor I did not really like and I feel a bit 
more in a position to exercise choice now. "
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In short, patients in this group were happy because, in their view, their ability to 
exercise choice served as a guarantee of a high quality of care, which enhanced 
their confidence in the primary care provider
A second group of patients (seven out of 29) held an opposite view, as they 
could not see how changes in health care organisation could have influenced 
their ability to choose a provider or any other aspect of their care. Most 
respondents in this group thought their level of choice in the pre-existing system 
had already been high, so there was really no change needed. One patient 
mentioned that the availability of choice depended, in his case, on the district of 
Stockholm and, more generally, on the part of the country a patient lived in, as 
the level of choice was not the same everywhere. Of all the respondents in the 
sample, two patients found the present arrangements more complicated then the 
previous ones. Another patient found the present system “more difficult for the 
elderly”, without elaborating any further on this matter.
6.1.5 Is your choice over hospital influenced by the fact that your 
GP is a fundholder/non fundholder (in the UK) or by the fact that you 
are registered with a house doctor (in Sweden)?
ENGLAND
In P, two patients out of seven did not know whether their GP was a fund-holder 
or not. The other five patients gave various answers. Three of them did not think 
that the reforms and/or, in particular, the GPFH scheme had had any impact on 
their increased ability to choose a preferred hospital site for referral. Only two of 
them said that the changes, and/or their GP fund-holders, had made a difference 
and increased their degree of choice.
Virtually no patient in S knew anything about the status of their GPs and most of 
them had never heard about the fund-holding scheme (the term itself, when 
explained, did not sound any more familiar, although afterwards a few assumed 
that their doctor was not a fund-holder). The majority could not answer whether 
the introduction of the reforms and, in particular, the GPFH scheme had given
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patients more ability to choose the preferred hospital site for their operation. This 
ignorance probably reflected the number of GP fund-holding practices in the 
area, which is relatively small and constituted only 16% of the total number of 
General Practitioners (in the second half of 1995) and was different from P, 
where quite a number of GP fund-holders was represented.
Only one patient in S said that it would not matter for him whether his/her GP 
was a fund-holder, as even without the scheme s/he was in a position to speak 
up for her/his rights. However, s/he was also one of the very few patients who 
chose to be registered with a fund-holder. Of the few patients in unit S who knew 
about the reforms, fewer thought the introduction of the reforms and/or the GP 
fund holding scheme could have enhanced their ability to choose preferred 
hospital sites.
Of those two patients, only one was positive about the relation that the increased 
availability of choice bore to the NHS reforms and the introduction of the GPFH 
scheme. The other patient, who had come from outside the hospital’s catchment 
area, did not think that s/he had more choice available to him/her. S/he admitted 
that it was her/his GP fund-holder who had convinced her/him to have the 
operation in this particular unit, because the quality of care provided was known 
to be very high and the waiting time low.
Also in unit U, more than one third of patients (six out of fifteen) were not in a 
position to comment on the issue of increased choice in relation to their GP 
status as they could not see any difference at all for them as a result of reforms. 
Another group were patients who did think they currently had more options 
regarding which hospital to have their operation in. Three patients expressed the 
hope, in a very hesitant manner that the reforms would result in more choice for 
them. One gave the example of being offered two alternative hospital sites and 
another referred to her/his expressed preference of hospital being met.
To sum up, of all the patients interviewed in unit U, one-third had never heard 
about the fund-holding scheme and the remaining two thirds either were not sure 
about their GP’s status or could not link it to an increased availability of choice.
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The percentage of GPFHs in this sample was the highest of all. This is probably 
due to the fact that "the GPs were very busy, anyway", as one patient put it. One 
person thought that it was a patient’s right to choose a hospital, regardless of the 
GP's status (fund-holders or non fund-holders). Another two said that the status 
of their GPs (who probably were fund-holders) would not make any difference to 
their availability of choice with regard to the preferred hospital.
The majority of patients in unit T (eight) were convinced that GP status did not 
matter at all. Seven of them replied that they could not see any difference. The 
remaining one-third of patients, who knew that they were registered with a fund­
holder, were still not at all sure whether this could give them any distinct 
advantage in the choice of hospital. One patient, for example, felt:
"The GPs would be too hesitant to refer me, as they are trying to save money 
and do not fully investigate. They could deal with me by prescribing a medicine 
instead. ”
SWEDEN
Almost half the number of patients (fourteen out of 29) felt that, since the 
introduction of reforms, they had been given increased choice over which 
hospital site to have their operation performed in (See Figure 6.3). The reasons 
cited were diverse. A few patients referred to their increased ability to ask for this 
from their house doctors. One patient stressed the importance of the combination 
of choice and continuous support and advice coming from the house doctor. 
Other patients also stressed the importance of availability of choice across 
catchment areas:
"There are alternatives and the patient has the full possibility to choose for the 
first time.”
Other respondents regarded the possibility of self-referral, through walking into 
the Accident and Emergency department, as a manifestation of choice of 
hospital. Walk-ins to the A&E for planning an elective operation, although not 
very common, were not unusual.
163
In two other groups, which consisted of six patients each, the responses given 
were either negative or could not be answered. Three patients did not answer the 
question and yet another three felt that there had been no major change. The 
arguments indicating less choice dealt mainly with the issue of the merging of 
three eye departments and the closure of other hospitals and the resulting 
decrease of options available. Also, a few patients indicated over and over again 
that choice was not a matter within their own competence and should be dealt 
with by referring it to doctors (private eye and house doctors or, sometimes, 
opticians).
6.1.6 Which are the main factors that influence/would influence your 
choice of hospital?
ENGLAND
The majority of patients in sample S opted for travelling distance (ten out of 
eighteen). Four of them thought that waiting time was the most important factor in 
deciding where to have an operation. An equal number of two respondents 
referred to the doctor’s opinion and the quality of care as the most important 
factors. It is likely that they may, in some cases, have interchangeable use and 
the doctor’s opinion may serve as a proxy for quality. However, after the 
interviewer had asked for further explanations concerning quality, the answers 
given pointed towards the direction of professional expertise (which seemed to 
be gained through the fame of the hospital as “being the best in its specialty”.
Three out of seven patients who opted for travelling distance also referred also to 
the quality of care. Only one person named waiting time as the most important 
factor. Patients who favoured travelling gave more specific comments on this 
issue, such as:
“It is especially important when outpatient visits are taken into account."
“I still have difficulties to see the number of buses (to get to the clinic)."
In T half, the number of patients (six) also opted for travelling distance. The 
reasons given were convenience and, as one patient explained, “most o f the
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London hospitals are the same anyway and it is easier for people to visit”. 
Second came quality of care and quality of surgeon. Two patients expressed 
their views more explicitly, stating:
"The quality o f the doctors matters, travelling doesn’t matter and waiting time is 
not important ”
For two patients only, waiting time was the most important.
In U, travelling distance was again referred to as the most important factor by an 
overwhelming majority of patients (eleven out of fifteen) while waiting time and the 
GP’s opinion was each mentioned by two people respectively. One of the patients, 
who pointed out waiting time as the most important factor, added that it was also a 
combination of travelling distance and the GP's advice.
Responses at P were more heterogeneous with waiting time and quality of care 
(without providing any further explanation as to what was meant by this) in 
addition to traveling, which was seen as being more important. Although more 
patients were registered with the fund-holders in this area, it seemed that the 
majority of patients did not realise that they could ask to be referred to a 
preferred provider unit.
SWEDEN
For the overwhelming majority of patients (22 out of 29) the most important factor 
for "choosing” the hospital was the view of the referring doctor. In eleven cases, it 
was the view of the private eye specialist (usually an ophthalmologist of a non- 
surgical grade). In yet another six cases, the recommendation where to have 
surgery came from hospital eye doctors (usually a surgeon), who, in half of the 
cases, saw their patients in their private practices. Two patients referred to their 
house doctor’s opinion, another two to their referring doctor’s opinion, and only 
one patient said that the view of the optician had played the most important role.
Three patients said that this was the only option available and yet another three 
self-referred themselves to the hospital by phoning or walking in. There was only
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one patient who spoke about travelling distance as the single most important 
factor for choosing the hospital.
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS’ VIEWS
6.2.1 Choice over the modalities of treatment given to patients 
which coufd be attributed to the reforms
ENGLAND
On the whole, there were only a few answers from the primary care doctors that 
suggested a positive attitude toward the effect of the reforms on the amount of 
choice available to patients or themselves. Several of them felt that the level of 
choice had indeed improved, but not all were satisfied that the reforms were at 
the root of this change. Views expressed by quite a few GPs indicated that the 
level of choice was already in place before the introduction of the reforms. The 
largest number of GPs, however, found it difficult to judge or said simply that 
there had been no appreciable change.
There were a variety of answers across the samples, most of which were fairly 
vague. Of those GPs who felt that choices available to patients had decreased, 
they suggested that this had happened because patients were having day care 
surgery, when this might not be what they really wanted. UN, in sample T, went 
as far as say that patients were "forced to be treated as day care patients ”, and 
CA, although less extreme, also thought that patients were "pushed into having 
more day care”.
The comparison of responses between the three samples of respondents 
showed that sample T seemed least knowledgeable about whether the reforms 
had affected any aspects of choice at all. More specifically, General Practitioners 
in this sample (except for one who was openly negative about the reforms’ 
results) were not very much in a position to comment on the changes in the 
choice of forms of treatment available to their patients.
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The practitioners from sample S referred to the aspects o f high quality they 
believed their patients received at the provider's site, but at the same, they paid 
little attention to choice over the modalities of treatment given to patients. The 
belief in - and impression of - a high quality of care was the strongest in this 
sample. The only fund-holder in the area vigorously opposed the notion of the 
reforms’ positive influence on patient choice, saying, “they had already choice of 
day care as more people could be treated this way".
In sample U, the responses were no different despite the fact that fund-holders 
constituted half the number of respondents. Again, surprising as it may seem, 
fund-holders were no more aware of the choices given to patients with respect to 
different treatment options than GPs from other samples. In U, the views were 
divided and most GPs again either demonstrated limited knowledge of this 
aspect of patient care or pleaded ignorance altogether.
For example, HW, a non fund-holder, was unsure and thought “these things are 
more discussed with patients now". One of the fund-holders, GG, voiced some 
criticism:
"There has not been more choice; it hasn’t changed, and there is no feedback on 
this."Again, GPs felt that patients were being influenced in the direction of having 
day care under local anaesthesia but "the push towards day care” was not 
necessarily seen as a bad outcome by most GPs, despite it being achieved at 
the expense of choice.
SWEDEN
Respondents in Sweden were on the whole more positive about the impact that 
reforms had on the choice for patients. Three out of five primary care providers 
interviewed in Sweden (including one non-surgeon private ophthalmologist and a 
specialist nurse) thought that choice had been low before and was not too high 
under the new arrangements either. This view was expressed by JS (an 
ophthalmologist), who thought that:
“Choice did not matter at all as patients went where they were directed, which has 
always been the case."
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The ophthalmic nurse thought: “there was not much choice as the patients came 
to K for highly specialised treatment/' The other two doctors reckoned that choice 
or at least patients’ attitude, to it had changed because there V a s  more freedom 
of choice given to patients, as they could now choose the doctor with whom they 
wanted to register". PG reiterated this message, explaining:
“Before, patients would be happy to see the doctors at all; now they want more 
choice"
MK stressed the increases in aspects of information provided and the change of 
attitude towards patients:
“They are listened to more; also, doctors and nurses respond more to their 
questions."
6.2.2 The impact of the reforms on empowering patients to exercise 
choices (including “The Patient’s Charter”)
ENGLAND
Nearly all GPs had noticed a change in the level of empowerment of their 
patients. Only AR and GR in sample T (inner city), and CA from sample U (North 
London) said that there had been no change. CA was of the belief that patients 
had always been “able to speak for themselves". OL, in sample S (South 
London), said that s/he was not sure about developments in this area but was 
actively opposed to the philosophy of “The Patient’s Charter", arguing that 
“doctors' intentions to do the best for their patients should be taken for granted, 
and not seen as the part o f the bureaucratic procedure".
The changes that had been noticed by other doctors were in the amount of 
questions that patients asked, and in the demands they made. For example KS 
and PW in sample T commented:
T here is a visible difference in the choice that is exercised by patients as they are 
more inclined to ask for a second opinion and also to ask for a referral to a 
particular hospital."
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PW agreed th a t"patients in general have become more assertive and demanding 
and they express their need to obtain more information". But in contrast to some 
other doctors s/he felt it was not the reforms but the idea of patients' rights put 
clearly in “The Patient’s Charter” which may have played some role and may also 
have helped to set a “GP Charter of Practice”. Another GP thought that there had 
been no change because “choice was difficult to measure".
On the whole, GPs from samples S and T (both of mixed population from 
deprived and middle class areas) did not generally relate the changes that they 
had seen to the reforms. The one who did from sample T (PW) only went so far 
as to say that “The Patient's Charter” “may have played some role". Someone 
else reiterated the view of increased patients’ awareness, which according to 
him/her was mainly due to the “changes in society and the impact of information 
provided by the media" while acknowledging the contribution of the reforms and 
“The Patient’s Charter” in this process.
The GPs from sample T gave the impression that patients were much more 
interested in making choices nowadays, regardless of the reforms, whereas 
those from sample U either attributed the change specifically to the reforms or 
claimed that patients were already demanding quality care before the reforms 
were introduced. GPs from S were the least convinced that reforms were at the 
root of changes that had taken place.
In sample U (a relatively affluent suburban area), three of the six GPs, two fund­
holders and one non fund-holder, directly linked the reforms to manifest changes 
in patient empowerment. HW, for example, thought: ‘They asked more to be 
referred to the best hospital and choice has been improved by the implementation 
of contracts." PE agreed this was very much the case, but qualified it by saying 
that cataract surgery was not a good case to demonstrate it, “as the elderly like 
doctors to decide for them; but overall, people are more in power now".
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SWEDEN
Most primary care providers, with the exception of one (a medical 
ophthalmologist), had seen changes in patients’ empowerment and they 
invariably linked them to the reforms; but they also referred to parallel changes 
that might have contributed to this outcome. MK, for example, agreed that there 
had been a visible difference in choice exercised by patients, which in her view, 
"was due to the reforms but also to the new health laws of 1982/3, compelling 
doctors to inform patients more".
NB commented that patients had become more demanding and asked more 
questions, which was "due to the new system of freedom of choice of doctors". It 
had also had some side effects; for example, doctors were now called on to 
resolve all problems at any time “in order to fulfil expectations which were 
unrealistically high and which had been created for purely political reasons". PG 
and CH both thought that choice and empowerment had increased, but while the 
latter felt that this had resulted from the reforms, the former ascribed it to changes 
going on in society outside the health sector.
6.2.3 Patients’ choices of hospital site, the factors influencing their 
choice, and the factors influencing GPs’ choice of hospital for 
referral
ENGLAND
When asked whether patients’ choice of preferred hospital site for surgery had 
increased, the overall opinion was that this was very much less than before. 
Eight of the doctors said that there was less choice, in one way or another. Only 
AU in sample S thought that there was more choice, although s/he made it clear 
that this choice was only for fund-holders and that patients’ choice was no 
greater, because, "they will, anyway, go where they are told to go”.
It turned out that all General Practitioners were convinced that contracts had had 
a limiting effect on freedom of choice for referrals. It also was clear that any
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increase in choice accrued only for GP fund-holders and not necessarily for their 
patients. Overall, the fund-holding GPs were in agreement with the non fund­
holders on this point.
NO, in sample T, implied that less choice was linked to the fact that Health 
Authorities had a list of preferred providers, whereas before they could refer 
wherever they liked, agreeing, though th a t"not too many patients were involved in 
that’. GR, in the same sample, also saw a divide between fund-holders and non- 
fund-holders in this respect: T here is definitely less choice for non-fund-holders 
nowadays, because of the contracts."
This was echoed by another doctor in sample S who also thought that for a non 
fund-holder it had got worse; before, s/he could refer patients anywhere, “but 
now that was gone, because referrals are bound by Health Authority contracts 
and a giant bureaucratic system". Surprisingly, the only fund-holder in sample S 
reiterated this point by saying 7 could refer patients more freely before, if  they 
wanted".
In U, fundholders and non fundholders alike acknowledged the limiting nature of 
contracts and elaborated on how they always tried to refer patients according to 
their preferences. CA said, for example, “when clinics in hospital U were in 
upheaval, I did not refer patients there but to unit T, although the waiting time there 
was lo n g e rHW also encouraged patients to go to places they knew, "so it would 
make things easier for them”.
The exceptions were two respondents in this group whose views were discordant 
with the majority. One thought that it did not matter too much that contracts limited 
freedom of choice because, "more than anything, patients do not want to have 
many choices"; another, who was generally frustrated with patients' expectations 
from the new scheme, said:
"Middle-class patients misinterpret fund-holding and ask for more things nowadays 
because of the reforms."
A broad spectrum of replies was received when doctors were quizzed as to what 
they felt most influenced patients’ choices in terms of the hospital to which they
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were to be referred. Topping the list were length of waiting times and distance 
from the hospital, closely followed by the opinion of the referring doctor. 
Strangely, if the GPs are to be believed, the quality of care available at the 
different sites plays a smaller part in patients’ choices than convenience. The 
replies have also provided some insight into General Practitioners’ understanding of 
patients’ priorities, which were analysed concurrently and compared with the GPs' 
responses (See Figure 6.4).
This diversity of responses reported by the General Practitioners contrasted with 
the almost unanimous message coming from patients, where the majority referred 
to travelling distance as the single most important factor. Waiting times were ranked 
first by the GPs but came only third in the patients’ valuation. Convenience and 
habit or attachment to the local hospital, were the determining factors expressed in 
patients' preferences. Close behind came quality of care, a definition influenced by 
opinions of the immediate environment and by the view of the primary care doctors.
The only difference in perception was observed in sample U, where General 
Practitioners’ views came closer to what the patients thought important for them in 
choosing a hospital. This convergence in responses could be linked to the 
characteristics of the population living in the area of sample U - homogenous and 
predominantly middle class patients, who could possibly communicate their needs 
better - or it could be because the GPs were more in touch with their patients’ 
needs and perceptions.
When in turn doctors were asked which factors influenced their own decision on 
where to refer patients, the leading factor was the quality of service and their 
previous experiences with each hospital. In sample T (consisting of non-fund­
holders only), it was clear, that they were still interested in cultivating personal 
relationships with providers as, in their experience, it was a proven method for 
obtaining results. For two other GPs from sample T, waiting time was also of 
importance because, as expressed in the words of the latter 'The reforms have 
fuelled the drive to provide the service quicker."
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In sample S, quite a few GPs referred to aspects such as waiting time and the 
quality of care and they seemed to be satisfied with what the local hospital offered 
in this respect. There was an element of loyalty in an attempt to support the local 
hospital, as referred to by one GP who pointed towards previous patterns of co­
operation:
’There is only one hospital, close to my practice and the travelling distance is 
normally most important unless the service is very bad or patient prefers it 
otherwise."
Except for the sole fund-holder in sample S, all other fund-holders (from the 
sample U) made surprisingly little reference to the variance in cost between the 
different hospitals although, interestingly enough, non-fund-holders felt that this 
would be the primary factor, were they to become fund-holders themselves. Cost 
implications were referred to in a general manner and the price of sen/ice was not 
mentioned explicitly. This glossing over of the cost aspects of service could be 
linked to the so called "halo effect”, where the respondent presents an idealised 
vision of his/her behaviour with the aim of preserving a good self-image.
One fund-holder in sample U admitted that patients were solely referred to the 
hospital of the consultant who did the out-reach clinic regardless of the travelling 
time involved. The justification provided turned out to be a combination of factors 
with quality being the most important. Only one General Practitioner mentioned 
the distance as his/her main consideration but even for her/him the patient’s wish 
was supreme. Patient preference was often quoted as a deciding factor, and was 
of overriding importance to two of the GPs in the sample U.
SWEDEN
While patient choice was a new feature promoted by the reforms in the 
Stockholm Model, there was uncertainty expressed as to whether patients had 
increased choice in reality, mainly because the County Councils had tried to 
influence them to use their own hospitals. At least, this was the view of the 
majority of respondents, whose views pointed out the change in policy over time 
regarding choice of hospital given to patients. BN and MK commented 
respectively:
173
“Patients are still free to express their preferences, but the County Council tends to 
influence GPs to send patients to their own establishments. ”
“One or two years ago, a house doctor had to offer choices to patients and even 
had to tell the patient that s/he needed choice. Now we have to sell by 
recommending a particular hospital within the County Council boundaries. ”
Two other two primary care providers saw the choice of hospitals decreasing as 
a result of the reforms, either because of mergers or because of new payment 
methods. PG did not necessarily see this as a negative effect - “it is convenient to 
have all the services in one site” - but JS thought this was achieved at the expense 
of the choice of hospital:
“After the prices between private and public hospitals were equalised, the waiting 
lists disappeared, but only two hospitals have survived. Now the County Council 
has a monopoly on service provision and consequently there is less choice for 
patients.”
Only one respondent thought that choice had increased without, however, 
qualifying it.
When asked which were the factors that mostly influenced patients in their choice 
of hospital, most of them thought that it was their opinion or the opinion of 
relatives and also, as MK put, it “the lack of bad publicity about the hospital”. In 
quoting the factors they primarily took into account, previous patterns of co­
operation came out as the most important factor, along with waiting time. One 
doctor mentioned waiting time to be the most important factor and another 
explained how "a private clinic which is very good does the cataract operation 
within one week".
CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS
6.3.1 Choices over the modalities of treatment resulting from the 
reforms
ENGLAND
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There was general agreement among the consultants in sample S that there had 
been a certain degree of change in the levels of choice available to patients and 
their GPs. But it seemed that the shift towards day care surgery and local 
anaesthesia had reduced the amount of choice available in this area. DA said, 
“patients were 'guided’ by the medical staff rather than given complete freedom”, 
and AL elaborated:
“There was very little choice at all, unless there were strong contra-indications for 
using day care, but most patients were happy with the suggested arrangements, 
once the implications had been explained to them.”
There was some doubt expressed as to whether this reduction in the level of 
choice could be directly attributed to the reforms. AL linked choice and the 
introduction of technology in the following way and expressed his/her conviction 
in lack of interest that patients had about choice:
‘There was no day care ten years ago and when it started to come in, patients 
had choice; but now they all have local anaesthesia and day care. It’s not an 
issue, as patients don’t want to have choices anyway.”
The clinical director, a strong supporter of the reforms, put it even more strongly: 
“There is less choice now. I firmly believe in not giving any choice. ”
The pressure from management to use certain methods (day care, local 
anaesthesia) was also ascertained, and so, even when patients expressed a 
preference, they were pushed towards making a decision that was suitable to the 
hospital, which was called by one consultant a “guided choice”. JO elaborated: 
“Patients do as they are told, because it is how we see the service developing. ”
All four consultants felt that the choice available to patients was very limited. 
None of those questioned saw this as a direct consequence of the reforms, and 
none of them mentioned that they thought this lack of choice was in any way 
detrimental to the quality of treatment received by the patients.
In sample T, there was a mixed response to this question. All the consultants, 
except BL, felt that there had been changes in the amount of choice over 
procedures. There was a general feeling that the greatest change was in the 
form of anaesthesia, although the clinical director expressed some doubt as to 
whether this change was directly accountable to the reforms, believing this
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development had been well under way before 1991. MH, of unit U, who was also 
doubtful about the reforms’ impact in this respect, explained that in terms of 
modalities of treatment:
“Patients still have the same amount o f choice; there has always been a choice 
between local and general anaesthesia, but the choice over day care has 
changed.”
Most consultants in P also agreed that there had been no significant change in the 
choice available to patients that could be related to the reforms. One of them 
explained:
“Patients’ choice has been always a priority forme, and I have maintained it even in 
today's environment where there is pressure from management to promote day 
case surgery.’’
TF pointed out that: “Choice for some patients (those registered with GP fund­
holders) may have increased, while for others (those who are not) choice has got 
worse’’.
However s/he did not think that there was any difference among patients as to 
what was offered in terms of procedure; it was rather the possibility of having the 
operation sooner.
SWEDEN
Swedish surgeons did not think that any changes in the choice of treatment for
patients could have resulted from the reforms, although each of them proposed a
slightly different explanation for this. MH thought that some impetus for choice
had been provided by the reforms introduced through the Stockholm Model:
"It created some incentives in this direction, but I think that we would have had it 
in any case.’’
But, like everyone else, s/he admitted that patients had very little choice because 
for the past 10-12 years all patients had been treated using local anaesthesia 
and day care, adding that:
“If they wanted to have another form of anaesthesia, they would be sent to a 
regular hostel or home’’.
“If the patient insisted on having a particular doctor, s/he would be referred to a 
private establishment.”
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Another surgeon thought that, in the latter case, a patient had simply to face a
longer waiting time. Two other surgeons, SW and BC, elaborated that:
The question o f choice is only put to some patients, to whom it may be of 
importance (e.g. for psycho-social reasons) but this is a small fraction o f the 
patients. It has not changed, no options are given and we try to convince them 
that whatever is to be done is due to medical reasons.”
BP provided an explanation for this situation by stating that the general public 
was not very well informed about what medical care could offer and there were 
fewer eye units in the hospitals nowadays (in Stockholm County Council).
On the other hand hospital eye doctors felt strong about this aspect of care 
possibly because they perceived it as an area they had some leverage in 
influencing their choices. MH had a view that patients were not that much 
interested in choice but, instead, followed the advice of the doctor who was 
operating.
6.3.2 The impact of the reforms on empowering patients to exercise 
choices (including “The Patient’s Charter”)
ENGLAND
With respect to the empowerment of patients since the reforms, there is a certain
level of contradiction. From the answers that the consultants gave, there is an
opinion that patients are now more aware of their rights and better informed
about medical conditions and procedures. In the same time, doctors agreed that
it was them or purchasers who maintained control, one of them commenting:
The patients haven't had more choice; they are sent to the same hospital, or to 
the hospital where the GPs get cheaper deals. Only the purchasers’ choice has 
increased. ”
However, there was a wide difference of opinion between consultants, even from 
the same units, over the nature of the changes, when they had occurred, or 
whether the changes were necessarily due to the reforms. For example, in S 
neither AL nor DA had seen a change. The clinical director thought there had 
been a slight change in "middle class people knowing more about their rights", 
which in her/his view was related to "The Patient's Charter' creating higher
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expectations”. JO thought there had definitely been a change, but did not state 
whether s/he thought it was directly attributable to the reforms.
In unit T, consultants could identify some impact on patients’ empowerment 
resulting from the reforms and “The Patient’s Charter”. As the clinical director of 
the unit put it:
“Doctors are encouraged to think more about “The Patient’s Charter" and things 
in writing that should always be adhered to.”
In U, one consultant thought similarly that contracts empowered the purchasers 
but not the users:
“When the Secretary of State said how marvellously patients’ choice would 
increase, knowing it couldn’t be true, but the government now argues that 
patients are not aware of their rights, and that is why they do not make the 
decisions."
At the same time, s/he admitted, though, that there was a general trend towards 
patients’ empowerment as they became more knowledgeable about what the 
surgery involved:
"Ten years ago, patients were more ignorant. But there is still a long way to go in 
the field of patient education”.
In P, one consultant (JJ) thought that patients now had more options in the way that 
the cataract operation was performed; referring to small incision surgery 
(phacoemulsification), s/he said it had resulted in less follow up and better quality of 
sutures, but this ‘Was due to the developments in surgery itself and not related to 
the reforms”. S/he acknowledged, though, that day case surgery and its wider use 
had resulted from the reforms and made available more forms of treatment. TF 
while supporting the view of the increase in day case surgery was partly as a result 
of the reforms, claimed that this was not in the same reflected in patients’ choice 
over the procedure.
As for the factors influencing choice of the hospital, this was a question intended 
for those who were responsible for referrals (general practitioners/family doctors) 
and those who were referred by them and was therefore not asked of hospital 
doctors. However, some of the consultants referred to this issue while answering 
earlier questions but only AL in sample S made an explicit comment. S/he
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thought that the choice of hospital was not available to patients as this choice 
was made by the GPs - as were the choices regarding day surgery or overnight 
stays, which were very much guided by the supervising medical staff. This view 
seemed to be confirmed by BL in unit T who also thought that patients never 
showed a preference.
SWEDEN
Surgeons almost unanimously thought that choice for cataract surgery had not
increased, either because 'patients were not used to asking for choices or
because it was not very suitable for this procedure. MH summed it up by saying:
"It will take time before they get interested in choice, and in ophthalmology there 
is not too much to choose from anyway.”
BC was uncertain as to whether patients exercised choice or not, as only very 
few moved from their own area even though they could, concluding, "it was 
important for politicians but turned out not to be very important for patients”. Only 
one surgeon thought there was a visible difference in choice exercised by 
patients but, again, it was "rather a slower, continuous change in society and not 
due to the market”.
WS thought it was primarily the fame of the hospital, the hospital’s resources and 
equipment, general information about the quality of care in the hospital, and the 
opinion of relatives; s/he also believed that referring doctors might direct patients 
to private clinics because they knew the doctors performing there, which was 
simpler with small private clinics.
Surprisingly, surgeons did not particularly comment upon merging of the eye 
units into one specialist eye hospital in the County Council of Stockholm and its 
impact on choice.
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MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS
Managers and purchasers from each hospital and/or catchment area were 
interviewed in both countries. However, in some units the clinical director had 
assumed the management duties (S in the UK and K in Sweden) and the 
management of the hospital usually had broader responsibilities of the surgical 
sector and often could not reply to specific questions asked with regard to the 
eye services. Similarly, issues such as for example choice or peculiarities of 
cataract surgery were either too detailed or outside the interest of the purchasers 
and they could not provide relevant answers. For these reasons, they were not 
treated as core respondent groups and their replies are reported only when they 
contribute significantly to the understanding of the specific issues.
ENGLAND
The deputy director of the acute service from unit S acknowledged that at the 
end patients were given choice if they insisted on staying in hospital for treatment 
but that a lot of emphasis was placed on the positive aspects and benefits of day 
care surgery. Despite the many changes which had occurred as a result of the 
reforms with regard to patients’ choice:
"There was no choice as to the change of consultant, nor could the patient ask 
for a second opinion. ’’
By contrast, the director of the acute services in unit U thought that the opposite 
was true:
‘The reforms have brought a positive pressure for change and there is a visible 
difference in choice exercised by patients, which is better seen in some services 
such as maternity care. I am not sure that this always coincides with the interest 
of clinicians and the management."
S/he also thought that patients’ attitude had changed as they had become less 
tolerant of the status of public service and attitudes such as, "we don’t have much 
money". While the public’s trust had been eroded by the higher expectations 
created by “The Patient’s Charter'’ the elderly, though, were still “over-tolerant" 
according to him/her.
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The public health doctor from T, who was involved in providing input to the top 
management of the hospital, elaborated that because of the fact that all 
negotiations were made between purchasers and providers, the choice issue 
really depended on the purchasers. S/he reflected:
“A lot o f people complain that choice has been reduced because of the contracts 
and the providers trying to become a monopoly. The money, however, is still not 
following the patient, largely due to the surplus of providers within the Health 
Authorities."
The responses coming from purchasers were diverse and reflected the 
peculiarities of each situation. The purchasers from T for example felt that they 
were in a very special position as a Health Authority, having the choice of three 
hospitals and one tertiary specialist eye hospital, because of which they have 
always enjoyed good service and choice. There was the possibility of buying 
cataract services from all these provider units, and this they did. The director of 
acute commissioning admitted, nevertheless, that the reforms had made 
providers think about how to deliver a better service. S/he thought that they had 
realised that they could not compete in such a small market and were obliged to 
co-operate:
"For example, in shifting day care services to one site and in-patient care to 
another, both situated close to each other. The reforms made these types of 
decision much more visible and transparent, because they had to be taken 
publicly."
By contrast, the commissioning director in sample S, who was also responsible
for quality issues, thought that the reforms relating to Extra-Contractual Referrals
had been restrictive as they diminished choice. S/he elaborated further:
"We try to get the best deals for the population as a whole within the given 
budget but ECRs do not contribute to that.”
The Public Health director in S and the chief of the research department in U did 
not comment on this issue, as they both felt that their responsibility was 
concerned with issues of needs assessment and the appropriateness of services 
provided, and less with choice. The impression was that they did not consider it 
important, in comparison with the former aspects of care.
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SWEDEN
Four purchasers were interviewed in Sweden, consisting of the director of 
commissioning department from one of the nine district areas of the County 
Council of Stockholm, and two executives and the quality director of Stockholm 
County Council. Here again, their replies dealt more with concepts of choice and 
information, among other things, rather than with specific questions, as was the 
case with other respondents.
There was unanimous agreement that the reforms had improved choice, which 
was in accordance with what had been proclaimed to be one of the main 
priorities of the reforms and reasons for their introduction. However, they also 
acknowledged that this might not have been so much the case for eye services in 
the Stockholm County Council.
Other respondents also acknowledged that hospitals had become public firms 
under the reforms (with County Councils owning most of the shares) and the fact 
that they were also allowed to make a profit had energised their managing 
boards and led to many positive developments. It gave most of the hospitals the 
opportunity to meet the same - or even additional - needs of the population, 
which were previously delivered by larger number of hospitals. This has also 
resulted in the merging of the functions of the hospitals and in a decrease in the 
number of beds, which might have impaired the choice of facilities for some 
specialist treatments, such as eye services.
In the view of executives from Stockholm County Council, there were shifts in the 
pattern of service provision which were labelled as choices, but which could 
hardly be considered as such. Thus, for example patients were more often 
referred to local hospitals rather than tertiary teaching hospitals, which used to be 
favoured before the reforms. The purchaser from Z district in Stockholm added 
that:
T he local hospital is supported so that it can achieve better results in co­
operation with primary health care and secondary care centres (health centres) in 
the area."
182
One of the executives from the County Council agreed that the empowerment of
patients in exercising their choices was an increasing trend. This, in his/her view,
was especially manifested in changes of house doctor, although s/he thought
that, in choosing the specialist provider, people still asked their family doctors to
refer them to the hospitals. S/he thought that choice had been stimulated by:
The introduction of the concept of the consumer which was a very important 
development and gave patients the freedom to chose among competing 
providers".
The purchasers representing a district in western Stockholm referred to this shift 
in culture in following words:
"Until then, the idea o f choice for the County Council administration was a 
bureaucratic concept, based on people’s place o f residence; the notion of 
patients being treated more like customers was not a priority. ”
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K E Y  F IN D IN G S
□ The majority of patients in the UK felt their choice had not increased while 
in contrast in Stockholm patients acknowledged this development and approved 
of it (See Figure 6.4). However, in both countries there seemed to be a moderate 
or weak desire for involvement in choices and in decision-making about 
treatment (See Figure 6.5).
Figure 6. 4. Patients' views on increased choices of forms of 
treatment after the reforms in London and Stockholm (n=81)
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Figure 6.5 Patients' satisfaction and wish for more choice in their treatment in 
different eye units in the UK and Sweden
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□ The overwhelming majority of patients in the UK were unaware of the 
reforms and of “The Patient’s Charter” in particular. Those who knew of it were 
uncertain of its usefulness or were downright negative about it. By comparison, 
patients in Sweden knew more about the reforms and approved of their content 
(see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6 Patients’ view s on the reform s and on the usefulness of ’The Patient's 
Charter” in promoting choice in London and Stockholm (n=81)
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□ Not all UK General Practitioners were convinced that the reforms had had 
any impact on patients’ empowerment, with the notable exception of fund­
holders. Primary care doctors in Stockholm held exactly the opposite view.
□ The most important factors for patients’ choice of hospital in the UK was 
travelling; waiting time comes a distant second, with the doctor’s opinion and 
quality of care coming afterwards. However, GPs thought waiting time was the 
most important factor for patients and eye surgeons thought patients were not all 
interested in making choices. In Sweden, patients overwhelmingly opted to follow 
the doctor’s view when choosing a hospital, but primary care providers did not 
always seem to be aware of this.
□ There was unanimity among PHC doctors in both London and Stockholm 
that the reforms had decreased the choice of hospitals available to patients, 
mainly because of the limits imposed by contracts and merging several eye units 
into one specialist eye hospital in Sweden. In the UK, the divide between more 
choice being available for fund-holders and less choice being available for non 
fund-holders has been criticised by both fund and non fund-holders alike.
□ The status of the referring doctor in the UK (GPFH or not) and its relation 
to the choice of hospital available to patients seemed not to be unimportant, 
according to the views of most GPs, but patients were not at all aware of this role 
or of its influence (see Figure 6.7).
Figure 6. 7. The status of the referral doctor (GPFH or not) and the 
choice of hospital (patients’ views) in the UK
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□ Consultants in both countries admitted they actively influenced patients’
choices over the procedures and reported an overall decrease in choice in this 
respect, which they ascribed more to the advent of technology and the way 
services were developing and less to the reforms.
□ Consultants in the UK and Sweden felt patients were now more aware of
their rights, and were better informed about medical conditions and procedures. 
But there was a wide difference in opinion between consultants, even from the 
same units, over the nature of the changes that had occurred, and whether the 
changes were necessarily due to the reforms.
□ Purchasers in Sweden unanimously agreed that the reforms had
improved choice, which was in accordance with the proclaimed priorities, and 
that empowerment of patients was an increasing trend, although changes in the 
society contributed to the outcome, which according to them primarily resulted 
from the reforms. Purchasers in the UK provided more mixed reviews and were 
both less certain about the reforms influence on choice and less preoccupied 
with this aspect of care.
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CHAPTER 7
INFORMATION
This chapter looks into the changes in the type and amount of information given 
to patients at the specialist providers’ units. It looks at the aspects of clarity and 
accessibility of the information provided, whether the presentation of different 
options and modes of treatment existed and also whether patients could 
understand and anticipate the likelihood of the post-operative complications. The 
first section examines the provision of verbal information from the perspective of 
all the actors involved; in the second part, the content and quality of the written 
information is considered.
7.1. Interviews with all groups of respondents 
PATIENTS’ VIEWS
The introduction of market elements into the system of health care delivery was 
expected to bring about some aspects of patient empowerment, either because it 
was seen as one of the explicit aims of the reforms - as in Sweden - or because it 
would be its inevitable concomitant, as it was argued in the case of Britain. 
Relevant and usable information is an important precondition for this process to 
occur because only informed users can make rational choices and participate in 
the shaping of the provision of their health care systems.
7.1.1 Verbal information regarding health problems and the way of 
dealing with it (cataract operation)
ENGLAND
The responses from the hospitals varied diametrically, which should probably be 
interpreted as reflecting the policy differences of each department.
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In S, every patient said they had received very satisfactory and useful 
explanations regarding their health problems. This referred mainly to the mode of 
treatment in detailed and simple form and was both given orally and was often 
demonstrated on a special maquette (three out of eighteen patients mentioned 
the latter). It seemed that every single patient treated at hospital S was left with 
an impression of being in some way informed about the treatment procedure.
The overwhelming majority of respondents (twelve out of eighteen) evaluated the 
quality of information received as very good and sufficient. The attitude of the 
group of respondents who were very satisfied was summarised in the words of 
one them:
"Details of how the operation was to be earned out were given at length and the 
inclusion of technical aspects made me feel amazed at the efforts put in the 
preoperative information session, which lasted about one hour. I could ask all my 
questions there. ”
Another group of patients, representing a third of all respondents, expressed 
more moderate comments about the quality of information received. Thus, one 
patient characteristically said that the information provided was "more or less on 
how the operation would be done”. Another had the impression that "the 
information on the condition and the procedure of treatment was vague” and 
someone else stated that s/he was not sure what the operation was to be about, 
especially since in his/her case co-pathology (glaucoma) was involved. Another 
patient noted that it was given to him/her on the way to the operating theatre and 
clearly stated that relevant written information given beforehand would have been 
the optimal solution.
There were patients who complained that the most common and prevailing 
attitude was still of the kind “we will let you know when the time comes, which 
does not meet the patient’s need for knowing what is going to happen”. However, 
the same person also admitted that doctors were reassuring when providing 
information and giving out details about the application of the local anaesthesia.
In P, by contrast, three patients stated that they had received no information prior 
to the operation. Another four respondents affirmed that they had received some 
information in form of a printed leaflet without providing any further elaborations.
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In sample T, the overall satisfaction with the information given ranged from good 
to moderate, which was expressed by approximately 80% of respondents. Only 
20% of patients in this sample said they did not receive any information at all. 
Most patients thought that the information provided was good or satisfactory and 
that “much more information was given, compared to what they did before”. 
Another patient commented:
uAli my questions were answered, the staff was very helpful and I felt optimistic 
aftenwards. ”
There were other patients who acknowledged that information had been given to 
them although there was a feeling of insufficiency that pertained to all their 
responses: “I didn't know what would be done and knew even less what was 
going on when complications after the operation occurred", as one patient put it. 
Two other comments highlight some of these aspects further:
“Maybe I was told but I still don't know what the problem in my eye was".
“The only thing I was told about the treatment was that an operation had to be 
done”.
Three other patients, who also felt that the information provided was insufficient, 
considered this an important omission and, more importantly, thought this was a 
missed aspect of care they were entitled to. “This is a more general issue of not 
being in control o f what is done to you” as one patient put it and another one 
reiterated this message by saying:
“I don’t like the idea of being told that this is nothing important, especially when 
someone is doing things in my eye.”
The importance of information in the context of the situation of the elderly was 
stressed:
“Doctors should consider this aspect of patient care more, in particular in a 
situation when the patient is living alone”.
In U patients were the least satisfied with this aspect of care. Almost half the 
number of respondent (seven out of fifteen), complained about the amount and 
quality of information received. Of the remaining half, only a few patients seemed 
to be moderately satisfied with what was offered to them. Few of them claimed
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they did not need it as they had obtained it somewhere else. One person already 
knew about cataract operation through her/his family, another was informed 
about it because of her/his profession (staff nurse).
Those who were fairly content with the information received commented
generally on this issue. Three patients admitted that the information provided
helped them to dispel their fear, expressed by one of them as: *I was afraid about
the operation, but then, after the information was given to me, I became
convinced". One of patient described his/her positive experience as:
7 had information from the optician but then I received it again in the hospital where 
I was encouraged to ask any question I wanted. "
Respondents representing one third of the total number of patients were the most
visibly dissatisfied either with the quality of information ("only very basic things were
given out), the timing of its provision ("at a very late stage on the day of the
operation') or its amount. In most cases, the complaints were multiple:
"The information given was fragmented, and I needed to know how to put the drops 
in afterwards".
Some patients were deeply disturbed about the elementary lack of concern they 
experienced:
"I was not even told that I should not eat before the operation as I was going to 
have local anaesthesia. ”
Complaints about the attitude of health professionals were also voiced in this 
group and one patient characteristically pointed out that the reforms were to 
blame for their attitude:
7 was feeling that the consultant was interested in me as a number and not as a 
patient. The reforms are to be blamed for a lot of this, as the emphasis is put on 
piece-work and on sending the patient home quickly."
Only two patients were not in a position to comment on this subject because they 
either could not remember or were uncertain about what had happened. Given the 
age of respondents and the likely deterioration of their memory and/or other mental 
functions, which are typical concomitants of senility, this was an expected outcome.
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SWEDEN
Slightly less than half the number of patients (fourteen out of 29) treated in 
hospital K in Stockholm expressed their full satisfaction with the quality and 
amount of information provided, although this did not necessarily imply that it 
came from the hospital. Four patients named other sources such as the referring 
doctor, previous experience and friends, which is reflected in the following 
statements:
Trie  information was good and I already knew from other patients what would 
happen. ”
“I had a cataract operation 15 years ago, so I knew everything about the side- 
effects and the fact that this was the only treatment.”
A quite unexpected source of information was also reported (offering surgery to 
people who had self-referred themselves or had come in because of another eye 
problem), which might indicate new marketing strategies adopted by the hospital 
to attract patients:
"As I was self-referred through the A&E department, I was told everything 
beforehand and I am very happy about what was explained to me.”
Patients who were satisfied with the information provided referred to the aspect 
of its continuous provision something that was stressed by at least two 
respondents. The confidence acquired through the process of provision of 
appropriate information was also referred to. One patient, who compared the 
quality of information given out by different units, came to the conclusion that the 
unit included in this study (K) was much better than the previous settings s/he 
had experience of:
“Where none talked too much and I had to ask a lot of questions. This should be 
done by the hospital, especially when the patient is stressed. ”
There were other patients who expressed their ambivalence about the desirability 
of provision of thorough information, which was expressed by one of them as, 7 
don’t want to know too much because I’m afraid”. ). The evidence for the latter 
opinion is provided through statements such as:
“Patients should be informed very carefully and only as much as they understand 
should be said to them”.
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Others thought that information on what would happen to them was quite 
important. Despite rather widespread satisfaction with the information provided, 
only one patient linked this to the features introduced by the reforms: 7 got 
everything very clearly explained. I think competition did a lot o f good.”
The other quite large group of patients (twelve out of 29) consisted of those who 
felt that the information received was not sufficient, both in terms of quality and 
amount. As far as quality was concerned, the prevailing feeling seemed to be 
that it was either too general or that essential pieces were missed out (i.e. 
information about after care and about the treatment procedure itself). Other 
respondents also referred to the gaps in information and the lack of continuity. 
One of them commented: 7 would appreciate having more continuous 
information.”
Quite often patients found it confusing and at least two patients stated clearly that
the information received was also not sufficient. In at least one case, doctors at
the specialist hospital assumed that the specialist who had referred the patient
would have already provided it. Also, the importance of informing individual
patients about the outcomes that could be expected, was stressed:
7 would like to have been told that I would still not be able to see clearly, due to 
the co-pathology involved, so I would have had more realistic expectations from 
the operation.”
7.1.2. Provision of printed leaflets with detailed explanations of the 
health problem, the treatment and the available options, as well as 
the likely post-operative complications
ENGLAND
In P, only one patient remembered receiving printed information in the form of a 
leaflet, which included information on cataract and its treatment, aspects of 
anaesthesia and the options for day care. For three others, it had contained 
information only on the former and for two others, only on the latter. There was, 
however, a unanimous agreement about the lack of information concerning post­
operative complications. This relative divergence can be explained in two ways.
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Either the leaflets distributed were not the same one, which is a rather unlikely 
option, or the patients paid particular attention to the parts that were of most 
interest to them.
In sample S, the responses to this question varied. The first group of patients, 
which represented almost half the number of respondents (eight out of eighteen), 
agreed that information on the health problem, on the procedure of the treatment 
and on the likely post-operative complications, had been included in the leaflets. 
But more detailed comments revealed that the degree of discomfort was 
understated. As one patient put it:
The  possibility o f post-operative discomfort was only mildly put in the leaflet, but 
a warning was given orally."
Quite a few patients (four) also stressed the lack of information concerning after 
care and the fact that the verbal explanation of how to use the drops after the 
operation was not sufficient. Another four patients stated that, in their view, only 
information on the type of problem and ways of treating it had been included. 
One of the patients concluded that even this was not specific enough.
There was also another group of patients, comparable in size with the first group 
(six out of eighteen respondents), who could not remember whether any of these 
details had been provided. Some patients, who could not remember specific 
details, would typically use the phrase "very useful" when describing the leaflet, 
and another two indicated clearly that they did not remember the fact of 
information being given away in printed form. Another stated that s/he was not in 
a position to read the received leaflet.
Another respondent group referred to the importance of diagrams and the user- 
friendly layout of the leaflet. In general, this group of patients stressed the overall 
usefulness of the leaflet because it had enabled them to know “what to expect 
from the whole procedure", as phrased by one of them; but they could also point 
at the improvements needed, which were significant. Some respondents 
commented that what mattered for them in terms of information were rather 
different issues. For example, two patients mentioned aspects such as clear 
instructions on the date and place of the operation and two others referred to
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details concerning after care. Also, the availability of a contact number for further 
clarifications was important, and even things such as the size of print, which was 
expected to be bigger and thus more adequate.
The respondents in T can be divided into two broad groups. In the first group, 
representing half the number of respondents (six out of twelve), the receipt of 
booklets and other forms of written information was acknowledged but the level 
of satisfaction varied. In this sample, as much as in the others, the impression 
given was that the written information provided was not seen as sufficient or 
specific or even the way that booklet was given out was not very helpful. For 
example on of the commentators said:
“I received a general booklet from the hospital without any particular information 
about the eye problem".
Only one patient asserted that all the information s/he needed had been 
included. All patients unanimously pointed out that no information was given 
about the likely complications or the availability of options. Sadly, the second 
group of patients, representing the other half of respondents, who stated that no 
written information had been provided at all, voiced their complaints at the quality 
of the oral information given, which did not differ greatly from the replies given by 
the former group. For example someone remembered, “only some rudimentary 
information was provided afterwards on what should be done and what avoided"
The situation did not seem to differ much in sample U, as the replies coming from 
the largest group of respondents (six out of fifteen) stated that they had not 
received any printed information. The other group consisted of seven patients 
who shared the opinion that printed information had been given, but they 
disagreed as to its type. Only two patients of the whole sample of fifteen 
respondents could specify what was in the printed material. One of them 
mentioned the information regarding after care and the other remembered 
information on what a cataract was and how it could be treated.
195
Another five people had a very general and vague impression of what was in the 
leaflet. For example, they commented "yes, a leaflet with everything in there but I 
am not sure what it was as it happened on the ward" or even as general as 
*some leaflet". Two patients could not remember anything about it, which, as 
explained by them, was a result of their weak memory, raising the question about 
the usefulness of such material when it is only distributed and not followed up by 
oral explanation, as it seemed to be the case in U.
SWEDEN
Slightly less than half the number of patients (fourteen out of 29) confirmed that 
they had received some sort of printed information. However only two of them 
suggested that all the above mentioned aspects were included in it. A few 
patients were quite critical of the quality of information included in the pamphlets. 
On occasions, they had not found it very helpful either because it did not contain 
information on the options available or because it gave no guidance on after 
care. Some patients compared it unfavourably with the quality of information 
provided by other sources:
"I got the usual information that a patient gets, which was not very helpful. I read 
books at home and listened to the radio programs instead."
As far as the content of the leaflet was concerned, it seemed that the information
on which most patients agreed had been contained in the leaflet, referred to
preparation and after care, although even here there was the exception of one
patient who thought differently: "No information on the condition, treatment or its
options and after care was contained in the pamphlet." Others thought that the
leaflet contained information on the problem and the procedure of treatment.
Finally, two other respondents concluded that the procedure itself was seen as a
learning experience, which is reflected in their opinions:
"The information contained in the printed leaflet referred to what to do before the 
operation and not to the operation itself. I also learned a lot during the operation." 
"I have to say though, that I learned more on the operating table”.
In the second largest group, where eleven out of 29 patients were represented, 
the respondents claimed they had not received any printed information. Half of 
the answers were constrained to a monosyllabic “no”. However, there were also
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patients who elaborated further, referring, for example, to the unavailability of
brochures “because they were out o f stock". Also, patients in this group
expressed their wish to receive information and stressed its importance:
“I found information in the newspaper which referred in particular to K hospital 
but I would have liked to receive it from the hospital itself.
“No, which would be quite useful, especially with a reference to the likely 
complications as it turned out to be relevant in my case”.
There was only one patient who thought that the lack of written information did 
not matter too much, but only again because s/he “got the information about the 
condition from other sources”. There were also a few patients (five) who provided 
unclear answers, either because they did not remember or because of other 
reasons, such as “receiving the leaflet from the private clinic”.
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS’ VIEWS
7.2.1 Changes in the amount and type of information provided 
resulting from the reforms
ENGLAND
In sample S, the majority of respondents either thought that there had been no 
major changes or were not sure about them. Two doctors acknowledged the 
increase in demand for information on the users’ side, which at least some of them 
received with mixed feelings. At least one primary care provider openly expressed 
his/her concern whether this could be satisfied within the constraints of general 
practice. The other respondent who admitted that improvements in patients’ level 
of information had happened, also related this change to the introduction of 
explicit entitlements stated in “The Patient’s Charter”. Another GP agreed that the 
need for information has increased, but s/he thought that, “this reflected the 
general trend in medicine and people wishes to be more informed".
Although the answers in sample T were by no means unanimous, there was, 
however, a common thread, which can be summarised as disbelief in the ability
197
of the reforms to promote genuine changes in the patient/doctor relationship. 
Even where changes did occur, they seemed to be resented by at least some of 
the doctors and were seen as aimed at reducing their status and clinical freedom. 
It was also felt that they pressurised them to devote more time to issues that 
were not most highly valued by the GPs. In addition, they tended to see any 
changes in patients’ requests for more information as being a direct result of 
changes other than the reforms, of which the most commonly mentioned were a 
consumerist approach and the media’s impact. Thus, for example, one of the 
doctors thought:
“Patients were more demanding in terms of wanting things sorted out quickly, 
because of the changes in communication culture and also because patients were 
now more often perceiving health care as a service".
KS, while expressing her views more cautiously, still thought that changes such 
as more information being made available in areas like counselling occurred, but 
she thought that these had been due to, “increased pressure from the 
management o f the Health Authorities for this to be provided". S/he concluded, “it 
always depended on the doctors, and this was still the same". UN said that there 
were probably some changes, which could be summarised as doctors having 
less time for the patient, but, on the other hand, they were giving out more 
leaflets.
General Practitioners seemed not to be really aware of the extent to which
patients desired more information, which is evident when the responses of the
latter are compared. This difference in perception is mirrored in RA’s view that
the concept of patients wanting information was distanced from reality:
“It was rather my problem to find out whether patients wanted to know more about 
issues surrounding the treatment. Maybe patients fmm affluent areas would be 
much more interested in asking for - and obtaining - information on their health 
problems.”
By contrast, most doctors in sample U seemed to be more knowledgeable; and 
they agreed that patients did get better information, either because the reforms 
created an environment for better communication and they, GPs, were given an 
increased role; or because they had greater need for it; or both. Some doctors
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pointed out their own efforts at providing information, which according to them, 
had always existed.
One respondent expressed the view that, as this procedure was a clear-cut one,
there was possibly no need to give out further information to the patients. HW
thought, “people generally wanted to know more as they read more about these
things" but CA did not think this was specifically relevant to the case of cataracts,
as, in her words, “it is a fairly confined and dry field". Two doctors pointed out the
aspects of communication, which, in their view, the reforms had improved. For
example, DC, a fund-holder, thought: “it was better communication in both
directions - providers and patients"; and PE, a non fund-holder concluded;
“These days patients know why they put the drops into their eyes, which is a 
result of reforms and all the talk about the increased role o f the patient. There is 
a lot more respect for what the patient can understand".
Two other doctors, in addition to the impact of the reforms, also stressed their 
attempts to educate patients, which were summed up in the words of GG, a fund­
holder, as:
“In the case of a cataract, I always try to explain things to patients, because I do not 
know what happens when they are with the provider".
SWEDEN
Most respondents were uncertain about improvements, which might have
occurred with regard to the quality and amount of information provided. They
expressed cautious views on this subject, which NB summed up as:
'There were probably slight improvements, compared to what it was like before, 
due to competition and the fact that doctors were more conscious and more 
respectful".
JS thought:
“It is possible that patients get more information at present; this is probably 
happening more widely and can be seen as a result of competition."
CH, on the contrary, held a clear view that the information provided was better on 
the whole, because staff were aware of these requirements and the content of 
what was needed. As she characteristically put it:
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‘We also realise that it pays off to take time with a patient, otherwise s/he will come 
back to demand even more information."
PG, who also stated that this was the case, reiterated the last comment:
"We have to provide information, otherwise patients will ask fora  second opinion if 
they are not happ /’.
MK, on the other hand, explained that there was a current focus on co-operation
with the family, so, even if patients did not ask, the doctor would put the question
to find out whether they wanted information and what type of information they
required. S/he qualified further, referring to the changes in patients’ attitude:
“Nowadays we meet more people who want to know about their condition and 
their care but the elderly do not usually dare to ask questions as they are afraid, 
or still regard the doctor as a semi-God."
Also, the health centres ran training courses for young doctors in order to 
improve their communication skills with patients. S/he suggested that there was a 
difference between older doctors and young doctors who were more trained, as 
well as women doctors "who give more time to patients and listen more to them".
7.2.3 Provision of printed information with detailed explanations on 
the health problem, treatment, the available options, and the likely 
post-operative complications
ENGLAND
Of all the GPs questioned, only one expressed an opinion as to whether leaflets 
for patients were used more widely since the reforms. All the other GPs replied 
either that there had been no discernible change, or that they did not know. The 
answers show the GPs to be very poorly informed in this respect, which is really 
rather disturbing.
All respondents from sample S either did not know or guessed that it had not 
changed significantly. Findings from the other study sites also confirmed the inability 
of primary care providers to reply to these questions. This is even more worrisome 
in the context of the very limited time that patients spend in the GPs’ surgery and 
during the specialist consultation; in the former, it does not exceed 10-15 minutes
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and is usually less. The distribution of printed information, presented in a user- 
friendly form, could at least partly ameliorate the insufficiency of information that 
was felt by the patients.
Typical responses from doctors in sample T provide an example of their attitude,
which is quite similar in all the samples examined, although ignorance seems to
be more prevalent among primary care doctors in inner city areas. Thus, the
majority of them (four out of five) were not in a position to answer the question at
all. Some comments provided, such as the ones of PW and GR, pointed in the
direction of guesses rather than informed judgment:
“No astounding change. There is certainly more talk than real change”.
‘This hasn’t happened, but even if information is provided in the form of leaflets, it 
has nothing to do with increasing patients’ choice as they are not at all in a position 
to judge."
No respondent was aware of how much (if any) information patients got from the 
hospitals; they could not answer this question in sample U either, where half of 
the GPs were fund-holders. For example, one of them commented in the 
following manner:
The trend was definitely for giving out more information to the patient and they 
received it from the hospitals in the form of a copy of the discharge letter”.
This means that, despite the belief that fund-holding incentives would motivate
primary care providers to become “the patients’ best advocate”, this has not
happened to the extent expected at least when information aspects were
concerned.
SWEDEN
Only one primary care provider (the ophthalmic nurse) was able to provide some 
information on this subject, and she thought that more leaflets were being given 
out, following the reforms’ introduction. All doctors pleaded ignorance.
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CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS
7.3.1 Changes in the amount and type of information provided 
resulting from the reforms
ENGLAND
On the whole, in sample S, all the consultants agreed that there had been 
developments in the information given to both patients and purchasers. Once 
again, according to the surgeons’ views there was little evidence to suggest that 
the change in patient education had come about as a result of the reforms, 
according to the views of most consultants interviewed. AL in sample S 
epitomised the attitude of the consultants’ in the statement,"this has always been 
there” at the same time pointing out that the way in which information was 
conveyed had changed.
JO in sample S agreed that the type of written information provided in the form of 
leaflets had increased, while s/he stated at the same time, "it is not a result of the 
reforms, we had them before, and they are increasing all the time". The clinical 
director clearly related the changes s/he had seen to reforms, while another 
younger consultant actively rejected the idea that the reforms had had an effect 
in this area.
However, even doctors, who were critical of the reforms’ impact, agreed that
nowadays patients had more material available to inform them of ophthalmic
conditions and procedures. On the other hand, the clinical director in sample S,
who was most likely to acknowledge the reforms’ impact, believed it rather to be
a consequence of attempts to satisfy patients’ and purchasers’ desires for more
information. This indicates that in the aftermath of the reforms, the need to keep
GPs ‘happy1 in all respects has become very important:
“There has been an enormous change since the reforms. We had to become 
business-minded in order to compete with other providers and to make sure that 
patients and purchasers were satisfied. ”
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In unit P, the clinical director, similarly to some of the previous respondents, 
thought that the amount of available information had not changed and that there 
had always been good information due to internal initiatives, which had nothing to 
do with the reforms. However, s/he agreed that there had been some change in 
the form that information was now given out. All other respondents in this sample 
were inclined to accept that the reforms were at least partly at the root of the 
changes introduced. Thus, for example, the consultant with the longest working 
experience, while explaining that s/he always used to give oral explanations 
about the procedure, agreed that:
*Written information has been routinely used only after 1991, although I believe that 
it would also have come about anyway, even without the reforms."
TF, a staunch critic of reforms also thought that: “patients are now given more 
information, due to the introduction of {The Patient Charter} ”.
In sample T, one of the newly appointed consultants did not know the answer to 
this question, as s/he had not been in the post for too long. The clinical director of 
unit T elaborated that, in her/his view, there was more written information about 
the operation itself nowadays, which s/he found very helpful:
“Use of the written information is a useful weapon and there is added enthusiasm 
for doing things that should be done.”
MH, of unit U, thought there had been a sort of continuous improvement, an
effort to increase the quality of service they provided, not as a result of the
market but rather because of patients’ increased expectations and their higher
level of education. S/he elaborated somewhat contradictory:
“We often operate on elderly patients who are very poorly educated and being a 
doctor entails an obligation to give some essential information. With daycare, we 
can inform and explain things to a group of patients”.
SWEDEN
The views of surgeons were rather divided, although the overall impression was 
of some improvements positively influenced by the reforms; however, these were 
not very significant and possibly not sufficient either. Predictably, changes were
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also attributed to influences outside the sphere of health care or the 
reorganisation introduced by the reforms. Thus, one surgeon thought:
The changes are linked more to the level o f knowledge o f patients, who are 
more informed; they know more about methods and options and demand more."
One of the leading consultant eye surgeons in hospital K expressed genuine
interest in the results of this study with regard to patients' responses on the
information that had been provided to them and explained the changes occurring:
7 think we have improved the information we give out, but there are still problems 
and a need to improve on this aspect o f care."
CZ compared the standards of information provided in hospital K to the highest in 
the world, without being able to provide any specific comments other than: "We 
do inform them, and this is exactly like in the USA." BC, a holder of the vice­
director’s position, was, on the contrary, not convinced about the reforms’ impact 
on the information aspects.
7.3.2 Distribution of printed information with detailed explanations 
referring to one or more of the health problems, the procedure and 
options of treatment, as well as the likely post-operative 
complications
ENGLAND
The content of these leaflets was reported as being very similar by almost all 
consultants from the four units studied. Medical conditions and the different 
treatments available were covered, with information on the relative benefits of the 
type of anaesthesia, and day care, as opposed to overnight stays, were also 
outlined. None of the consultants said that the leaflets given to their patients 
contained information about the possible complications from surgery. This was 
most probably a conscious decision on the part of the leaflet’s designers, rather 
than an oversight.
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For example, in sample S, the clinical director said of health problems and 
procedures that “the leaflets describe the procedure, and patients can expect to 
know how it is done”. For leaflets dealing with post-operative complications, s/he 
felt that there was not sufficient detail, stating: “we have to put in more”, and of 
leaflets relating to the options of surgery and anaesthesia, “no, we don’t give a 
choice because it is not relevant. ”
DA explained that leaflets were currently more in use and mostly included 
aspects of health problems and the procedures of their treatment, but “did not 
really expand on options for surgery”, adding that “leaflets about possible 
complications did very poorly.” JO agreed that the leaflets contained information 
on health problems, treatment procedures and options for surgery. In his view, 
post-operative complications were not covered in the written form but s/he 
explained that this depended very much on various booklets “which were being 
currently updated. "
Only one consultant (AL) had not seen any change as opposed to all those who 
thought that this difference was reflected in the leaflets made available, which 
covered the aspects of health problems and medical procedures.
The clinical director of unit P clarified that only the health problem and 
procedures of treatment were included in the leaflets, while her colleague, CH, 
thought that the available options of surgery and anaesthesia were also 
contained. The latter added that, since 1991 patients had been given printed 
leaflets, which, at the time of interview, were not available however, as the clinic 
had run out of them. S/he also somewhat improbably claimed that very serious 
and rare complications were very briefly mentioned.
By contrast, other surgeons who had been more recently appointed to the unit, 
elaborated more on the leaflets that were to be used. JJ thought that they would 
include a description of the problem in lay terms, the likely side effects and 
expectations of how the patient might feel thereafter. TF briefly concluded that 
the leaflets were going to be introduced and that they would include all the
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information on the health condition, the options of treatment and the likely post­
operative complications.
Surprisingly, in sample T, only a few of the consultants were in a position to 
answer this question. BL, for example, who was relatively newly appointed, did 
not know what was happening. MJ, who had worked for quite a long time in the 
same unit, was not sure either pointing:
“You should ask the nurses. Leaflets are more widely used in this hospital than in 
some others, I believe .”
The clinical director was more knowledgeable and s/he said that leaflets referring
to what a cataract was, what should be expected from the operation and advice
on patients’ self-care afterwards, were distributed but, as s/he conceded:
“No complications were mentioned but information on local and general 
anaesthesia was included. ”
MH explained that, in unit U, the policy adopted was to give out written
information in the form of a leaflet, but not to all incoming patients:
“Only those who ask about it are given a pnnted leaflet. Not everybody wants 
them and some probably know about it already. We are considering producing a 
video with information on the operation."
SW EDEN
The overall impression of Swedish surgeons was similar to that of their British 
counterparts as they could all trace some changes but did not consider them very 
significant and, in any case, not a result of organizational reforms.
WS, for example, conceded that there was standardised information given out, 
agreeing that it might have increased but for reasons other than to facilitate 
patient choice or to increase their empowerment:
“We give a little bit more information but not in great quantity, as it is aimed more 
at helping us to handle the patients and not to give them options. There is not too 
much information about aftercare or the side effects”.
BP reported that there was a booklet given out which contained some basic 
information about cataracts, including information about the health problem, the 
procedure of treatment and the likely post-operative complications. S/he 
explained, however:
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W e always had it but we put more emphasis on it now. We have also created 
some videos to be shown in the waiting room, which have not been used yet." 
CZ acknowledged that booklets, which contained information on the health
problem, the procedure of treatment and the likely post-operative complications,
were now given away adding, W e didn't have this book before. ” BC thought that,
while more written information of better quality is given out now, which had
already been initiated in the past:
“It started ten years ago and lectures for patients started even before. But now it 
has grown and it is more focused on specific conditions and there is now a 
special reception for patients with certain diseases - for example, melanoma".
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The views on information provision coming from the trust executive of unit S were 
fairly general. S/he stated that it had become more language-sensitive and age- 
sensitive, with numerous translations being made available. Attempts had also 
been made to reflect and to be consistent with the composition of the population 
in the area. S/he commented:
“Answers are given in a reassuring manner and also more attention is paid to the 
detail."
The senior nurse from the eye unit of hospital S, who had also quite extensive 
management responsibilities, ascribed the changes in the provision of 
information primarily to the existence of "The Patient’s Charter". In her view, this 
had encouraged giving more information to patients on the one hand, and had 
led to them becoming more demanding on the other. She noticed that those 
patients who were more informed were also the most co-operative. She 
commented characteristically:
“The attitude of health professionals in the past was dictatorial as compared to 
the more democratic attitude at present, which is attributable to the reforms. We 
more often use the phrase, “It is up to you". We are guided more, and led more, 
by the patients".
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She provided further explanation on the role of the written information contained 
in the leaflet:
“Yes, the leaflet is given out at the time when the date of operation is defined and 
the possibility o f risk is explained orally. We tend to play down the major aspect 
of the surgery in order to make them less nervous. We also try to make them feel 
comfortable in the waiting room and to provide any additional explanations 
needed."
The views of a manager from unit T were represented by the Public Health 
Doctor, whose views were that information was mainly provided in order to 
respond to purchasers’ requirements and was, in addition, more often than not 
provided in quite a bureaucratic form in response to the purchasers’ demands. 
Although s/he could identify "a lot of rhetoric about information for the patients, 
which was a part o f the bigger rhetoric of responsiveness to patients needs", s/he 
could also see patients themselves acting to put forward their demands for 
information that "reflected the wider movement in a consumerist society and not 
just the reforms in health care.”
At the same time, s/he analysed the incentives that the purchaser-provider split 
reforms created for trusts: "It has clear interests in promoting its image of being 
user-friendly in order to attract more referrals" remaining deeply suspicious, 
however, as to whether these changes could definitely alter the behaviour of 
doctors and nurses.
“The real agent o f change is consultants’ attitude to information. Nonetheless, in 
practice, it is translated into the production of booklets and posters, with 
information on issues considered to be strictly professional".
The purchasers were asked whether they had observed changes in the quality of
information provided to them as, on the whole, they were in no position to
comment on what had happened to the patients in this respect. The view of the
director of commissioning services from the area of unit T was that the
information was much better now. In his/her own words, “one may say that it is
light years ahead o f what it used to be". However, s/he quickly added:
7 am not sure that we make the best use of it. As purchasers, we are very good 
at accounting but less so at interpreting the data and turning it into meaningful 
information".
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S/he complained that the information provided was quite often superficial and of
poor quality but at the same time acknowledged that the purchasers lacked the
time to ask for precise information. An example of difficulty in using the database
provided and in extracting the relevant information was provided:
“Even obtaining something as basic as the number of people in attendance may 
not always be possible, because the data base provided is not always relevant’.
His/her proposals for improving the quality of information were numerous and 
quite innovative:
"Possibly we should think o f establishing an information sen/ice on the providers’ 
side and we need to be able to ask more for things like case/mix, but so far we 
don’t get it or the information we get is not good. The future trend of 
commissioning could be to ask for a particular type, and not just an indiscriminate 
amount, o f information".
Another purchaser in area T spoke of the lack of preparation time needed to fulfil 
the tasks that purchasing involved, which was dependent on the provision of 
reliable information - a situation which in his/her view Health Authorities faced 
continuously.
The director of commissioning from S expressed similar worries:
'We have very little information about price, as each hospital has a different 
case/mix. The NHS performance indicators referring to different health sen/ices, 
which are published, can provide some help but are not sufficient."
She also pointed out the need to upgrade the quality of information received:
'We quite often receive information that is still bloody awful. Before, there was an 
integrated quality approach and assurance was based on inspection by District 
Health Authorities".
SW EDEN
There were no comments on these issues other than those already expressed by 
senior eye surgeons who were responsible for their management.
The purchaser of district Z of Stockholm County Council asserted that there was 
more flexibility about appointment times and that there were also attempts to 
provide patients with more information about the procedures of treatment. 
Providers to keep their staff on their toes also manifested this in an increased
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use of patients’ questionnaires and in more attempts. S/he was aware, however, 
that the area that had not been much affected by reforms and where one could 
still not see much difference was the information about medical outcomes, which 
was not provided to the patient. S/he articulated the fears related to making 
public this type of information:
“There is a lot o f discussion whether organising an information centre in the 
hospital for users, is an appropriate development Heads of departments are very 
conscious about this because it could be misused in a competitive market, which 
has somehow created incentives to suppress information that could be used for 
improving performance. But on the other hand it had a positive impact on 
monitoring activities by the GPs and Councils".
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KEY FINDINGS
□ Only half of the patients were satisfied with the type and amount of 
information received (see Figure 7.1) and these are the patients who came from 
units that were performing well under the reforms, such as S in the UK and K in 
Sweden (see Figure 7.2); lower satisfaction with the information provided was 
reported by patients from an under-performing unit, U. Patients in Sweden who 
reported that they possessed sufficient information, qualified it by saying it had 
not necessarily come from providers’ units but rather from the media or other 
users.
Figure 7 .1 . Patients’ satisfaction w ith the type and amount of 
information received in London and Stockholm (n=81)
Do not know 
12%
Sufficient
51%
Insufficient
37%
□ The reasons for low satisfaction was linked to both content (too general, 
out-of date and not responsive to patients’ needs) and also to the timing of its 
provision at too late a stage of the operation. Patients who complained felt that 
appropriate information could facilitate them to get through the operation and 
care for themselves better after the operation.
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Figure 7. 2. Satisfaction with information received in different eye units in 
London and Stockholm (patients' views)
□  Somewhat 
satisfied
□  Satfied
□ The information contained in the leaflets was not highly thought of by patients 
in both the UK and Sweden. There was no unit in which the written information 
contained details on all the aspects investigated, such as the health problem, the 
treatment alternatives, the post-operative complications, and after care. The last 
was especially highly valued by patients, but very few found information about it 
in the leaflets and those who reported receiving any type of written information 
represented less than half of patients both in the UK and Sweden.
□ Perplexing as it may sound patients across all the units studied in the UK 
were rather uncertain as to whether they received written information or not. Less 
than half of them could confirm receipt of information in written form (usually a 
leaflet). The situation in Sweden is different as the majority of patients got written 
information in form of a leaflet (see Fig.7.3).
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Figure 7.3. Patients' views on written information provided in different units in 
London and Stockholm
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
□ GPs in the UK and Sweden tended to see any changes in patients’ requests for 
more information as being a direct result of changes other than reforms, of which 
the most commonly mentioned were a consumerist approach and the impact of the 
media. Nonetheless, ‘The Patient’s Charter” was also referred to as a source of the 
increased expectations it nurtured in some patients.
□ What was surprising, though, was that General Practitioners seemed not to be 
really aware of the extent to which patients desired to receive more information. 
The answers show the GPs to be very poorly informed in this respect and they 
were equally uninformed as to whether the provision of written information had 
changed in any significant way after the reforms. On the whole, there was no big 
difference between fund-holders and non fund-holders with respect to how well 
they were informed about these issues.
□ Consultant eye surgeons agreed that there had been developments in the 
information given to both patients and purchasers, but they only reluctantly 
ascribed them to the reforms’ impact. While agreeing that the systematic 
provision of written information is a recent phenomenon, they thought these 
changes had already been under way. Some of them accepted, however, that 
they had to become yet more responsive to purchasers’ requests in this respect.
□ Managers in the UK felt that purchaser pressure was the real agent of 
change transforming their attitude, but some of them openly stated that they were
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not sure about the benefits accruing to patients. The purchasers, on the other 
hand, were uncertain about the usefulness of all the data that providers gave 
them and were in the process of establishing mechanisms for gauging really 
meaningful information.
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CHAPTER 8
QUALITY
The aspects of quality investigated in this chapter include the type of health 
specialist who provides patients with information, the length of notice patients are 
given of their operation, and waiting time at the outpatients’ clinics. Changes in 
the attitude of the health professionals are also examined. All these aspects of 
quality trace changes that are concerned with process indicators.
The importance of patients being seen and being given information about their 
condition and proposed treatment/s by a fully specialised doctor, and not a 
trainee - at least on the first visit - is considered to be a quality safeguard. Its 
importance has been reasserted and is implicitly stated in “The Patient’s 
Charter”; it is also requested by a number of purchasers.
Informing patients well in advance about their operation time on the other hand is 
important for the elderly, who can then make arrangements to be taken into and 
out of hospital. It is valued by patients and is thus seen as an important quality 
indicator. The notice given to patients of their operation date relates to the fact that 
elderly patients, who often live alone, need to make appropriate preparations for 
after-care in their own homes and it also relates to the waiting times for the first 
specialist appointment and the operation. In the case of day care surgery, they also 
have to attend a follow-up session, which is quite often on the next day. Patients 
usually need assistance to travel to and from the hospital with their vision as of yet 
poorly restored that is why allowing sufficient time for necessary arrangements is 
essential.
This study also takes the view that waiting time at the outpatients is an indicator that 
reflects the success of the provider in securing quality of service beyond the level of 
technical competence. Another quality indicator considered here deals with 
changes in the relationship between patients and doctors and the attitudes of the
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latter, its respective success or failure in user-friendliness and responsive to 
patients’ perception of quality.
8.1 Quality - Information Aspects: interviews with all 
respondents groups
PATIENTS’ VIEWS
8.1.1 Who provided information about the treatment: senior doctor, 
junior doctor or nurse?
ENGLAND
There is, again, a significant difference between the hospitals (see Table 8.1). In 
S, the consultants saw most patients on their first visit (which was not a very long 
one, however) and then further explanations were given by the nurse allocated to 
each patient throughout the duration of care. Quite a few patients found this later 
arrangement useful. Rarer were the cases where patients made their first contact 
with either a junior doctor or the staff nurses. Three patients could not remember 
or were not sure of the status of the person who saw them, one of whom 
commented on the poor continuity of care: "each time I was seen by someone 
else."
In P, patients were seen in equal numbers either by consultants, junior doctors or 
staff nurses. One patient could not remember any details.
In T, the majority of patients (eight out of twelve) thought that a consultant eye 
surgeon or another senior doctor had seen them. Two patients thought they had 
been seen by a junior doctor, another two were not sure and another two did not 
reply.
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In U, a senior doctor saw more than one third of patients (six). Another third (five 
people) could not remember who first saw them. Four patients were certain that it 
was a junior doctor who received them on their first specialist appointment.
SWEDEN
Over half the number of patients (sixteen out of 29) received an explanation of 
the treatment procedure, which came either from a nurse (six) or from the nurse 
and junior doctor (six), or from a nurse and senior doctor (four). The few 
comments provided by this group were, on the whole, very positive, which is 
reflected in the following statements:
7 saw many nurses. All were very kind."
"I was surprised by the clarity o f information given by the young and intelligent 
doctor".
Two patients claimed to have been seen by the consultants only, two by the 
consultant and junior doctor and another two by a team of senior and junior 
doctors. Nurses saw four other patients. Some insight on how patients felt about 
this aspect of care is provided by the following comments:
7 was seen by the same doctor, who made me feei reassured."
"Doctor spoke to me throughout the operation, which was very different from the 
time when I had the same operation on my first eye, when I was not told anything 
- even when I asked questions.”
Three patients did not reply and one was not sure.
On the whole, it turned out that senior doctors saw patients quite often in 
approximately half of the cases in the UK and one third of the cases in Sweden. 
The responsibility for diagnosing was quite often devolved to junior doctors who 
were supported by nurses and, increasingly, to teams in which all grades of 
seniority were represented, which was especially prevalent in Sweden (for details 
see Table 8.1).
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Table 8.1: Patients' views on the seniority grade of the doctors/nurses who saw 
them on their first visit in the eye units in Outer London and Stockholm_________
Name o f the 
unit
Senior
doctor
Junior
doctor
Junior doctor 
and nurse
Could not 
remember/did 
not know
Unit S (n=18) 12 2 2 2
Unit T  (n=12) 8 2 0 2
Unit U (n=15) 6 4 0 5
Unit P (n=7) 2 2 2 1
Unit K (n=29) 8 6 1 0 4
8.1.2 The ease of arranging appointments and the timing of 
information provision concerning the date of the operation (> 2 
months before or > 2  weeks or < 2  weeks)
In S, thirteen patients stated that they were informed two months in advance 
about their date of operation (though, in practice, it varied between two and three 
months), one patient was informed five months beforehand and two others were 
called prior to the given date, following someone else’s cancellation). Four 
people were given between four and six weeks’ notice and another two could not 
recall any details. An overall conclusion can be drawn that the majority of 
patients were informed of their operation date sufficiently in advance to make the 
necessary arrangements and preparations, with the median being approximately 
twelve weeks.
In P, the eye unit recreated in November 1994 with a team of four new 
consultants hired, the waiting time for surgery or for the first appointment was 
expected to be unusually low, at least when the pilot study was conducted (in the 
autumn of 1994 and the winter of 1995). More specifically, in five out of seven 
cases, it was more than two weeks but less than two months and in two cases it 
was less than two weeks, and this was very short by London standards and was 
exclusively due to the special situation of this unit.
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Thus, when comparing the very short notice given to patients in unit P with the 
notice of surgery appointments given by the more established units (which was 
also reflected in the difference in their other waiting times), this peculiarity has to 
be accounted for (see Table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Advance information about the operation date given to patients in eye
units in the UK and Sweden (median values)_________________________________
Eye Unit Examined__________Length of waiting t im e s   _
Unit T (n=12) 8-10 weeks (median)
Unit U (n=15) 20-25 weeks (median)
Unit P (n=7) 2-3 weeks (median)
Unit S (n=18) 10-12 weeks (median)
Unit K (n=29) 3-4 weeks (median)
In U, patients also seemed to be informed well in advance about the date of their 
operation, which was, on average, somewhere between two to four months (the 
median being 23 weeks). However, there were some cases where patients were 
informed only two to six weeks beforehand.
In T, the largest group, consisting of six respondents, was informed relatively late 
about the operation date, the notice ranging from three to five weeks. Second 
came a group of four, who were informed more than two months in advance, with 
the maximum period being six months. One patient was informed of his/her 
operation only a few days beforehand; another stated s/he could not remember.
Two patients provided further information, pointing out the fluidity of waiting times 
and the unpredictability of dates, which were quite often subject to changes for a 
number of reasons. These, in the patients’ view, brought about some degree of 
uncertainty as they were not sure whether it was created to give flexibility to 
patients or whether it was simply a manifestation of poor management of the 
appointments system in this particular clinic:
“I was given notice of less than two months but, in reality, I had to wait double 
that time".
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“First, I was given a date one month beforehand. Then the operation got 
postponed and I went back on to the waiting list, but eventually I got i f ’.
These differences in waiting times among the units could be interpreted in 
several ways. First, it seems that the date reflects the length of the waiting list 
when the patient is given a date nine months beforehand and, in fact, has the 
operation on that date. Second, it is based on the assumption that the patient will 
probably not make use of the availability of an earlier date which could, for 
example, result from a cancellation likely to occur during such a long period. In 
this case, the patient could be waiting one year for the operation and be given 
notice of the date of the operation just two months in advance.
Third, in some units there seems to be some flexibility built into the waiting time 
system. This can be inferred from cases where patients have been able to 
change the initial date, given five months in advance, for example, to a later date 
because of travel or other reasons. A similar situation occurred when a GP 
obtained an earlier date of two to three months ahead as opposed to the one- 
year originally planned, after acting on a patient’s complaint.
SWEDEN
The majority of patients (thirteen out of 29) were informed three to four weeks 
beforehand about their operation date. This effectively represented the waiting 
time for the operation itself, calculated from the moment when patients were 
given a specialist appointment. In order to estimate the duration of waiting time 
for the operation, an additional two to three months had to be added on average. 
The latter represented the whole period, from diagnosis and referral to the date 
of securing the first specialist appointment.
The next largest groups of patients (five and two out of 29) were informed one to 
two weeks beforehand and less than one week respectively. One of the 
respondents in this group provided an interesting comment, which illustrated the 
patients’ widespread perception of day care: Initially, I thought that they would 
operate on me the same day. ”
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In the third group, patients had their operation date set three months (three), two 
months (two) and six weeks (two) in advance.
There were also comments on the general nature of waiting times and on the 
appointments system for the operation, but apart from stating that “there was a 
big difference", respondents did not usually quote any specific figures. Two 
patients referred to the difficulties they had experienced in arranging an 
appointment, having had to re-confirm the appointment date or rearrange the 
appointment:
7 had to call twice to get the operation date. They had somehow forgotten me, 
and I don't understand why I had to go twice”.
“I had to reconfirm my appointment by calling more than once”.
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS’ VIEWS
8.2.1 Who provides information about the treatment: senior doctor, 
junior doctor or nurse?
ENGLAND
Primary care doctors did not seem to be very well informed about who gave
information to patients at the eye clinics in the hospitals. Almost everyone in
samples T and S felt either that the situation was the same as it had always been
(without actually stating precisely what this entailed), or said that they did not Know.
Of those who did express an opinion, there were contradictory beliefs. UN, in
sample T, thought that a consultant had seen less than half the patients, and AR of
the same area came up with the somewhat improbable figure of “more than 90% of
patients seeing the consultant without any change occurring in this respect’. The
situation in sample S as to the level of General Practitioners’ knowledge seemed to
be only marginally better. One of the doctors expressed a view that:
"Most patients are seen by consultants nowadays, though there are various models, 
for example, the assessment can be done by a junior doctor first, followed by a 
consultant.”
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Most General Practitioners said there had been no change, without being able to
give more specific information about whom patients, in fact, saw. One GP in
sample S came up with an explanation for the presumed absence of change:
“If there had been a great change, they would sell it. Certainly, there are fewer 
complaints about this issue now."
The primary care doctors in sample U were better informed about this aspect of 
patient care when compared to the doctors in the two other groups. There was 
the impression of a good deal of variation from hospital to hospital; nevertheless, 
this was not mentioned as being a problem area by any of those interviewed. 
However, there was no great difference between fund-holders and non fund­
holders, except in the case of an outreach clinic where the treatment of patients 
could easily be considered as being preferential, as was confirmed by one of the 
fund-holders:
“Now that there is the outreach clinic, we are mostly sending patients to P and they 
are invariably seen by the clinical director or someone very senior."
Possibly this ability to make use of the outreach clinics and refer patients 
accordingly created differentiation in quality of care aspects that were available to 
some patients; it also gave fund-holders a feeling of higher empowerment in 
comparison with the majority of their non-fund-holding peers. One non-fund 
holder found this an opportunity to remark on the inequity of access, stating: 
“elderly who don’t get information and care, do not benefit from that.” CA, also a 
fund-holder, thought that nursing input had become more significant. Another GP 
(soon to become a fund-holder) conceded that, in all the units s/he worked with, it 
depended on the hospital whether or not senior doctors saw patients on their 
own or had delegated this task to the junior doctors or nurses.
SWEDEN
Swedish primary care providers seemed somewhat better informed about this 
aspect of patient care, which was not least due to the fact that, in the hospital where 
this study took place, there was a clear policy on who should see the patient first. 
Thus MK, the female GP, thought that, “most of the time it is the consultant eye 
surgeon”; and NB expressed his view that, “referrals are dealt with by the senior 
doctors”. PG, the only private GP in the sample, thought, on the contrary, that, “it
222
was the junior doctors on call who usually dealt with the patient first' which was 
somewhat curious as the service in question was a strictly elective procedure. CH, 
an ophthalmic specialist nurse, agreed that:
I t  was important for the patients to be seen by the doctors and, for this reason, 
hospital policy was that all patients were seen by both the doctors and nurse”.
8.2.2 The ease of arranging appointments and the timing of 
information provision concerning the date of the operation (> 2 
months before or > 2  weeks or < 2  weeks)
ENGLAND
When asked how far in advance patients were informed about impending 
surgical appointments, only one doctor from unit T gave a specific answer (UN), 
suggesting that more than two months’ notice was given for the operation. 
Nobody else could say for certain, although HW of unit U said that patients were 
being given more notice these days; but s/he could not name the average length 
of time.
PE, of unit U, said that s/he was not sure, simply because patients had not 
complained to him/her about the lack of notice, so there was no need to know the 
precise times. This was partly echoed by CA, of the same area, and it is even more 
interesting that both of the respondents were fund-holders. Another fund-holder in 
the same sample characteristically commented: ult is difficult to say because we 
have an outreach clinic, so everything was very quick”
This result is a little unsettling. It seems that once a patient’s care is passed from 
the GP’s surgery to the hospital eye unit, the GP very much loses touch with the 
treatment process.
SW EDEN
No primary care provider in Sweden could comment on this issue; instead they 
referred the interviewer to hospital data, saying that it should provide all the 
information requested. Although there is no real justification for this ignorance,
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the existence of the three months care guarantee (which was still operating at the 
time when the interviews took place) can be regarded as a factor which 
somewhat mitigates in favour of the respondents. In addition, the fame of hospital 
K, which, as a virtual monopoly provider was known in the market to deliver high 
quality services quickly, may be another factor contributing to the primary care 
providers’ perceived lack of responsibility in monitoring this aspect of care.
However, the most important reason in this case is the almost de facto 
separation of the two tiers of service and the very poor communication between 
the primary and secondary care sectors that is still characteristic of the Swedish 
health care system.
CONSULTANTS’ EYE SURGEONS VIEWS
8.3.1 Who provides information about the treatment: senior doctor, 
junior doctor or nurse?
ENGLAND
In unit S, all the senior doctors interviewed agreed that information provision was 
not confined to one particular staff group. HS (the clinical director) and AL, the 
newly appointed consultant, pointed out that senior medical staff usually gave the 
initial information, and then others joined in later. The other consultants gave 
broad answers, saying that all groups were involved in providing information. 
More specifically, the clinical director expressed a view that, “it varied”, 
explaining,” booklets were given by the nurses pre-operatively and senior doctors 
saw the new patients".
DA, another new consultant, agreed that there was a variation, asserting that all 
three tiers of health professionals, including senior and junior doctors, dealt with 
patients on their first appointment: 'The doctor who saw the patient gave some 
information and the nurse did the rest” AL shared this view and spoke of a 
tendency towards keeping down the length of appointment time, due to pressure
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caused by “The Patient’s Charter, which had led to a lack of time being spent on 
complicated cases:
“There is a tendency to cut the time for consulting. I think that patients are aware 
of what's happening and they are willing to wait for a while for good treatment 
and for good information”.
JO confirmed that information was given by each of the three groups.
In sample T, the consultants explained the way the process of information 
provision to patients was earned out. The overall impression was that they were 
quite modest about their role in this process. Also, they did not seem to explore 
patients’ needs in this respect. For example, BL, a newly appointed consultant, 
replied that, while s/he saw patients in the clinic, "more detailed information was 
given to them on the pre-operative ward by junior staff and the nurses", MJ, who 
had worked for a long time as a consultant in the unit, thought that information 
about the disease and its treatment was given out and added, somewhat 
vaguely, “patients now get more information from everyone”.
The clinical director of unit T was more specific, explaining that Senior House 
Officers gave out information during the pre-clerking clinic, where they went 
through the details of the operation. The nurses also did this upon patients’ 
arrival for the operation, and patients were also seen post-operatively by both of 
them.
MH, of unit U, said that patients received information from a senior doctor as a
rule, and it was usually a consultant who saw them on their first visit explaining:
“There is an attempt to provide continuity o f care as we try to have patients kept 
under the same consultant, but not necessarily to be seen by him/her The 
consultant tries to look at all the notes and checks whether what s/he asks for is 
done."
SW EDEN
In Sweden, the care of patients and provision of relevant information during the first 
specialist appointment is designated to a team of professionals. It seems, however, 
that the input from senior surgeons was rather limited and nurses and junior doctors 
carried out most of the procedures that were necessary at this stage. The director of 
the hospital provided some details on how this system operated:
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"The information is usually given by nurses, as it is more efficient in terms of the 
use o f doctors. Surgeons provide information before the operation and also on 
the first visit."
BP, an experienced surgeon, explained in greater detail the procedure that was 
followed:
*Patients are sent an answering sheet prior to their first visit. Then they meet a 
nurse who does the measurements for the lenses to be fitted. Some of the junior 
doctors take over after this procedure is completed."
CZ thought that, most of the surgeons meet the patients on their first visit, during 
which time the patients also meet the nurse, who takes measurements of their 
visual acuity.
8.3.2 The ease of arranging appointments and the timing of 
information provision concerning the date of the operation (> 2 
months before or > 2  weeks or <2  weeks)
ENGLAND
There were a variety of opinions expressed on the average amount of notice that 
patients were given before their date for surgery. It was generally thought to be a 
matter of weeks rather than months.
For the clinical director of unit S, the main factor here seemed to be that patients 
were told of their operation date on the day on which they were placed on the 
waiting list. S/he pointed out that the aim was to improve the percentage of 
patients who were given more notice, as a response to the competitive nature of 
the market that the reforms had introduced:
“We try to give the date of the operation at the time o f the appointment to a 
higher percentage o f patients, because it is a quality issue for the patients to 
know the date of the operation beforehand. Approximately 20% to 30 % of them 
know this two to three weeks in advance, and we intend to provide this for all, 
because that is what patients and GPs prefer.”
All other consultants came up with quite contradictory views, both as to the 
length of notice patients were given and as to how this procedure was carried
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ou t For example, AL, a new consultant in the unit, said that the date was given 
on booking, which was six to eight weeks in advance, and that "a// patients were 
operated on within six weeks”. DA, another newly appointed consultant, was less 
certain and said that this practice was a new development: “We often give the 
operation date at the time when patients are listed, which was not done before." 
Also, according to JO, patients were told about their surgery date on “the day 
they came to the clinic.”
In unit T, most consultants did not know the answer MJ compared the periods 
before and after the reforms by stating:
"Before, they would get a letter informing them when the operation would be 
performed, which could be done at relatively short notice; now, when they come 
to pre-clinics, they are informed two weeks in advance."
MH, of unit U, replied that this period was generally three weeks in advance, 
adding:
“Sometimes we bring the patient in at short notice, asking them whether they 
would agree to come in for the operation as there is a slot free on the operating 
list."
SW ED EN
In Sweden, the situation was broadly similar to the UK in terms of giving patients 
information about the date of the operation, although the period of notice was 
much shorter. The latter was related to the much shorter waiting time 
characteristic of the Swedish health system as a whole, and of cataract surgery 
in the Stockholm County Council area in particular. Replies from respondents 
within this unit seemed to be more consistent than those of their British 
counterparts. The hospital director referred to the data available within the 
department and commented:
"One aspect o f its high quality o f care is that patients can go home as soon as 
possible. We also provide a human approach by planning our procedures well, in 
order to give patients time to plan their operation."
WS explained that patients usually came in with a diagnosis. Once the specialists at 
hospital K had confirmed this, the patients would be listed for the operation on a 
specific date: “Usually two to four weeks ahead.” S/he explained that in fact, all
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planning was done well in advance, “primarily due to administrative requirements to 
organise surgical resources in advance”. CZ similarly said that it was two to three 
weeks, adding:
“They can choose a surgeon and the preferred length o f waiting time, which 
some do, and I think this is going to be more and more common."
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS
8.4.1 Who provides information about the treatment: senior doctor, 
junior doctor or nurse?
8.4.2 The ease of arranging appointments and the timing of 
information provision concerning the date of the operation (> 2 
months before or > 2  weeks or < 2  weeks)
ENGLAND
A senior nurse with extensive managerial responsibilities in unit S explained that
all nurses had to take care of their own client group and each did this according
to the task s/he was assigned. For example, the theatre nurse and the
assessment nurse each had to provide care during the relevant stages of
treatment. She elaborated further on attempts made to provide continuity of care
in terms of nursing care and explained the role of the consultant in this process:
“The intention was that the same nurse should see the same patient. The 
consultant gives the initial explanation, but does not spend too much time on this. 
One week before surgery, the patient is called in and the personally assigned 
nurse gives him or her all the information.”
The deputy chief executive of the same unit explained, with regard to question 
one, that the operation date was given to the patient during his/her visit to the 
outpatients’ department. S/he added that patients were informed of the hospital’s 
policy of allowing flexibility in fixing the date of the operation so as to accord with 
what the patient’s family wanted, rather than simply following the strict order of 
the list. S/he summed up by pointing out “the greater emphasis on what people 
wanted”, adding that satisfaction surveys on how patients had been dealt with 
were now carried out more often.
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The professionals involved in the management of other respective units (T and 
U) could not answer these questions and considered them to be too specific for 
them.
Purchasers in both countries seemed to have no view on this subject. On the 
whole, they considered that this was beyond their area of responsibility. Some of 
them also justified their ignorance by stating that this information could be 
inferred from the quality specifications used in the contracts. This situation was 
similar in both the UK and Sweden.
SWEDEN
The leading doctors in the hospital deal with all the management issues, other 
than finance, and the hospital’s director and deputy director, whose views are 
outlined above, managed most of the aspects of care.
A typical comment, articulated by one of the Swedish purchasers in the 
Stockholm County Council area, provides an insight into how purchasers 
perceived this issue:
7 am not sure whether this has happened, but it should apply for highly 
specialised services. In the future, where they will be dealing with customers, this 
aspect is likely to acquire a new importance. ”
A purchaser from Z district in Stockholm County, demonstrated some knowledge 
of this subject and asserted:
"Patients are now seen as people, who can turn round and go somewhere else 
for the service. There is more flexibility about the appointment times."
8.2. Quality - Waiting Times at the Outpatients’ 
Department: Interviews with all respondent groups
PATIENTS’ VIEWS
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8.2.1 Changes in time spent waiting to be seen at the outpatients' 
department resuiting from the reforms
ENGLAND
Most replies indicated a waiting time of approximately thirty minutes for both
hospitals (unit S and unit P) and occasionally less than this. Only one patient in P
said that s/he had had to wait for more than one hour. Two patients (with
previous experience of S) could not help remarking on how different things were
from a few years back, as expressed in the words of one of them:
“Before, one could wait for two or three hours in a room full o f people, and no one 
seemed to take any notice of it or even bother to apologize for the situation."
In T, the majority of patients (seven out of twelve) had waited either thirty minutes 
or less. The second group were patients (four) who had waited for between thirty 
minutes and one hour. Only one patient had had to wait for more than an hour. 
However, only a few patients could comment on the difference from the pre­
reform period and, even then, no impression of a major change came across 
from their responses.
In U, the figures were quite different as no patient had waited for less than thirty 
minutes and slightly less than half (six patients out of twelve) had waited for 
between thirty minutes and an hour. But most of them (nine out of fifteen) had had 
to wait for more than an hour, with the median being two to three hours on average, 
and patients were visibly dissatisfied with it (See Figure 8.1).
SWEDEN
The overwhelming majority of patients (27 out of 29) confirmed that waiting time 
in the outpatients’ department had been less than half an hour and, in most 
cases, it had actually been much less. Thus, ten patients had waited for less than 
five minutes or not at all, another ten patients had waited for 10 to 15 minutes, on 
average, and seven patients had waited for a period of < 20 minutes. Only one 
patient taking part in the study had waited for more than an hour and one other
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patient for between half an hour and an hour. Typical comments from patients 
were very positive, as could be expected:
"All the waiting times are very short” and “did not have to wait at all. ”
Figure 8.1 Time spent on waiting in the outpatients' in 
different units in the UK and Sweden (patients' and 
consultants' views)
M inutes
(average
va lues)
Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit 
S P T U K
H Patients' view 
@ Consultants' view
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8.2.2 C hanges in  tim e  sp e n t w a itin g  to be seen at the o u tp a tie n ts ' 
depa rtm en t re s u lt in g  from  the re fo rm s
ENGLAND
In unit T, the importance of the long waiting times at the cfinic were certainly more of 
an issue for some doctors, but by no means for all of them. Most GPs in the area 
had no idea about this subject. UN, for example, thought that it was between half an 
hour and an hour
“Since the service is overloaded and patients have to wait a very long time, and it 
gets especially bad towards the end. ”
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KS also thought that it was between thirty minutes and an hour, expressing a hope 
that, “it must be less than an hour" and adding quickly:
“Nowadays, one would not want to have people waiting for hours as it is more of an 
issue than it used to be and, even if this happened, explanations would have to be 
given".
In S, most GPs, again, could not say for certain what the situation was but, as 
one of them estimated, using rather a crude method, “there were no complaints 
and after one hour patients would complain". AU reinforced this by saying, “I had 
no feedback as there were no complaints about eye services. "TR thought that it 
had been slowly improving over the last ten years, “as the hospitals increased 
the effectiveness o f service provision".
The other practitioners did not know, and did not even attempt to answer the 
question.
Responses to this question in U gave the impression of a more accurate picture of 
the situation as far as waiting times at the outpatients' department were concerned. 
DC, a fund-holder in U, thought it was less than thirty minutes, justifying this by 
saying, “they also see a lot of extras", which is actually incorrect, since emergencies 
were, in most cases, separated from the routine appointments. CA, also a fund­
holder, was not certain but also thought it was less than thirty minutes, guessing 
that there “may have been a slight improvement’, and qualified that it also 
depended on how the counting was done, “whether it included the other staff or just 
the senior doctor*’. The other fund-holder also thought it was less than thirty 
minutes, but had no evidence for it.
LB, a non fund-holder, held a contrary belief, thinking that it was more than an hour 
“People still waited two hours, although fund-holders’ patients were marked in a 
different way". S/he also confirmed:" This has not changed, because people’s 
complaints are the same. ”
Two other doctors, one of them a fund-holder and one a non fund-holder, did not 
know.
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SW EDEN
On the whole, primary care providers were not in a position to comment on what 
the situation of the specialist provider was and referred the interviewer to the 
hospital data. The data confirmed the information given by patients, and firmly 
endorsed the belief that communication between specialist and primary care 
settings in this matter was not the strongest point of their co-operation, even 
casting doubt on whether it existed at all.
CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS
8.2.3 Changes in the time spent waiting to be seen at the 
outpatients9 department as a result of the reforms
ENGLAND
All the consultants thought that waiting times in the outpatients’ departments had 
declined since the reforms, AL saying that consultants were now more aware of 
the problem and that "this was a good thing brought about by the reforms".
According to the majority view, the average wait seemed to be in the region of 
thirty minutes. It was also generally thought that patients with earlier 
appointments at the clinic were more likely to have a shorter wait. This was 
certainly a problem area, MJ of unit T pointing out that the administration system 
was ill-equipped to reduce waiting times significantly because of unexpected 
emergencies, over-booking, and inflexibility over the order in which patients were 
seen. MH, of unit U (the one with the most abysmal record), also cited limited 
resources as a reason for the long waiting times.
All the consultants in P were in agreement that there were no major changes to 
be reported. The clinical director gave an explanation relating this to the number 
of doctors available and the number of appropriately trained nurses able to do 
the first assessment. Moreover, according to him/her, "the referral patterns also
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seemed to have played a role as numbers doubled following the increases in
throughput. Another surgeon clarified that although waiting time may not have
changed, there is an increased consciousness that the patient is waiting adding:
*Before, if  the patient was waiting, even for two hours, it wouldn't have mattered 
to the doctor, but now s/he tries to avoid this.”
Another surgeon explained that it also varied according the time of the appointment: 
if it was 9am, patients had a good chance of being seen without delay, but waiting 
time worsened as the clinic progressed.
In unit S, the clinical director proudly replied, "92% of patients were seen within 
approximately thirty minutes. ” All the consultants confirmed this figure and took 
the opportunity to stress that this was a unique achievement when compared 
with other eye units, where the average was at least double that figure.
In T, all the consultants agreed that waiting time was not less than half an hour 
and usually about one hour. The clinical director explained that there was a 
difference between hospitals, mentioning the example of one hospital, where 
according to him, “65% of patients were seen within an hour, and only 1% in 
more than an hour”, which she apparently considered a satisfactory outcome. MJ 
(the consultant with the worst record) held a view that not much has changed in 
this area "because patients either did not arrive when they were asked to, or 
eventually decided to seek private care. ”
S/he went further, dwelling on numerous factors responsible for the situation, 
such as an administrative system that over-booked patients and inefficient 
transport, concluding with a quite pessimistic remark: "There are too many 
factors in the NHS in which you can’t intervene. This will never be possible. ”
MH, of unit U, openly admitted that no significant changes have happened 
despite the new arrangements made for measurements of the visual acuity to be 
taken by nurses; patients still had to wait for a long time to see the doctor in spite 
of or because:
“A lot o f requests to see patients more urgently, there were limits imposed by 
scarce resources.”
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S/he could not comment on the number of on-time appointments, guessing, 
"maybe the early ones are on time, maybe 60% are on time, but the later 
appointments run late.”
SW ED EN
All the eye surgeons in Sweden were positive about the impact of the reforms in
decreasing waiting times for patients, especially the wait to see a specialist at the
outpatient’s department in the hospital. WS, for example, thought that waiting
time had been reduced, adding: "Doctors cannot be negligent any more about
waiting time.” An older surgeon, BP, also shared this view and explained how
disincentives had operated in the former system, conceding that:
“While waiting time was never extreme, we used to be a little more negligent, so 
nurses could put more patients on the lists.”
S/he also added that patients in particular were asked about their perception of 
the quality of care - whether doctors were nice to them or how long they had to 
wait while before only clinical outcomes were important clarifying: “In the past, we 
used to get rid o f patients, because the money for their care was fixed”.
CZ also thought that waiting time had been reduced, "though maybe it was only
sometimes a bit longer than it is now". BC, the deputy director heavily involved in
clinical management issues, explained that patients have been given an
individual booking time for the last two years, to reduce or rather, in this case, to
virtually eliminate waiting time upon patients’ arrival at the hospital because:
“If they were not seen within a half an hour the hospital loses money - the fee 
paid for seeing a specialist is refunded to the patient.”
S/he also commented on the dynamics of waiting time and its tendency to build 
up as the clinic progressed and was especially high around the lunch break as 
the survey conducted at the department has demonstrated (see Figure 8.2). 
Her/his information confirmed that certain actions needed to be taken for these 
improvements to materialise, even if waiting time before the reforms had not 
been extreme. The length of waiting time at the outpatient’s department quoted 
by the eye surgeons confirmed the information provided by the patients.
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Figure 8.2 W aiting tim e at the outpatients' departm ent in 
hospital K (Sweden) during different hours o f the clinic
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ENGLAND
The deputy director of surgery at hospital S acknowledged significant changes in 
a number of areas and mentioned waiting times at the outpatients’ department as 
an example:
“Before, all the outpatient appointments were made for 9 o'clock. Now, 
everybody gets an individual appointment time, and compliance with it is 
monitored. "
The senior nurse in S was another representative of management in unit S able 
to comment on this subject. She was the best-qualified person to provide
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answers to this question, as it was her direct responsibility to manage waiting 
times. Her reply was:
.'The quarterly audits we conduct have shown that it is between thirty minutes 
and one hour, but the majority o f patients have to wait for less than thirty 
minutes. ”
The quality department of hospital T presented its reports on the monitoring of 
compliance with targets set within the hospital for each of the main specialties. 
The table below provides some insight into the gradual progress achieved over a 
period of three years after the implementation of the reforms. Thus in 1994/95 
less patients are seen within thirty minutes (82.2%) than in 1996/97 (92.4%) and 
the total number of patients seen is also lower by at least a quarter (see Table 
8.3).
Table 8.3: Changes in waiting times at the outpatients’ department (all 
ophthalmology services) in unit T________________________________________
Agreed position: 80% of patients to be seen within 30 minutes and 95% to be seen within 
60 minutes
Agreed position: 75% ofpatients to be seen within 30 minutes and 95% to be seen within 
60 minutes fin 1994/95)
Year of 
measure­
ment
Patients
Surveyed
0-30
minutes
>30-60
minutes
>60
minutes
Cumulative % of 
patients seen 
between 
30 - 60 minutes
1994/95 185 82.2% 15.7% 2.2% 82.2% 97.8%
1995/96 197 88.3% 8.6% 3.0% 88.3% 97.0%
1996/97 237 92.4% 7.2% 0.4% 92.4% 99.6%
Source: Data from Quality Department unit T
It did not seem to be an area of specific interest to the purchasers interviewed. 
On average, they had a broad or vague idea that the waiting time must have 
changed but it was not usually an indicator on which providers were asked to 
report. It had been included in “The Patient’s Charter”, however. On the whole, it 
seemed that purchasers were more interested in the waiting time for the first 
appointment and for elective operations than in how long patients had to wait in 
the hospital after securing an appointment.
SW EDEN
This question is answered under the heading where the eye surgeons involved in 
management outline their views (for details see Figure 8.2). The unanimous
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opinion was that the introduction of the Stockholm Model had given incentives to 
work in a different way and that these incentives were very strong in promoting 
productivity, thus decreasing most types of waiting time. The purchaser in Z 
district was aware that appointment times had been individualised and the 
representatives of Stockholm County Council themselves expressed a view and 
a hope that waiting time at the outpatients’ department must have improved, 
along with the decrease in other waiting times.
8.3 Quality: The Attitude of Health Professionals: 
Interviews with all respondent groups
PATIENTS’ VIEWS
8.3.1 What are the improvements resulting from the reforms (if any) 
in the way you are treated by the health professionals?
ENGLAND
In S, the general impression was of patients being truly impressed by the quality 
of care provided, the kindness of the personnel and their helpfulness, as well as 
the speed with which everything was executed. Therefore, most of them found it 
quite difficult to add anything more on this issue. Comments like "sympathetic 
care” and "professional but not cold staff, efficient but caring”, “perfect” 
“everything marvellous” and “could not criticize” were commonplace.
There were a few comments on improvements needed, such as, “the need to be 
seen by the same doctor on the first post-operative visit”. Only a few patients, 
though, were able to compare this attitude with the one that existed in the former 
system because of their limited experience of hospital care.
In U, by contrast, almost half the number of patients (six out of fifteen) thought 
that the previous system had served their needs better. This was justified on 
several grounds, such as more time being devoted to the patients in the past,
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and higher staff morale and a better overall attitude were frequently referred to. 
For example:
“A change is for the worse. Twenty years ago, things were more efficient and care 
was more personalized.”
“Much better before. Patients were treated properly. Nowadays the waiting is 
longer and treatment is very rough."
Grievances were voiced as to staff’s attitude, which was perceived as 
inappropriate:
"Before, patients were not kicked out of the hospital, as happened in my case.”
Of this group, a few patients (four) admitted that there had also been some 
positive changes (such as less waste, better premises, occasionally nurses being 
kinder), but eventually even for them the losses outweighed the benefits, as was 
succinctly described by one patient:
‘Theirjob insecurity and problems of staffing are now much felt by the patient."
Another, less numerous, group of patients from unit U (four) saw no difference in 
the professionals’ attitude and for them this question seemed not to matter. One of 
them explained: "I am a very demanding and kind of pushy patient and that is why I 
always get what I want."Someone else said s/he would not know for sure and could 
not see any difference, also adding:" I am quite scared to give answers, especially 
when they deal with judgments."
Finally, a third group of patients, consisting of three people, was not in a position to 
comment, as they had had no previous experience of the NHS - surprising as it may 
sound! One of them said that s/he had enjoyed excellent treatment on this sole 
occasion.
In T, the prevalent view seemed to be positioned between the responses 
received from the two previous units. Two big groups of respondents, both 
composed of five patients, either thought that, “people are more considerate now; 
questions are answered and information about the treatment is given before and 
during the procedures", or saw more modest changes. Those who didn’t see 
major differences or no difference at all came up with the following statements:
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“No, I haven’t experienced any change, except for the fact that, before, there 
were a lot more people around. The wards are, however, still overcrowded and 
people sit for hours in the waiting room.”
7 haven’t noticed any difference, except for the doctors doing everything more 
automatically and more efficiently, so patients don’t have to wait But the 
treatment remains the same. "
There was also a third, much smaller group of two patients who did not feel they 
could comment on this issue, as explained by one of them: 7 cannot tell, anyway. 
It is the doctors who will tell me what to do’’.
SW EDEN
Almost half the patients (thirteen out of 29) held the view that the present system 
was better in terms of an improved attitude on the part of the health 
professionals, which was supported by four patients, and better information 
provided to patients, stressed by three patients. The following comments provide 
some insight into their opinions:
“Everything has improved, and it is better both as a patient and as a human 
being. ”
“There is a big difference. It’s better now, as there is more respect for each other 
than there used to be and the communication between nurse and patient is much 
better."
While patients acknowledged positive changes, they could also ascertain their
limitations; “Most o f the changes are positive, but these are not big changes".
Interestingly, there were also views, which linked new achievements, such as the
increase in information and choice and improvements in the attitude of the
professionals, to the competitive ethos introduced through the reforms:
“Competition with the private sector has been very good for Sweden, especially 
on the information side. It has also created a less nonchalant attitude among the 
staff".
" The matter of choice in today’s society is the slogan o f the day and I am very 
strong about that."
The possibility of voicing complaints and articulating demands was also seen as 
a new development: “In the past, one would not have thought o f complaining
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about things." The strengths of the system most often referred to were the 
change in attitude of the doctors and nurses and the decrease in waiting times. 
On the negative side, patients reported a lack of continuity of care and 
occasionally a lack of quality in inpatient care. The following comment illustrates 
these points:
“Before, when I had to stay in hospitai, the personnel had more time for me. 
Nowadays, I feel that patients are not too much cared for. Sometimes I even feel 
neglected."
One respondent pointed out an important factor, centred on the patient’s ability to 
articulate demands:
"I cannot say about the difference, because the quality of treatment the patient 
gets depends a lot on how much self-confidence s/he has to ask for it, and a lot 
of old people don’t dare to ask. "
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS’ VIEWS
8.3.2 In what way has the introduction of the reforms influenced your 
relationship with patients?
ENGLAND
There was no unanimous view as to how the reforms’ impacted on doctors’ 
relationships with their patients. This might possibly reflect the doctors’ 
perceptions of the opportunities given by the reforms and the way each of them 
made use of them. Thus, the views were divided.
In sample T, GR, a younger single-handed GP, and an elderly retired GP, 
thought they could devote more time to their patients. However, the latter 
explained that this was due more to “my move to the health centre and sharing 
work with my colleagues". PW, the GP linked to academia, and UN thought, on 
the contrary, that “it is now more difficult to find time for patients compared with 
before" and that "it was probably true that doctors have less time for their patients 
nowadays."
Primary care doctors in sample S echoed these views, and were again divided 
along the same lines. There was, however, a majority of doctors who could not see
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that any changes had occurred. Even when the changes were acknowledged, they
did not relate them to the reforms. For example, TR explained:
“I can devote more time to my patients, but this is not because of the reforms. It was 
already a trend before the reforms."
Someone else pointed out that the time devoted to patients had not changed, but 
s/he admitted: “The reforms have, to some degree, helped me to understand 
patients’ needs.” Another GP said that s/he could not devote the time to his 
patients s/he used to because of pressure on his/her time introduced by the 
reforms.
In sample U, there was unanimity among doctors about patients’ increased 
demands and the resulting pressures on doctors. The overall impression was 
that, even when the doctors devoted more time to patients, the patients did not 
feel that their needs had been always entirely satisfied. Respective statements 
coming from a fund-holder and a non fund-holder who intended to join the 
scheme illustrate this point:
"Patients are more insistent and place more demands on my time. There are also 
more complaints about waiting time and an increase in grass-roots empowerment."
7 feel more pressurised. Patients expectations are much higher, and patients like to 
discuss the options more."
Two out of three fund-holders felt that they could not devote the same time to 
patients either “because of the workload", as one of them explained, or “because 
it sounded like a discrepancy to me: the more the patients demanded, the less I 
caught up", as another one had put it. PE, a non fund-holder, also stated that 
s/he devoted more time to patients because they demanded it, but s/he also 
thought this was possible because:
“Doctors saw fewer patients than before and some of their work was now done 
more frequently by other health professionals, such as counsellors, nurses and 
dieticians.”
LB, a non fund-holder involved in commissioning initiatives, explained that while: 
"Patients are becoming more and more demanding, I am trying to meet their 
needs."
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SW ED EN
The Swedish doctors and a nurse were asked about certain aspects of care, 
such as the time they devoted to their patients. The responses from primary care 
providers were mixed. While some of them, such as the female primary care 
doctor and the private ophthalmologist admitted, "this has not changed very 
much" the other primary care providers, both the private doctor and the 
ophthalmic nurse, thought their working style had changed, as the former 
summed up:
7 cannot devote the time I used to before, because of the pressure for higher 
productivity.”
However, MK who felt she had not changed her attitude to patients, reported at the 
same time that most of her colleagues were complaining about not having enough 
time for research and other activities or for family life. On the other hand, NB 
thought that:
'There were probably slight improvements due to the competition and to the fact 
that doctors are now more conscious and more respectful, in order to avoid the 
mistakes of the past.”
CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS
8.3.4 In what way has the introduction of the reforms influenced 
your relationship with patients?
ENGLAND
The overall impression from the consultant eye surgeons’ responses was that their 
pattern of clinical work seemed not to have been greatly affected. Thus, the majority 
of them did not feel that their time for patients had, in any significant way, 
decreased, either because they had withstood the reforms' pressures or because 
their time was already quite limited.
The clinical director of unit P, who stated that this “has not changed, because 
pressure on performance was always that way forme", confirmed the latter view. 
Two other consultants from the same unit felt they understood that provision of
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good care might not be achieved if it were inefficient, but only one of them
indicated that the reforms had affected his/her attitude to patients:
7 now think more about providing better information for patients without wasting 
their time, and about giving them a pleasant and personal service. I regard this as 
being a direct benefit of the reforms.”
This attitude was also reiterated by the clinical director of unit S, a pro-reform, 
business-minded person who saw the patients “as customers with rights”, 
admitting that, before the reforms, s/he had considered the same issue quite 
differently:
7 thought I was doing them a favour. This has changed completely, and all for 
the better.”
DA, a newly appointed consultant to the S, thought that time pressure had 
negatively affected his rapport with patients and the time s/he should spent with 
them from medical point of view, elaborating:
7 cannot do enough, because o f these nonsensical standards, which are often 
artificial - for example, those that concern waiting time at the outpatients’ 
department. ”
S/he was also the one who explicitly asserted that the reforms had helped him to 
understand the difference between his and his patients’ perception of quality 
care:
“This is one of the biggest impacts of the reforms, as far as I am concerned, but 
possibly few doctors would agree with me. ”
Another newly appointed surgeon in the same unit agreed, with this comment, 
explaining:
“The time I devote to my patients has slightly decreased, but my attitude to 
patients has now changed. ”
As in the former unit, there was also one consultant who thought that things had 
remained unchanged for him/her.
In T, two of the consultants admitted that they had less time to devote to patients, 
one saying that waiting time standards had forced him/her to cut the amount of 
time spent with patients. One consultant was not sure, but, in his/her view, 
“patients behaved as customers and demanded more”, without providing any hint 
as to whether this change had been for the better. The other consultant believed
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that there had been very little change in this area: "but a certain decrease was 
noticeable because of productivity pressures.”
The clinical director also supported the latter colleague’s view, pointing out the 
marginal character of the changes that had taken place:
”lt is about the same, although timing is better and therefore more things are done 
within the primary health care clinic. "
MH, of unit U, did not provide a comment on this subject.
SW ED EN
The director of hospital K painted an optimistic post-reform picture stating the
importance of the human approach to patients that has been much enhanced
because of savings made in time-management: "Time once wasted can now be
used for talking to patients on the day after the operation. ” However, no other eye
surgeon could confirm this statement. The two other senior surgeons felt that, on
the contrary, they could not devote the time given previously to their patients
because of higher productivity pressures. As of them explained:
"On the one hand, I have to do a lot of surgery and, on the other hand, the 
investigation is standardised. As a result, the time devoted to the patients has 
suffered in the system. ”
The other doctor elaborated that s/he had to do a lot of cataracts it paid for his/her 
other interests -  such as research while conceding 7 do not know how other 
doctors can deal with this issue of lack of time spent with patients."
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS
8.3.5. Do you think that after the reforms were introduced, health 
service provision acquired a more user-friendly approach?
ENGLAND
The Public Health doctor involved in the management of hospital T thought that 
more comprehensive changes were needed to bring about a different attitude
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among health professionals. These would involve more interest on the 
purchasers side in all sorts of communication groups and learning from patients’ 
activities. S/he concluded:
In  reality, however, a lot o f this information is ignored because there is no money 
to respond to it and act on i t ’’
The deputy chief executive of the hospital in unit S saw the patient-provider 
relationship as having changed quite significantly. S/he commented on patients’ 
willingness to exercise their rights:
“Yes, patients will now complain about a five-minute delay, which is a definite 
sign of their empowerment. They also question consent and seek a second 
opinion. But we can see positive effects as a result o f their complaints over 
processes."
S/he also added that changes of attitude were occurring and were influenced by 
the increase in the number of consultants, junior doctors and nurses, who “tried 
to make the service more customer-orientated.”
The nurse managing the eye services in S had a few comments to make on the
changes in the attitude of providers and patients in the aftermath of the reforms:
“In every change we introduced, we asked patients first, as patients have to be 
satisfied with the change. We even tried to obtain feedback from the patients in 
our attempts to perfect the surgeon’s technique."
In U, the director of the acute department provided an insightful comment on the 
reasons why the attitude of the providers had changed, which, in his view, was 
more a response to the purchasers’ needs, both GP fund-holders and non fund­
holders:
“The efforts of the providers are directed at meeting specific targets set by them for 
their patients. But, in fact, the patients don’t decide. Even GPs can be persuaded 
that, for example, small incision surgery is less invasive and thus has positive 
implications for the quality of outcome. ’’
A manager from the quality department of hospital T gave information about a 
survey conducted every half a year and which investigated patients’ general 
impression of care, but s/he thought there was still a long way to go in terms of 
incorporating patients’ concepts of care.
246
Of the purchasers in the UK, the director of acute commissioning for the Health 
Authority covering unit S provided information on changes introduced by the 
reforms. Most of the doctors in S Health Authority were non fund-holders at the 
time the survey was conducted (summer 1995). Only 16% were fund holders, 
which meant that there were six fund-holding practices out of 60; another six 
planned to join in 1996. S/he explained the Health Authority’s interaction with 
them and commented on changes brought about by the reforms in the providers' 
behaviour:
“We try to work very hard with the fund-holders, but it is very difficult as they are 
very individually-minded and act independently. It is easy to get their views, but 
more difficult to influence their patterns o f behaviour. The power of individual 
consultants has been eroded and there are attempts to reach the middle ground 
in power between managers and doctors."
SW EDEN
The management of hospital K in Sweden is in the hands of the leading eye 
surgeons, the male director (MH) and his female deputy (BC). They are 
supported in their duties by a small team of accountants who have strict 
responsibility for financial matters and are headed by a financial manager. Their 
answers regarding this aspect of have already been outlined in respective 
section.
The purchaser in district Z of Stockholm County thought that there had been, so 
far, no negative signs as far as quality was concerned. However, there was an 
increased interest in recording quality "as this had not been done before". 
According to him:
“It was very difficult to say whether there was an improvement or a worsening in 
the quality o f care. The only thing one could mention was the increased 
awareness of its importance."
Another member of the County Council, who was directing the quality evaluation 
unit, thought that the steering system itself could not change the behaviour of the 
actors involved:
“Some changes will occur, but they will not be big, because the performance of 
doctors is not related to financial incentives, which are the real changes."
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S/he added that, even within the reformed system, “the money still flowed 
internally in the system" Thus, the real gains of competition had not been 
brought forward.
The other purchasers refrained from commenting on this issue.
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KEY FINDINGS
□ A wide range of people supplied verbal information. It appears that the general 
rule is that the consultant is the first to give information, during the patient’s initial 
visit. After this point, both junior doctors and nurses provide further information at 
different stages in the patient’s treatment, both pre- and post-operatively. Senior 
doctors in the UK more often saw patients (54%) than in Sweden (only 28%) on 
their first diagnostic appointment, but not as often as the specialist doctors in the 
hospitals claimed to be the case (see Table 8.3).
□ There is a wide difference in the timing of information about the operation date 
given to patients in different units, with the most notable difference occurring in 
an under-performing unit U (double the average value), which attracted the most 
complaints from patients. This seems not to be recognised by clinicians or the 
management of the respective provider.
□ The primary care doctors from the most of the samples in question do not know 
anything about how long in advance patients are informed of their operation date. 
It seems that, once a patient's care passes from the GP’s surgery to the 
hospital’s eye unit, the GP very much loses touch with the treatment process, 
although the doctors in sample U (where more fund-holders were represented) 
were better informed about this aspect of patient care than the primary care 
doctors in the two other groups where no fund-holders were represented.
□ Waiting time at the outpatients’ department in unit S was on average about 30 
minutes or less according to consultants, which was also confirmed by the 
majority of patients. It was for about one hour in T and it was significantly above 
this hour limit in U. It was much more according to patients and some 
consultants. There were no major changes in unit P and in unit K. In both cases 
all respondent groups unanimously agreed that waiting times were on average 
less than 30 minutes and quite often it was just 5-10 minutes (see Figure 8.1).
□ Waiting time at the outpatient units has been improving on the whole although 
the differences among units were significant. It seemed that those units, which
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embraced reforms and were ion favour of the business -  like mentality were 
more successful (S in the UK and K in Sweden). Conversely, the unit U that was 
tom by internal tensions between the management and clinicians and was 
eventually closed down had by far the worse record.
a Similarly, the positive shift in the attitude of health professionals was also 
markedly different in the units (S in the UK and K in Sweden), which had better 
performance on the number of indicators; a finding that was further confirmed by 
higher levels of patients’ satisfaction and dissatisfaction (unit U) respectively. 
However, even in the few cases that patients could see the positive changes this 
was accompanied by a marked awareness of the limitations involved. On the 
other hand, poor attentiveness and lack of friendliness in unit U was perceived as 
a result of changes created and it gave rise to open dissatisfaction on the 
patients’ side.
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CHAPTER 9 
RESPONSIVENESS: WAITING TIMES
This chapter deals with responsiveness to need, which is measured as changes 
in waiting times for the first specialist appointment (from the moment of referral) 
and the waiting time for the operation itself. Both waiting times are treated as 
crude measures of demand for surgery, and in the absence of more accurate 
indicators also as a proxy for need for cataract treatment. Bearing in mind all 
limitations that this approach entails, the views on sensitivity of this method are 
sought after from General Practitioners, eye surgeons, managers and 
purchasers.
Figures on the length of waiting times quoted by patients, GPs, eye surgeons, 
managers and purchasers are compared with national figures when these are 
available. Unfortunately, there is very little service-specific information on the 
waiting times for the period before reforms, which is non-existent for the first 
specialist appointment.
9.1. Waiting Times for the First Specialist Appointment: 
Interviews with all respondent groups
PATIENTS’ VIEWS
9.1.1 How long did you have to wait for your first specialist 
appointment?
ENGLAND
In S, quite a few patients did not remember what had happened to them and the 
answer to this question posed significant problems. Six out of eighteen patients 
thought the waiting time was less than six weeks, and it ranged from one week
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(in the case of a private patient) to six weeks - the average being four weeks. 
One patient thought it was around three months and the remaining ten 
respondents could not recall this information at all.
In P, five out of seven patients replied that the wait was less than six weeks; the 
other two patients waited for ten and twelve weeks respectively.
In T, five patients waited from three to six weeks. Another five patients had to 
wait for several months and the most often quoted figure was two months. One 
patient had to wait for only a few days and another could not remember the exact 
figure.
In U, four patients waited for less than six weeks, while the remaining eight 
patients waited for more than ten weeks .Two patients said it was not very long 
but they could not be more specific about the length. There seer^s to be a sharp 
division between the waiting times faced by patients in U. While the minority had 
to wait a reasonable time for the first specialist appointment, the majority had to 
wait for between four and five months (two patients), six months (three patients), 
and a year (three patients). One patient said that she was given a date one year 
ahead for a specialist appointment but, following her/his complaint, s/he received 
one after two or three months.
The differences between different units are presented in Figure 9.1.
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Waiting times for the first specialist 
appointment in the UK and Sweden
’-yv.
UnitS Unit P Unit T Unit U Unit K I
Figure 9.1: Patients’ views on the length of waiting time for the first specialist 
appointment in different eye units in the UK and Sweden (unit K) in 1995/96
SWEDEN
The average waiting time for the first specialist appointment was eleven weeks, 
which was almost double that of the best performing eye units in the UK (see 
Figure 9.1). The largest group of patients (nine and eight) waited for two and 
three months respectively. A few patients had to inquire whether the referral had 
arrived.
The next largest group included patients who had waited either for one month 
(four) or for a period between one and two months (three). Finally, one patient 
reported waiting for less than three months, another referred to a waiting time of 
one year, and someone else could not reply.
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PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS’ VIEWS
ENGLAND
The general feeling among GPs was that of a decreasing length of waiting time 
for the first specialist appointment in the eye units they worked with. Sample T in 
the inner city was certainly the most positive, with all believing that there had 
been improvements, although some doctors admitted that these were only slight. 
Only one doctor was of the opinion that the closing of hospitals had increased 
waiting times. The doctors were better informed of developments in this field as 
this was something that was included in GP information packs dispatched 
regularly by providers. One of the GPs explained how this new system enabled 
him/her to contact a particular consultant:
"GPs are sent a list of doctors with personalised information on waiting times for an 
appointment by doctor, which gives the GP an amount of choice to refer the patient 
to a particular surgeon instead of writing 'Dear Doctor* as it used to be before. "
When asked to expound further on their knowledge of the wait for the first 
appointment by giving an actual estimate of the time, there were some telling 
responses. Doctors in sample T were largely in agreement, with three out of five 
suggesting waiting times in the region of three months. One doctor was not sure, 
and another gave the somewhat alarming figure of thirty months. This was, in 
fact, far beyond the absolute maximum at the hospital to which this doctor 
referred most of his/her patients, at least during the time that this study took 
place in 1995/96 but it was a reality during the pre-reform period.
GPs in sample S gave a range of answers, but all were in terms of weeks rather 
than months, and it was a fairly accurate portrayal of the situation. RE summed it 
up by stating:
“It is four weeks. It used to be eight weeks. It is continuously decreasing, but varies 
from month to month."
Sample U showed an interesting divide between fund-holders and non-fund­
holders. The two fund-holders estimated the waiting time as being less than six 
weeks, and no more than four weeks respectively. The non-fund-holders from the 
same area were clearly less well off, or at least perceived this to be the case,
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most settling for figures in the region of ten weeks, and one guessing at six 
months. LB, a non fund-holder involved in commissioning initiatives, said it was 
more than ten weeks, explaining that, “the leaflets would say within a few weeks. 
But it was even longer before - about six months". HW, a non fund-holder who 
intended to join the scheme, also agreed that it was between six and ten weeks, 
adding that, "it was sometimes less but it could also be three to six months".
Fund-holders of the area CA and DC said that the waiting time respectively "was
between seven and ten weeks and sometimes less" and “one month in the
outreach clinic". Another fund-holder also agreed that waiting time had been
reduced, which s/he also related to the outreach clinic, but argued:
“It was hard to say whether outreach clinics happened only because of the reforms 
as, even before becoming a fund-holder, outreach clinics were organised by 
FHSA." .
The variation in figures quoted could be partly justified by the variation in waiting 
times in the hospitals to which different primary care doctors referred their patients; 
but it could also be due to their different status. This could happen either because 
they had special arrangements in the form of outreach clinics at other hospitals 
outside their area or because they could be offered shorter times in the same 
hospitals. On the whole, fund-holders as opposed to non fund-holders waited less, 
which is reflected in Figure 9.2, that compares waiting times among two types of 
GPs in sample U.
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Waiting times for the first appointment for patients of 
fund-holders and non fund-holders in U (North
London)
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Figure 9.2: Waiting times for the first specialist appointment at eye units in area U 
for patients of fund-holders and non fund-holders in the UK in 1995/96
SW EDEN
MK, the only female GP in the Swedish sample, thought waiting times had been 
reduced which, according to her, could be attributed to the reforms. NB also 
supported this view, explaining that waiting time has been reduced to a period of 
between two and six months for cataract surgery “while before, it used to be from 
one to one and a half years. ”
PG, the private GP, reiterated that “waiting time has been reduced due to the 
reforms”, adding that when s/he had wanted to secure access to an eye doctor 
within one week, s/he had referred the patient to a private clinic.
When asked to indicate more specifically the approximate average waiting time for
the first appointment, only MK and BN could provide an answer and they
respectively thought “it was between six and ten weeks” and “two to six months”.
The reason for this relative lack of knowledge about the specific length of waiting
times can be sought in the information provided by PG, who explained that:
“A lot of patients can go to the Accident and Emergency department of K hospital 
directly even for planning elective care, because they are less prepared to wait.”
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CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS
ENGLAND
According to the views of most consultant eye surgeons, the new stricter attitude 
towards waiting times - with specific targets being set by the government - seems 
to have forced them down. The decrease has not been a passive result of the 
reforms, but rather an area that has been targeted by the government. It was 
suggested that the main factor in reducing waiting times was extra staffing and 
the additional resources that were made available for this purpose.
Interestingly, consultants in sample T expressed their doubts most strongly as to 
whether the reforms were at the root of the decrease in waiting times for the first 
specialist appointment for cataract surgery. MJ, the consultant with the longest 
waiting times, thought:
‘Waiting time has improved, but this was not due to the reforms. It was due to the 
number of consultants hired. ”
S/he also ascribed it to the clinical director’s initiative to start primary health care, 
where patients could come in for specialist consultation, which had made a 
temporary difference because doctors’ limited time was used more efficiently. S/he 
complained, though, about the inefficiency in ophthalmology services in the UK, 
which had not followed the USA example:
‘Where technicians look at the patient first and it takes only five minutes of the 
consultant’s time to examine the patient.”
The clinical director of unit T also supported the view that any changes that were 
happening were not related to the reforms, as they depended on the number of staff 
and on the popularity of the hospital because of its teaching status. She referred to 
new consultants being hired and to the waiting list initiative being launched, which 
were both responsible “for the decrease in the waiting time from thirty weeks to 
nineteen" {see Table 9.1).
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Table 9.1: Changes in waiting times for the first appointment (by consultant) in unit 
T (inner city) by weeks in comparison with the agreed standard for the speciality
Name of 
consultant
Waiting time in 
1994/95
December March
Waiting time in 
1995/96
December March
Waiting time in 
1996/97
December March
CD 16
weeks
18
weeks
3 weeks 3 weeks 16
weeks
26
weeks
MJ 29
weeks
40
weeks
12
weeks
14
weeks
25
weeks
23
weeks
BL 14
weeks
12
weeks
4 weeks 5 weeks 15
weeks
15
weeks
Target
agreed
10 weeks 
standard
12 weeks 
standard
6 weeks 
standard
Source: Quality department data of the hospital T
It can be seen that the targets for waiting times were only achieved in unit T for 
1995/96, with most consultants reaching the standard agreed for that period. 
However, the preceding average lengths of waiting times and the ensuing ones 
in 1996/97 were only remotely related to what management aimed to achieve. 
The observed discrepancy between performance and the set targets in year 
1994/95, the overall compliance for the subsequent year 1995/96 (with the 
exception of one consultant), and the rebound to the previous state of divergence 
in 1996/97, is rather difficult to interpret. Possibly the effects of the reforms were 
short-lived and just when the results were starting to show, the reforms were 
quite hastily abandoned.
The overall average waiting time for a specialist appointment in sample S was 
about six weeks, with an upper limit of ten weeks. There was general agreement 
over this question. JO thought that this was partly due to the reforms, mainly the 
targets, which were set, and the strict control over them. The waiting times for 
specialist appointments did not differ among consultants; therefore, it was 
probably not relevant to provide this information to the purchasers. However, the 
changes in the number of patients waiting for more than three month for the first 
specialist appointment, although not calculated specifically for the cataract 
surgery, present a telling picture - especially when they are compared with the 
number of operations performed (See Table 9.2).
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Table 9.2: Number of patients waiting over three months (total for day cases and ordinary admissions - all ophthalmology services) in 
unit S (Southern London)________________________________________________________________________________________
Period measured June
1992
Sept.
1992
Dec.
1992
March
1993
June
1993
Sept.
1993
Dec.
1993
March
1994
June
1994
Sept.
1994
Dec.
1994
Mar.
95
Number of 
patients waiting
68 49 13 24 115 131 76 82 147 134 62 9
Number of 
patients operated
98 76 62 102 79 104 68 107 108 131 69 141
Source: departmental data from Eye Unit S Hospital
Table 9.3: Waiting times for cataract surgery in all eye hospitals in the County Council of Stockholm (expressed as numbers of patients
and waiting times in the years 1992-1 995
Name of the 
hospital
1992 (December) 
Number of 
operations
1992 (December) 
Waiting time (in 
weeks)
1993 (December) 
Number of 
operations
1993 (December) 
Waiting time (in 
weeks)
1994 (December) 
Number of 
operations
1994 (December) 
Waiting time in 
weeks
Hospital K 1455 10** weeks 2172 7*** weeks 1161 4-12 weeks
CC hospital X* 95 10 weeks
CC hospital Y 260 6** weeks 249 6-8 weeks 134 4-8 weeks
CC hospital Z 165 2-8 weeks 60
9-24 weeks
Private W n.a. n.a. ----------------------------------------- n.a. 3-4 weeks
Private X n.a. n.a. 100 3-4 weeks
Private Y ---------------------------- — ------------------------- 117 10 weeks
Total 1810 2586 1615
Source: hospital K data and County Council data
*Clinic closed in May 1993, ** patients without the care guarantee wait 16 weeks,
*** Patients with the care guarantee waited 15 weeks and those without the care guarantee waited 19 weeks.
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As the data illustrate, in S, there is a rise in the number of patients’ waiting in 
June and September, which is significant in all the years examined. It can also be 
noticed that the absolute numbers of patients waiting for more than three months 
increased over time, which may also be due to the total increase in patients seen 
(see Table 10.1 in Chapter 10). The department recognised that quarterly targets 
for waiting lists had to be set and ways of reducing waiting lists in the summer 
months devised without adversely affecting the revenues of the department.
Uniquely, in P, the prevalent view was that of an increase in waiting time for the 
first appointment because of the increase in referrals, which according to the 
clinical director had doubled as a result of the unit’s performance and the 
increase in the number of patients operated on. They added that waiting times 
depended greatly on the hospital and in particular on the management, on 
departmental policy and on set quality standards.
This was supported by one of the leading surgeons in the unit, who thought, “the 
reforms were responsible for increases in the waiting time for the first 
appointment”. Their views as to the length of waiting times were divided, which 
seemed to reflect the individual waiting times per consultant. Thus, the more 
established clinical director and another senior consultant had a waiting time of 
more than ten weeks (twelve to fourteen weeks) and six to ten weeks respectively, 
while the newer surgeons had waiting times of less than six weeks.
MH, the leading consultant in unit U, claimed that the waiting time was much 
shorter than the times quoted by patients in the same sample. S/he quoted a 
figure of twelve to thirteen weeks, while patients referred to 20 weeks on average. 
MH acknowledged that s/he did not know for certain what the length of waiting time 
was, but explained that the recent increase in waiting times “was caused by the 
specific policies pursued by the trust, which in order to become a community 
hospital reduced services and moved them to a nearby hospital.”
Unfortunately, data for the period before the introduction of the reforms, which 
could have provided some comparison, were not available because they were 
not at all monitored, either by the hospitals or by the eye departments. This lack
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of data refers to the waiting time for cataract surgery, the waiting time for the first 
specialist appointment, and the waiting time at the outpatients’ departments 
across all the units examined.
SW EDEN
The hospital director was not aware of the exact figure for waiting times and 
referred the interviewer to the data from the specific departments. The surgeons 
in the departments confirmed that the period was around three months. WS 
explained that this included between six and ten weeks waiting for the pre- 
operative examination and another three to four weeks waiting for the operation 
itself, adding that the hospital made a serious attempt to stick to that.
BC said that where patients were found to have waited longer than the care 
guarantee maximum of three months’ waiting time, they could ask for the refund 
of 180 SEK paid for each attendance. S/he confirmed:
“Some patients were making big deal about this and, as the hospital was losing 
money, it acted as a deterrent"
S/he elaborated further that had it not been for the substantial amount of extra 
money given specifically for this purpose, waiting times would have stayed equally 
as long as in the past. In his/her view:
This was rather a political decision. It can also be said that the reduction in waiting 
times was a joint contribution of higher efficiency and more resources being made 
available."
BP explained how the hospital dealt with referrals that came from primary care 
providers:
They were then given the exact date of arrival, which was one month later; but 
most patients had to wait for about three months. "
CZ said waiting times were less than two and a half or three months, adding that:
The waiting time has been reduced and there is a proof for that in the form of 
feedback in writing from the doctors who refer patients to the hospital."
261
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS
ENGLAND
The management in unit S thought that the waiting time for the first specialist 
appointment was less than six weeks and was closer to five weeks. Figures 
quoted by the management in unit T are presented in Table 9.1. In U, according 
to the director of acute services, this was more than ten weeks (thirteen weeks). In 
P, this was said to be around two months, although a wide variety in waiting 
times between consultants was also confirmed by the manager of the respective 
unit.
From purchasers, only the acute commissioning officer of the Health Authority to
which hospital T belonged administratively provided a specific comment on
waiting times for the post- referral period. S/he asserted that:
"While waiting times for operations have certainly gone down, the waiting time for 
specialist appointments has not necessarily followed the same trend. ”
In his/her view, the latter was probably due to the choice available through the 
different units in the inner city area, and also due to more activity being carried 
out and more patients being operated on. These patients were picked up more 
easily, because of greater development of the outpatients’ facilities. The average 
waiting time for first specialist appointment, when compared across the different 
hospitals in the area, was currently three to four months.
Purchasers from other units decided to comment on waiting times in general or 
not at all and did not make specific references to waiting times for the first 
appointment.
SW EDEN
The data presented by the clinicians were confirmed by the figures quoted by the 
deputy director responsible for the management of waiting times and other 
quality related issues. When purchasers were concerned the situation is similar 
to that of the UK, with purchasers not being preoccupied with distinctions 
between waiting times for the first appointment and the surgery itself; this could
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be a result of relatively insignificant difference between those two at least in case 
of Sweden.
9.2 Waiting Times for Cataract Surgery: Interviews 
with some respondent groups
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The GPs showed a relatively poor knowledge of the changes, which had taken 
place when questions about the length of the waiting lists for cataract surgery at 
the local hospitals were asked. In most cases, they also could not say whether 
there had been any significant change in their length since the introduction of the 
reforms.
Samples T (inner city) and S (South London) seemed to be the least informed, 
with doctors in the former answering that they did not know, or that there had 
been no significant change. Those in the latter did feel that waiting lists had 
decreased, but often said that their patients had not made any complaints. There 
were responses that indicated unwillingness by the doctors to acknowledge the 
reforms as being at the root of the changes occurring, which was well 
summarized by the only fund-holder in the S area:
"Hospital S was always world famous and its performance has nothing to do with 
contracts. The contracts coincided with what was already happening. ”
Most interesting are the replies from area U where differences between the 
reports of fund-holders and non fund-holders are even more evident. The two 
fund-holders from sample U (North London) said that waiting times had 
decreased “enormously", according to one of them, and they were respectively 
quoted as being less than three weeks. The non fund-holders were divided 
between thinking that there had been no real change or that waiting lists had 
grown slightly smaller.
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One non fund-holder summed up the current attitude of providers, and also 
patients’ compliance with whatever was offered, as follows:
“It [the waiting time] is less than it was. They [the hospitals] are slightly more 
sympathetic and if people complain they immediately get a place after a phone 
call from the GP. Although patients are often told to get a General Practitioner to 
write a letter, which is a total waste of time, people do not complain. ”
The figures quoted by the non fund-holders were respectively four months, three 
to six months, and one year to eighteen months (for details see Fig. 9.3).
Figure 9.3: Waiting times for cataract surgery in hospitals in area U for fund­
holders and non fund-holders in the UK in 1995/1996
Waiting times for cataract surgery for fund-holders 
and non fund-holders in area U (North London)
""J-1:.....:rr..;....................   r r ..FH 3
FH 2
FH 1
FH 3
FH 2
FH 1
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The doctors were then all asked if they thought that the waiting list was 
unacceptably long and, if so, what actions they had taken to tackle the problem. 
None of the GPs in sample S chose to answer this question. Those in sample T 
offered a range of solutions, and all agreed that waiting lists were too long, which 
was odd when their ignorance of the state of waiting lists at the time is taken into 
account (as demonstrated above in their responses to the previous question).
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Sample U offered solutions along the lines of increased communication between 
GPs and consultants (two of them) which was not in any way a novel solution, 
and another two pointed to the transfer to fund-holder status. The GP in U who 
had decided on the latter move commented:
“Now consultants are more interested in contracts coming from fund-holding 
practices. Fund-holders have made a difference. That's why we are aiming at 
becoming fund-holders.”
The doctors were asked whether they felt that the size of the waiting list could be 
used as a sensitive measure of the demand for cataract surgery. There was very 
little agreement over whether or not this was the case, and a number of different 
points were mentioned in the answers. One GP from area T expressed a view 
that s/he did not think it was a sensitive measure, adding that in order to get a 
clearer picture, "the number of people being operated on has to be compared 
with the number of people being referred for cataract surgery”. Another answer 
summed up the complexity of the issues involved:
“It was a difficult question to answer as, on the one hand, it does not give you a 
guide to the throughput of the unit and, on the other hand, a long waiting list does 
not have to mean low productivity.”
One doctor from the inner city area T presented an alternative hypothesis and
explained that people who were kept on the waiting list to be seen in one year's
time were now being sent back to be cared for by the GPs. S/he added:
‘There would also be other pressures for referring or stopping the referral of 
someone who had been on the waiting list too long.”
A non fund-holder in sample U thought, “it was not a sensitive measure of demand
but a measure of agreed supply”. S/he referred to the example of his/her practice,
which was situated in quite an affluent area, where half the patients did not wait at
all as 50% of them would go privately, and s/he characteristically commented:
“They are not on the waiting list at all. It is, rather, people who are poor and 
inarticulate who agree to the second-tier service."
Another interesting point, which may or may not necessarily be relevant, is that 
the two fund-holders were both of the opinion that the length of the waiting list 
was a sensitive measure of demand for cataract surgery. Someone else 
guessed:
265
“It must be some reflection of demand but it also comes down to beds, change of 
consultants and how many of them were employed .”
SW EDEN
The responses of the Swedish primary care providers to this question were rather
short and concise. Most of the primary care doctors agreed there had been a
decrease of waiting time, with BN, the other GP, explaining that it usually took one
to two months more after the specialist appointment. When asked about the
resolution of the waiting lists problem, MK thought different budgeting systems
could possibly be an option in resolving this problem. NB said:
“A lot of cuts that are made nowadays could lead to a decrease in the quality of 
care - in the form of long waiting lists for operations and other elective procedures.’’
CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
On the whole, consultant eye surgeons from all units agreed that waiting times 
for cataract surgery had decreased. Notable exceptions were some consultants 
in P who felt that their productivity achievements had resulted in them being 
“penalized” in the form of more referrals, which, in combination with scarce 
money from purchasers, had eventually led to the rise in waiting times.
In P, the reason that was specifically mentioned as being responsible for increases
in waiting times was “ex-listing", where patients were taken out of the list to be
replaced by fund-holders' patients, as explained by one consultant:
'This was due to pressure from management before the end of each financial year, 
when there was no more money to operate on patients from the list.”
S/he noted that the fund-holders' patients waited for only two to three weeks in 
this period but this meant an increase in waiting time for the patients who were 
already on the list. In support of this view, another consultant described the 
results of the lack of funding typical of the end of each financial year and 
resulting in surgeons being unable to operate at all. S/he gave specific examples:
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“After the hospital became a trust, we did not operate for four months in the first 
year, for two months in the second year and for six weeks in the third year, which 
had an obvious impact on the waiting list.”
S/he continued to explain that it happened because of the "vicious" financing 
system employed by purchasers. The system they used was to discount the 
amount of money for the number of operations that had been performed in the 
previous year by 5% each year, which obviously had to have a cumulative effect 
over the years. Hospitals were pressed by the management to perform fewer 
operations in order to preserve their financial stability. Thus, an "iniquitous system", 
as expressed by TF, was created.
The clinical director and another surgeon took a different view and focused on 
the positive side of the reforms, which, for them, meant the new £5 bln. eye unit, 
which had been created on the site of hospital P in order to meet the needs of 
the local population. This, it was hoped, would solve the problems of waiting 
times in the longer term and, as expressed by JJ:
“This would never have been possible without the reforms enabling hospitals to act 
under Trust status, which gave them more flexibility and freedom of movement.”
In S, the unanimous belief among the consultants was that the waiting time for 
cataract surgery had decreased since the reforms. The reasons for this drop 
were many and varied. There had been an introduction of extra operating lists, 
leading to an increased patient throughput. The shift to day care treatment was 
mentioned, as was an increase in the number of patients having surgery on each 
operating list, and a general rise in efficiency. However, here again the clinical 
director complained of the perverse incentives that “over-performers” faced in the 
form of more work for the same amount of money:
“We get more referrals which are not funded, but we don’t necessarily increase 
the number of operations. Money does not yet follow the patient because only 
the GP fund-holders have money.”
This view was also echoed by another consultant from the same unit, who on the 
one hand criticised the artificial incentives to reduce waiting lists that had existed 
before, but also disapproved of the mechanistic nature of the standards for 
waiting times set in the contracts:
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“In principle, it ’s enough to complete all the cases within six months but they 
have to be spread throughout the whole year and, in order to solve this problem, 
we try to attract a number of referrals from GP fund-holders."
All consultants in T also felt a decrease of waiting time had occurred. CD thought 
that it was about one to two months after the first specialist appointment and the 
other newly appointed surgeon, BL, thought it was two to three months. MJ 
commented:
“It may have come down due to the reforms. Waiting lists have come down a lot, 
from six - twelve months to four months due to the introduction o f the re-clerking 
clinic where eye sight was measured”.
MH in unit U quoted a figure of ten months for routine cataract surgery, adding “but
it has still decreased from what it used to be”. S/he commented:
“We were forced to bring waiting times down because otherwise we would have 
been penalised. This was extremely difficult though. We achieved it only with 
extra lists. I am now more aware of waiting time for patients who want to see
_  i tme.
There was a good deal of doubt among consultants about the sensitivity of the 
length of waiting lists as a measure of the demand for cataract surgery. It was 
pointed out that a longer waiting list did not necessarily imply a greater demand 
for surgery, but perhaps an inefficient or over-stretched provider.
The many suggestions for a more sensitive measure included: patient throughput 
per doctor; the ratio of people with the diagnosis to the number of people 
operated upon; and needs assessment based on the prevalence of patients with 
cataracts per 100,000 of population. The age structure of the population in 
different areas was also referred to; and the creation of a central computerised 
service, with all GPs referrals estimated and linked to the diagnoses made by 
consultants, which could provide a more accurate estimate of real demand, was 
also proposed. Finally, someone said, half jokingly, that the only resolution would 
probably be:
To assassinate the recent government, but this would also be an impermanent 
solution, as they would come back on the wave of popular support they enjoy"
AL, a newly appointed male consultant in S, said that waiting time perversely 
increased with increased efficiency:
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“Given the set referral patterns, the waiting list should decrease with increased 
efficiency but that’s not the case. If we outperform the operating list in order to 
cut it down, the waiting list will go up as more patients will get referred."
BL, the newly appointed surgeon in unit T, also thought waiting time was an
insensitive measure, suggesting that the use of the number of facilities divided by
the cataract’s prevalence would be more useful, as “this would avoid an artificial
sense of need and the sense o f an artificial lack of provision", as s/he put it. MJ,
of the same unit, considered that waiting time was related to the number of
doctors and amount of money available, stressing “this has changed as the GPs
look more at the cost and not so much at the waiting time, which has become
less important now". The clinical director of the same unit stated:
“It was difficult to know what the real demand was when patients could go to several 
places with different prices; also, some could have died or moved and yet still 
appear on the list."
MH of U thought that the actual waiting time was not a very reliable measure of
demand as it depended on a lot of other factors that interfered with waiting:
“For example, it depends on throughput and turnover, and if a waiting list was short, 
this could mean problems with the staff."
The clinical director of P thought that the waiting list reflected only 50% of the 
real demand and particularly that of the lower income groups in the population 
as, in her/his opinion, half of all cataract operations were done privately. S/he 
suggested that the age threshold for cataract had dropped. The other consultant 
in the unit thought that it was a good measure, provided that the system worked 
efficiently “with no running out o f funds and cutting of the list". TF saw it as only a 
very crude measure of demand because different surgeons use different criteria 
for operating and there also be a backlog in referrals from the GP or the opposite - 
long waiting lists may discourage GPs from referring patients.
SW EDEN
All consultants agreed that there was a real decrease in waiting time as a result of 
the reforms, which amounted to about three months for the first eye surgery; but as 
one of the surgeons acknowledged:
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The people who come now may have better vision than those who would have 
qualified for the operation in the past, because the standards have changed. The 
waiting time for eye surgery has also changed in this respect."
S/he continued by explaining the political nature of the problem involving the 
cataract queues, which the establishment needed to solve because of the 
increasing pressure from patients’ groups who “were not prepared to accept these 
waiting times any longer and which was especially strong in big cities". In 
Stockholm, they had been more successful than elsewhere because they had 
obtained a three months guarantee for cataract surgery in both eyes and not in 
one eye, as was the case for the rest of the country. The vice-director elaborated 
on the aspect of changes of criteria for the operation: “about 50% of waiting time 
has changed in this respect”.
CZ compared the situation with the past and explained the changes in waiting 
times: "less than two months and down from six months" stating somewhat 
curiously “some waiting time between the diagnosis and the operation is 
reasonable for patients to adjust to the idea."
When asked about their views on whether waiting lists for cataract surgery 
constituted a sensitive measure of demand for the service, most of the other 
respondents either did not know or were not prepared to answer in any different 
way from the way they had already answered.
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The deputy director of acute services in the hospital in unit S claimed that 50% of 
patients were operated on within three months and that everybody was operated 
on within twelve months. When asked about the waiting lists’ suitability for 
measuring demand, s/he doubted the validity of this indicator if interpreted out of 
context, because long waiting lists could mean that no one wanted the service at 
all or that it did not exist:
“If a service exists, the demand for it will exist too”.
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S/he conceded that it could be used as a pressure tool by consultants to extract 
additional resources from an unresponsive management but it might also mean 
that not enough work is done in the clinic. Accordingly waiting times would have 
some validity only when all the other quality indicators were being satisfactorily 
met but “the numbers of referrals by GPs to consultants should also be taken into 
account1’.
The senior nurse managing quality aspects and waiting times at unit S stated 
that, while the waiting time for an operation from the moment that patients were 
sent by their GPs was approximately nine months for other hospitals, the wait for 
a first appointment in S was about five weeks. According to her, the average 
waiting time for cataract surgery was about two years elsewhere but in S it was 
less than three months (approximately twelve weeks).
The manager of the quality department of unit T stated that patients waited for 
about twelve months to have the cataract operation while, before, it used to be 
eighteen months, clarifying “there was some differentiation, however, and some 
of them waited less”.
The public health doctor responsible for management in hospital T saw waiting 
lists as:
“A big political football, and when the issue became sensitive the strategy was to 
throw more money at it, e.g. by launching the waiting list initiative. ”
In his/her view, the real problem was the lack of money. Attempts to squeeze 
things as much as possible had led to the reforms and not the inappropriate 
structure of the system. S/he doubted whether the reforms could tackle this 
successfully as waiting lists were not necessarily an issue to be resolved in the 
market place:
“But with the existing excess capacity on the providers’ side, extra work could 
now be done because of more money being made available to Health 
Authorities. ’’
The public health doctor from area S, who acted on behalf of purchasing 
authority, thought that waiting lists were a poor and counter-productive indicator 
of quality as they were too often politically driven:
'They were probably there because there are a lot of incentives for maintaining 
long waiting lists on the surgeons’ side - for example, to feed their private
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practice. They [the waiting lists] are very confusing and there are all kinds of 
incentives to put people on them .”
S/he thought that the real answer to the problem of waiting lists were protocols of 
care and standardisation of clinical procedures as well as clinical competence. 
S/he also suggested that the GPs should have more knowledge of the former in 
order to refer their patients properly, mentioning an initiative by the clinical 
director of the eye unit in hospital S who wrote guidelines for GPs outlining the 
criteria for referrals.
The director of acute commissioning in the same unit was also adamant in 
negating the use of waiting lists for this purpose, stating, "The opposite held 
true”. S/he pointed out that they were dependent on the volume of care and if the 
volume was low, the waiting time would go up. S/he also felt that purchasers had 
to take more responsibility:
"If we continue to say we cannot afford to buy enough cataract operations, there 
will always be a waiting list. One of the worst problems, though, is the inability to 
plan in the event of excess capacity that quite often exists on the providers’ side.”
S/he complained about the providers’ attempts to deliver or extract work from 
Health Authorities that was not initially included in the contracts, despite their 
efforts “to plan according to the suggestions provided to us early enough by the 
clinicians”.
For the purchaser from T, who was also responsible for acute commissioning, 
things had markedly changed, which, in his/her view, boiled down to the attitude 
of the providers: "Before the reforms, the consultants used waiting lists as an 
internal bargaining tool. ”
S/he went on to explain that the reforms’ contribution was to make the process of 
putting patients on the list more explicit. Consultants were required to justify the 
number of people on the waiting lists, which made them reluctant to list people 
who should not have been there in the first place. According to his/her 
information, the average waiting time for secondary elective procedures was 
twelve months and the next target was to reduce this to nine months but 70% of 
patients were operated on within three months.
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S/he reckoned that cutting the waiting lists should be a priority, with purchasers 
having to decide “where to draw the line on the level o f waiting time that was 
acceptable”. S/he also pointed out that, even nowadays, clinical judgement 
impinged excessively on waiting lists, which in turn “pushed towards the direction 
of evaluating the effectiveness o f procedures”.
SWEDEN
In specialist eye hospital K, there was no separation of management functions, 
which in most cases were assumed by the senior clinicians (the heads of 
departments). Therefore, almost all questions concerning the organisational 
aspects of care have already been explained through the views of clinicians also 
responsible for management.
According to one of the purchasers, the executive from Stockholm County 
Council, the waiting list of the past could be used as a way to obtain resources 
for the clinic, but the introduction of the Stockholm Model gave incentives to work 
in a different way, which were very strong in promoting productivity. As s/he 
explained further, the problem was that purchasers were supposed to meet the 
needs of their population for a given budget, but the providers had not agreed to 
provide the same level of care for much less money.
The issue of rationing had therefore come into the arena. This was manifested in 
the reappearance and building up of waiting lists. Also, criticism was raised 
against the care guarantees, which could no longer adhered to, because it was 
believed they had been subsequently expanded too much and had ended up 
including conditions, which were too narrow. Also the example of patients in 
Stockholm exceptionally obtaining a care guarantee for surgery in both eyes was 
introducing some new and explicit inequity. An executive of the Stockholm 
County Council was quick to point out that the decrease in waiting time for 
second eye cataract surgery:
“Was a purely political decision for Stockholm and not the result of the work of 
the market”.
The purchaser in district Z of Stockholm County Council explained that the care 
guarantee introduced in 1992 for several elective procedures, including cataract
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surgery, had resulted in an overall decrease in all waiting times; in particular, the 
waiting time for the operation itself had been dramatically reduced from about 
one year in the Stockholm area to approximately three months (which was the 
requirement outlined in the care guarantee).
However, when the figures for waiting times provided by the same purchaser in Z 
district were analysed, a quite different picture emerged, despite the limitation 
caused by the absence of data for the period before the introduction of the 
Stockholm Model (see Table 9.3). As the comparison of the waiting times for 
surgery in hospital K and other eye units in the Stockholm area in years 1992-94 
indicates, there seem to be fluctuations in the lengths of waiting times rather than 
a linear decrease. This is observable not only in hospital K but even more so 
across all other hospitals.
274
Table 9.4: Percentage of appointments fulfilled according to “The Patients* Charter” standards - all ophthalmo ogy services
Name of 
Hospital/ 
NHS Trust
% seen 
within 3 
months 
1993/1994
% seen 
within 12 
months 
1993/1994
% seen 
within 3 
months 
1994/1995
% seen 
within 13 
weeks 
1994/1995
% seen 
within 
26 weeks 
1994/1995
% seen 
within 
12months 
1994/1995
% seen 
within 3 
months 
1995/1996
%  seen 
within 13 
weeks 
1995/1996
% seen 
within 26 
weeks 
1995/1996
% seen 
within 12 
months 
1995/1996
Unit S 44%* 100%***** 45%* 91%**** 99%* ** * 100%***** 74%****fl 99%* * * * * 100%* * * * *
100%
* * * * *
Unit T 63% 
no star
99% no 
star
63%
***
54%
*
87%
*
99%
* * * * *
38%
*
84%
* * * f t
97%
***ft
99%
* * * * *
Unit U 56%** 96%* * * * 56%** 83%*** 97%*** 95%* * * * 53%** 96%* * * * * 96%*** 78%
UnitP 15%* 56%* 55%** 95%* * * * * 100%* * * * * 91%* * * f t 96%* * * * *
ft
99%
* * * * *
100%
* * * * *
99%
* * * * *
It
National
average
not avail­
able
Not avail­
able
51% 73% 94% 91% 52% 76% 96% 95%
*Star ratings according to the Performance Tables in ascending order. Where no star ranking appears, it indicates that the Audit Commission was not satisfied 
with the quality of data presented and results were published without ranking.
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Thus, waiting times in K were just below the care guarantee at the end of 1992, 
decreased significantly during the same period in 1993, and doubled again by the 
end of 1994, which could have coincided with misgivings about the Stockholm 
Model reforms and their sustainability, already expressed in 1995. Another 
interesting point is that the private clinics competing with the virtual monopoly 
provider K halved their waiting times. This could have been done in order to 
attract referrals from the very few primary care providers (such as the private GP 
represented in this study’s sample) but could also have been related to their 
much lower throughput.
9.3 Comparison of the study’s findings with the national 
data on waiting times
ENGLAND
Before 1991/92 there was no routine collection of data on the numbers of patients 
waiting for specialist referral either on a national scale or at Health Authority level. As 
there was no incentive to measure them on a regular basis, no systematic records 
were kept before 1991/92 with the exception of some departmental data collected 
as a result of individual consultants’ initiative. Some specific targets were set 
explicitly for the first time in The Patient’s Charter" and in 1993, measurement of the 
performance of all providers on a national scale against related indicators was 
initiated in what became known as League or Performance Tables.
Data used in the League Tables collected during the period 1993/94 - 1995/96 and 
extracted for the purpose of this study, refer to all ophthalmology services. 
However, as cataract operations and related outpatient visits make up the bulk of 
eye services (approx. 75% of all of them, Davidge et al, 1987), they were analysed 
and used as a proxy for the cataract procedure itself (see Table 9.4).
Analysis of the data presented in Table 9.4 highlights some interesting changes 
that took place during the first three years of the reforms’ implementation. These 
mostly refer to increases in admissions within three-month and twelve-month 
periods, observed at the same hospitals. More specifically, the change in the 
former is most visible in S, where admissions within a three-month period rose
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from 44% in 1993/94 and 45% in 1994/95 to 74% in 1995/96. This is even more 
remarkable in the case of unit P, where in 1993/94 only 15% of admissions were 
within three months; in 1994/95, they increased more than threefold to reach 
55% and were about six times higher during the following year, reaching an 
impressive 96% in 1995/96.
The proportion of admissions within twelve months is constant for S and T, at 
100% and 99% respectively. However, changes occurred in unit P: in 1993/94 
the percentage of admissions within twelve months was 56%; in 1994/95 it was 
91%, reaching an even higher 99% in 1995/96. Interestingly, in the case of U 
there was a significant fall from 96% in 1993/94 and 95% in1994/95 to 78% in 
1995/96, with a further tendency for decline projected.
As far as longer periods of admission - within thirteen and 26 weeks - were 
concerned, the data are only available for two years, but there is a visible trend 
towards an increase in the former. Thus, in S they rose from 91% in 1994/95 to 
99% in 1995/96; in T they rose from 54% in 1994/95 to 84% in 1995/96; in U they 
rose from 83% to 96% respectively; and, finally, in P they rose from 95% to 99%. 
These last figures have remained constant since then as there was very little 
room for further increase.
Although the general trend seems to be a decrease in the number of patients 
waiting for longer periods, there was one surprising finding in the figures for unit 
U. Standards for admission within 26 weeks were met for 96% of cases, while 
standards for admission within twelve months were fulfilled in only 78% of cases, 
and there was a notable trend towards further deterioration in 1995/96. A year 
earlier, the respective figures had been 96% and 95%, which again confirms the 
dramatic impact of changes resulting from the conflict between the management 
and the clinicians, leading to the resignation of the latter.
When the national data were compared with the study's findings, some of the 
latter seemed to be confirmed, whereas others were disproved. As can be 
inferred from the Figure 9.4, the waiting time for the first appointment in S was 
approximately six weeks, while the national figures for the years 1993/94 and
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1995/96 suggest that only 44% and 46% of patients were seen within a three- 
month period in these respective years. This, however, rises to 74% in year 
1995/96 when the interviews for this study were taken, which could also mean 
that the references made by the interviewees were mostly made on the basis of 
this last period.
The average waiting times for the first 
appointment in different eye units in the UK 
and Sweden
Weeks
Unit U Unit P Unit KUnit S Unit T
Figure 9.4: The average waiting time for the first specialist appointment in different 
eye units in the UK and Sweden in the views of different actors in years 1993/94-
1995/96
In unit T, there seems to be higher consistency between the study’s findings and 
the data reported for the purpose of the Performance Tables (usually by the 
hospital itself, but also subsequently scrutinised by the Audit Commission). 
These figures indicated that in 1993/94 and 1994/95, only 63% of patients were 
seen within a three-month period, which decreased even further to 38% in 
1995/96. In the same year, 84% of patients were seen within 13 weeks, but there 
were also few waiting longer than 26 weeks. Data provided by our respondents
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confirm unusually long waiting times that ranged from 19 to 26 weeks, with the 
average being 20 weeks (for details see Fig. 9.4).
By contrast, in U the average waiting time reported by the study’s respondents 
was approximately fifteen weeks but waiting times reported to the Audit 
Commission indicated that 56% of patients were seen within three months in 
1993/94 and 1994/95 and 53% in 1995/96. However, 83% of them were seen 
within thirteen weeks in 1994/95 and 96% of them were seen within the same 
period in 1995/96.
The example of P is also interesting as reports from the study site present a 
picture of a very efficient unit. But this picture was not reflected in the data of the 
Performance Tables for the year 1993/94, and the effects of the overhaul of the 
eye department, which occurred simultaneously, were not even apparent during 
the subsequent year 1994/95. Thus, according to the present study, the number 
of patients seen within a three-month period represented only 15% in 1993/94 
and 54% in 1994/95 but rose to an impressive 96% during the next year. In this 
very same year, the average waiting time for the first appointment was less than 
six weeks (for details see Fig. 9.4).
This pattern was confirmed by the changes in waiting times for patients seen 
within thirteen weeks. In 1993/94, only 56% of patients were seen within twelve 
months with the remaining 44% having to wait longer than that. However, in 
1994/95 and 1995/96 almost all patients were being seen within thirteen weeks, 
with the respective figures being 95% and 96%. In the same years, no patient 
had to wait longer than 26 weeks to be seen by the specialist.
SW EDEN
Waiting times for elective surgery in unit K, in the other eye units in the 
Stockholm County Council area, and in the hospitals in south east Sweden were 
compared, and this led to several conclusions. First, hospital K was ranked 
between the two other public hospitals (R and Y) in the Stockholm County
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Council area, with its waiting time for an operation being eight weeks for patients 
with the care guarantee and twelve weeks for those without, as opposed to four 
weeks and six to eight weeks for hospital R, and a ten- week waiting period for 
hospital Y.
Hospital K’s performance was worse when compared with private eye clinics in 
the same area - the best performers being W and X, where the waiting times 
were only three to four weeks and four weeks respectively for those with the care 
guarantee. But K was much better than Y, where waiting times were up to ten 
weeks for those with the care guarantee and 12-24 weeks for those without. 
However, when these waits were compared with the numbers of patients waiting 
for the operation and with the numbers of operations performed, the picture 
becomes clearer. Thus, in unit K in 1994/95, 1,611 patients waited for an 
operation, which represented 18% of the total number of 6,855 operations 
performed during the year. The same rough percentages of patients waiting were 
found in the two other public hospitals (in R and Z) while the percentage of 
patients waiting in private eye clinic was respectively 6% for W 4% for X and 
even for Y it was only 12%.
When waiting times for patients with the care guarantee in counties outside 
Stockholm (Southern Sweden) are compared, a fairly constant picture emerges. 
Most figures range between eight and twelve weeks in most cases, with an 
occasional sixteen and seventeen weeks’ wait. As most places outside 
Stockholm County Council have no private eye facilities, there is no room for this 
type of comparison. However, there are big differences between K and other 
areas in waiting times for patients without the care guarantee. They start from 
twelve to thirteen weeks and go as high as 50 weeks, which was not unusual. 
The most common figure is between 20 to 26 weeks (see Table 9.5).
This difference can be explained by the fact that the care guarantee in Stockholm 
applies to two eyes and in the rest of the country to only one. The number of 
patients waiting without the care guarantee (expressed as percentage of all 
operations performed) usually ranges between 8% and 12% in more than half of 
the cases with 18%-20% being quite common, but occasionally even a figure of
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50% appears. What is positive is that, in the vast majority of county hospitals, 
patients without the care guarantee having to wait for quite a long time represent 
less than 5% of the total cataract operations performed (see Table 9.5).
281
Table 9.5: Waiting times for cataract surgery in eye hospitals in Stockholm and 
selected County Councils in South East Sweden (expressed as numbers of 
patients waiting and weeks of waiting time) in year 1994/95__________ __________
Hospital Patients 
iwith care 
guarantee
Patients
without
care
guarantee
Weeks 
with care 
guarantee
Weeks
without
care
guarantee
Operations
performed
Stockholm C.C.
Hospital K 1611
Not
applicable 8 12 6855
CC hospital R 134 n.a 4 6-8 671
CC hospital Z 117 n.a. 10 — 674
Private W 100 n.a. 3-4 — 1392
Private X 43 n.a. 4 — 1105
Private Y 60 n.a.. 9-10 12-24- 427
Uppsala C.C.
University Hospital 146 232 8 33 786
Sormland C.C.
M alar Hospital 95 317 10 26 895
Nykoping 27 117 11 25 417
Kulbergska — — — — ..57
Ostergotland C.C.
Linkoping 157 287 9 48 854
Norrkoping 87 165 12 20 657
Jonkoping C.C.
Ryhov 202 163 10 50 942
Hogland hospital 41 182 11 52 333
Kronoberg C.C.
Vaxjo n o 157 10 20 597
Gotlands Commun
Visby 24 65 8-10 23-30 222
Blekinge C.C.
Karlskrona 62 119 8 12 703
Kristiansand C.C. 
Krisitianstad 500
------------
16 114
Malmo city
City hospital 159 480 12 ..28 1165
Malmo area C.C.
Lund 157 231 ...9 16-24 1450
Landskrona 8 18 ...4 4 469
Helsinborg 53 73 10 13 834
Ystad 17 120 17 24 272
Source: data from hospital K and various County Councils
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KEY FINDINGS
□ According to the extracts of data reported by the actors interviewed waiting time 
for the surgery varied. For example in S it was around six weeks according to the 
consultants and four months according to the patients and GPs. In T it has 
changed from 30 to 19 weeks according to the consultants but it was still nine to 
twelve months according to the purchasers. In U, it was only about ten weeks 
according to the consultants but again the management reported different period 
of four to ten months according to the defined priorities. In unit P it was about 
twelve to fourteen weeks according to one consultant and around ten weeks 
according to some others. Finally, in K unit in Sweden patients’ reports (app. 
eleven weeks on average) coincided with reports of providers and purchasers 
(app. twelve weeks).
□ Similarly, waiting times for first specialist appointment varied in accordance to the 
source of report. Thus in S it was less than six weeks according to the 
consultants but slightly higher in patients’ estimation. In T the report of 
consultants coincided with figures quoted by patients, which were in the range of 
26 weeks or even less according to the latter. In unit U patients waited for about 
20 weeks, which for the consultants was between 5 -18 weeks and depended on 
emergency and the consultant. In P it was less than six weeks according to most 
reports but still the views were not unanimous. Again in K all actors seemed to 
agree on one approximate figure of about twelve weeks.
□ The waiting times for the first specialist appointment seem to be the shortest in 
the units that have embraced the reforms and have benefited from them, such as 
unit S in South London in the UK and unit K in Sweden (for details see Fig. 9.5).
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Figure 9.5 Patients’ views on the length of waiting time for the first specialist 
appointment in different eye units in the UK and Sweden (unit K) in 1995/96
i -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiting times for the first specialist appointment in 
the UK and Sweden
U nits Unit P Unit T Unit U Unit K
□ Analysis of the data from the National League Tables in the UK (DoH, 1994; 
DoH, 1995a; DoH, 1996) highlighted the changes in waiting times for the first 
specialist appointment that took place during the first three years of reforms’ 
implementation. They indicated that increases in admissions within three-month 
and twelve-month periods were mostly observed and reflected a general trend to 
decrease the very long waiting times that were beyond 26 weeks and more. Most 
of the national data confirmed the findings of this study and occasionally provided 
insight and better understanding of the specific results. In Sweden national data 
helped in positioning the results of the unit K, which turned out to be not the one 
with the shortest waiting times but it had the shortest waits in relation to its 
throughput.
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CHAPTER 10 
EFFICIENCY
Efficiency was measured in terms of increases in throughput, changes in prices and 
their impact on waiting times, and also on the basis of clinical outcomes (visual 
acuity and complications). At least two hypotheses were examined. The first was 
whether hospitals that increased their throughput might also be the ones that 
provided quicker services; the second was whether this had an adverse result for 
clinical indicators. Another hypothesis dealt with counterfactual evidence that 
changes other than the reforms, which occurred simultaneously, might have 
produced similar results. Such could, for example, be the influence of advances in 
medical technology, like day care or sutureless surgery.
Quantitative data on the number of operations and the price of cataract surgery are 
presented below, followed by the results of an audit on clinical outcomes and data 
on changes in the amount of day care surgery performed in the UK and Sweden. 
Subsequently, an analysis of the responses of doctors (GPs and surgeons), 
managers and purchasers and their perception of the results that the reforms had 
on providers is summarised.
10.1. Comparison of the cataract figures in eye units in 
the UK and Sweden
If changes in the number of cataract operations performed are compared for the 
years 1988-1996, it is evident that some increases (in quite few cases significant 
ones) took place (for details see Table 10.1). This is most visible in the case of 
unit S, which is shown to be “the super-performer” of all the locations studied as 
it achieved an almost six-fold increase in throughput between 1989 and 1996.
The second highest increase happened in unit T, where the 1989 figures had 
almost doubled by 1996. In the case of unit U, the situation is more complex as
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tthere was a moderate increase from 1988, peaking in 1994, at which point it had 
improved by approximately two thirds, and then suddenly dropping to its 1988 
levels in 1995 (for which the latest data existed). This irregularity can easily be 
explained by the clash at the end of 1994 between the management and the 
clinicians in the eye unit, which resulted in the voluntary resignation of the latter.
The situation in unit K in Sweden was also somewhat different from the first two 
units in the UK where an uninterrupted rise was observable. This, however, can 
be easily explained by the course of reforms in the Stockholm County Council 
area. After high productivity gains had been achieved in 1993 and 1994, the 
arrival of a new government in 1995 signalled a departure from competition. It 
was argued that the budget deficits that County Councils would have to incur, 
should they continue to reward the productivity gains of some of the providers, 
would be overwhelming. This was because reimbursement on a fee per case 
basis was inflationary, since many hospitals were in a position to provide 
services on demand, which did not necessarily coincide the needs of the 
populations concerned.
Table 10.1: Number of cataract operations performed in S, U, T, and K in years 
1988-1997
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
U n its n.a. 270 294 887 1021 974 1132 1484 1366
UnitU 545 613 694 666 n.a. n.a. 841 482 n.a.
U nitT n.a. 489 558 703 837 744 605 777 879
Unit K n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7271 6855 6600* 6600*
Source: Departmental and hospital data from S, U, T and K
*Estimate
10.2. Analysis of the data on prices for cataract surgery in 
London and Stockholm
The analysis of the available data on changes in prices resulted in clear-cut 
conclusions only in the case of unit S, where prices followed a constant decrease 
for both inpatient and day care procedures (see Table 10.2). This, when 
combined with big rises in throughput, clearly means that efficiency gains were 
most likely to have been achieved in this unit. However, this was less clear for
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unit T, where prices for both inpatient and day care procedures fluctuated, 
dropping in 1993/94, rising in 1994/95 and 1995/96 and decreasing again in 
1996/97 and 1997/98. The last decrease may partly be related to the different 
method of measurement that started to be used during these last two years (see 
Table 10.3).
The data for unit U are mostly missing and in P they are available only for three 
years starting from 1995/96. They are divided into prices given to fund-holders 
and Health Authorities, but, on the whole, there is a rise in prices for both 
inpatient and day care procedures over the years. Interestingly, the prices for 
fund-holders were constantly higher than those offered to the Health Authorities 
(see Table 10.4). For unit U, in the year 1995/96 the prices for cataract surgery 
were £878 for inpatient procedures and £751 for day care. Data were not 
available for previous years. Data on costs of the services in the UK could not be 
obtained and those that were available from Stockholm were not used for the 
purpose of the analysis.
Table 10.2: Ophthalmology prices in years 1991/92-1995/96 in Pounds Sterling -  
Unit S
Year of 
measurement
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Extra-contractual
Referral Prices
• Day case n.a 73 61
• In-patient 49 72 2 9
1,4 1 5 82 91
04 1,1 1.1 4 0
36 13
GPFH Prices
• Day case 31 33 n.a 68 59
• In-patient 3 2 1 1
95 72 1,0 81 86
4 0 09 9 2
Source of data: Departmental data from Hospital S
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Table 10.3: Prices of cataract surgery OPCS4 according to the hospital data -  unit 
T
Year of Method of costing Inpatient Day care
measurement used procedure procedure
1992/93 Procedure cost 723 GB Pounds 496 GB Pounds
1993/94 Procedure cost 666 GB Pounds Not available
1994/95 Procedure cost 914 GB Pounds 615 GB Pounds
1995/96 Procedure cost 904 GB Pounds 686 GB Pounds
1996/97 HRG cost 796 GB Pounds 525 GB Pounds
1997/98 HRG cost 852 GB Pounds 377 GB Pounds
Source of data: Financial Department of Hospital T
Table 10.4: Prices of cataract surgery OPCS4 according to the hospital data -  
sample P_______________________________________________________________
Year of 
measurement
Inpatient procedure 
Fund-holders/Health Authority
Day care procedure 
Fund-holders/Health Authority
1992/93 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993/94 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1994/95 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1995/96 979 1359 979 790
1996/97 787 1359 787 790
1997/98 1741 1506 1741 960
Source of data: Financial Department of Hospital P
The prices for specific cataract operations performed as inpatient procedure 
(Table 10.5) and day care (Table 10.6) in Stockholm County Council including 
hospital K, with codes for the different surgical procedures, are presented below. 
These two tables clearly demonstrate the gradual drop in prices for most of the 
procedures. The prices were set artificially high in 1992 at 15,500 SEK for 
inpatient stay and 7,872 SEK for day care and were lowered to more realistic 
levels in 1993. There was, again, a significant rise across the board in 1994. The 
prices rose from 11,601 SEK from in 1993 to 15.252 SEK in 1994 for small 
incision surgery (inpatient) and from 6,961 SEK to 8,528 SEK when performed 
on a day care basis.
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Table 10.5: Prices for cataract surgery as inpatient care procedures in the 
Stockholm County Council area in years 1992-1996 (median prices in SEK for each 
financial year are used)___________________________________________________
Type of cataract 
operation coded in 
KOKS system
1992
inpatient
care
1993
inpatient
care
1994
inpatient
care
1995
inpatient
care
1996
inpatient
care
039 Cataract (lens & 
corpus vitreum)
15500 8723 7708 8094 8435
039B Simple 
cataract
n.a. 7763 10168 8100 9517
039C Phacoemulsifi­
cation (small incision 
surgery)
n.a. 11601 15252 14294 12981
039D Lens 
extraction
n.a. 17446 17876 18772 19560
039E Lensectomy n.a. 20324 26568 21183 22072
039F Complicated 
lens extraction
n.a. 24250 24928 26177 27278
Source: Hospital data, Stockholm County Council data, SPRI information
Table 10.6 Prices for cataract surgery for day care procedures in Stockholm 
County Council in years 1992-1996 (median prices in SEK for each financial year 
are used)_______________________________________________________________
Type of cataract 
operation coded in 
KOKS system
1992 
day care
1993 
day care
1994 
day care
1995 
day care
1996 
day care
039 Cataract (lens & 
corpus vitreum)
7872 5234 5248 4650 4251
039B Simple 
cataract
n.a. 4658 6396 4572 4376
039C Phacoemulsifi­
cation (small incision 
surgery)
n.a. 6961 8528 5838 5332
039D Lens 
extraction
n.a. 10467 5248 5315 4597
039E Lensectomy n.a. 12195 5248 5065 4597
039F Complicated 
lens extraction
n.a. 14550 5248 5065 5248
Source: Hospital data, Stockholm County Council data, SPRI information
This trend is especially visible for day care surgery with the exception of year 
1994 where, for example, the price for a simple cataract operation dropped to 
5,234 SEK from 8,727 SEK in 1993. However, the lowering of prices in 1993 as 
compared to both the previous and the following year was not confirmed by the 
departmental data, which referred to only one procedure C39 
(phacoemulsification) and which are presented in Tables 10.7 and 10.8. Thus, 
the hypothesis is that data for 1993 could possibly be an artefact because data
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provided by the County Council quote different figures for day care at 6,961 SEK 
as opposed to the 9,087 SEK quoted by the hospital data. The situation is similar 
for inpatient care C39 (phacoemulsification), where the respective figures are 
20,102 SEK and 11,601 SEK.
In Tables 10.7 and 10.8, changes in prices for small incision surgery 
(phacoemulsification) are presented. Unit K moved swiftly towards this procedure 
not only because adopting new technologies would keep it at the cutting edge, 
but also because it was more attractive in terms of DRG prices. Small incision 
surgery, which at the time of the study (Fall 1995) made up almost two thirds of 
all operations performed, was chosen as a typical case to illustrate the decrease 
in prices for services. A comparison of 1992 and 1996 shows a drop from 9,087 
SEK to 5,332 SEK for day care and from 20,102 SEK to 12,981 SEK for the 
inpatient procedure (See Tables 10.7 & 10.8).
Table 10.7: Prices for cataract surgery operations performed as day cases using 
small incision surgery (phacoemulsification) 039C in hospital K (Sweden) including 
the cost of the visit
Day surgery procedures 
1993 1994 1995
1996
Cost of the operation 9087 SEK 8528 SEK 5838 SEK
5332 SEK
Cost of the out­
patients’ visits 1377 SEK 1129 SEK
946 SEK 1010 SEK
Total amount 10 464 SEK 9 474 SEK 6 848 SEK
6 461 SEK
6 642 SEK*
Source: Financial department o f hospital K
* In 1995, a discount o f 3% was applied to all patients in the Stockholm area
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Table 10.8: Prices for cataract surgery operations performed as an inpatient 
procedure using small incision surgery (phacoemulsification) 039C in hospital K 
(Sweden)___________________________________ __________________________
1993
1996
Inpatient procedures 
1994 1995
Cost of the operation 20102 SEK 
12981 SEK
15252 SEK 14294 SEK
Cost of the out­
patients’ visits 1377 SEK 1129 SEK
946 SEK 1010 SEK
Total amount 21479 SEK 16198 SEK 
14110 SEK
15304 SEK
14845 SEK*
Source: Financial department of hospital K
* In 1995 a discount of 3% was applied to all patients of the Stockholm area
10.3 Audit on clinical outcomes at the unit P in the UK
To ascertain how far the real improvements in clinical outcomes occurring in 
everyday clinical practice corresponded with the views of clinicians on this issue, 
a small audit was conducted at the pilot site, unit P. For a sample of n=46 
randomly selected patients, improvements in vision (defined as pre and post­
operative changes in visual acuity) were measured. Data on surgical technique 
and the surgeon’s grade were also collected, as was the information on the time 
when the assessment was made upon discharge. Data on patients’ age, gender 
and the experience of complications were also recorded (for details see Box 1, 
Annex I).
As to the improvements in visual acuity, this seems to have been achieved for 
the overwhelming majority of patients (41), which was significant for most of them 
measured in Snellen scale. Three of them experienced no improvement, and in 
one case the outcome was worse than before the operation. As far as 
complications were concerned, their number was negligible and they were only 
noticed in three cases. Finally, the patients’ gender, the grade of the operating 
surgeon (service grade or consultant), the technique used (small incision or 
extracapsular extraction) and the period after which they were discharged, were 
insignificant both as to their severity and in absolute numbers (less than 1%) in 
relation to the clinical outcomes.
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These findings suggest that clinical improvements achieved either by means of 
organisational innovation (i.e. reforms, day care) or the diffusion of medical 
technology (suture-less surgery) had insignificant impact in terms of side effects 
and complications. Although the sample used is very small with all limitations that 
this entails, it provides some indications on the relation between clinical 
outcomes and the input structure that could be impacted upon in the environment 
undergoing intense organisational change.
10.4. Changes in rates of day care surgery in outer 
London and Stockholm
The analysis of quantitative data from the hospitals in the UK shows that the 
number of operations performed as day care procedures significantly increased, 
especially after the years 1993 and 1994. This was very strongly manifested in 
the case of S, where the number of operations performed as day cases doubled, 
though it should be noted that the starting level in S was already relatively high at 
18% in 1990 and so was very different from that of other units, such as unit U, 
where this figure was below 5% (See Fig. 10.1 and Fig. 10.2).
In S, the number of day care procedures rose to an impressive 92% already in 
1994, while in unit U, this figure was only 14% higher than the previous year’s. 
The figures for the other two units, T and P, were similar to those of unit U, where 
a steady increase (even two or three fold) from a very low starting point though, 
was observed. But this was not as significant as the almost total shift to day care 
that occurred in S (for details see Table 10.9).
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Table 10.9: Cataract operations performed as day cases in the years 1989-1997 in 
S, U, T, P and K (expressed as a percentage of total number of operations)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
U nits 17% 36% 18% 31% 74% 94% 97% 96% 98%
Unit U n.a. 12% 13% 20% n.a. 15% 21% n.a. n.a.
U nitT n.a. 0.2% 11% 14% 16% 19% 30% 34% 26%
Unit P n.a.
i
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Unit K n.a n.a n.a 90% 95% 97% 98% 99% n.a.
Source: Departmental and hospital data from S, U, T, P and K
F i g u r e  1 .  C a t a r a c t  o p e r a t i o n s  p e r f o r m e d  
a s  d a y  c a s e s  in U n i t s  ( % )
10 0 %
9 0 %
6 0 %
50  %
4 0 %
30  %
2 0 %
1 0 %
□  Da  /  C a s e s
Figure 10.1 Cataract operations performed as day care procedures in unit S in 
1990-1995
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F i g u r e  10.  2.  C a t a r a c t  o p e r a t i o n s  p e r f o r m e d  as day
day  c a s e s  in Un i t  U
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Figure 10.2 Cataract operations performed as day care procedures in unit U in 
1991-1995
In the Stockholm County Council area, the situation was somewhat different as 
day care cataract surgery was already relatively widely used from the middle of 
the 1980s. Even before the introduction of the Stockholm Model, the rate of 
adoption of day case surgery in unit K was 96% (See Fig. 10.3), according to 
SPRI data (Ophthalmology Services in Sweden 1988-1991, SPRI 1992). When 
the aggregate data were analysed on a national level, however, there was a 
noticeable increase between 1991 and 1995 (See Fig. 10.4). This is an indirect 
evidence of market’s work both in the counties that introduced different forms of 
competition and purchaser-provider split but also for those who did not it had 
some spill-over effects that manifested as a significant increase in the rate of day 
care surgery (see Fig. 10.4).
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Figure 10.3. Cataract operations performed as day cases in
Unit K (%)
 ....W.WSV.'AV.V.V.V.SV.'.SV.SV.V.V.S-ASV
SW.V.WA'.W.VAV.V.W/.WS•!v .v .w .w .sssw .sv .\
WW.V.S-A
□  Day Cases
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Figure 10.3: Cataract operations performed as day care procedures in unit K in 
1991-1995
F i g u r e  4.  D a y  c a s e  c a t a r a c t  s u r g e r y  p e r f o r m e d  on  
n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  - S w e d e n  (% )
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Figure 10.4: Cataract operations performed as day care procedures in all eye units 
in Sweden during 1991-1995 (SPRI, 1994, Association of Swedish 
Ophthalmologists, 1993-95)
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10.5. Changes in the Numbers of Operations Performed: 
Interviews with some respondent groups
GENERAL PRACTITIONERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
On the whole, GPs thought there had been no change in the number of 
operations performed in the units in which they worked. Responses from sample 
S were unanimous in this respect, but this belief was also partly held by the 
doctors in sample T, although there were notable differences in opinion. One of 
the doctors in the former pointed out that the incidence of eye complaints had not 
changed, and so, in his/her view, the amount of surgery had not changed. Two 
other doctors did see a change, with one of them explaining that “it did not relate 
to the reforms", and the other putting the change s/he had seen “down to medical 
technology, as more frail people can have it now". Yet another doctor 
commented on interrelations between GPs’ work and the hospitals’ throughput:
‘Throughput has increased in response to the patients' demands, although a lot 
more of these things could be done in the GPs' surgeries. However, we are limited 
by time pressures and the amount of money we are paid for carrying out these 
tasks."
Sample U revealed a variety of opinions. All the fund-holders in the sample
thought that numbers were bound to increase because of the operation’s impact on
quality of life and the higher demands by elderly patients. One GP stated:
“In absolute numbers, there has been a 10% increase for those over the age of 65 
and this is going to become even higher."
Yet another said that this was because"more patients come through the optician 
anyhow". A non fund-holder, in spite of the lack of major change, saw potential 
for higher throughput “because the decrease in the length of stay and the set 
amount o f money created more idle time". When exploring the reasons for this 
increase one of the GPs felt that changes in the number of operations were 
“demand led" and not a consequence of the reforms, but someone else thought 
that there had been some relation:
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“As the service was quicker, more patients got operated on and more patients 
came through the care provision process
The doctors were asked to expand on these beliefs, and asked whether an 
increase in the number of operations could be attributed to the introduction (or 
wider use) of day care surgery and local anaesthesia. The replies were generally 
vague, and gave the impression that GPs had not had the time or the inclination 
to explore the effects of new methods of treatment on the number of operations 
performed.
Three of the doctors in sample S either didn’t know the effects or could not 
answer the question; the other two suggested that there was no relation. Those 
in sample T thought that an increase in operations was partly attributable to an 
increase in the use of day care and local anaesthesia, but did not expand on their 
answers. Sample U gave a variety of answers, with one of them saying it was 
"the main reason for the change" and another thinking it was not related. A third 
GP said that it was not relevant, as the patients would have been referred 
anyway.
The responses again demonstrated a lack of awareness on the part of GPs, but 
this did not seem to be something that they were too concerned about, leaving 
the choice of method of treatment and its effects up to the provider unit, and not 
taking an active part in these processes.
SW ED EN
MK had an impression that the total number of referrals had increased “because of 
the role of active marketing in this process”. S/he recalled the differences with the 
past:
"Ten years ago, people with the same condition would have been referred, but not 
all o f them would have had their problem solved, which is easier now because of 
the earlier operation date ”
NB also thought that the total number of operations had increased, “but only 
slightly”.
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When questioned on the reasons that were at the root of the changes, or the lack 
of them, most practitioners could not come up with a response. CH thought the 
fact that patients from other districts, who were being referred outside their area 
and could also get treatment, played a role. JS thought:
"There was some impact of the reforms on medical technology, although there is no 
direct relation between these changes and medical procedures per se.”
CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
Six of the eight consultants questioned said that there had been an increase in 
the number of operations performed at their clinics since the introduction of the 
reforms. BL in unit T thought that it was hard to judge in which way things had 
changed, if at all, and AL in unit S was alone in thinking that the number of 
operations performed had actually decreased, unfortunately not elaborating on 
this answer.
On the whole, the consultants in unit S varied in their responses to this question. 
Three of them stated that the number had definitely increased, with JO 
suggesting that the increase had not been particularly marked, not because of 
lack of capacity but because of the limited demand by purchasers:" we could do 
more if  we were paid for this”. The clinical director of unit S, who also believed 
that the number of operations had increased, explained that this was because 
money had been attracted "through extra business” and the process had become 
more formal "as there was more sense of the marker.
MJ, in unit T, who thought that the number of operations had increased on the 
whole, ascribed it "to the younger staff' and the clinical director of the same unit 
provided figures which reflected a slight increase, “not a lot, about 950 to 1,050 a 
yeaf.
MH in unit U also opined that there was an increase in U.
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Consultants in unit P were on the whole pessimistic about the reforms’ ability to 
promote higher turnover as they felt their capacity was rather under-utilised as a 
result of cash limits on operations imposed by the purchasers, which was 
“translated into pressure by the management”, as put by one consultant. 
Someone referred to organisational shortcomings, such as the waste of time 
engendered by patients walking from the ward to the operating theatre, poor 
preparation by the nurses, inefficient taking down of a patients’ medical history, and 
others, adding:
“The potential for an increased number of operations on the surgeons' part and day 
care surgery alone cannot produce higher turnover.”
They were then asked whether they agreed that the increase in the number of 
operations performed could be attributed to the introduction or the wider use of 
some forms of medical technology such as day care surgery and local 
anaesthesia.
More than half of the consultants felt that the increase in the number of 
operations was attributable to the use of day care and local anaesthesia, at least 
to some extent. Only DA of unit S was convinced that this was the main reason 
for this rise. BL and MJ of unit T thought that the use of local anaesthetics was 
the cause, rather than the switch to day care. Other reasons given were pressure 
from management and higher staffing levels. It was also said that the trend 
toward performing more operations was in place before the reforms, that general 
efficiency had increased, and that there was now more operating time available.
More specifically, the clinical director and one of the leading consultants of unit S 
(South London) were of the opinion that the increase in the number of operations 
carried out was related to the wider use of day care surgery and local 
anaesthesia, the clinical director adding, "we did this before at our hospital, but it 
is relevant for most o f the country”. AL thought that the increase was more 
closely related to the targets set by the management, and hence a product of the 
reforms, rather than advances in surgical treatment.
JO also did not believe that the rise had come about as a result of day care and 
local anaesthesia, pointing out that the number of operations had always been
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increasing, and attributing the rise to greater numbers of staff and higher 
efficiency:
“We could increase the number of operations due to our increased capacity. For 
example, in 1987 the number o f operations performed was 400 a year and in 
1991, 1,000 a year."
One consultant explained that this rise was because of local anaesthesia, but not
day care, because the number of anaesthetists needed had decreased:
“//? the case of general anaesthesia, two anaesthetists were needed and it could 
quite often take 20-30 minutes for the second anaesthetist to come."
The clinical director of unit T felt that although more patients were operated on 
under local anaesthesia, the difference was not that big and the reforms’ impact 
was even smaller.
MH, in U, gave no answer and consultants in unit P were almost unanimous in 
thinking that technological changes (such as local anaesthesia) were at the root 
of a more efficient performance but they could not link these to the advent of the 
reforms. The above replies could be seen as contradicting each other. In fact this 
was not the case because different respondents referred to their own experience.
SW EDEN
All surgeons agreed that in the aftermath of the reforms an increase in productivity
was observed, which had nevertheless already stabilised by the end of 1995 (when
the interviews took place). One of the leading surgeons provided figures:
"For the last three years it has been relatively stable at about 7,000 a year, in 1992 
and 1993 around 5,000 a year, in 1991 3,000-4,000 a year and in 1990 much less."
Another surgeon asserted that during the last ten years productivity had doubled
in the Stockholm area because no limits had been put on hospital production. At
that time, anyone - even those who had a small private clinic - could raise the
number of patients. S/he thought that clinical guidelines were needed in order to
avoid this situation, but these were difficult to establish because:
"Vision was a complicated combination of factors and, as a consequence, there 
had been a tendency to cut down on the number o f cataract operations in 
Stockholm County because otherwise it would be a freely growing tree."
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By contrast, the director of hospital K, who thought that the number of operations 
might have increased and referred to the current figures as being 5/1000, was 
critical of the timing of the operation because it was usually done for those who 
already had visual impairment, while it would be important to have the operation 
prior to the handicap:
“This would save the municipality the money spent on providing home support and 
taxis for visually impaired who then gradually got used to it and were not prepared 
to give them away. ”
CZ claimed that the number of operations had increased as more people were 
currently working to provide for patients. The increase of operations performed was 
from seven or eight daily to ten or twelve per surgeon, which were consecutively 
performed in five theatres, and this had been a routine process for the last three 
years. S/he added, “Reforms have influenced this process, as each operation is 
reimbursed using the DRG prices.”
Surgeons were divided between those who thought that organisational changes 
introduced by means of the reforms had been responsible for the wider introduction 
of day care and those who considered this rise was because of independent 
advances in technology. The clinical director and the two most senior surgeons in 
the hospital belonged to the first group. One of them explained that, after 1990, 
private clinics were allowed to offer day-care and that the care guarantee was 
introduced for each patient with vision of less than 0.5 in the best eye (and in 
Stockholm in either of them), which guaranteed an operation within a three- month 
period:
“Before the budget was fixed but with the care guarantee more money was made 
available for employment of new doctors and the purchase of more lenses was 
possible. Before it was not possible as money did not follow the patients."
The deputy director explained that in 1992/93 an additional 5 million SEK was 
provided to shorten the waiting list and for this reason:
W e operated on Saturdays and Sundays in order to meet this target. All these 
factors taken together have an impact on the increase in the operations performed.”
The clinical director and the other leading surgeon had similar views and 
stressed other aspects contributing to this outcome such as the way the work 
was organised and certain routines for the standard procedures, which were
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implemented to avoid long waiting times for patients. CZ also thought that 
changes in the organisation of work, such as planning nurses’ time, sessions, and 
payment by DRGs, had an influence, but more important was the combination of 
medical technology (new lenses) and the higher demand that it had created and 
the higher life expectancy of patients. By contrast, WS believed that technology 
had to come first because “the changes occurring in the system were aimed 
totally against the medical profession”.
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The deputy director of hospital S acknowledged that both the activity rates and 
the discharge policy in cataract surgery had been influenced by the reforms but 
in a more limited way than in other areas. S/he thought it was a combination of 
factors, such as technological development, pressure on the number of beds and 
enthusiastic young consultants keen to introduce changes.
A view from the management of hospital T held that “pressure for efficiency 
helped us to become aware of excess capacity", which made them realise that 
there should not be too much activity performed for the money available, which 
also made us feel dysfunctional".
According to the deputy general director at unit U, there seemed to have been no 
major change. S/he explained that the numbers were roughly the same, 
regardless of the fluctuations as contracts moved from one environment to 
another, commenting:
“The demand for elective surgery was made more visible in the market 
environment. In this sense, the reforms can lead to frequent increases or 
decreases in workload."
The view of the scientific consultant employed by the purchasers’ agency in U 
reckoned these diseases were neglected in comparison with cataract operations, 
both because there were no effective treatments for the former and also because 
the latter was remunerated on per case basis “with obvious incentives for 
providers.”
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In S, the purchaser concentrated on “the fact that the provider, who is contracted 
to a specific number of procedures, over-performs and asks for more money 
afterwards", which was strongly resented by the organisation.
SWEDEN
After conducting an interview with the financial manager of the hospital, it 
became clear how the hospital earned out its activities, not only in terms of 
obtaining contracts but also in terms of pricing the services. It had contracts with 
all nine districts in the Stockholm County Council area, which were made at the 
end of each financial year for the following year in advance. This was helpful in 
terms of estimating the number of operations to be performed the following year 
for the population of each respective area. If specific regions wanted to buy more 
operations without having a contract for the additional number, it was subject to 
negotiations.
The executive from Stockholm County Council reported that, in 1991, the 
cataract operations performed in all hospitals in the Stockholm County Council 
area amounted to 5,178. According to his/her view, there was pressure from 
providers to show competitors that they could perform:
“There was a threat to survival as beds were taken away and day care had to be 
introduced on a wider scale or else providers would not be able to meet the 
needs of the population."
Another purchaser, in Z district, stated that during the 1980s the average number 
of cataract operations performed nationally was 7,000 and that, in 1992, this had 
increased to 37,000. This could have also happened because budget devoted to 
health care had increased by an average of 10% each year. Thus, for example, 
the budget for 1996 was 11.7% or 1.5 bln SEK higher than the budget of 1995. 
Prices in 1992 had been set at 10% less than before and, in 1993, by 7% less 
than in the previous year. S/he said:
“This resulted in DRGs being used as the indicators o f performance although 
there was initially no intention to use them for this purpose. ”
S/he was certain that all had been set in motion by the care guarantee and the
differences in prices for phacoemulsification and that the standard procedure had
caused the rapid shift to the former (see Tables 10.7&10.8).
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10.6. Changes in the Price of the Service: Interviews 
with some respondent groups
GENERAL PRACTITIONERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The GPs were asked whether or not the reforms had influenced the cost of 
cataract operations at the hospitals with which they worked. Almost all doctors 
responded that they did not know, but again this question related to information, 
which was not necessarily directly relevant to them. It is not surprising that the 
non fund-holders did not know about the cost of the service, and two of the fund­
holders (out of four) were among the few who offered an answer. Of the latter, 
one GP thought that there had probably been no effect, and another simply 
answered that the cost had come down.
SWEDEN
Only PG (a private GP) knew about the cost of care and the way it had changed 
after the reforms and, in his/her estimation, the overall cost in the case of his/her 
practice had decreased. JS commented:
"The County Council insists that the total cost o f care has increased due to 
widespread private practice. However, in reality, only 3% of the population uses 
private services."
MK referred to the most important impact of the reforms on cost saving, which was 
related to restructuring and hospitals looking more carefully at their bed capacity 
and how to improve the follow-up of patients within different departments of the 
same hospital."
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CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS
ENGLAND
There was a fairly even split between the consultants who felt that the cost of
operations had increased, and those who thought that they had decreased. Of
those who thought that the price had increased, the reasons cited were inflation
and raised staff salaries, a greater awareness of the actual cost of surgery, and
an increase in the cost of theatre time. The clinical director of S thought that the
price had increased but that the reforms had had no impact, admitting though:
“We certainly became better at pricing and costing because o f the market and 
business mentality:"
DA thought the price of operations had decreased but AL said:
"Formally, they became more expensive after the reforms - at least, we had 
better information on i t ”
It seems that following the reforms, the awareness of the financial outlays of the 
departments increased, and money saving measures were introduced. 
Departments attempted to get the best prices for their drugs, lenses and 
equipment, from different suppliers. Individual departments paid more attention to 
their budgets, and to areas in which savings could be made. In respect of the 
latter, the clinical director of unit S clarified:
“Purchasers demand a 5% improvement in prices each year but our different 
ways of saving include negotiating prices for lenses, stopping the use of sutures, 
analysing budgets and making them more realistic, and prescribing spectacles 
for children only."
One other consultant supported this view by stating that changes in cost-saving 
measures were a result of the reforms and related to "managing our own budget 
and increased cost-consciousness, expressed in tendering for implants and 
drugs, whereas in the past there was no reason to do this". Yet for someone 
else, “it has always been the practice to try to obtain the best prices for lenses 
and drugs".
In sample T, one of the new consultants replied that the cost hadn’t changed for 
outpatients, but some money had been saved through more aggressive
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negotiations with medical drug companies. Again, another senior consultant was 
more pessimistic:
“The problem is that everything is a part of a huge hospital drug bill and we don't 
have the incentive to save on helon, for example. We would have saved if  we 
could have kept some o f the money for new equipment "
The clinical director of T provided some other examples of savings made, such
as the reorganisation in nursing that had resulted from cutting down on beds:
"When the outpatient sister left, we were not allowed to replace her, and instead 
we used the remaining nurses more efficiently."
MH, in U, said that s/he had always been cost-conscious anyway “and had 
always tried to get the best deals, even through personal involvement."
In unit P, the whole range of answers was presented. Some consultants thought 
prices had increased because of introduction of new and expensive technologies, 
which were “inherently more expensive" or because the cost of the reforms “was 
ridiculously high", but someone else thought price had decreased. The clinical 
director stated that prices had not changed greatly but “the awareness of the cost 
has changed significantly". This had also had an impact on cost-saving methods, 
expressed in giving equally efficacious but cheaper drugs, and in replacing theatre 
materials such as helon with cheaper ones (air bubble). There was also more of a 
cross-cover for consultants, which also extended to lower grades of surgeons.
SW EDEN
All eye surgeons agreed that the cost of the procedure had decreased, which, 
according to the clinical director, “had to do with increased volume and better 
equipment". The deputy director explained that:
"DRG pffces for cataract surgery have decreased by 20% from 1994, which was a 
result o f competition with the private clinics."
When asked whether they had put in practice different ways of savings as a result 
of the reforms, MH was convinced that economic incentives created by means of 
the reforms had resulted in savings; in addition, there was now “the possibility of 
negotiating deals, with approximately 5m to 8m SEK a year being saved this way". 
The deputy director who stressed another aspect created by the reforms supported 
this:
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"Staff suddenly realised how much things cost and negotiations with companies 
were initiated.”
The clinical director provided a detailed report on how the price for services had
decreased by 17% from 1994 prices, which had been achieved by shortening
certain routines, like establishing cashiers and introducing a high level IT network:
“This was an indication of good quality that, in turn, resulted in efficiency, but also 
improved patients’ satisfaction. ”
Further examples given by the director referred to the organisation of work in order 
to minimise patients’ waiting time at the outpatients’ department and to motivate the 
personnel:
“It initially took time to establish a different working culture. Now the personnel are 
happy because they are working as a team - and the absenteeism rates are very 
low.”
WS reiterated that the most important aspect of saving was linked to the fact that all
the companies from whom goods were procured by the hospitals had been made
cost-conscious and had consequently lowered their prices:
“This has been a very important result of the reforms, especially in the long term 
contracts and high volume contracts, as they are all now subject to negotiations.”
BP also agreed this was happening:
"Possibly it was because of the way patients were handled (more efficiently, there 
was less waiting time); also transportation back home was quickly arranged.”
MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The executive from unit U thought that the cost of performing cataract surgery 
had decreased significantly because "of the reduction o f time spent in hospital, 
which had an impact on the nurses, staff and beds that were needed".
The manager from unit S thought that, “the cost has decreased slightly in total, 
as more patients are now operated on during a single theatre session”. When 
reporting on cost saving measures, s/he referred to the clinical director who
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managed the whole budget of his/her unit and explained, “We, as the 
management, were very keen to let her/him do so. ”
The representative of the purchasing agency in U explained that the cost of 
theatre time was higher than it used to be before the reforms, but this was offset 
by the cheaper bedtime due to the wide use of day care surgery.
The purchaser in area T expounded on the changes that the role of the Health 
Authorities had undergone. S/he reckoned that, under the previous system, they 
had dominated the system but had also had to run the hospitals so there was 
always a conflict between their double role of planner for the population and 
manager of the hospitals. Before the reforms, Health Authorities had been very 
preoccupied with running the hospital budgets and protecting the interests of the 
providers, which had dominated their activities. Now they had to think more about 
the population’s needs the purchaser/provider split and not so much the 
competition, “which is not real anyway", giving an example when the Secretary of 
State intervened to prevent the closure of hospitals, “which would have been the 
outcome if the market had been allowed to work."
SW EDEN
The financial director of the hospital explained that pricing at hospital K was 
undertaken once a year and was basically calculated by dividing the total amount 
of fixed costs by the number of operations. Doctors were very actively 
participating in pricing procedures and they estimated how labour intensive each 
of them was. According to him/her:
‘The cost of each procedure has been gradually lowered over the years. This is 
also because the hospital's productivity has increased dramatically."
S/he provided examples that were supported with figures. Thus, in 1993, the total 
number of outpatients’ visits was 60,000/year, increasing to 90,000 in 1994 and 
120,000 in 1995. Prices in the years between 1992 and 1995 decreased by 34% 
and in 1996 the price was lowered by another 10%.
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According to the purchaser in district Z, hospital K was a monopoly in the eye 
service market as it provided about three-quarters of the cataract operations. 
There were four other private providers and one eye unit in a general hospital 
situated on the southern outskirts of the Stockholm County Council area, which 
shared among themselves the remaining one quarter of the market for cataract 
services (for details see Table 10.10).
Hospital K was still a dominant player in the market at the end of 1995 but there 
had already been a marked decrease in its percentage of market share, down 
from 73.1% in 1992 to 57.7% in 1995. This was largely because of more vigorous 
competition from the private sector, where private clinic W increased its 
percentage of operations performed from 6.9% to 9.5%, while clinic Y raised its 
percentage from zero to 5.6%. The dominant position of hospital K was likely to 
become even more threatened as a new competitor, a teaching hospital in 
southern Stockholm, restarted its operations in 1995.
Table 10.10: Operations performed by different eye units in the County Council of 
Stockholm area in numbers and their percentage of market share_______________
Name o f the 
hospital
1992 1993 1993 1994 1995
Hospital K 7263 ..... 7271 6855 6548 5452
(73.1%) (69%) (61.6%) (60.6%) (57.7.%)
CC hospital 276 131
X* (2.8%) (1.2%)
CC hospital 568 794 671 669 426
Y (5.8%) (7.5%) (6.0%) (6.1%) (4.5%)
CC hospital n.a. 161 427 426 78
Z (1.5%) (3.8%) (3.9%) (0.8%)
Private W 686 770 1105 1100 900
(6.9%) (7.3%) (9.9%) (10.1%) (9.5%)
Private X 1135 1417 1392 1400 1100
(11.4%) (13.4%) (12.5%) (12.9%) (11.6%)
Private Y n.a. n.a. 674 649 500
(6.1%) (6.0%) (5.3%)
Total 9938 10544 11124 10792 9434
Source: hospital K data and County Council data; 
* Clinic closed in May 1993
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10.7. Changes in discharge policy, clinical outcomes and 
the use of cost saving technologies: interviews with some 
respondent groups
GENERAL PRACTITIONERS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
The GPs were asked if they had experienced any changes in the discharge 
policies at the units with which they worked, that they could attribute to the 
reforms. The replies almost exclusively pointed to a significant decrease in the 
length of stay, mainly due to an increasing use of day care. For example, all of 
the doctors in samples S and U said that there had been a significant change, 
referred to as “the most tremendous impact” by one fund-holder of the latter 
sample, and most pointed to day care surgery as the cause. GG, another fund­
holder in the same sample, added that, once again, “advances in technology 
were central to this change, rather than the reforms".
The doctors were questioned further on this point, and were asked exactly what 
they felt a decrease in the length of stay could be attributed to, for example 
changes in discharge policy, or the introduction of new technology. Almost all of 
them attributed them to both advances in technology and to changes in 
discharge policy brought about by the reforms. Only the doctors in sample T 
once more proved to be the least certain, with two of them not being sure of the 
reasons. The doctors in samples S and U expressed the opinion (either explicitly 
or implicitly) that while new technology had undoubtedly affected the length of 
stay, the new policies on discharge had also had a major effect. DC, from unit U, 
stated, “They have gone hand in hand".
There was a lack of certainty among the GPs when they were asked whether a 
decrease in the length of stay had had an impact on the rate of readmission or 
complication rates. Six of the doctors either offered no comment or said that they
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did not know. Among those who did reply, the overall feeling was that there had 
not been a significant effect. RE, of sample S said that while earlier discharge did 
not cause much of a problem in the field of eyes, it had had a greater impact 
elsewhere “where patients were handled by community care, whereas they 
required intensive nursing."
In sample T, the majority of doctors thought there had been no changes in clinical
outcomes, nor were they aware of any changes happening. AR and UN did not
think that any significant changes had occurred, UN added:
"There are no significant differences, although improvements in technology have 
had an impact on efficiency and clinical outcomes."
One doctor said that readmission and complication rates remained the same, 
adding "Surgeons would not allow themselves to compromise in clinical matters".
In sample S, opinions were more diverse. For example, one GP stated s/he 
wouldn’t know but they were definitely not worse. Someone else said that if this 
happened it should not be the case of cataract surgery. The most prevalent view 
was summed up in one of the statements: ‘The reforms may have partly 
prompted the use of day care which has improved clinical outcomes."
In sample U, doctors not only saw improvements in clinical outcomes but came up
regularly with their own clarifications as to what may have been be the reason for
this and it was almost invariably ascribed to changes in technology, rather than to
anything else. DC, a fund-holder, said, for example: "the whole cataract procedure
has been a revolutionary thing and patients were thrilled by local anaesthesia." One
non fund-holder thought that there had been no changes and another reckoned
that: “people were very satisfied because of technological and not so much political
changes". When questioned about the complications, the majority of doctors
dismissed the possibility of increases except for one or two doctors who thought:
"In terms of readmission there is no increase but there are more complications than 
before, such as fibrosis behind the lens, but this is treated quickly with a laser."
There is an increase in complications, such as scar tissue, because the cataract is 
more common; but there is no association at all [between this and the changes] as 
a lot o f complications happen in private practice too."
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The GPs were asked whether they felt that the element of competition introduced 
among self-managed trusts had enabled providers to adopt or experiment with 
new forms of treatment and medical technology. The answers did show a limited 
knowledge among the GPs on this issue, but the subject was very much out of 
their field and was intended more for those working within provider units. The 
doctors were also asked for their impressions regarding the range of treatments 
available, compared to those available before the introduction of the reforms, 
specifically in terms of day care surgery, local anaesthesia, and the 
phacoemulsification technique (small incision surgery). They were asked to 
expand further, on whether they would attribute the wider use of new methods of 
treatment to the introduction of the reforms.
Sample T seemed to be the least certain, with only one doctor offering a vague 
answer “increases in all of the procedures have happened, but it is difficult to 
know if  it is only due to the reforms or also to technology". Overall, the doctors in 
sample T were divided between not answering and believing that these changes 
would have occurred anyway.
An elderly GP believed that the advance in technology was the main cause of the 
adoption of new treatments, and not the reforms. UN said that although day care 
surgery was on the increase, some patients had suffered, as there had been 
“insufficient support from district nurses, and the patients themselves could not 
put drops into their eyes". Someone else (coincidentally a foreign GP from an 
English-speaking country) added that:
“The UK is always a bit behind, as, being more conservative, the UK’s doctors 
pick up later on changes in technology."
The fund-holders in sample U were both of the opinion that the methods would 
have been adopted without the reforms, but that they had certainly acted as a 
catalyst in the process of their widespread uptake. Apart from the doctors who 
chose not to answer, the two fund-holders summarised the general opinion quite 
well that medical technology was the real cause of developments in this area, but 
the reforms had had an effect in that more cost-effective methods were adopted 
more readily. There was, therefore, a generally positive feeling, but the lack of
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certainty again pointed to GPs not being well informed about developments at 
their provider units.
SW EDEN
MK expressed a view that problems related to the increased introduction of 
expensive technology may be related to these changes. NB thought that 
competition had speeded up the introduction of some forms of technology; for 
example, day care surgery had certainly been influenced by the reforms, but for 
other technologies the changes had had very little impact, as their diffusion had 
already been happening before the reforms. PG did not know/did not answer the 
question, while JS felt:
“It is rather a matter o f scientific obligation for the departments to introduce new 
technologies and this cannot only be interpreted in terms of the impact of the 
reforms."
CH pointed out that the reforms had not greatly accelerated the evaluation of the
technologies introduced. The continuing lack of audit was also widespread:
"Very little evaluation was done and it was very rudimentary and usually done at the 
initial stages of the introduction of the technology, but the approach was not 
systematic at all.”
CONSULTANT EYE SURGEONS’ VIEWS 
ENGLAND
It was agreed that the average length of stay was decreasing, though this was 
not believed to be an effect of the reforms. Only AL in unit S thought that there 
might have been a very slight increase due to the inevitably less satisfactory 
work performed by junior staff while learning the technique. New technology 
(more specifically phacoemulsification) was again believed to be central to the 
lower discharge threshold. The trend towards using day care was also cited.
Earlier discharge, according to one surgeon, had caused problems of its own in 
terms of follow-up care for the patient. However, the common position from
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almost all the consultants was that this reduced length of stay did not have any 
negative effect on complications following surgery or readmission rates. Only JO 
of unit S said that if there were a slight rise, it would not be due to the discharge 
policy, but because of the learning curve involved in the phacoemulsification 
technique.
Comments in unit P on changes in discharge policy again pointed towards 
advancements in technology, with better wound construction (small incision and 
suture technique) that made the earlier discharge safer and enabled the immediate 
post-operative period to be spent at home. There was one notable exception of a 
consultant who believed that “the reforms have hastened the ‘kicking out’ of 
people”.
In unit P also, the clinical director thought that local anaesthesia was related to 
more difficulties in performing surgery, which was due to the learning curve in the 
initial stages of the technology’s diffusion. JJ for example thought that outcomes in 
visual acuity after day case surgery could be slightly worse, “but it had yet to be 
definitely proven". S/he also claimed that, after local anaesthesia, some post­
operative complications could be slightly more common. On the other hand, it was 
free of systemic complications that were common in the use of general 
anaesthesia on older people.
When asked whether the reforms had encouraged experimentation with new 
technology, the response was largely negative, and that the practical implications 
of adopting the new methods (patients’ and purchasers’ satisfaction and better 
clinical outcomes) were the primary reason for their acceptance. The three 
consultants who responded to this question all gave different answers. Points 
mentioned were that the increase in operations was a continuation of a trend 
already in place that more operating time was now available, and that people 
were now working more efficiently.
The clinical director of unit S, for example, thought, “it was a natural propensity of 
something that we had already started”. DA, from the same unit, explained that
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this was because “people were forced to do it to perform more efficiently and that 
was where the clear impact o f the reforms was manifested
In unit P, the responses of most consultants clearly stated that the widespread 
introduction of day care was a result of the reforms, although other reasons were 
also referred to, such as experience transferred from the USA (where the number 
of ophthalmologists was greater) and 7the feeling that there was a tide flowing". This 
was summed up by one of them:
"The increase in day case surgery is a result of the reforms; nevertheless, the trend 
was present before
Two doctors also unusually commented on reasons for the delay in adopting 
proven procedures by saying:
'The conservatism and backwardness of the British establishment, as well as a 
national mentality that prefers old-fashioned ways of doing things and is reluctant to 
take on new ideas, is to be held responsible for this delay.”
There were also, however, quite a number (four out of sixteen) who chose not to 
reply.
All in all, only three of the consultant eye surgeons regarded the set of incentives 
introduced by the reforms, such as freedom to organise their workload more 
efficiently and the ability to respond to clients’ needs. This was seen as a strong 
positive force speeding up innovation on all levels of everyday clinical practice. 
This included the adoption of cost-saving technologies, as well as managerial 
procedures.
When asked if the range of treatments had increased, there was a very positive 
response. Again, phacoemulsification was put forward as an important 
development, as was the increasing use of day care. AL of unit S pointed out that 
there was now a more aggressive approach to treating eye conditions across the 
board, leading to a greater variety of treatment methods. It was not felt that the 
reforms had had a large influence here, and that the new methods of treatment 
were a consequence of advancing technology, which would have occurred 
anyway.
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BL of unit T felt that the reforms were largely responsible for the introduction of 
new techniques being used on a widespread basis, though higher cost- 
consciousness had posed problems in purchasing the appropriate equipment. 
One of the consultants in the same unit elaborated on the difficulties in 
communicating with the administration:
“We had to say we needed phacoemulsification for more day cases, which was 
not true. ”
SW EDEN
MH was sure that the reduction in the length of stay was in some way related to day
care surgery and the reforms and the decrease in number of beds. WS could not
say definitively whether the reduction in the length of stay was related to
productivity. It was explained that the extra money did not always follow the
increases in productivity because, after certain level of operations had been
performed, no more money was provided for extra production. S/he rather thought
that this was related to the introduction of the new technologies:
'The intraocular lenses are the most important development in day-care surgery, as 
local anaesthesia has been used for at least thirty years in cataract surgery. With 
IOL, patients could not only go home, they could use the eye the very next day.”
BP thought the discharge policy had speeded up because "of the demand from
society on the one hand and the medical ego on the other", acknowledging that
day-care had possibly played a role too. CZ put forward a hypothesis for an
almost complete shift to day care from the beginning in hospital K:
The beds were not ready when the new hospital started, so it had initially to go 
without beds at all. Afterwards, there was no need for them.”
When questioned on the relation between organisational change and the
widespread use of day care surgery and other new technologies, most of them did
not think it to be an issue. On the whole, most surgeons thought it was medical
technology and not so much the reforms that had made the shift to other cost-
saving procedures possible. One of them summarised this as:
The better quality of lenses and small incision techniques made day-care possible 
on a wider scale; but it was surely influenced by the reforms because of their impact 
oncost efficiency.”
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The views on the benefits of the use of new techniques (small incision surgery) 
were that there was no clear-cut answer because the learning curve was too long 
(at least one hundred cases per surgeon). WS thought that if patients stayed in the 
ward for three or four days then it would be possible to observe post-operative 
infection: “It did not mean that the infection rate had decreased; it was just 
diagnosed later'1. CZ thought the complication rate was lower, as it was related to 
the higher volume of operations performed: "Day-care has not had an impact on 
lack of complications."
Surgeons asserted it was a mixture of factors, such as the higher productivity
achieved due to the reforms and the money resulting from that, and the wider
availability of technology. According to MH, the clinical director, the elements of
competition introduced between hospitals led them to take on new technologies:
“It certainly had an impact on new forms of treatment adopted because the 
hospital had acquired own budget and could buy equipment provided, it was put 
out to tender and justified in terms of expected achievements."
BP thought that, “this was a matter of leadership” but also explained that the 
reforms had made money available and the administration had been pushed to 
purchase equipment. It also helped doctors to realise their objectives “to stay at 
the top".
WS, while seeing the impact of the reforms on the introduction and wider use of 
new forms of treatment conceded that other factors were also important. S/he 
elaborated at length on the causes of new technology adoption, asserting that the 
media played an important role in publicising technological achievements, which, in 
turn, influenced the public and also had an impact on technology adoption by the 
hospital:
“Patients' expectations and the competitive environment put pressure on hospitals 
to catch up with the newest technologies."
S/he also referred to the role of professional pressure from international 
competition transmitted through professional contacts, meetings and others, 
which “was at least as important as pressure from patients, or even more so." CZ 
supported this view by stressing that “the philosophy of competition was necessary 
but the contribution of new technologies, was more important.”
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MANAGERS’ AND PURCHASERS’ VIEWS
ENGLAND
The purchaser of unit S reckoned there were no changes in clinical outcomes 
following the reforms because they had been around too long in the medical 
profession and there were so many other factors influencing the quality of 
service. S/he also added how important the information work with patients was 
on why the changes had occurred in discharge policy:
“We have to work towards reassuring GPs and patients that they can go home, 
not because o f a lack of beds but because it is acceptable from the medical point 
of view.”
The manager at unit U said there had been a decrease in length of stay due to 
pre-admission assessment clinics. This could be seen as a crude efficiency gain 
caused by the reducing in waiting time, which could probably be attributed partly 
to the reforms. But, s/he explained, “nothing happened just because of one 
reason; it was also due to the introduction of new technology and some other 
non-quantifiable thingsK which were made possible by the reforms.”
On the other hand, the connection between the changes in discharge policy and the 
readmission and/or complication rates “never seemed evident to him/her.
The purchaser from T believed that the screening system used at the outpatient’s 
clinic had improved greatly, due to the reforms, and more people were picked up 
as qualifying for surgery at the lower end of the spectrum than before. The 
introduction of day care had also speeded up the discharge of patients: “We drive 
the provider towards this end by asking questions such as, ‘why are the patients 
still in bed?”’
When asked about the impact of technology in this process the manager in T 
thought it was difficult to define how great the impact of technology had been, as it 
was also related to the contracts. But day care and lasers had resulted in higher 
efficiency as well as effectiveness and s/he added, “Technologies that supported 
the aims of the organisation were now given more preference”.
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A manager in S also thought that there was no doubt that wider use of some 
procedures had been influenced by competitiveness, stating, however, that “it 
was not only the cost-effective ones that were promoted, because the other 
procedures were not researched nor were they investigated" S/he added that 
there was obviously a pressure on day care surgery, as there was a set target of 
50% of procedures to be done this way:
“In the case of our hospital, it was surpassed and 62% o f all cataract procedures 
were done as day cases. Other developments in surgical techniques, like small 
incision surgery, are more conducive and easy to convert into day care surgery. ”
A manager in hospital U referred to the introduction of new technologies, such as
anaesthetics and day care surgery, as quite significant, though s/he added:
“ft is due to all these and some other non-quantifiable things that the reforms made 
possible."
The purchaser from unit T believed that the reforms had speeded up the use of
some preventive diagnostic procedures and the introduction of day care surgery:
"Of course, money played its role in that and reforms made everything much 
more explicit. For example, if  providers want to invest in equipment, they have to 
justify its significance in terms of the population’s needs and not just clinical 
practice."
The scientific collaborator with the purchasing agency in sample U argued that, 
for phacoemulsification surgery, long-term average costs were lower, its short­
term average costs were higher and the equipment needed to be in full use for 
quick amortisation of the costs. S/he also referred to the problem of the learning 
curve, which, according to her/his, only decreased on average after 300 cases 
performed by a single surgeon:
“Before that is reached, the results may be slightly worse compared to 
conventional techniques.”
SW EDEN
In hospital K, the management of the clinical and most of the non-clinical aspects 
of care (except for finance) was under the team of senior clinicians, as were 
other aspects, and their views were presented under the heading of consultants’ 
views.
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As a purchaser in district Z in the County Council of Stockholm area explained, a 
system aimed at recording outcomes had been developed, in the form of a 
national initiative known as “Quality Registers”, conducted under the aegis of the 
National Board of Health and Welfare and also supported by the Swedish 
Medical Association and the purchasers. It was based on the collection of 
standardised information from each provider’s unit. The indicators used for this 
process are summarised in Box 2 (Annex II).
S/he clarified that, before 1992, there had been a very large difference in the 
rates of day surgery and it had risen sharply after the introduction of the 
organisational changes, varying between 5% and 45% for different hospitals in 
Stockholm (e.g. for knee-replacement). This difference with the former period 
was that day surgery had been confined to the experiments and research 
activities of the professionals who were interested in gaining status by performing 
these activities. But after the introduction of the reforms, there were incentives for 
its rapid diffusion, which indeed happened in reality. The variation between 
different hospitals also decreased with equal speed, the specialist beds in the 
Stockholm County Council area decreasing by 30-40% between 1992-1996.
An executive from the County Council of Stockholm added that some forms of 
medical technology were swiftly introduced on a wider scale because of 
differences in reimbursement prices. One such was the dramatic shift to the 
phacoemulsification technique (the suture-less small incision surgery), the price 
of which was 5,838 SEK in 1994 when performed as a day care procedure and 
14,294 SEK when performed on an inpatient basis (039C in KOKS system). The 
simple cataract operation (039B) was respectively priced at 4,572 SEK and 8,100 
SEK (also see Tables 10.7&10.8).
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KEY FINDINGS
□ Increases in throughput were observed, although they could not be fully 
expressed because of the cash limits imposed by purchasers, which quite often 
resulted in idle time and were resented by clinicians in the UK. These increases 
were even more evident in Sweden, where reimbursement for surgical 
procedures was conducted on a per-case basis but there were no hard 
budgetary constraints. This led to higher throughput but also increased the 
amount of money spent on these services. In the UK and later on in Sweden 
purchasers also had to restrict the providers’ drive to “over-perform”. Again 
General Practitioners in both countries seem to be poorly informed on this aspect 
of change.
□ There was no uniform trend in prices for cataract surgery and there were 
differences in charges for the same procedures according to block or per-case 
contracts in the UK. Only in the case of unit S, and less so in unit T and unit P, 
was a dramatic rise in throughput and a decrease in price clearly demonstrated 
this trend. In Sweden, prices showed an adjustment, after starting with an 
artificially high mark-up, and decreased by 20% during the three years of the 
reforms' implementation. Yet, the large providers were the price leaders and they 
also shifted to procedures that were financially attractive such as for example 
phacoemulsification technique in hospital S in the UK and K in Sweden.
□ The clinical outcomes of care seem not to have been adversely influenced by 
efficiency drives or by the decrease in length of stay and there were strong 
convictions on the specialist providers’ part that some technologies (less 
traumatic surgery) might even have improved them. The former seems to be 
confirmed by the small outcomes’ audit conducted on the pilot site P, where no 
significant relation between the technique used and the grade of surgeon could 
be detected for the indicative sample of patients (n=53); if anything outcomes 
were invariably poorer only when co-pathology was involved. This maybe partly 
explained by another indirectly related finding that is linked to the lack of explicit 
or uniform system for setting indications for cataract surgery that is a norm in the
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UK unlike in Sweden where the decisions who is to be operated are much more 
standardised and clear. This absence of universal criteria could in turn result in 
limiting the appropriateness of procedures performed, creating another type of 
inefficient behaviour on the surgeon’s side whose assessment determines the 
demand for services.
□ The relation between the adoption of efficient technologies and the relevant 
incentives introduced by the reforms were by no means recognised, either by 
GPs or by the consultant eye surgeons which was more obvious in the UK 
sample. Surgeons in the UK asserted it was a mixture of factors, such as the 
higher productivity achieved due to the reforms and the money resulting from 
that, and the wider availability of technology. In Sweden, the responses of most 
consultants implied that the widespread introduction of day care was a result of 
the reforms, although other reasons were also referred to, such as for example 
technological progress innate to medical sciences and transfer of the experience 
from elsewhere.
□ Even the managers and purchasers especially in the UK, were not convinced 
whether reforms were at the root of change, despite the figures and purchasers’ 
specifications in the contracts suggesting otherwise. Most clinicians ascribed the 
changes to technological progress already underway, and their delay in adopting 
some procedures when compared to Sweden, for example, was explained on the 
grounds of the innate conservatism of the British medical establishment. What 
can be concluded, is that is that there is a great degree of uncertainty as to the 
role that market mechanisms or the NHS Management Executive’s directives 
played in speeding up this process; they could have also had synergy effects. 
One way or another reforms were instrumental in bringing about these changes 
either by means of introduced incentives and/or planning devices such as target 
setting.
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IV. DICUSSION AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
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CHAPTER 11 
DISCUSSION
The assessment of changes in choice, information, quality, responsiveness and 
efficiency in the aftermath of the reforms’ introduction was conducted to test 
whether the expectations placed on managed competition were happening in 
reality. The first two indicators were simultaneously looked upon as the tools for 
enhancing the market’s effectiveness but also as important outcomes in their 
own right. Responsiveness and efficiency were both proclaimed as explicit goals 
of the reforms and quality of care was also expected to improve as a result of the 
market’s work.
The research methodology relied on qualitative methods such as interviews with 
all involved actors: patients, general practitioners, eye surgeons, managers and 
purchasers. Their perception of changes on choice, information, quality, 
responsiveness and efficiency was analysed and then compared with the 
national figures or hospital data. This study was aimed at measuring changes 
expressed as process indicators in the periods before and after reforms. 
However, due to the lack of quantitative data from the time preceding the reforms 
this was not always possible. This chapter discusses the findings of the study 
with regard to all these indicators.
11.1 Limitations and constraints of the methodological 
approach used
Before proceeding with the discussion and interpretation of the findings, the 
limitations and constraints that this study faced should be repeated. They relate 
primarily to the qualitative approach, and in particular to the case study 
methodology that was adopted as the primary means of investigation, the bias 
resulting from the type and size of the sample, the problem of counterfactual 
evidence, and the constraints that are usually imposed on international 
comparisons. A clear delineation of the restrictions and a thorough description of
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the methodology followed Is essential in this type of research as they assist in the 
correct interpretation of findings and increase trust in the results generated.
The qualitative methods that this study used for its interviews with different 
groups of actors, the content analysis of interview transcripts and the contextual 
analysis of the most relevant documents were chosen as being the most 
appropriate for examining specific issues that this study investigated in detail and 
depth. The aim of the research was to acquire some understanding of the causes 
that underlie specific responses to policies that are often beyond control of those 
who enact them and to unearth some of the factors that influence these 
reactions. A case study approach is a form of qualitative research that isolates 
and defines categories that are under investigation and expects them to change 
as the research progresses. For this reason it was seen as the most suitable 
method for examination of the dynamics of health care environment that was in 
the process of continuous change even when this research took place.
However, in spite of the promises that this methodology yielded and fulfilled to a 
satisfactory degree, it also had its limitations. These were mainly linked to the 
generalisability of the results produced or rather to the concept of generalisability 
adopted. As Yin has convincingly argued, qualitative methodology aims at the 
‘analytic generalization’ as opposed to the ‘statistical generalization’ typical of 
quantitative research methods. In the former, the previously developed theory is 
used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study 
(Yin, 1994). This approach assists in understanding social phenomena in natural 
rather than experimental settings by giving due emphasis to the meanings and 
views of all participants (Mays et al, 1996).
However, inevitably, this methodology limits the size of the sample and the 
number of study sites it can realistically examine, especially when the resources 
of a single researcher are employed. In this project three study sites and an 
additional pilot site (all from the greater London conurbation) and one large eye 
hospital from the Stockholm area were studied. Although in selecting study sites 
in the UK every effort was made for them to meet the criteria of diversity and thus 
to ensure as great a degree of representativeness as possible, inevitably the
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sample of respondents in each site was relatively limited. In addition, the 
characteristics of the sample of patients (median age 78 years for men and 80 for 
women) compounded the problem of its representativeness.
A further problem in the research aimed at establishing direct causality, which 
was also apparent in this study, is whether the proposed interpretation of events 
can withstand the test of counterfactual evidence. Quite often the answers given 
are speculative and the only ways of supporting the hypothesis is to examine 
alternative explanations rigorously for the phenomenon concerned and to provide 
the analytical framework that tolerates uncertainty. This limitation was 
acknowledged and was dealt with rather successfully. In fact, the agreement of 
the findings from data collected by means of this case study with some other 
published findings on similar issues corroborates the results yielded by the 
project and thus provides a positive indication of the robustness of the method 
used. Any disagreement with published research, on the other hand, was duly 
reported and used for testing the relevant hypotheses.
Finally, it is worth noting that the problems that usually bedevil international 
comparisons, such as difference in definitions of the indicators measured and 
variable quality of data are largely absent from this particular study. The 
qualitative method chosen investigated and compared the dynamics of response 
to changes in individual settings that shared common features and occurred in 
similar and yet distinct environments such as the health care systems of the UK 
and Sweden. These were collected by the same researcher who applied uniform 
methodology in both settings and used cataract surgery as a tracer condition for 
highlighting some of the changes.
11. 2 Choice
The original intention of the reforms was to replace the notion of the patient as a 
passive recipient with the concept of a customer and, later on, the user of 
services. This presupposed an easier access to comprehensive and relevant 
information and freedom of choice, which would stimulate competition among 
providers within a regulated market environment. It was therefore expected that
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increases in both information and choice would occur. Freedom of choice for 
purchasers was also intended to keep the less responsive providers on their toes 
(Abel-Smith et al, 1995). It meant that they would either have to modify their 
behaviour according to market signals (reflected in the combination of price and 
quality of services delivered) or be driven out of the market altogether if they did 
not respond effectively (Glennerster et al, 1994a).
11.2.1 Evaluation of changes -  the evidence
The evidence in the case of cataract surgery presented in this study shows that 
the expectations of the market reforms for an increase in, and a shift towards, 
freedom of choice have largely not been fulfilled. The answers received from 
almost all participant groups led to the conclusion that the degree and type of 
choice currently available is very limited, and is possibly less than before the 
introduction of the reforms. The purchasers - the District Health Authorities and 
the fund-holding and non fund-holding GPs in the UK, and the County Council of 
Stockholm, particularly support these facts although the reasons differ in each 
case.
Contracts have limited the referrals outside the catchment area because this 
would result in loss of income for the purchasers in both the UK and Sweden. On 
the one hand, giving choice to users proved to be expensive. In fact this was the 
reason why in Stockholm County choice of family doctor and specialist provider 
that was vigorously pursued in the beginning of reforms was then hastily 
abandoned. It also transpired that users of this particular age group were not too 
much in favour of enacting choices concerning their treatment should they be 
offered to them.
Choice o f service/choice over the modalities o f treatment
One of the dimensions of choice examined in this study dealt with changes in the 
options and/or the modalities of treatment of cataracts that were given to users. 
This aspect of choice is, in general, difficult to implement because patients who 
lack specialist knowledge are disadvantaged in putting forward their views when
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compared to specialist doctors. It is particularly problematic in the UK, where 
there is no choice of the latter and patients have even less leverage over 
providers’ responsiveness and/or their willingness to offer choices. All in all, 
patients felt that not too many choices existed especially when treatment was 
concerned but the majority of them did not feel that this was an important 
omission. Even in those few cases when they spoke in favour of choice they 
rather implied more information.
As this study demonstrated, General Practitioners usually showed little interest in 
this aspect of care and, as a rule, did not ask their patients for feedback. As a 
result, GPs were not providing patients with sufficient assistance and were not 
correcting for the inherent deficiency of the system by empowering their patients. 
Almost none of the GPs interviewed, whether in the UK or Sweden, could answer 
questions regarding choice of options of treatment given to their patients; hence, 
the assumption that agents were necessarily properly qualified to best promote 
users’ needs and wants could not be validated. On the contrary, it became 
apparent that this might not always be the case as the GPs and family doctors 
themselves possessed insufficient information on important aspects of specialist 
care.
It has been known for quite some time that agents’ presumed suitability to 
promote patients’ needs in the best way is not self-evident, as their own 
concerns, priorities and requirements for choices and information may be quite 
different from patients’ own perceptions and may even interfere with the former 
(Beaver et al, 1996; Luker et al, 1995). This could be linked to the broader 
assumptions that the post-war welfare state’s construct (including health care 
services) rests upon. As Le Grand has pointed out it may be based on the not so 
realistic expectations that health professionals will, under all circumstances, be 
solely motivated by altruism and put their patients’ good ahead of their own, 
something that he described as the behaviour of a knight (Le Grand, 1997).
Furthermore, it also transpired that the majority of patients in this study were not 
too keen to be involved in the type of decisions that high technology specialist 
care of cataract treatment entailed. Besides, many of the patients interviewed
328
either confused, or treated jointly, choice that was available with their need for 
more information. The explanation for this attitude may lie with the peculiarity of 
the study’s sample of patients, where the median age measured at the national 
level in the UK was over 80, as reported in the large study conducted by the 
Royal College of Ophthalmologists (Courtney, 1992). Advanced age, with its 
consequent frailty and susceptibility, may partly explain patients’ lower 
expectations and their limited inclination in assuming a proactive stance and 
make choices regarding their treatment.
It is also possible that elderly patients have stronger attachment to the universally 
and freely but also collectively provided health care, which has its roots in 
wartime solidarity and immediate post-war social order according to Klein’s 
argumentation (Klein, 1995). This may, in turn, make them feel that individual 
involvement and pursuit of personal needs are incompatible with the philosophy 
of the system and that it could jeoparidise these values. A number of patients in 
the UK (although less so in Sweden) spoke in terms of gratitude for whatever 
was provided to them and their references to their own limited competence for 
taking such decisions (the latter was equally stressed in Sweden) had also 
rendered support to this view.
The above factors, taken together, may perhaps explain why patients were not 
as interested in being active participants in their care as might have been 
expected (Shackley et al, 1994). The issue of patients’ competence and 
willingness to be involved in treatment-related decisions, as well as their 
readiness to handle the information when it was given, used to be a relatively 
under-researched area with, according to some authors, only scant or outdated 
evidence available (Chamy et al, 1990; Shackley et al, 1994).
However, it was known that the seriousness of the disease was negatively 
associated with patients’ willingness to participate in medical decisions (Cassileth 
et al, 1980), but the latter was positively associated with educational status 
(Deber, 1994; Deber et al, 1996). Waldenstrom et al, who looked into 1527 
pregnant women preferences in choosing alternative maternity care in the
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Stockholm area also found that age, educational and professional status were 
crucial in this process (Waldenstrom et al, 1993).
Some of the new empirical studies have provided more insight into the specific 
factors which determine patients’ wish for involvement, such as the severity of 
the condition itself (Ovretveit, 1994a), the timing of information provision (Beaver 
et al, 1996; Luker, et al, 1996) and also educational status and - of more 
relevance to this study - age (Anell et al, 1997; Waldenstrom et al, 1993). On the 
other hand, there were also attempts to link attitudes towards health related 
decisions to more generic behavioural patterns.
Ryan et al for example, applied the logic of regret theory first developed by Bell 
and Loomes & Sudgen after observing people who faced uncertain monetary 
outcomes who, it was found, anticipated not only the likely financial gains but 
also the possibility of experiencing regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sudgen, 1982). 
She argued that patients acted similarly when deciding whether to undertake 
medical procedures and that they also considered the disutility that might result 
from wrong decisions, which could explain why patients wanted information but 
usually preferred to defer the decision to the doctor (Ryan et al, 1995; Ryan, 
1994; Ryan, 1992).
Changes in choice o f primary and/or specialist care providers
The factors that influence patients’ choice of primary care providers are 
considered to be very important because of the key role that GPs play in the 
UK’s health system, a structure that has also been recently attempted in the 
Swedish health system (Charny et al, 1990; Saltman, 1992). The primary care 
providers of the NHS assume a double and somewhat contradictory role, acting 
both as agents or “advocates” on the patients’ behalf and also as the 
gatekeepers of the system. However, the wishes of patients for the amount and 
type of care may conflict with the latter.
The results of this study support some of the findings of previous research, which 
looked into uncertainties related to patients’ willingness and ability to choose
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primary care provision, along with arrangements that would best facilitate it 
(Shackley et al, 1994). The study’s respondents from the UK were not inclined to 
travel while pursuing their choices and were rather uninterested in this aspect of 
care, a finding supported by another study (Mahon et al, 1994).
On the whole patients, in the UK seemed also quite unwilling to change the 
hospital they were accustomed to and the proximity of location played a crucial 
role in the process of choosing it. One can extrapolate with a relative degree of 
confidence that the similar held true when the case of choice of the GP was in 
question. However, this could be because the availability of choice of GPs in the 
UK, though always existing in theory, was rather muted. Even in the context of 
the reforms, it was stressed only for a relatively short time during the immediate 
post-reform period, after which more collective forms of purchasing - or, as it 
soon became known - “commissioning” took over (Goodwin, 1998).
At the same time, the study disproved some others findings when referring to 
Sweden. For example, research relatively recently conducted by Anell concluded 
that patients in Sweden made limited use of opportunities made available by the 
reforms because of the scarce or complete lack of information provided on the 
existing options (Anell, 1996). In its absence, convenience became the most 
important factor for selecting or, as it turned out quite often, not selecting a new 
provider. However, approximately one third of patients in the Swedish sample of 
this study (n=29) reported a change of primary care provider (known in Sweden 
as a house or family doctor).
It indicated that a more positive relation existed than Anell assumed, which 
allowed for conclusions to be drawn, despite the relatively small size of the 
sample. His later study, which looked into factors that influenced patients’ choice, 
concluded that elderly and young, uneducated and well-educated patients alike 
wanted to participate in decision making, although they would consider different 
perspectives. The former were keener on choosing a physician; the latter were 
more likely to have been involved in treatment decisions, and education had 
played an important role in their involvement (Anell et al, 1997).
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Changes in choice o f provider and factors influencing it
The results of this study demonstrated that choice over the place of referral for 
non-fund-holding GPs and their patients in the UK was limited, in practice, to 
providers contracted by the Health Authorities. As a result of this, and the 
tendency to conclude contracts on the basis of patterns of previous co-operation, 
there were no incentives for the Health Authorities, and consequently for the non 
fund-holding GPs, to enhance choice of specialists for their patients.
This was worsened by the additional difficulty of referring patients outside each 
their catchment area using the mechanism of Extra Contractual Referrals, as it 
would result in a cross-boundary flow of money in favour of another Health 
Authority. Limited funds for this purpose were allocated to each Health Authority 
from the central government and they were meant to cover all health care needs 
of their respective populations.
In fact, one third of the total number of GPs - and all non fund-holders - claimed 
that they had more freedom to refer patients outside their catchment areas during 
the pre-reform period, although, as most of them agreed, they had rarely used it. 
As a consequence, the choice of hospital in the UK was hampered by powerful 
barriers raised by contractual obligations, which determined the referral patterns 
for specialist care “purchased" by GPs on behalf of the Health Authority.
The theoretical analysis would indicate that the opposite should hold for GP fund­
holders because their freedom of purchasing was not limited by financial 
considerations taken into account by some, as was the case for GPs not enrolled 
in the fund-holding scheme. On the contrary, their referrals could be decided on 
their own and should be solely guided by the best interests of their patients 
(Glennerster et al, 1994a). Yet four out of five of the interviewed fund-holding 
practices established an almost exclusive relationship with only one provider, 
which according to them, was based on the combination of price and quality of 
services offered to their patients. There is also some support for the findings 
presented here from related research which demonstrated that, while fund­
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holders were more willing to offer choices to their patients, a change of providers 
rarely took place in reality (Ellwood, 1997).
This lack of choice over the hospital is a direct result of the organisational part of 
the reforms and transformation process that formerly DHA-run hospitals have 
undergone in becoming competitive trusts and constitutes an example of how 
services were “marketed" to purchasers. The proliferation of outreach clinics, 
usually conducted at the site of the fund-holders practice, serves as one such 
example. While it is unknown whether the combination of price and quality 
offered by those providers was, in fact, the best (Gillam et al, 1995; Maynard and 
Bloor, 1995), it is certain that it limited patients’ choice.
A more general point is that consultant eye surgeons, both in the UK and 
Sweden, confirmed this view when referring to the factors responsible for 
decreases in options of treatment available to patients. They claimed that the 
established departmental policy, based on the best standards of care, was 
followed in most cases, which left no room for patients’ choice. It is also likely 
that operations had to be produced in high volumes to obtain the benefits 
resulting from economies of scale and to achieve efficiency gains (as happened 
in some of the eye units in this study), which in turn resulted in a lack of choice. 
Some consultant eye surgeons’ views (of whom more than half admitted that 
choice over the procedure of treatment was not really given to patients) gave 
support to this hypothesis.
Their argument was that, in the case of cataract surgery, the most cost-efficient 
option for its delivery was when it was performed as a day care procedure under 
local anaesthesia, a view that is also supported by the evidence available 
(Perceival et al, 1992, Effective Health Care Bulletins, 1996). However, this was 
achieved at the expense of other quality indicators, such as the time that could 
be devoted to patients to explain the options of treatment and, quite often, 
choice.
A comparable situation involving a decrease in available alternatives occurred in 
the County Council of Stockholm region, although the reasons were different. In
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1991/92, the eye departments of three hospitals merged into one big specialist 
hospital established on the site of a previously closed general one. While its 
creation was not directly related to the market oriented reforms of the Stockholm 
Model, the big specialist eye hospital clearly benefited from them, becoming also 
their representative success story. It is not insignificant, either, that K is 
considered to be a likely follower of another hospital which took the 
unprecedented step of rejecting its public status and changing ownership to 
become the first hospital to be privatised in the County Council of Stockholm 
region, in 1999.
Market incentives, combined with a cost per case remuneration system and 
economies of scale accruing from its size, have enabled the specialist eye 
hospital to provide an impressive volume of services of the highest quality and at 
competitive prices, and eventually made it a DRG (a costing system for treatment 
procedures) price leader. Nonetheless, the choice of eye services for purchasers 
and patients alike in the County of Stockholm was not very high when this study 
was conducted. Hospital K captures 70-80% of the market, with the remaining 
20-30% left to a few smaller private eye clinics, where the operations are often 
performed by the same senior eye surgeons that work in the publicly owned 
hospital K (see Table 10.10, Chapter Ten).
The purchasers from Z District of Stockholm County Council and the Health 
Authorities of London have also realised that the introduction of contracts has 
made referring outside the County’s/Authority’s boundary less flexible because it 
would mean cash flowing into another County’s/Authority’s purse. This, in turn, 
had a limiting effect on the choice of providers. County Councils in Sweden are 
administrative units whose borders were quite often defined in an era when 
geographical isolation played a crucial role. In some parts of the country (i.e. in 
Western Sweden), this historical administrative division is quite often disregarded 
due to the proximity of healthcare facilities, and cross-referrals between the 
counties occur regularly (Rhenberg, 1997).
In several other County Councils in Sweden, where different forms of public 
competition have been introduced (Anell and Svarvar, 1993; Saltman, 1990) and,
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in particular, in the selected study site of Stockholm County, “money followed the 
patient'- in the literal sense of the phrase. This was a result of the freedom given 
to patients to decide where to purchase care (for both primary and secondary 
services). They could follow their preferences for a provider regardless of private 
or public sector, though usually within the County boundaries and limits of set 
DRG prices (Anell, 1995; Charpentier and Samuelson, 1994), which was rather 
quickly discontinued because of its high cost implications for the County 
Councils.
11.2.2. Comparison between the UK and Sweden
It seems, so far, that the spirit of the reforms of the Swedish public competition 
model (regulated and monitored at a local or regional level by elected politicians) 
may correspond more closely to the objective of patients’ choice acting as a tool 
to encourage their active participation than to the UK’s internal market. In fact, all 
Swedish politicians have attached importance to the issue of individual choice of 
health care providers and Swedish patients have always had more choice in 
comparison with British patients (Saltman and Van Otter, 1992a). Accordingly, 
different forms of pluralistic models promoting this objective were implemented in 
thirteen counties in Sweden, although their effects on patients’ choice were 
mostly confined to urban areas (Anell, 1995; Rhenberg, 1997).
On the other hand, in the UK’s internal market, which is regulated and monitored 
centrally with agents acting on the patients’ behalf, there seems to be less scope 
for citizen’s direct participation. It may arguably be regarded more as an attempt 
to respond to users' increasing consumerist expectations (although limited by 
given budgetary constraints) than as a creation of real mechanisms for them to 
have control over health-related decisions. According to the policy makers’ 
design, direct choice was never meant to be an issue under consideration and 
even less so a subject to be acted upon by the British patients themselves. In 
fact, opting out of the NHS in favour of private care continues to be their only real 
choice, something that had already existed for a long time prior to the reforms, as 
pointed out by Klein (Klein, 1989; Klein, 1995).
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This assumption was, however, carefully omitted and not explicitly stated in any 
of the respective documents (DoH, 1989a; DoH, 1989b; DoH, 1991a); neither 
was the possible lack of alternatives openly discussed during the period 
preceding the announcement of the reforms. On the contrary, “the availability of 
choice for patients” was heralded with a large degree of publicity and NHS users 
were promised a major breakthrough in this respect (DoH, 1989a), albeit defined 
in rather vague and nebulous terms. In this study, the overwhelming majority of 
respondents across all groups highlighted its conspicuous absence in reality.
This conclusion becomes even clearer when one notes that, five years after the 
introduction of the reforms, half the patients in Britain (n=52) had acquired no 
knowledge of the reforms; nor were they in a position to comment on their likely 
impact on the choices that would be made available to them. Although one 
should be wary when attempting to quantify qualitative data from rather small 
samples nevertheless, the indication that this finding provides is an important one 
and cannot be easily ignored on the grounds of its lack of representativeness 
(see discussion on this aspect following on in this chapter pages 356-357).
Sweden is somewhat different in this respect. Not only were patients better 
informed (see Figure 6.3, Chapter 6), but also the choice of family/house doctor 
in Stockholm constituted a notable exception, demonstrating patients’ increased 
empowerment within “the monopolistic integrated system”, as it is succinctly 
described by Anell (Anell, 1996). Moreover, the innovation mentioned above - 
whereby specialised care could be chosen from both the private or public care 
providers, regardless of the patient’s residence area as long as it was within the 
same County - may serve as another example of an attempt to increase patient 
choice. Reimbursement was, in this case, paid by the County up to the level of 
prices set for each service.
Another (unintended) increase of choice for patients was caused by the 
combination of excess capacity and the per case remuneration system 
introduced by the reforms that have created clear incentives for the specialist eye 
hospital in Stockholm County Council to attract as many patients as possible thus 
making the self-referral an acceptable option.
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Other differences concern factors that influence the patient when choosing a 
provider. In the UK, when choice was given in quite a limited form - such as the 
possibility of changing GP or having a say over referral to a specialist - and the 
most important aspect that patients referred to rather frequently was travelling 
distance. This could be because choice over such matters is considered to be 
insignificant or because it is really of no consequence without information on 
what the different options entail.
However, it is also very likely that patients from the Outer London area were less 
often in favour of travelling any distance than those in Stockholm, because of the 
comparative distances faced by the residents of the two areas, which in the 
former case were significantly bigger. The latter is confirmed by other studies 
(Rhenberg, 1997; Anell, 1995), which refer to the ease of movement across 
county boundaries in Western Sweden, resulting from the low cost of travelling to 
receive treatment. Furthermore, the highly subsidised taxi prices from and to 
hospital that visually impaired Swedes are entitled to probably played a role, too. 
It may also serve as an indirect reinforcement of the priorities that the elderly 
patients of this study indicated when choosing a hospital in which have their 
operation.
As this study has demonstrated, and other findings have confirmed, patients 
responded enthusiastically to this novelty (Saltman, 1990). Nonetheless, overall 
patients’ awareness of existing choices and also their actual availability was 
subject to significant regional variations and depended essentially on the density 
of population and also on the concentration of facilities (Rhenberg, 1997; Anell, 
1995).
11.2.3 Conclusions
In the extracts from government documents in the UK (DoH, 1989a; DoH 1989b), 
a general commitment to better freedom of choice is pronounced, which is seen 
as both a means and an end of the market. Furthermore, a new role for the 
patient, based on her/his sovereignty and behaviour as a good consumer, is 
envisaged. The first conclusion resulting from the analysis of the evidence
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presented in this study suggests that these statements ended by becoming pure 
rhetoric throughout the reforms’ implementation. A hypothesis put forward is that 
they were never intended to be anything else, at least in the UK’s case. By 
contrast, in Sweden, during the life span of the Stockholm Model there was some 
real commitment to offer choice of provider to the users, though this was quickly 
abandoned because of the cost it entailed, among other reasons.
Second, clearly in the UK and less so in Sweden, purchasers were to be the 
ones to exercise choices that would ultimately benefit the patients; but the 
transferability of empowerment by the intermediaries (fund-holding General 
Practitioners acting as the patients’ agents) to the users themselves was rarely 
envisaged. The validity of the assertion that agents could fulfill this role is 
incomplete, if not fundamentally flawed, as it rests on the notion of benign 
paternalism. It therefore needs to be carefully re-examined in the light of the 
findings this study presents and the evidence available from elsewhere (Audit 
Commission, 1996; Coulter, 1995a; Dixon et al, 1995; Mays et al, 1996a).
Third, as far as the choice of provider is concerned in both countries, it is 
uncertain how much willingness and ability to exercise it exists on the patients’ 
side (Chamy et al, 1990; Saltman, 1992) or what arrangements would facilitate it. 
In addition, the analysis of the implications of policies aimed at increasing 
patients’ direct participation showed that there is a need for differentiation 
between the services, which are more compatible with patients’ direct 
involvement. For this purpose, the definition of the appropriate level and the 
content of choice to be exercised by the different groups of patients may need to 
be attempted by the policy makers.
Fourth, there is a broader point of difficulty in establishing a reform process that 
would simultaneously lead to the attainment of all the desirable objectives. The 
potential for conflicts entailed in the reforms’ agendas has been recognised in 
both countries (Anell, 1996; Dawson, 1995). The findings of this study illustrate 
how the pursuit of efficiency resulted in choice being impaired, with additional 
negative consequences for certain aspects of quality of service provision in the 
UK, with the reverse phenomenon occurring in Sweden. To sum up, the evidence
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provided in this study highlights the difficulty of pursuing conflicting policy 
objectives, even if they are deemed desirable for reasons of political expediency.
Finally, there were recently arguments voiced against freedom of choice in health 
care, which, according to some, can be substituted by high regulatory standards 
to secure quality (Saltman, 1999). It is not implausible however, that arguments 
against choice have won because costs of health care services are better 
controlled in this way. In any case, limited choice by intermediaries instead of 
users themselves was always seen as the most preferable option by policy 
makers in the UK, something that was retained even when pro-market reforms 
were introduced, for this arrangement was believed to contain them more 
successfully.
However, choice not only of the provider but also of the mode of treatment and/or 
of the option of no treatment at all and health care decisions more generally, can 
modify attitudes and behaviours and bring about the desirable shift towards 
provision of more efficient and appropriate care. Arguably, this can only be 
achieved through the participation of well-informed and empowered users. In 
addition, the concept of service users’ rights are now more tangible issues (Luker 
et al, 1995) and the possibility for patients to enact their preferences is an 
essential component of these rights, without which patients’ participation in 
decision making in health issues would be meaningless.
11.3. Information
Information was not an explicit aim of the reforms in either the UK or Sweden. 
However, information about the prices and outcomes of services that is made 
available to purchasers is a necessary precondition for achieving market 
effectiveness while information on the options of treatment given to patients is 
also an important function of quality of care, contributing to a user-friendly 
approach and making rational choice possible.
On the other hand, asymmetry of information, both on the side of the providers 
and of the users, is inherently associated with health care markets and it is quite
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uncertain whether perfect or even sufficient information can be achieved at all 
(Arrow, 1963). The reforms raised big expectations that the scheme of newly 
created purchasers would correct these market imperfections because at least 
General Practitioners were assumed already to possess, or be able to obtain, the 
relevant information and were therefore regarded as suitable intermediaries 
between providers and patients.
The other tenet was that collective agents would manage the competition using 
different tools, such as standardised prices and benefits, to counteract market 
failure related to imperfect information. However, apart from the inherent 
deficiencies that these beliefs involve (such as the creation of incentives for 
agency relationships explored in the insurance literature), they could also 
severely test the theoretical assumptions underpinning the suitability of collective 
agents, whether District Health Authorities or County Councilors, and lead to the 
re-examination of their role in delivering efficient and effective care.
Arguably, this concern has also prompted the movement towards establishing 
criteria for the effectiveness and appropriateness of medical procedures, 
measurements of the outcomes of procedures, and the standardisation of clinical 
practice that was initiated by the Department of Health. However, the hallmark of 
government policy with regard to information was proclaimed in “The Patient’s 
Charter”. It explicitly stated that patients had a right to obtain information about 
his/her treatment and to be involved in these decisions should s/he wish to be so 
(DoH, 1991a; DoH, 1995b).
Although the launch of the “The Patient’s Charter is not an inherent part of the 
quasi-market reforms and, in the view of some, represents a dilution of the spirit 
of the reforms and a return to the dirigisme (Le Grand, 1995; personal 
communication), because of its importance for the issues considered and the 
frequent reference made to it by the respondents, it was examined in parallel and 
as a part of the original reforms.
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11.3.1 Evaluation of changes -  the evidence
The impact of the quasi-market reforms on information available to purchasers 
and users seems to be more positive than that for choice. Almost all parties 
involved agreed that the information provided has improved over the last five 
years. Even so, less than half of the ophthalmic surgeons and GPs interviewed in 
the UK considered that this was a result of the reforms; it was rather a 
manifestation of other changes, which were already under way. Despite that, 
almost all the representatives of purchasers and providers in the UK and Sweden 
did admit that the systematic provision of information and its distribution in written 
form was a new development. It seemed that the views of the majority of actors 
involved (purchasers, doctors and patients) coincided on this point, although their 
degree of satisfaction with it varied.
It was decided that, when referring to the provision of information, it is useful to 
make a distinction "between the type of information and for whom it is provided". 
This need for differentiation was also recognised for choice and was therefore 
incorporated into the research methodology. The approach adopted in this study 
has been justified by the results obtained. It was shown that, while most 
purchasers (GPs, Health Authorities and County Councils) seem to be rather 
satisfied with the information contained in activity data and the quality reports, 
less than 50% of patients in Sweden and approximately 40% of patients in the 
UK felt the same way. In the view of the other group of patients, representing 
50% and 60% of respondents of the respective samples from Sweden and the 
UK, the amount and type of information given to them by providers was not 
perceived to be sufficient.
Furthermore, the trend for giving out printed leaflets for patients markedly 
increased after reforms, which indicates that they may have had some impact on 
this aspect of care. However, the quality of information and sometimes the way 
and the stage it was given away was often irrelevant and occasionally 
inappropriate. On the other hand, purchasers felt overwhelmed by providers’ data 
but little of these could be turned into meaningful information.
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Information provided to purchasers and patients
The UK’s purchasers (both Health Authorities and GP fund-holders) were more 
satisfied in terms of the information provided to them and were less interested in 
what information was provided to their patients about issues such as the health 
problem, the existence of treatment alternatives and the risks associated with 
them.
However, provision of information in both oral and written form is one of the 
important dimensions promoting good health. Coulter et al, point out that good 
information for patients about health problems can help in preventing disease, in 
promoting self-help and supporting treatment choices, as well as in improving the 
effectiveness of clinical care (Coulter et al, 1998). There is also evidence that 
patients may value information not only because of its utility in reducing anxiety but 
also for the sake of knowledge as such (Ryan, 1992; Ryan et al, 1995).
However, findings from all the study sites (with the slight exception of U) clearly 
indicated that General Practitioners in the UK and family doctors in Sweden were 
both uninterested and unable to comment on these aspects of patients’ care. GP 
fund-holders were equally ill prepared to answer questions about the type and 
quality of information given to their patients when they underwent specialist 
treatment.
Therefore, a source of concern is not only the surprisingly modest or non-existent 
awareness of change in these aspects of information that General Practitioners’ 
demonstrated, but also the little amount of anxiety that they expressed over this 
lack of knowledge. What can be inferred is that General Practitioners placed a 
different value on the importance of written information when compared to their 
patients’ views. There was no discernible difference in sample U, where half of 
the respondents were fund-holders; their responses did not markedly differ from 
those of the samples where no, or very few, fund-holders operated.
Why were primary care providers were so little interested in the aspect of care 
that represents the most common reason of patients’ complaints is an issue that
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is open to debate. Certainly, time pressures that GPs continuously face in 
conjunction with the limited sample of specialist eye patients they encounter in 
their routine appointments and absence of information from the frame of the 
monitored indicators have all spelt poor outcomes for this aspect of care. 
However, it could also be because health professionals are traditionally trained in 
an environment that, not so long ago, followed the military type of command- 
structure, with the patient being at the lowest rank of the chain, defined by his/her 
lay status as described by Axelsson (Axelsson, 1999).
It could be because the assumption that doctors, unlike other human beings, will 
always behave like knights and sacrifice their own priorities, which as Le Grand 
has demonstrated does not withstand the reality test (Le Grand, 1997). As it 
turns out, these priorities can be as trivial and mundane as convenience and 
leisure maximisation at work. It can also be because doctors are not taught to 
cross-identify with their patients’ needs and empathy is not commonly thought of 
as a skill that is required of doctors. Rather, a degree of distance is perceived to 
be necessary for them to perform their therapeutic tasks.
Nonetheless, consultant eye surgeons in Sweden believed that, in most cases, 
sufficient information had been successfully obtained from the media. Almost all 
of them expressed the view that the majority of patients already had good 
information about the procedure when referred for specialist care. However, a 
few consultant eye surgeons, in both the UK and Sweden, admitted that the 
quality of information provided could be improved if there was less pressure to 
increase productivity and if more resources were made available (i.e. to increase 
the number of appropriately qualified staff).
Moreover, the views of providers and purchasers were something of a contrast to 
patients’ opinions, where more than half of them in the UK (32 out of 50) reported 
that no sufficient and/or adequate information was given to them. This was 
further reinforced by the replies of Swedish patients reported in this study, as 
less than half of them could confirm that they possessed sufficient information on 
their treatment beforehand.
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Even fewer (a quarter of the total number) felt that they did not need any 
additional information over and above what the specialist doctors could give them 
in the hospital. Thus, unsurprisingly, these outcomes are in line with findings from 
other studies, where the patients’ most often voiced complaint is the lack of 
information (Calnan et al, 1994; Stizia and Wood, 1997). A study from the UK 
that looked into ophthalmic patients’ understanding of their diagnoses found that 
70% of patients (152 out of 219) required more information and suggested that 
access to it needs improvement (Sudesh et al, 1994). The most recent study 
from Sweden, which examined factors influencing patients’ choices, found that, 
even when they did not want to take part in decisions about treatments, patients 
were strongly in favour of more information (Anell et al, 1997).
The findings of this study indicate, that health professionals’ perceptions of 
patients’ needs for information may be different from their own, which is also 
supported by evidence from other studies (Luker et al, 1995; Beaver et al, 1996; 
Luker et al, 1996). The divergence in views between patients and doctors is 
important for at least two reasons. First, patients may receive treatment, which is 
inappropriate to their needs (Cockbum and Pit, 1997; Coulter et al, 1994). 
Second, there is an increased interest in shared decision making (Coulter, 1997; 
Ovretveit, 1996), which is one way of counteracting the phenomenon of 
institutionalized disempowerment of the patients, which so far seems to be 
largely inbuilt in the system of health care provision.
However, this study also demonstrated that a similar phenomenon also took 
place with purchasers who, regardless of patients’ satisfaction with the type and 
quality of information provided in leaflets (which for quite few of them was quite 
high), seemed not to be aware of, and/or interested in, this information aspect at 
all. On the contrary, they paid quite a lot of attention to the data and information 
that was designated for their own use, even though they did not always find it 
satisfactory. The latter could be interpreted in the light of a marketing strategy 
adopted by providers operating in a competitive environment, whilst the former 
constituted possibly the most evident case of the reforms’ impact on providers 
embracing a more user-friendly approach.
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On the other hand, the results of this study only partly confirmed the findings of 
another piece of research with a sample of elderly patients carried out at the 
early stage of reforms, which found that they did not often recall receiving 
information, at least where the provision of primary care was concerned. By 
contrast, many patients interviewed in this study recalled the type and amount of 
information given whether it concerned leaflets or verbal explanations. In the 
same time some improvements in personal contact with hospitals were already 
being observed at the early stage of the reforms (Jones et al, 1994) were further 
supported by the findings of this study.
Provision o f written information and its content
There was virtually unanimous agreement among respondent groups in both 
countries that systematic provision of written information in the form of leaflets 
started to occur only after the reforms. Most doctors felt this was rather a result of 
the standards and targets that were explicitly formulated in “The Patients’ 
Charter” (DoH, 1991a; DoH, 1995b) than the work of market incentives perse. 
Others considered it to be a development that was partly introduced as a 
response to purchasers’ demands and partly constituted an attempt to adopt a 
more user-friendly approach to users.
However, the content of the written material was considered useful by only one 
third of the patients, although there were differences among units in the UK. 
Paradoxically, there was a wide degree of disagreement among respondents as 
to what the leaflets actually contained, which implicitly indicates the limited use 
that was made of them. This confirms the findings of another study from the UK 
which after examining 50 booklets for patients with breast cancer concluded 
negatively as to their usefulness for patients (Beaver et al, 1997). In addition, the 
differences in evaluation of written material - and even in recording its existence - 
that were observed between different units and reported by patients, provide 
some indications of the quality of material and/or the form in which it was 
presented to the patients, which could, in turn, have had an impact on its 
effectiveness.
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The views of patients and doctors seemed to broadly coincide on one point: there 
was no reference to the likely side effects or even to the degree of discomfort 
that patients might experience afterwards, nor was there any discussion about 
the options of treatment. Leaflets usually included some more or less 
comprehensible description of the health problem and/or some usually very 
general information on the way it is treated. These findings are confirmed by 
research conducted by the King’s Fund Institute in the UK, where different 
materials for several specialties were examined as to their quality and usefulness 
from the point of view of users and specialists alike. It found that on the whole, 
patients had difficulties in accessing the information about their condition and 
treatment in the form in which it was presented to them (Coulter et al, 1998).
Another quite specific problem identified by the respondents in the study related 
to the accessibility of written material for people with some (often significant) 
degree of visual impairment. Most patients also complained that no consideration 
was taken of the crucial, in their view, aspect of after care. The importance of 
self-care is recognised in both controlling symptoms and enhancing recovery 
(Gibson et al, 1997; Sudesh et al, 1993). It is, therefore, surprising that this 
element of care, requiring so little effort, was so often neglected.
11.3.2 Comparison between the UK and Sweden
All groups of respondents came up with similar responses in the UK and 
Sweden. Although over half the number of patients in both countries were 
satisfied with the quality and amount of information they received in hospital 
about the issues concerning their health problem, the options of treatment, after 
care and the likelihood of complications, another 40% were not. Patients in 
Sweden were more active in seeking information on their own, which may be 
explained by their higher educational status and degree of emancipation of 
women who, in this age group, had a more frequent history of working outside 
the home when compared to their British peers. The possibility of self-referral 
and, thus, lesser contact with the primary care provider in Sweden, could have 
also contributed to this outcome.
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Consultant eye surgeons in both countries acknowledged changes, but some of 
them felt there was room for much more improvement. The reasons this was not 
happening were variously ascribed to a lack of time resulting from high pressure 
to produce efficiently and to a somewhat patronising disbelief in the importance it 
represented to patients.
The difference between British and Swedish consultants was that the former 
were less likely to interpret even modest changes as being the result of the 
reforms. This could be a consequence of the fact that quasi-market incentives in 
the Stockholm Model were made more explicit in the area of choice (though for a 
rather limited period of time), which made doctors respond to them by providing 
better information. It could also be because of the well-entrenched mentality and 
tradition of collecting and analysing information that Swedish respondents felt 
was the case.
General Practitioners and family doctors were equally poorly informed, which in 
the case of Sweden maybe ascribed to the relative novelty of the scheme, unlike 
in the UK. By contrast, the purchasers in both countries had seen an increased 
flow of data, which, especially for the purchasers from the UK, was often quite 
unintelligible. As one purchaser put it, “we often have no clue as to how to 
transform this stream of data into meaningful information".
This clearly indicates that the providers could easily have given data which they 
themselves possessed and/or produced, though this would not necessarily have 
meant that they were really catering for the purchasers’ needs; quite often the 
purchasers did not know exactly what to ask for, so the providers would rather 
mechanistically respond to what they felt was asked of them. Managers in the UK 
felt that the introduction of the scheme of competing purchasers was the agent of 
change in this domain, which they saw as a significant development.
A final issue is the significant difference in the level of patient satisfaction with the 
information received between the four UK provider units and hospital K in 
Sweden. A possible explanation is that units oriented towards high productivity 
(such as S in the UK and K in Sweden) might have had to sacrifice the amount of
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time spent on giving information, making, instead, an extra effort to provide 
continuity of care in pursuit of the efficiency objective. The consultant eye 
surgeons working in all UK units and also in Stockholm’s hospital K supported 
this hypothesis.
11.3.3 Conclusions
General Practitioners and family doctors seemed to be equally ill informed about 
changes in the information provided to their patients, as was also the case for 
choice offered to patients. The first conclusion is that the predictions that fund- 
holding General Practitioners in the UK would have plenty of incentives for 
seeking data and monitoring whether or not their patients were properly informed 
by the specialist doctors, did not prove to be the case for the respondents 
represented in this study. In fact, they knew no more about this aspect of care 
when compared to their non fund-holding peers, which is somewhat perplexing in 
the light of theoretical analysis stating otherwise (Glennerster et al, 1994; 
Glennerster et al, 1994a; Le Grand, 1994).
Second, it raises the issue of the agents’ limitations in representing their patients’ 
interests, which has already been raised over choice gains. The assumption of 
agents’ largely idealised suitability to act on the users’ behalf has to be further 
adjusted for the limitations posed by the imperfect information possessed by 
them.
The question, whether doctors are uninterested in the single-minded pursuit of 
their patients’ benefit because their own priorities are primary, as is suggested by 
the theorists of public choice for example (Niskanen, 1971), or whether it is 
because they fail to realise the difference between their own and their 
beneficiaries’ perception of good and utility, is a difficult one to answer. In any 
case, more empirical work in this area is needed to fully substantiate either view. 
What can be said for certain, however, is that the generalised assumptions 
should not be used as a guideline for policy making if they are not grounded in 
proper empirical evidence.
348
Third, patients in both countries have an overwhelmingly unfulfilled need to 
receive information, without necessarily wanting to act upon this (Anell et al, 
1997; Coulter et al, 1998). Information about the health problem, the alternatives 
of treatment and the likely outcomes represent a value in itself (Ryan, 1992; 
Ryan et al, 1995). This aspect of care has, therefore, to be taken seriously into 
account by policy makers who aspire to bring empowerment to the users and 
respond to their needs. It still remains unclear, however, how well informed the 
consumer may be if no other mechanisms for overcoming the problem of 
informational advantage governing the exchange between the health provider 
and the patient/consumer (known as the agency relationship) are foreseen 
(Shackley et al, 1994; Ryan, 1994).
The fourth, and possibly most important, conclusion is the need to devise 
methods and incentives that would stimulate and motivate agents to use their 
informational advantage in favour of those whom they are meant to represent in 
all the cases where their use is indispensable. This is especially relevant for 
public health systems, which rely on the intermediaries and/or agents for their 
efficient operation.
11.4 Quality
Soon after the reforms’ introduction, there seemed to be a lot of disagreement as 
to their impact on quality. Some claimed that the efficient provision of care should 
have a positive spill over effect and should, in fact, be considered as one of the 
dimensions in a broader concept of quality of care (Overtveit, 1992). Others 
thought that the priority given to budgetary considerations by the GP fund­
holders on the one hand (Keeley, 1993) might lead to under referral and, on the 
other hand, under treatment and conflict of interest between trusts could 
adversely affect the continuity of patient care (Wall, 1994). However, the 
proclaimed intention of the government with regard to quality was nothing less 
than remarkable improvements that could serve as a proof of the healing effects 
of incentives and competition.
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GP fund-holders were seen as the properly motivated agents to enact these 
principles and bring the expected gains to their patients in terms of improved 
quality (Goodwin, 1998). The elements of competition for contracts among trusts 
would also create a favourable environment for improvements in quality 
(Hamblin, 1998). However, there was a conspicuous absence of any explicit 
definition from the government’s statements as to what was meant by quality of 
care and, moreover, what the scope of its likely enhancement would be (DoH, 
1989a; DoH, 1989b).
It is well known that quality is a multidimensional concept (Donabedian, 1966; 
SPRI, 1990) and that the different aspects dealing with inputs (resources and 
skill-mix of the staff), processes (waiting times, friendliness of the personnel) and 
outcomes (improvements in health status) can be measured to make inferences 
about the manner in which it changers. If universal criteria for assessing changes 
in quality existed, or if there was agreement on the most important aspects for its 
measurement, modifications in quality could be used as a meaningful indicator of 
the reforms’ impact that pro-market reformers claimed would be brought about.
However, as this is not the case, selected process indicators were used as 
proxies for quality of care in this study. One such was the evaluation of changes 
in waiting times at the outpatients’ department, which was known to be common 
problem in both the UK and Sweden during the period preceding the reforms 
(Dixon, 1998; Hanning et al, 1998). In addition, the availability of contact with 
senior clinicians and sufficient notice of the operation date given to patients 
beforehand were examined to provide indications on changes in quality. All these 
aspects are concerned with changes in friendliness towards the users.
11.4.1 Evaluation of changes -  the evidence
Several aspects that were used as proxies for quality indicators examined in this 
study pointed in the same direction. These factors indicated patients’ relatively 
limited expectations, while providers and purchasers demonstrated their 
unstructured approach and fragmented awareness of the importance of quality
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issues which extended beyond the set of mechanistic targets (for example, 
waiting times).
However, even when the latter were examined in order to draw conclusions on 
process indicators of quality, the net effect for all the units was that they were 
only realised in less than half of the cases. Thus for example the targets for 
waiting times at the outpatients were successfully met only for unit S in the UK 
and K in Sweden (which reached app.90%). The remaining three units fell short 
of the 30 minutes target and unit U for example could not even remotely 
approach this target.
The reasons for this situation are many and various. First, it was the use of 
mechanistic and not always realistic standards promulgated by “The Patients’ 
Charter”, which, as Ham argued, were meant to demonstrate the reforms’ 
tangible successes (Ham, 1997). It seemed as if the government that had 
devised and engineered quite an innovative set of reforms had, less than half 
way through the process, lost its belief in the effectiveness of market means in 
bringing about the desired outcomes and so decided to provide a helping hand 
by devising standards, which had to be met.
The idea of setting explicit yardsticks against which the project would be 
measured, on the one hand, and outlining patients’ entitlements in written form, 
on the other - as represented in “The Patient's Charter” - is an important and 
desirable objective. However, their use as a substitute for the “invisible” but 
existing and otherwise operating mechanisms was a quite apparent shift in 
policy, which took place before the market-oriented reforms could prove or 
disprove their merits.
Another reason may relate to the fact that the set of conflicting objectives that the 
reforms incorporated created a situation that was conducive to conflicts and 
confusion. One example was the situation in U, where a clash between the 
management and the consultant eye surgeons’ team led to a disruption of 
service provision for quite some time and its impact was recognised by both 
patients and General Practitioners. However, it could also be because the
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reforms, with their imperfect incentives, brought into light, and made explicit, 
forms of inefficiency that were no longer tolerable.
Another finding was that patients were, on the whole, grateful - irrespective of the 
quality of service provided. This seemed to undermine any notion of rights being 
exercised or demands for a certain quality of care to be provided and was also 
repeatedly referred to by patients from other units, both in the UK and Sweden. 
One British patient summarised this attitude in a succinct way by saying:
“It is a matter of a long culture within the NHS, to teach patients to be grateful for 
anything that is done to them."
This was especially acute in the context of the closure of hospitals and increased 
uncertainty about the future of care, which was often perceived as a threat by the 
elderly. As has already been discussed above, this may have been a result of the 
frailty that was a characteristic of many of the aged patients represented in this 
study, though it may also have been a culturally conditioned attachment to 
collectivist values especially in the UK.
Some respondents in the consultant sample, in both the UK and Sweden, 
reported widely cited anecdotal evidence (referred to also by some patients and 
General Practitioners), that the increased productivity pressure may have had an 
adverse impact on the quality of care. They usually referred to the medico- 
technical aspects of quality of care, but also had in mind the inconvenience 
incurred by patients when they were dealing with inappropriately prepared 
community services. However, as far as the example of this service is 
concerned, this study has largely disproved the fears that efficiency 
considerations had any negative impact on the clinical outcomes (for details see 
below: section 5. Efficiency).
However, there were also less comfortable findings. The most uncomfortable one 
was that GPs, both fund-holders and non fund-holders, were little or not at all 
aware of any changes with respect to quality provided in secondary care settings 
although it is known that both fund-holders and Health Authorities have 
introduced quality standards in the contracts (Coulter, 1995b). This applied not
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only to the features examined in this study, but also to all other aspects of quality. 
While Goodwin states that fund-holders acquired better services for their patients 
on the site of their practice - primarily referring to outreach clinics (Goodwin, 
1998) - it is evident that they did not use their clout to fulfil an important aim of 
the reforms, which was to improve care at the hospitals.
Although conclusive evidence about the impact of outreach clinics is hard to come 
by and the effects of outreach clinics on quality has so far never been a subject 
of in depth evaluation, there are some indications that this may not be the most 
efficient option in the provision of care (Gillam et al, 1995; Harris, 1997). In 
addition, there were more general questions posed as to whether primary care is 
under any condition more cost-effective in comparison with the hospital care 
(Coulter, 1996).
At the beginning of the reform process, Maynard warned against the 
indiscriminate embrace of procedures, of whose efficacy there was little 
evidence, referring to outreach clinics in particular (Maynard and Bloor, 1995). 
Later evidence by Kerison and Comey confirmed that there was no means of 
monitoring the impact of outreach clinics on the quality and efficiency of the care 
that was being offered. They also found that there was significant private 
provision taking place on their site (Kerison and Corney, 1998).
However, if quality offered at the outreach clinics would prove better this would 
appear to be an example of a less expected outcome where quality of care in 
primary care settings could be improved at the expense of choice of hospital, at 
least when direct users were concerned. In this case, it would also give raise to a 
number of questions as to whether high quality of care necessarily coincides with 
the availability of choice and, more generally, whether loss of choice inevitably 
leads to poorer outcomes or lesser satisfaction with care. However, in an 
absence of evidence on the subject this issue cannot be concluded either way.
There are cases where trading-off some aspects of quality of care against 
efficiency took place in reality and it relates to after care, routinely reported as 
being inadequately handled. This happened either when elderly patients were
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too hastily discharged to undermanned community services, or when they had to 
come for the next morning follow-up session without having a say over this issue. 
Many patients referred to the substantial inconvenience incurred while travelling 
to the hospital with vision only poorly restored at that point.
Availability o f the contact with the senior specialist
The contact of newly admitted patients with senior staff, and the provision of 
information during the course of the consultation, can be safely regarded as one 
of the quality process indicators which, in the absence of more sensitive ones, 
are often used as proxies for the outcome of care. This was acknowledged in a 
number of documents attempting to set quality standards in the form of patients’ 
entitlement to contact with the senior doctor, as stated in “The Patient’s Charter" 
(DoH, 1991a; DoH, 1995b) in the UK and in the quality standards set by the 
Swedish Medical Association for ophthalmology (Federation of County Councils; 
1994) (for details see also Annex II).
While patients were quite unaware of whom they saw on their first and 
subsequent visits - the majority did not attach any importance to this issue - it 
also seemed that GPs were equally unaware and uninterested in this matter. As 
the findings demonstrate almost no GP in the UK and Sweden could provide any 
indication on this issue. The question of why General Practitioners are so little 
interested in these aspects of care, which are aimed at safeguarding quality 
(even if they are imperfect measures of it), is an important one.
One explanation may be that patients referred for the operation constitute a 
significant minority of those they see on a regular basis, something that was 
reported by some GPs. However, the most important reason must be that GPs, 
both the fund-holders and non fund-holders, were able to devote no more than 7- 
10 minutes on each follow up visit and approximately 12-15 minutes for each 
new patient on average. In this context, it would be quite unusual if they could 
afford the time for anything more than performing the absolutely necessary 
procedures. Apparently, under the circumstances finding out under what 
conditions care is provided in secondary settings is not one of their priorities.
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This happens against the backdrop where the information given by providers 
refers mainly to waiting times and can hardly be used as a source of 
comprehensive information on the quality of health care that is provided to 
patients. Besides, the quality specifications when included in contracts by the 
purchasers are, on the whole, quite generic and were rarely specialty specific. In 
the majority, they were designed for a “typical” surgical specialty, which 
occasionally led to discrepancies, as with, for example, the inclusion of standards 
such as the absence of bedsores. In unit T, for example, the quality standards 
followed were even more generic and were a combination of “The Patient’s 
Charter" standards of care and could be adapted to any service.
The other perplexing finding is the contrast between consultant eye surgeons’ 
views as to how often they saw patients on their first visit and what patients 
actually remembered. This may be the result of the relative unimportance of this 
issue to the patients, which was especially marked in the UK. However, the 
senior doctors may also have tended to overstate their availability for all new 
patients in order to avoid appearing unwilling to fulfill the standards set explicitly 
by some purchasers and implicitly by “The Patient’s Charter” (DoH, 1991a; DoH, 
1995b). Swedish consultants seemed to be more open about this issue and, 
therefore, their responses were closer to the views of their patients, which must 
also be a matter of cultural difference where admission of imperfection is likely to 
be more tolerated in some places than in others.
One hypothesis put forward as to the reasons for both primary care and 
specialist doctors’ limited awareness of what was important to their patients - and 
for the tendency of doctors to follow a rather mechanistic approach to fulfilling 
the standards set by purchasers (and prompted by government directives) - 
argues that this could have resulted from the impact the reforms had had on the 
working environment.
This seemed to be an overall message that primary care doctors and consultant 
eye surgeons expressed when they were questioned as to the effects that the 
reforms had had on their own work. As another study found that fund-holders 
themselves felt dissatisfied with the workload and pressures that were imposed
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on them (Leese and Bosanquet, 1996). Furthermore, hospital doctors in one 
study in Sweden noted that the time they spent with patients had been negatively 
affected a result of pressures introduced by the reforms (Forsberg et al, 1998).
On the other hand, there were also indications of decrease in satisfaction with 
changes on the users side. One study in the UK concluded that there were 
negative effects on patients’ care that accrued from the change of roles. After 
undertaking a review of the literature, Hoey claimed that fund-holders, in 
particular, were out of touch with patients’ views (Hoey, 1995). In addition, a 
Consumers’ Association survey found patients of fund-holders to be less 
satisfied than those of non fund-holders (Consumer Association, 1995a; 
Consumer Association, 1995b) and Howie et al also found the satisfaction of 
patients from six fund-holding practices in the UK to have slightly decreased 
(Howie et al, 1995).
Although the latter study could not deduce whether this was necessarily a new 
development or whether it applied to fund-holders’ practices more than to others, 
it is easy to understand in this context why the complaint voiced by the majority 
of GPs in this study (both fund-holders and non fund-holders) dealt with the 
unrealistic, and sometimes even irrelevant, demands placed on them. While 
some of the non fund-holders did not join the scheme because of the 
overwhelming demands it presented, all of the five fund-holders interviewed in 
this sample made it clear that their decision to join the scheme had been 
determined by the overall trend and by a fear that neighbouring practices would 
supersede them. In any case, it was not because it signified their choice or their 
belief in how things should be run.
Waiting time to be seen at the outpatients’
There is rather a big variety in waiting times between the units examined, which 
reflects the responses adopted by them. Thus, waiting time targets at the 
outpatient’s department were only successfully met in one unit in the UK (S) and 
in hospital K in Sweden; were only partly met in a second unit (T) and totally 
failed in a third unit (U). This study puts forward a hypothesis that, on balance,
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the eye units that followed rigid policies in order to become efficient producers 
were also successful in meeting certain quality or responsiveness indicators (e.g. 
waiting times for the operation, adherence to the appointment time, written 
information given to the patients and friendliness of the staff).
It also became clear that most patients who had to face unreasonably long 
waiting times at the outpatients’ department complained strongly about this 
aspect of service which was felt to cast serious doubts on their impression of 
quality of service. Such was the case, for example, for the amount of waiting time 
at the outpatients' department at the unit U, which on average exceeded one 
hour and quite often was significantly longer.
An impression is that waiting at the outpatient was an every day reality long 
before it was raised through the reform agenda. It seems that policy makers did 
not fully acknowledge of the problem of prolonged waits to be seen in the 
hospital, conveying a message that this was an issue of lesser importance. This, 
however, might not have reflected patients’ perceptions and level of satisfaction 
as the evidence presented demonstrates. It is, therefore, surprising that General 
Practitioners did not have any idea of what the waiting time at the outpatient’s 
department was like (except for one who rather assumed than knew what should 
be the approximate figure).
One may wonder whether this was happening because it was not considered to 
be an important quality indicator of service provision by the hospital, or because 
waiting to be seen by the doctor was acceptable for General Practitioners 
because it was not an infrequent situation within their own practices?
The amount o f notice before the appointment for the operation
This is a type of service specific indicator that was intended to approach quality 
issues by proxy. It is important, though, because the elderly need to make quite 
substantial preparations for an operation and need support from family and 
neighbours that has to be planned in advance. Patients were, on the whole, 
moderately satisfied with what hospitals could provide in this respect, but it again
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differed greatly among units, where the efficient ones were also the most 
responsive.
This indicates that incentives, even the weak ones that the reforms promoted 
and produced some kind of expected results in terms of quality. Unit S in the UK 
and hospital K in Sweden took efforts to adopt a user-friendly approach as much 
as possible; they were also kinder and more responsive to the details that were 
important to the elderly. Again, the views of eye surgeons diverged from those of 
their patients and, again, the GPs were unaware of what was really happening in 
this aspect of care.
The difference between GPs’ awareness of this matter in the three study sites 
shows that either the General Practitioners in sample U did eventually consider it 
to be a relatively important factor for assessing the quality of care and that they 
therefore attempted to obtain this information; or it could have been that their 
patients communicated their views to the doctors more eagerly. This may be 
actually the other side of the same issue, though it may also be related to the 
differences in the characteristics of the sample, with more affluent and more 
highly educated patients, who are usually known also to be more articulate, and 
who were also prevalent in this area (Goodwin, 1998).
It has to be remembered, however, that in the sample where GPs were more 
sensitised to whether the patients got proper information, the fund-holders’ 
proportion was the highest. However, even fund-holders knew little about this 
aspect of care and it seemed they did not consider it a high priority. Thus on the 
whole this lack of clear and qualified opinion on the side of GPs, “the patients’ 
best advocates’’, is puzzling.
This study had no intention of using the General Practitioners’ limited knowledge 
about the notice of appointment time given to patients as the single yardstick of 
their grasp of changes in information and quality of care and more generally to 
make conclusions about their suitability to promote patients’ needs. Nonetheless, 
the little awareness that GPs have of the patients’ experience of treatment at the
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hospital may well suggest a lack of doctor/patient communication about such 
matters, except in the event of a complaint.
Of course, the usual clinical letters dispatched by hospitals do not go into detail 
about the amount of notice given to the patients about their operation date, so 
the feedback has to come very much from the patients themselves. That this is 
not happening either indicates a perfect system, in which patients feel no need to 
mention to their GPs concerns in this area, a lack of interest on the part of GPs, 
or poor patient/GP discussion. Another matter is that patients may not always 
complain, even if they are seemingly not satisfied with the quality of service 
provision.
Finally, the response of consultant eye surgeons in both the UK and Sweden 
differed according to the unit. Nevertheless, the majority of consultant eye 
surgeons mentioned that, during the period following the reforms, they and/or 
their colleagues had had to rethink their attitude towards the patients. This 
involved issues such as taking steps to diminish patients’ anxiety through the 
provision of relevant information and reducing unnecessary waiting at the 
outpatients’ department. Patients’ views moderately supported the efficacy of 
these efforts.
11.4.2 Comparison between the UK and Sweden
Respondents in Sweden maintained even more strongly that changes in the 
working environment were the result of productivity pressures and the lack of 
time that had resulted from the purchaser-provider split. Eye surgeons claimed 
that this was the reason behind having less opportunity to discuss at length 
different aspects of care with patients personally, and primary care providers felt 
they could not fulfill all the overwhelming and occasionally conflicting demands 
that were placed on them.
Another study that reached a similar conclusion has shown that many health 
professionals have experienced a decrease in influence and control over their 
work situation. They have felt that much of their previous power has been
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transferred to other groups, like managers and administrators, and that their 
freedom to plan their work has been seriously curtailed. This situation has 
become even more stressful as it has been accompanied by staff reductions and 
an increasing workload (Forsberg et al, 1994; Forsberg et al, 1999).
Many supporters of the purchaser-provider models in Sweden have, on the other 
hand, claimed that the service to the patients has been improved as a result of 
the different market-oriented models of reforms. According to this view, freedom 
of choice, for example, has given the patients more power and therefore forced 
the health care providers to become more “customer oriented” (Axelsson, 
1998b).
All groups of respondents interviewed in Sweden substantiate these views by 
providing ample evidence and citing numerous examples of how this was 
manifested in practice. The most dramatic change in this respect was the total 
disappearance of waiting times at the outpatients’ unit and the exemplary 
courtesy of the personnel and doctors, both of which were repeatedly referred to 
by respondents.
The former was most likely the result of one of the care guarantees introduced in 
the Stockholm Model, namely that waiting time at the outpatients’ should not 
exceed half an hour from the given appointment time. If this was not kept to, the 
patient could claim back the amount of 180 SEK that was paid to the hospital as 
a co-payment for the specialist visit. The difference in philosophy of what 
“customer orientation” meant for even the best performing unit in the UK and 
Sweden was considerable.
It could also be a result of the approach to quality assessment, which is reflected 
in the standards-setting procedures for eye services and cataracts as well as for 
other services. These are much more systematic and form part of the “Quality 
Registers” initiative, which was conducted under the aegis of the National Board 
of Health and Welfare and the Federation of County Councils of Sweden 
(Federation of County Councils, 1994). Every spring and autumn, a randomised 
survey of one hundred people is conducted, which is aimed at investigating the
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quality of care according to the adopted indicators that are set with the 
assistance of the Swedish Ophthalmological Association.
These indicators are concerned with both the processes and outcomes of care 
for ophthalmology and, in particular, for cataract surgery. There is also provision 
for addressing complaints, which are dealt with by the National Board of Health 
and Welfare (the approximate number is 300-400 a year for 1993); if need be, 
they are addressed to the Medical Disciplinary Board, which was the case for 
about 100 complaints in 1993 (Bergman, 1994).
By comparison, "The Patient’s Charter* is the only document dealing with quality 
standards in the UK, though they are treated in quite a general and not too 
specific a manner. Moreover, as Calnan et al commented, they are dependent 
upon the procedures that need to be developed to give substance to the 
’’Charter" principles (Calnan et al, 1998).
11.4.3 Conclusions
For many observers, one of the main achievements of the purchaser-provider 
split was the clarification of the roles of different actors in the health care system. 
In both the UK and Sweden, this has been manifested in some quite powerful 
responses to the incentives from all new and old actors. However, the results of 
this for quality have been quite mixed, according to the evaluators’ views. In the 
UK, there were a few studies that investigated some of these aspects but 
similarly no definite answer as to whether major shifts occurred was provided.
This study found quite a high degree of difficulty experienced by GP fund-holders 
and non fund-holders but also by primary care doctors in Sweden in completing 
all the tasks that were expected of them. This finding was supported by one of 
the studies, which found that a percentage of fund-holders and General 
Practitioners were dissatisfied with increases in their workloads and with 
efficiency pressures (Leese & Bosanquet; 1996). These, I think, were two of the 
chief reasons for poor information on different aspects of the quality of care in
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secondary settings and for the quite insufficient time devoted to the concerns of 
their own patients.
The other finding was that units, which responded more vigorously to the 
reforms’ incentives, attempted to adopt a more user-friendly approach and 
provided services of higher quality. Despite the tendency to replace even the 
weak markets incentives by standards that were rarely realistic, yet even in this 
limited form, the pattern of small successes that were observed gave some 
indications of how powerful these instruments could be if used adequately.
11.5 Responsiveness
The principal indicator of responsiveness used in this study was the change in 
waiting times for cataract surgery itself and for the first specialist appointment. 
Waiting lists have been a permanent feature of the NHS throughout its history. 
While their absolute numbers were subject to fluctuations over the years, their 
percentage of the total throughput remained virtually unchanged. It was even 
proposed by some that they should be considered as an attribute and not as an 
anomaly of the system (Frankel and West, 1993). The existence of long waiting 
lists for some hospital procedures (mostly for elective surgery) was widely 
documented in the UK (Goldacre et al, 1987; Frankel and West; 1993) but also in 
Sweden (Hanning, 1996; Lundstrom etal, 1996; Hanning etal 1998).
Cataract surgery, along with some other elective procedures, repeatedly 
appeared as one of the main items on the waiting lists throughout the country, 
although it was subject to significant inter and infra regional variations (Williams 
et al, 1993; Davidge et al, 1987). At the beginning of the 1990s, there seemed to 
be a widespread agreement as to the fact that demand for the service had 
significantly outpaced its supply, although the explanations proffered varied.
The main culprits were sought in the shortfall of qualified surgeons (College of 
Ophthalmologists Audit Commission, 1988), the insufficient use of cost-effective 
procedures such as day care (Williams et al, 1993) and the imbalance in, and/or 
inefficient use of, available resources (Drummond et al, 1991; Mason et al;
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1993). Moreover, the variations in surgery rates (Williams et al, 1993) and 
perverse incentives incorporated in reimbursement systems (Iverson, 1993) as 
well as other unknown factors related to artifacts and the internal dynamic of 
waiting lists (Goldacre et al, 1987) were referred to.
In Sweden, the phenomenon of waiting lists and the explanations proposed were not 
very dissimilar to those of the UK. Some commentators proffered the familiar 
argument that the long waiting lists for some surgical specialties were common for 
publicly financed health care systems because of the absence of pricing 
mechanisms (Hanning, 1996; Hanning et al, 1998) and others claimed that 
increasing demand for services was responsible for the long waiting lists (Lundstrom 
et al, 1996). The unpopularity of this situation with the public, in conjunction with the 
ideological convictions of the Conservative government led to the launch of a waiting 
list initiative in 1992, and a temporary amount of 500 mln SEK was made available 
for this purpose (Berleen et al, 1994; Bergman, 1994).
The preliminary evaluation of the reforms’ effectiveness in reducing waiting lists in 
the UK attracted criticism, as data for demonstrating the reforms alleged success at 
six months after their introduction were patchy and fragmented and interpretation of 
them deeply superficial, for which it was severely criticized (Radical Statistics Health 
Group, 1992; Radical Statistics Health Group, 1995). The immediate periods before 
and after the reforms were used for comparison and they indicated little difference in 
numbers that would have had any statistical significance worthy of proper analysis, 
which, in fact, was not even seriously attempted. The government of the UK was 
politically motivated and, in order to prove the reforms’ success, it decided to 
proceed with this self-initiated and hazy evaluation while, at the same time, 
restricting access to independent and more rigorous assessments, at least at the 
initial stages (Ham, 1997; Dixon, 1998).
In Sweden, the first attempts at evaluating the impact of the reforms were 
similarly devoid of rigour and were too often politically motivated and/or produced 
at the request of the County Council Federation or other government authorities. 
Consequently, their reliability was not uniformly recognized and they were open 
to criticism.
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11.5.1 Evaluation of changes -  the evidence
In the analysis of data from the settings participating in this study, it was 
immediately understood that it would be very difficult to ascertain the size of the 
change for individual hospitals on the basis of quantitative data analysis, as, 
before the reforms, there was no recording of this type of information. In the rare 
cases that this took place, it was not done in any uniform manner and, even after 
the reforms, the eye units of the four hospitals examined - and the hospitals 
themselves - used to keep data in a very different way.
Waiting times for the specialist appointment
The waiting times for the first specialist appointment seem to be the shortest in 
the units that have embraced the reforms and have benefited from them, such as 
unit S in South London in the UK (for details see Fig. 9.6).
The waiting times were exceptional for unit U in North London, which could be 
explained by the conflict between the team of clinicians and the management of 
the hospital, which eventually led to the resignation of the former and the 
effective closure of the eye services department. These services were shortly 
afterwards either taken over by T or moved to another hospital in the same 
Health authority area.
The reduction in waiting times for a specialist appointment was a result of the 
innovations adopted which, according to many consultants, the reforms made 
possible. Such were the examples of primary care eye clinics run by the 
hospitals, where pre-screening of patients was carried out (hospital T) and 
certainly the adoption of cost saving technologies, such as day care and 
sutureless surgery phacoemulsification (discussed more in detail in section 5. 
Efficiency).
Unlike for outpatient waiting times, GPs gave an impression that they were 
relatively well informed, possibly as a result of the input from local providers, 
which is confirmed by the fact that not even a single doctor named patients as
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the main source of information on this issue. However, even the awareness of 
this issue had its limits and there were exceptions to this rule. Although the real 
waiting time during the period of this study (1995/96) was three or four months 
on average, with six months for one consultant, a GP in area T referred to an 
alarming figure of 30 months, which could have been his/her recollection of the 
past. Nonetheless, this ignorance is more worrying because this doctor held a 
teaching position and lectured on General Practice at the Medical School 
attached to the same hospital.
On the whole, the replies coming from doctors in sample U (half of whom were 
fund-holders) and other samples constituted a fair description of the real situation; 
some of the respondents also demonstrated a good understanding of the issues 
involved in waiting time for specialist referral. There were two other interesting 
points raised by some fund-holders, in particular. First was the reference to the 
existence of outreach facilities in the period preceding the reforms (although this 
could not be confirmed by any other source). The second dealt with the 
awareness of the conflicts taking place between the team of specialists and 
management of unit U with its likely implications for care delivery.
These findings again confirm the impression that providers, and also purchasers, 
were directed not to respond to market incentives as originally intended, but 
rather to act upon what the government felt were the priorities at any given time, 
which were issued in the form of directives from the Management Executive 
(NHSME, 1993; NHSME, 1994). This can possibly shed some different light on 
the question of why the GPs and hospitals demonstrated more responsiveness 
and sensitivity to some aspects of the reforms than to others. It can also explain 
why GPs fund-holders and non fund-holders alike were poorly informed, or not 
informed at all, about the information and choice aspects, for example, but had 
reasonable knowledge of what the government had decided to monitor and held 
the providers and purchasers accountable for (i.e. waiting times).
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Waiting times for the operation
On the whole, reductions in waiting times for the operation were not uniform. It 
took about one or two years after the reforms’ implementation before any 
decreases started to be manifested, and they were again short-lived as, by the 
end of 1996, waiting times overall started to increase. This was the result of 
decreases in additional funding that followed the first two years of the reforms in 
the UK (Ranade, 1998) and Sweden (Hanning, 1996).
It could also have been a result of more patients being treated (Timmis, 1997), or 
because the internal dynamics of the waiting list had changed and the amount of 
patients waiting for a long time had diminished at the expense of a higher 
number of patients waiting for a shorter time (Ham, 1997). Appleby also claimed 
that a decrease in waiting times stimulated doctors to refer more patients 
(Aplebby, 1994), a view that has been repeatedly voiced by most consultant eye 
surgeons in this study.
A consultant in sample T gave estimates that were somewhat longer than those 
reported by patients who were interviewed. The consultants’ average was 
between three and six months while the patients’ average was only eight weeks. 
This might be due to the significant difference in waiting times between 
consultants that existed, and continues to exist, in this particular unit, which is 
also given to the GPs and purchasers.
All consultant eye surgeons demonstrated a good grasp of the intricacies and 
possible reasons behind the phenomenon of the “inexorability” of waiting lists. 
While seeing the difficulties involved in tackling this issue, they came up with 
numerous proposals, of which quite few were innovative. The message that 
came most strongly from the well performing units (S of South London and P of 
West London) was the fact that market incentives which could bring about higher 
productivity and consequently some visible reduction in waiting times, were 
hampered by the cash limits applied by purchasers.
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The conflicting nature of some of the objectives that were pursued through the 
reforms was well understood by the providers, who felt disconcerted and 
confused. In their case, it meant that responsiveness to need (or to demand, 
even if this was imperfectly defined) contradicted the objectives of increased 
efficiency and it was therefore perceived rather as an "indicator o f agreed 
supply", as one doctor put it. Still, the picture painted by the respondents in face- 
to-face interviews seems to be somewhat rosier than the data reported by them 
to the Audit Commission to be used in Performance Tables (DoH, 1994; DoH, 
1995a; DoH, 1996, DoH, 1997).
For example, it seemed that there were quite numerous patients who had to wait 
for more than thirteen weeks to be seen, even during 1995/96. However, in U 
(with half the number being fund-holders) it seems that figures included in the 
Performance Tables were over-optimistic when compared with the reports of 
patients and also with the information provided by consultants or managers. 
Purchasers recognised their responsibility in influencing the phenomenon of 
waiting lists and also seemed to be aware of the limitations involved in the use of 
waiting lists as a main tool for their purchasing activities. The need to devise 
other indicators that would deal with the appropriateness of care and evidence- 
based purchasing was also anticipated.
Given that waiting lists were regarded as a central cause of dissatisfaction with 
the health service, it did seem odd that the GPs were, all in all, not too much 
aware of developments in this area. One respondent from the non fund-holders’ 
group acknowledged that decreases in waiting times, from which fund-holders 
benefited the most, had also had a spill-over effect on other General Practitioners 
who were non fund-holders. Overall, however there was an impression of a good 
understanding, even among GPs, of the complexity of the issues involved in the 
waiting list and of its limitations as an indicator of demand, although not all 
respondents fully shared this understanding.
It is also worth bearing in mind that while the primary care doctors held 
seemingly contradictory opinions, they were referring to their own experiences 
with different providers, and did not give their opinions on the general picture.
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Opinions expressed by some of the respondents highlighted different aspects of the 
changes, which had occurred in recent years.
11.5.2 Comparison between the UK and Sweden
As in the UK, Swedish purchasers realized that they had to operate in an 
environment of excess capacity on the providers’ side and that the removal of 
obstacles in the form of disincentives included in payment systems made it 
evident. It also became explicit that the build up or absence of waiting lists is 
largely a matter of political decision relating to the level of care to be provided 
from public funds and more generally to deal with priority setting in health care 
delivery. For example, in 1992 in Sweden 500 mln SEK was given to reduce 
waiting times to three months, a pledge included in the care guarantee for the 
whole country (Berleen et al, 1994; Bergman, 1994)
These findings are also supported by research findings from both the UK 
(Appleby, 1994; Ham, 1997) and Sweden (Lundstrom et al, 1996; Hanning, 
1996). It was argued, for example, that waiting times were reduced only when 
pressure from the government (Ham, 1997; Hanning et al, 1998) and/or 
additional resources for this purpose were made available and, in any case, the 
gains were in both cases rather short-lived (Hanning, 1996). Concerns were 
voiced that where longer waiting lists existed or reappeared, rationing within the 
waiting list could still be the practice, especially given that listing patients for 
surgery is at the surgeon’s discretion in the UK and is not based on any explicit 
guidelines or standards.
A positive correlation between the length of waiting list and the rate of cataract 
surgery does not always exist, as one study from Finland has demonstrated 
(Nordberg et al, 1994), suggesting that the lack of resources were not the only 
reason for the long waiting lists. Nonetheless, they agreed that both long waiting 
lists and high rates of operations (such as in cataract) result from high demand 
for surgery, which they argued should lead to more rigorous and critical re­
examination of the indications for surgery (Nordberg et al, 1994).
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The most significant difference dealt with the care guarantee for four and a half 
specialties (half being cataract surgery), which was introduced simultaneously 
with the Stockholm Model. This meant that if a patient did not receive care within 
three months in his/her catchment area, s/he could be referred for service 
elsewhere, including private facilities. The cost of this would be covered by the 
County Council of his/her residence, up to the level of the set DRG price. 
Exclusively, in Stockholm, the care guarantee was provided for cataract surgery 
in both eyes and not for the “best one", as was the principle in the rest of the 
country (Malm, 1994; personal communication). The latter could possibly be 
explained, “by the political clout that voters of this particular County Council were 
able to command" as one respondent from the County Council remarked.
The introduction of this care guarantee created some impressive results at the 
very initial stages of the reforms (Hanning, 1996; Hanning et al, 1998; Lundstrom 
et al, 1996); but, as most of the observers agreed, as soon as the additional 
money for tackling this issue - and, in effect, for commissioning extra services - 
became unavailable, the likely gains also withered away. In fact, the waiting lists 
in both the UK and Sweden have almost been restored to their pre-reform levels.
The other important result that this study demonstrated is that in both the UK and 
Sweden the success of the different units in reducing the waiting times was 
related to their overall success in meeting the reforms’ objectives (such as high 
productivity, efficient provision and quality of care), which as this study argues, 
was somehow conditioned in their enthusiastic embrace of them. These findings 
seems to be confirmed by another study from Sweden where the less successful 
units with regard to the decrease of waiting times are those who had low 
operation rate or those who chose not to follow the care guarantee (Hanning et 
al, 1998).
11.4.3 Conclusions
First, waiting times for the first specialist appointment and also for elective 
surgery changed and were in most cases reduced, although not impressively. 
Second, this was the result of a political decision to focus on these issues and
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provide extra resources, and not so much a result of market forces. For example, 
the reduction in waiting lists was chiefly related to more generous funding. Thus, 
in this context, it was quite difficult to disentangle the effects of organisational 
changes introduced by the reforms from the effects of the extra funds made 
available, which could possibly have resolved the issue temporarily even without 
the reforms. However, a pattern of added value of the reforms seems to emerge 
despite these other confounders.
This renders support to the argument of the importance of competitive market 
elements in improving the provision of public goods versus the desirability and 
the degree of regulation required for this type of imperfect markets. The 
argument against the appropriateness of using of market elements to improve 
the deficiencies of public delivery seemed to be negatively resolved in this case. 
Rigidly planned systems, where there is no observance of basic economics, tend 
to create passivity, engagement in rent-seeking behaviour in the form of bidding 
for resources in addition to infrastructure and capacity being disconnected from 
the results produced because the targets are at best outdated and at worst 
irrelevant. These phenomena arguably contribute to the formation of the waiting 
lists.
On the other hand, even the introduction of some basic market elements, such 
as incentives, made this situation explicit. For example, the excess capacity of 
certain facilities and, conversely, the lack of others for a number of areas has 
been noted and could not be ignored. However, in this case, even this substitute 
for the market was not allowed to work. No possibility for exit from the system 
was envisaged and when it was, in fact, contemplated the resulting attempts 
were usually half-hearted because government at least in the UK case bailed out 
hospitals, which would have to close down if the results of the competitive 
incentives were manifested.
In addition, the undesirable phenomenon of replacing old disincentives already 
present in the system with new disincentives seems to have occurred in many 
cases. Such was for example “the dead period” in the operating theatre, which
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resulted from meeting the performance targets few months ahead of the end of 
financial year.
Third, regardless of the success or failure of policies driven by “achieving better 
value for money'’ within given resource constraints, the dilemma of how to find best 
ways to match the demand and supply of services remained unresolved within the 
framework of quasi-market reforms. According to Maynard, this is not bound to 
happen until the issue of using payment methods to promote only technologies and 
procedures of proven cost-effectiveness is thoroughly re-examined (Maynard, 
1993a). Then the debate about the appropriate level of funding and strategies for 
achieving it can and will have to be seriously re-considered in the light of the 
evidence made available.
11.6 Efficiency
The system of quasi-markets introduced in the UK in 1991 and in Sweden in 
1992 had the achievement of improvements in efficiency of service delivery as its 
most important goal. The former meant either a decrease in the cost of inputs for 
a given outcome or an increase of outputs produced at the same cost, which 
derives from the industrial production process. The latter that is more often used 
in the domain of public policy, would occur when the benefits gained from the 
use of given resources were maximised. Although this was not explicitly 
articulated in government manifestos in either of the two countries, it can be 
assumed that the reforms were ambitiously targeted at tackling both aspects of 
efficiency.
This study has considered efficiency in order to ascertain whether improvements 
in quality, responsiveness and choice were achieved at the expense of efficiency 
and if they were achieved at all. As has been suggested by Propper et al in 
reference to the US health-care market, purchasers in competitive markets who 
do not face hard budget constraints tend rather to compete on quality than on 
price, which leads to higher costs (Propper et al, 1998). The opposite effects on 
quality by reforms that were driven by efficiency considerations were also 
examined without, however, investigating all the detailed aspects and links
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between quality and efficiency. In order to draw conclusions on changes in 
efficiency throughput, the cost of the procedure, the clinical outcomes and the 
adoption of cost saving technologies were examined.
11.6.1 Evaluation of changes -  the evidence
Changes in throughput and the cost o f the procedure
There was no uniform pattern observable in the changes of the prices for 
cataract surgery although it differed among the four units in the UK, with those 
that were more successful and keen on the reforms lowering their prices for 
services as a whole. They were able to achieve this because of higher 
throughput and, more importantly, because of their spectacular shift to day care 
surgery and almost total disposal of beds. Such was the case in unit S in the UK 
and hospital K in Sweden.
One of the features of the reforms, known as the Stockholm Model, was the 
introduction of a system of costing services on the basis of the American DRG 
system, which was adopted by Sweden and became known as the KOKS 
system. Initially, there was very little experience with costing procedures and the 
setting of prices was done in quite an arbitrary manner and was therefore 
readjusted every following year. The purchasers (the County Councils) applied a 
benchmark of a 10% discount on the previous year’s prices.
This was not a simple and straightforward process as the story of cataract 
surgery illustrates. The evaluation of prices was done twice a year - in May and 
December. Thus, for example, in 1992 the price for cataract operations was set 
at 15,500 SEK on the 1st of January 1992, and went up to 16,400 SEK on the 1st 
of June of the same year. They were lowered to 15,250 SEK on the 1st of 
January 1993, and went up again to 16,010 SEK on the 1st of July of 1993.
This steep climb in prices illustrates the uneasy process of costing services with 
no previous practice in this area and also the role that the bargaining power of 
the profession played in setting prices. The latter was manifested in price
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fluctuation (going up and down within a period of less than one year), which 
meant uncertainty for providers and an inability to make longer-term plans and 
was, therefore, resented by them. In addition, the provider units, which were 
more experienced in delivering certain procedures came out as price leaders at 
providing the services in which they specialised. Such was also the example of 
the specialist hospital, which participated in this study.
However, this increase could not be attributed to the increases in cataract 
operations, as the numbers remained relatively stable, ranging between 7,271 in 
1993 and 6,600 in 1996. Moreover, the DRG (KOKS) prices for services were set 
at 10% less than the previous year’s value and the hospital had to find ways to 
save money while maintaining this turnover. This was not easy according to the 
management of the hospital K because the labour cost had increased, though 
the cost of disposables and materials used had decreased. The latter was 
achieved as a result because of negotiations with the suppliers, which led to 
better deals, and also because of more careful purchasing of new equipment. It 
was also because instead of purchasing a new item, there was more of a 
tendency to rent it from the County Councils.
The other notable feature in the Stockholm County Council area was the 
decrease in the number of operations performed by all hospitals in the fourth 
year after the reforms’ introduction by between one sixth and one fifth, which can 
be observed for all the hospitals. This represents a sharp shift in the trend of 
remarkable increases that were observed after the introduction of the Stockholm 
Model (see Table 10.11) and can be explained by the relatively rapid fall in the 
initial level of enthusiasm following the rise in productivity gains that the reforms 
achieved during the first years of their implementation. This enthusiasm was 
soon replaced by an appreciation of excess capacity and of the necessity for the 
introduction of rationing despite the concomitant political difficulties it entailed.
The rival explanation is that this decrease could be due to the reduction in 
demand once the backlog in waiting lists has been dealt with. This holds partly 
true but only for the two first years of reforms when additional funds for clearing it 
were made available in either country. However, after these funds ceased to flow
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and hard budget constraints were imposed on the number of operations 
performed, waiting lists reappeared both in the UK (The Economist, 1999) and 
Sweden (Hakansson, 1999), suggesting that initial productivity gains that seem 
to have resulted from reforms have disappeared when the incentives and 
structural mix of inputs were reversed to the previous patterns. This reversal or 
inconsistent follow up of perceived gains in productivity understandably had a 
negative impact on staff morale, something that representatives of providers in 
the UK and Sweden referred to on several occasions.
In the UK the similar problem was differently expressed or rather muted because 
hard budget constraints imposed by purchasers made it impossible for these to 
manifest openly. However, as the responses of the providers presented in this 
study suggest, the potential for higher throughput was internally realised and 
manifested itself as the “dead theatre time” for some eye units, which meant that 
no eye operations were performed for prolonged periods of time (several weeks) 
usually before the end of the financial year.
In case of the GPs in both the UK and Sweden but especially in the former, the 
overall impression was that they took very little notice of the changes which were 
occurring, as even the very significant ones were either not at all, or very little 
remarked upon by the primary care providers from all samples, and, in particular, 
by those in sample T (Inner London).
When GPs were asked for their views on cost-saving measures introduced by 
the reforms, some of them referred to the spillover effects that the reforms (which 
were aimed primarily at fund-holders) had had on all GP practices. This was 
especially important for those considering becoming fund-holders. But it also 
seemed that some General Practitioners, in their own perception at least, were 
already aware of the need for efficient use of scarce resources, so the new cost- 
consciousness mentality did not have any serious impact on them.
The conclusion is that cost-consciousness was not such a novelty for most 
General Practitioners as might have been expected. Most doctors were already 
attempting to prescribe generics when possible and the potential for savings
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seemed to be higher for fund-holders as incentives (such as the possibility of 
investing savings back into the practice) were there. The latter was succinctly 
outlined by one of the non fund-holders who stated that the effects of the reforms 
on making doctors more cost-conscious were contradictory, as more money was 
made available although findings from other research seem to disprove this 
(Goodwin, 1998).
The answers here demonstrate a trend, which dominates most of the GPs’ 
answers. General Practitioners in the inner city area seemed to be less informed 
about aspects of care, and could not speak about their relationship with 
organisational changes. General Practitioners from south London (which 
contains a mixture of residential and deprived areas) were somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum, with GPs from north London (almost exclusively 
residential and relatively affluent areas) being the best informed.
Changes in clinical outcomes
The clinicians, both General Practitioners and especially the consultant eye 
surgeons, did not perceive the organisational changes introduced by market 
oriented reforms as having any impact on clinical outcomes. In short, they 
regarded them as non-existent or as marginal at the very best. They seem to 
share an almost unanimous belief that outcomes have improved, which in their 
view was due to the influence of technological developments. By these, they 
meant advancements in surgical techniques, the improved quality of local 
anaesthetics and lenses, and possibly the wider introduction of day case 
surgery.
The same was true where readmission rates were concerned. As was asserted 
by one of the doctors, “eyes were not a very good example for readmission rates 
while in other specialties, such orthopaedics, day care could be held responsible 
for readmissions”. The view represented by the few GPs who gave an answer was 
also confirmed by other sources (consultant eye surgeons and also by a small pilot 
study carried out within the framework of this research). However, again the limited
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knowledge of General Practitioners about the outcomes of care provided to their 
patients was manifested, which remained a worrisome trait.
The views of clinicians have been confirmed by the findings of a small audit (n=54) 
of the clinical outcomes performed at one of the study sites (P) where there was no 
correlation found between the surgical technique, the grade of surgeon or the age 
of the patient (for details see Annex I). These findings confirm what other studies 
have suggested (Schein et al, 1993) pointing, as expected, that the only factor 
having a negative impact on the outcomes was the existing co-pathology, which 
other studies also confirm (Courtney, 1992).
In the past few years, the emphasis has been on building outcome measurement 
into routine clinical management of departments and hospitals in the UK through 
the identification of outcome measures based on existing data. These were 
usually conducted under the banner of evaluating the targets of the "Health of 
the Nation”, but also tried to follow the recommendations from “The Patient's 
Charter" (DoH, 1991a; DoH, 1991b; DoH, 1995a).
There were also attempts to link the processes to outcomes by using indicators 
such as Consultant Completed Episodes, which included the concept of 
continuity of care and necessity for readmission after the procedure was 
completed. In this case, however, concerns were raised that this might result in 
creating incentives for both sides to "play the system", with providers assigning 
multiple CCEs by patient and purchasers concentrating excessively on 
measuring quality by applying "efficiency index" on the other (Gill, 1993). 
However, this study could not provide any evidence of their influence in clinical 
practice in the units examined.
The change in adoption o f new technology and its consequences for 
efficiency
Quasi-market reforms introduced into planned health care systems seem to have 
speeded the pace of adoption of day case cataract surgery especially where its 
previous level of diffusion was unexpectedly slow and where the utilisation rates
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were very low, such as the UK (Perceival et al, 1992). Changes in the pre­
existing payment system that, according to some analysts, created constraints 
and disincentives for both clinicians and the management (Beech et al, 1992) 
were expected to result in a respective response on the providers’ side.
The reaction of providers to the changes introduced was noticeable. This was 
mainly manifested in their attempts to reduce the cost per unit of services and to 
tailor them to purchasers’ quality specifications, as expressed in contracts. The 
primary responsibility for achieving these objectives rested with the managers, 
but the close co-operation of clinical directors became crucial for successful 
outcomes. These dynamics have clearly been expressed in the case of 
technology adoption examined in this study.
The forces that encourage or impede technological development and its adoption 
are multiple and interact with each other on many levels (Geijlins et al, 1994). It 
is widely recognised, however, that positive or negative payment incentives have 
a significant impact on the adoption of new technologies (Steinberg et al, 1993), 
which may even result in the phasing out of procedures of proven clinical value 
when their cost is not reimbursed by a third party payer (Kane et al, 1989).
Formerly, any efficiency gains in the budgetary use would make no difference or 
would have an adverse effect on increases in the hospital budget, as the system 
of resource allocation basically followed previous years’ patterns with adjustment 
for inflation. Under the new competitive arrangements, however, the productivity 
of the hospital was to be reflected in the income earned (Le Grand et al, 1994; 
Charpentier and Samuelson, 1994). Furthermore, those providers who delivered 
services more efficiently (that is at a lower cost per unit) and within the requested 
quality specifications, would be rewarded by an increase in the number of 
contracts attracted. It was assumed that this would also apply to day case 
cataract surgery if the combination of an open-ended payment system and an 
excess capacity on the providers’ side existed.
However, despite most of these predictions happening in reality, the majority of 
consultant eye surgeons in the UK (over 60%) and almost all of them in Sweden,
377
while acknowledging the widespread use of day case surgery during the 1990s, 
had not linked its adoption to the introduction of the reforms. The typical 
explanations given would be that this type of technological innovation was 
already under way or that possibly the reforms might have to some degree 
contributed to their increased diffusion.
Only very few of them regarded the set of incentives introduced by reforms, such 
as the freedom to organise their workloads more efficiently and the ability to 
respond to clients’ needs, as a strong positive force speeding up innovation at all 
levels of everyday clinical practice. These included the adoption of cost saving 
technologies as well as managerial procedures. This also holds true for the 
overwhelming majority of General Practitioners, both fund-holders and non fund­
holders, who were not able to comment on this issue at all (12 out of 16). Even 
those who could see some positive link between changes in the adoption of day 
case surgery and the reforms still considered it as only one of the factors 
influencing this process.
The situation in Sweden was quite different although most actors interviewed in 
the County Council of Stockholm area (doctors, purchasers, managers) could not 
ascribe the use of day care for cataract surgery to the Stockholm Model reforms 
either. The reason for this was that already in 1992 the diffusion rate of the day 
care in cataract surgery for Stockholm County Council was over 90% (see Fig. 
10. 4) while the national average was 52% of all cataract operations performed 
(Swedish Ophthalmological Society, 1993; Swedish Ophthalmological Society, 
1994; Swedish Ophthalmological Society, 1995; Eckerlund et al, 1992) as 
compared to 5% in the UK (Effective Health Care Bulletins, 1996; Williams et al,
1994). Some of the respondents, however, indicated that reforms could have 
influenced this process in other places since the beginning of 1990s a number of 
Counties had experimented with different forms of managed competition.
On the whole however, health professionals interviewed for the purpose of this 
study, who were aware of cost implications and fully involved in management 
activities aimed at increasing efficiency in their respective units’. However, they 
did not, in their majority, ascribe the diffusion of day care cataract surgery to the
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introduction of the reforms. Their perception about the factors influencing the 
diffusion of new technologies seemed still to be dominated by the importance of 
medical and clinical factors. This has proven to be the case even for units where 
the data extracted from hospital and departmental registers reported a massive 
change which could not simply be justified by the clinicians’ interpretation, who 
tended routinely to undervalue the impact of determinants other than medically, 
oriented research and development.
It is suggested that this is could be possibly caused by the lack of a self-auditing 
or self-evaluation tradition within the medical profession which would extend 
beyond the rigorous clinical and basic research studies and would also deal with 
other aspects of care (Long et al, 1993a; Long et al, 1993b; Shanks et al, 1993). 
Of course the supremacy of empiricism in which medical sciences are deeply 
rooted which is based on “hard” investigative methods and the importance of 
professional dominance plays an important role too. Furthermore, the relative 
lack of awareness of research findings (Dawson, 1995; Potamitis et al, 1994) 
combined with the disbelief in their effectiveness contributes to this outcome 
(Dawson, 1995).
Another finding of this study, which is the inability of a majority of GPs to 
comment on links between organisational changes and the adoption of day case 
surgery must also be related to these limitations. Here, at least, GP fund-holders 
who tend to make extensive use of services provided on ambulatory basis (due 
to their cost-saving implications), were expected to be more aware and more 
closely involved in the monitoring of these changes (Glennerster et al, 1994a) 
which was, however, disproved. The GPs’ limited awareness of crucial 
developments in ophthalmology services, for which they commonly referred their 
patients, was also supported by another study (Potamitis et al, 1994).
As has been discussed elsewhere (Rosen, 1996), both clinicians and managers 
have an incentive to promote jointly the introduction of new technologies in order 
to obtain extra income through Extra Contractual Referrals and per-case 
contracts with GP fund-holders in addition to their block contracts with Health 
Authorities. Thus efficiency benefits resulting from day care surgery that were
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already known of (Audit Commission 1990, Audit Commission 1992) could now 
fully be realised.
There is a caveat to this, however, which has also been illustrated by this study: 
the pace of its adoption is dependent on a number of factors, such as the pre­
existing level of diffusion of certain technology in the department, commitment to 
its introduction on the part of the clinicians, and co-operation between 
management and clinicians. This can clearly be seen in the case of the two of 
the four selected study sites, where unit S demonstrates the reforms’ success 
and unit U their failure story. In the latter case, the lack of smooth co-operation 
between clinicians and the management of the hospital led to acute conflict, 
resulting in the resignation of the whole team of consultants, which had a marked 
impact on the overall performance of the department for the years to come and 
has eventually resulted in its closure.
As far as managers were concerned, it was found that - while attempting to 
demonstrate their commitment to increasing the percentage of operations 
performed as day care procedures - when asked about the impact of the reforms 
on this process, they seemed to be influenced by the views of the surgeons from 
the respective units. Moreover, the decision-making process for technology 
adoption also tended to be strongly influenced by the clinicians’ views on the 
technology’s effectiveness. More importantly, managers’ requirements seemed 
to be determined by ad hoc priorities that prevailed and which usually coincided 
with the short-term efficiency gains (Rosen, 1996). It transpired, that there was 
very little serious consideration of the long-term effects of introducing new 
technologies.
On the other hand, it is known that purchasers used to specify the desirable level 
of procedures performed on an ambulatory basis, which were explicitly stated in 
the contracts. Purchasers in the UK increased their demand for day care 
procedures, which was expressed as a growing percentage of services that had 
to be performed on an ambulatory basis in comparison to the previous year. 
Nevertheless, the purchasers of the Health Authorities did not always specify the
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required day care rates by specialty, as the type and volume of services they 
bought were mostly in block contracts.
It also transpired that purchasers experienced a significant degree of confusion 
about their role in promoting the appropriate level of diffusion of medical 
technology. They did not seem to follow their own policies in this respect, but 
rather adopted the directives and recommendations elaborated on a central 
level, such as the Management Executive (NHSE, 1993; NHSE, 1994a; NHSME, 
1993; NHSME, 1994; Audit Commission 1990, Audit Commission 1992). It is 
argued that purchasers’ real involvement in technology evaluation activities is 
not, in fact, compatible with their being guided by centrally set directives referring 
explicitly to a desirable type and level of service provision.
Although the implications of technological innovation may be cost reducing, cost 
increasing or neutral and may manifest themselves differently during its life 
cycle, the usual long-term net effects of introducing new technology are 
associated with an increase of total health care costs regardless of its positive 
effects on the quality of life because it becomes available for a larger number of 
patients who would otherwise go untreated. Such is for example the benefit 
associated with restoring binocular vision, which is the preferred treatment for 
patients with cataract-induced visual impairment (Javitt et al, 1993).
The escalating cost of health care expenditure on the other hand, has commonly 
been attributed to the rapid growth and diffusion of biomedical technologies 
(Newhouse, 1992; Rettig, 1994). In order to counteract this process, there is a 
necessity for a structured and systematic approach to health technology 
assessment, which would inform the debate on appropriate policies; this has 
increasingly been realised within the political, regulatory and academic 
community (Battista et al, 1994).
11.6.2 Comparison between the UK and Sweden
The utilisation rates of day care cataract surgery in the UK were significantly 
lower than those of Sweden and the USA, constituting only a modest 20%
381
expressed on a national level (Effective Health Care Bulletins, 1996) as 
compared with a respective 50-60% and 80% (Steinberg et al, 1990). These 
figures refer to the period of two to three years after the introduction of the 
reforms, while in the period preceding the reforms in three out of the four units 
examined in the UK there was no day care cataract surgery performed at all.
The national differences in utilisation rates of day care cataract surgery between 
the UK and Sweden as well as other comparable countries, may only partly be 
explained by regional and geographical variations characterising medical 
practice (Steinberg et al, 1990) and incentives incorporated into the reimbursing 
system (Steinberg et al, 1993).
A more relevant explanation, which was pointed out by some of the study’s 
respondents, refers to the British medical establishment’s traditionally cautious 
approach to innovation. The conservatism of the medical profession was strongly 
demonstrated when the likely effectiveness and efficiency gains which would 
result from the more widespread use of day care surgery were evaluated by the 
Royal College of Surgeons (Royal College of Surgeons, 1985). Dawson has 
argued that doctors are frequently unaware of the results of research and 
development and even when they are aware they are often skeptical about the 
feasibility of general application (Dawson, 1995).
Surprisingly, doubts about savings resulting from the use of ambulatory care in 
connection with the required support from community services and reservations 
related to clinical outcomes (the latter were not supported by hard evidence), 
outweighed its likely benefits for the evaluators (Royal College of Surgeons, 
1985). This explanation is further supported by the fact that cataract operations 
in the UK were still being performed under general anaesthesia in the majority of 
cases as late as the beginning of the 1990s (Rassam et al, 1989) while it is 
known that the same practice has only rarely been used during the last 10-15 
years in countries such as the USA or Sweden. This study’s data also confirm all 
the above views.
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Despite this, a growing number of well designed studies conducted in recent 
years in the UK have established that day care surgery produces outcomes 
equal or even superior to inpatient care (Lowe et al, 1993; Effective Health Care 
Bulletins, 1996). Such procedures are also reported to enjoy a high level of 
patients’ acceptance (Davies et al 1992) and can have an effect on decreasing 
the hospitalisation rate due to the postoperative infection (endophthalmitis) 
(Javitt et al, 1994). Of most importance are its significant efficiency implications 
(Strong et al 1991; Williams et al, 1994; Perceival et al, 1992), which are 
achieved through savings made on the number of beds and staff required and 
the increased number of patients that may be treated within a given time frame.
It is predicted that the trend initiated by the market oriented reforms within the 
NHS will continue unabated and the use of day care cataract surgery will reach 
its optimal potential, which is estimated to constitute 80% or more of all the 
cases performed on a national level (Effective Health Care Bulletins, 1996).
11.6.3 Conclusions
The first conclusion is that, there was no unanimous decrease in prices of the 
service examined although on the whole the expected increases in the number 
of operations performed ensued (with an exception of unit U, which was closed 
down after some years of reforms). Prices seem to fluctuate and this can 
possibly be explained by lack of previous experience with costing and accounting 
which brought some arbitrariness at least in the initial stages of reforms. Again 
there were differences among units and the most successful demonstrated more 
marked increases in throughput but which was not necessarily commensurate 
with the decrease in prices.
The second conclusion is that, despite these changes, the majority of contracts 
between large providers and Health Authorities in the post-reform period were 
still based on patterns of past co-operation. This can be partly explained by the 
oligopolistic and oligopsonistic position that large providers and purchasers 
respectively occupy in the market, which may lead to cosy arrangements 
between them as outlined by Propper (Propper, 1992). In Sweden on the other
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hand, there were views expressed that the arrangements were never meant to 
be really competitive and that they rather resembled “ a game within a family’ 
(Axelsson, 1998a, personal communication).
Another impediment to the full realisation of competition objectives was related to 
the fact that the majority of services requested by purchasers were still defined 
under block contracts, which made it difficult for more efficient departments to 
feel fully motivated to increase their activities. The evidence provided by this 
study also supports the latter view, which was often referred to by a number of 
clinical directors interviewed. In addition, government in the UK intervened 
whenever a threat of closure of the hospital became real either because the 
excess capacity in the area was realized or because it could not withstand even 
the minimal competitive pressures.
Second, the importance of clinicians’ commitment and their involvement in 
decision making, aside from purely medical issues, seems to bring rewards in 
terms of organisational effectiveness and the quality of care provided, as has 
been demonstrated in the case of S and also unit K in Sweden. In both cases, 
clinical directors are strongly involved in managing the budgets of their 
departments and their overall performance, measured in terms of the efficiency 
of production, the quality of services provided and the users’ satisfaction with 
care, is higher than average. A hypothesis about the role of clinicians acting, as 
the “cadre decide” for improving organisational effectiveness and efficiency in 
their departments, should possibly be further explored.
Third, there is some evidence that quite a few providers were prepared to 
sacrifice the cost-effectiveness considerations of service provision, which this 
option entailed, in order to attract extra income in the form of per-case contracts 
from GP fund-holders, even from distant areas, by conducting an outreach clinic 
at the GPs’ surgeries (Gillam et al 1995). Ophthalmology services were well 
suited for attracting GP fund-holders to refer patients almost exclusively to a 
certain provider in exchange for outreach clinics conducted by consultants on the 
site of the GP's practice.
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them the major ones deal with equal consideration of rival explanations, the 
search for negative cases for testing hypotheses and triangulation techniques 
that use different data collection sources and different research methods to 
strengthen the analysis (Patton, 1987).
In this research project all these methods were applied. Triangulation was 
assured by both employing the different perspectives of the main actors and the 
complementary use of quantitative methods to elucidate some of the issues that 
had been drawn out by the qualitative methodology of semi-structured and in 
depth interviews. Although different results were obtained through qualitative and 
quantitative methods -  as to why or whether changes in day care surgery rates 
occurred for example - this was possibly because different methodologies 
investigated different aspects of change. While quantitative methods looked for 
an indication of the increase in absolute numbers of day care cataracts, 
qualitative interviews aimed at understanding how and if this change was 
perceived by main actors and whether this increase was linked in any way to the 
reforms and/or other causes.
In the former, change in frequencies of occurrence was measured while in the 
latter perception of change was recorded and analysed. Similarly, another study 
of elementary school classrooms, which analysed potential conflicts between two 
sets of data and concluded that difference among them resulted from 
measurement of different things that were not readily apparent, which has 
indirectly confirmed the reasons for this “inconsistency” (Shapiro, 1973 quoted in 
Patton, 1987).
Rival explanations on the other hand, were seriously considered even when they 
were inconsistent with the line of interpretation offered and they could not be 
refuted by it. This is especially evident in the discussion chapter when for 
example the attributability of increases in day care surgery to the internal market 
reforms in the UK is considered alongside with the account of diverging views of 
clinicians on the same subject. It can also be seen when the alternative 
explanation for the lack of information by GPs on the different aspects of care of
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their patients is put forward, or finally when limited choice over treatment or 
hospital site that is available to patients in the UK is discussed.
Negative and deviant cases were carefully recorded and incorporated into the 
framework of analysis, as they are regarded particularly helpful in testing the 
hypothesis (Patton, 1987; Silverman, 1993). As a result the initial hypotheses 
were revised, such as, for example, in the case of divergent views among 
doctors and patients on the priorities of the latter in choosing a hospital or when 
views of patients on the availability and content of printed leaflets differed 
significantly. Only after repeated exploration of hypotheses for their potential of 
generating alternative explanations was the most plausible theoretical 
interpretation then given.
The problem of generalisability is another issue that has to be addressed when 
case study methodologies are used. The generalisability of findings -  also known 
also as the external validity of the case study method - has been a contentious 
issue since the inception of the method. Many proponents and opponents of the 
method alike seemed to share their views on either the impossibility or 
unattainability of this objective or both (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000). 
However, Yin amongst others has argued in favour of the case study’s potential 
for replicability. He pointed out that as long as the methodology used in this type 
of research was clearly described it would be possible to replicate it elsewhere 
thus increasing the power of its findings (Yin, 1994). This latter approach guided 
the methodology adopted in this study.
Extensive notes were kept throughout all the stages of interviewing process, 
which were then transcribed without the aid of a tape recorder. The decision to 
avoid the use of a tape recorder was intended to create a relaxed and informal 
framework that would facilitate the interview and to promote the sharing of 
information that was often confidential in nature. The voluminous data produced 
were organized and simplified into meaningful and manageable categories, 
which were then coded using content analysis techniques. Subsequently, logical 
analyses aimed at the cross-classification of data and obtaining new insights, 
together with an iterative process, under which the categories were applied to the
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data and amendments to them were made according to what they revealed, were 
employed.
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CHAPTER 12
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The research question examined in this study has dealt with the impact of 
market-oriented reforms on different aspects of health care delivery especially: 
choice, information, quality, responsiveness and efficiency. Competitive market 
elements and the separation of functions between producers and buyers of care 
were introduced into the health systems of the UK and Sweden, which had 
previously relied on planning and central budgeting, respectively, as methods of 
operating the system and allocating resources. The reforms were intended to 
enhance the responsiveness of health services bringing it closer to the users’ 
needs and wants, and also to increase its efficiency (in the UK) and its 
productivity (in Sweden).
In the view of the reforms’ proponents, quality of care, choice and 
responsiveness were seen as highly desirable attributes for health care service 
delivery in consumerist societies. It was expected that these would be equally 
highly regarded by the users of health services in industrialised countries and 
would come either second to, or even ahead of, technical effectiveness in their 
valuation. On the other hand, policy makers in the UK saw increased efficiency 
as a desirable end in itself but more importantly as a necessary means to 
achieve technical effectiveness. In Sweden, increasing productivity and, later, 
efficiency were the primary considerations behind the reforms, which were 
independent of the Liberal Government’s genuine commitment to patients’ 
choice.
The proper evaluation of structural changes introduced by means of pro-market 
reforms is fraught with difficulties. They relate to methodological and political 
constraints alike. On the one hand, the evaluation is too often tainted by 
ideologically motivated criticism of the reforms or exaggerated praise of the 
market elements introduced into health care. On the other hand, too few 
resources were devoted to the creation of appropriate tools for a proper
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evaluation that would have provided information and input for decision-making by 
national and local politicians, or even by purchasing authorities. In addition, a 
sound evaluation requires time, which again may not coincide with the priorities 
of politicians.
The first question that this chapter considers is the extent to which the reforms 
fulfilled the expectations placed upon them and whether or not they vindicated 
the associated fears and reservations. The reasons and causes for their success 
or failure are also investigated. A second question is why this relatively modest 
attempt at innovating the system had such a short life and why it was terminated 
before it had the chance of proper evaluation. The final question deals with the 
legacy of this experiment for the future of publicly operated and financed health 
care systems and how, if at all, this experience has paved the way for future 
developments. In another words, did this set of reforms serve as a basis for 
future developments or did it constitute an isolated attempt and, in effect, a cul- 
de-sac?
12.1 Expectations fulfilled, failed or neither?
This thesis investigated the impact of the reforms on choice, information, quality, 
responsiveness and efficiency under the market oriented reforms in two 
countries, which followed similar policies. The first conclusion resulting from this 
comparative analysis is that quasi-markets in health care may have an adverse 
impact on choice of the provider and the modalities of treatment alike. These 
findings confirm the earlier indications from the UK (Mahon et al, 1994; Jones et 
al, 1994) and provide some novel insight into the developments in the eye 
service in the Stockholm County Council.
Second, it was also demonstrated that the quasi-market reforms could only 
moderately stimulate the increase in information, at least where direct users were 
concerned. The increase in information, which was very modest, seemed to be 
primarily tailored to meet purchasers’ requests. This is an original contribution of 
this research as no other published studies dealt with the aspects of information
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under the market oriented reforms either in the UK or Sweden. This study also 
indicates that policy makers had even less awareness and comprehension of 
agents’ limited success in promoting users’ need for an adequate standard of 
information, both in terms of amount and quality.
Third, although it was very difficult to ascertain whether there was an obvious 
improvement or worsening in the quality of care, except for an increased 
awareness of its importance, quality indicators used in this study suggest that 
some positive changes did take place. The transformations were expressed as a 
change of attitude and the provision of more user-oriented care, both of which 
were more likely to have occurred in units, which had benefited from the reforms 
and which could also demonstrate efficiency gains. This indicates that incentives, 
even the weak ones that the reforms promoted, produced some kind of 
improvements in terms of quality of process; the latter is also confirmed by 
another study in Sweden that investigated quality of care (Garpenby, 1997).
Fourth, units that adopted reforms enthusiastically such as hospital S in the UK 
and hospital K in Sweden took efforts to adopt a user-friendly approach as much 
as possible; they were also kinder and more responsive to the details that were 
important to the elderly. This supports one of the main arguments that this study 
puts forward: that those units who were more positive about reforms, either 
because it reflected the attitudes of the leadership or because they were in a 
position to benefit from the reforms, were also more successful in their 
implementation. An alternative explanation could also be that units thriving under 
reforms were more innovation oriented already in the pre-reform period, which 
seems to be the case for both S in the UK and K in Stockholm.
The fifth conclusion is that responsiveness to need, which in this study was 
measured by the changes in waiting times for surgery and the first specialist 
appointment, was more pronounced in units that represented the success story 
of the reforms. This hypothesis is again supported by some other studies mainly 
from Sweden (Hanning et al, 1998; Lundstrom et al, 1996). Meanwhile, it is also 
recognised that government initiatives, complemented by extra funds provided to
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ameliorate the problem of long waiting times, played a crucial, if not the most 
important, role in reducing them.
Sixth, while efficiency gains were difficult to evaluate, as, in both cases, 
significant increases in resources followed the introduction of the reforms, 
productivity did improve in some cases, especially in the initial stages of the 
Stockholm Model in Sweden. In the UK, there is no straightforward answer to the 
question as to whether or not any expected efficiency benefits happened in 
reality, although some indication of a more efficient provision of care in hospitals 
(Soderlund et al, 1998) and primary care by GP fund-holders (Goodwin, 1998) 
can be found in some of the evaluations conducted.
The prediction that competition at micro-level, which is believed to have quality 
enhancing potential and could therefore have a positive impact on the cost- 
effectiveness of service provision, was not investigated in this project. The case 
studies used did not, on the whole, provide any empirical evidence in support of 
this claim; but, again, there were some indications that increased throughput by 
the well performing units led to the decrease in the price of the service.
Seventh, incentives incorporated in the reforms stimulated and speeded up the 
diffusion of cost saving techniques such as day care surgery. This relation has 
not been so far investigated in any published research that is known to the 
author.
What are the general conclusions to be drawn from the results of this experience 
and what could be the possible explanations as to the reasons of these 
outcomes? More importantly, what do they signify in terms of lessons to be 
learned and conclusions to be drawn for the future policy options?
The first conclusion is that changes in the control system and the incentives’ 
structure resulting from reforms highlighted the complexity and multiplicity of 
facets involved in choice, information, quality and responsiveness issues within 
the dynamics of health care environment.
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Second, for cataract surgery, which was used as the tracer condition, the lack of 
choice induced in Stockholm was primarily due to the decrease in alternatives 
resulting from the merging of existing eye units into one specialist hospital. In the 
UK, it represented a conscious decision by at least one type of purchaser, the 
Health Authorities, most of whom adhered to previous patterns of co-operation 
with the providers, only more strictly.
Third, liberally minded policy makers seem to have overestimated users’ 
willingness to opt for choices in health care while giving little attention to their 
largely unmet need for usable and appropriate information. It also turned out that 
patients’ motivations for participating or not in health care decisions depend on 
various factors, which are only partly understood. This implies that provisions for 
enabling patients to defer choice to the provider has to be taken into account 
when designing framework for choices around treatment within a public health 
care system. In another words users should be given the opportunity to choose 
how much they want or do not want to know about their treatment and condition 
of health.
Fourth, as far as information is concerned, in this instance it became apparent 
that market incentives alone were not enough to generate it sufficiently and that 
there is a need to establish effective mechanisms within market oriented systems 
facilitating the process of obtaining relevant and adequate information on options 
available, by all concerned. As a result, it can be concluded that the rhetoric and 
statements proffered for the inevitability of enhanced choice and better 
information following the introduction of market elements into health care 
provision were shown to be false.
Fifth, this study indicates that General Practitioners (both fund and non fund­
holders) in the UK demonstrated only a limited success in promoting users’ need 
for an adequate standard of information, both in terms of amount and quality. It is 
therefore argued that intermediaries such as GPs for example, should not be 
blindly counted on to act exclusively and under any circumstances as the perfect 
defendants of the patients’ needs. This consideration is especially relevant when 
plans are being made to entrust extended and vast powers to primary care
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doctors, along the lines of the most recent change introduced by the new NHS 
White Paper (DoH, 1997).
Sixth, this study has also demonstrated that policy makers, somewhat 
inconsistently and/or naively thought all these occasionally mutually exclusive 
goals such as for example choice, quality and efficiency could be achieved at the 
same time. Already in the aftermath of the reforms’ introduction, it was quickly 
recognized that the simultaneous objectives of the reforms could be in conflict 
with each other.
Moreover, even before the reforms had been introduced, the emblematic 
concerns of the publicly funded systems had been articulated in the form of 
reservations as to whether higher efficiency could be achieved without affecting 
equity of access to the services. In addition, fears were voiced as to whether the 
economic incentives, new to planned health systems, would not be too difficult to 
manage in the public sector, especially if they posed threats to medical ethics 
and medico-clinical aspects of quality as well as equity (Berleen et al; 1994; 
Bergman, 1994; Whitehead, 1994a; Scheffler, 1989). In the UK, it was predicted 
that different trusts had conflicting objectives, which could damage the continuity 
of patients care (Wall, 1994).
According to the early critics of the reforms, this was likely to happen because 
standards and specifications of services and criteria for their evaluation were ill 
defined and designing them would be a very lengthy process (Keeley, 1993). 
However, there seemed to be no realisation that the goal of increased choice, 
information or responsiveness might involve trade-offs against efficiency 
considerations, and views on this subject were muted. In Sweden, Anell pointed 
out the inherent contradictions in the reforms’ objectives and their half-hearted 
commitment to pluralism, which, in his view, would ultimately doom them to 
failure (Anell, 1996).
The conventional view is that increased choice, information, responsiveness and 
quality will promote efficiency (Ovretveit, 1992). Nonetheless, the unequivocal 
implications of this project which were explicitly articulated by health care
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providers is that improvements in efficiency and quality were mainly or only 
possible because there was limited choice and no time consuming investment for 
providing sufficient information.
This study has demonstrated that the fears about the likely detrimental impact of 
the market ethos on the quality of care have been largely disproved. In both 
countries so far there seem to be no negative signs about quality; if anything 
there was an increased interest in recording it, as it had previously been ignored. 
Meanwhile, the use of cataract surgery has simultaneously revealed how these 
contradictions were evoked and provided an illustration as to the extent of the 
trade-offs and substitution effects that were involved in choice, information, 
quality and occasionally responsiveness versus efficiency. It also exposed the 
explicit nature of the resources required to increase choice, information, quality 
and responsiveness, which even in a managed market environment could be 
expressed either in monetary terms or as opportunities forfeited.
Thus the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of attaining the conflicting objectives 
stated in the reforms’ agendas, was once more reiterated. The conclusion is that 
it serves as a reminder of the need for clarity in defining policy objectives 
beforehand, especially when they are visualised and launched on a large scale, 
as was the case in the UK.
Seventh, an overall conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that quality, 
responsiveness and efficiency are more likely to improve when providers can 
identify gains for themselves that will accrue together with achievement of these 
results. Therefore, it is essential that specific policy objectives are sustained by 
appropriate incentive structure for all those whose support is indispensable for 
the successful implementation of the reforms without which they may not be 
successful. There is empirical evidence from other studies that support this 
hypothesis (Garpenby, 1997; Hanning et al, 1998).
Nonetheless, on the whole, there was an opposite trend observed during the 
short life of reforms, which became an overt policy statement in the immediate 
post-reforms period. Policy makers demonstrated their ambivalence when facing
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the results of the markets’ work and attempted either to blunt the incentives in the 
weak form they already existed or decided to abandon them altogether. All along 
they seemed compelled to complement and/or altogether supplant for the 
invisible hand of the market in almost every step, as if they were driven by 
disbelief in reforms’ effectiveness.
This happened on more than one occasions; soon after the reforms were 
introduced in both countries the tendency was to replace more intangible and 
flexible market mechanisms with more rigid and not always realistic standards 
and mechanistic targets. Also the governments fuelled additional funds to smooth 
the implementation of reforms during most of their stages. As a consequence, 
market elements even in its embryonic form were hardly allowed to work: 
competition, incentives and freedom of choice were hardly given a chance to 
demonstrate their success or failure.
Despite these many strictures and the unfavourable environment, the power of 
incentives, even those reluctantly introduced, was demonstrated and both 
providers and users of services exercised them. As the experience of this study 
has shown, the providers attempted to maximise their profit or simply to survive 
by providing more efficient care while the users attempted to improve the 
conditions of service by-choosing the most suitable provider. Notably, the 
response to incentives was more vigorous in Sweden where incentives were 
sharper but also the users of service were more articulate in expressing them.
Summing up, the effects of introducing incentives into health care systems 
should be seriously considered beforehand because they are powerful; they work 
and have to be adequate to achieve their purpose. It is argued, that the 
experience presented in this study has offered a better understanding of the 
limitations entailed in the introduction of competitive incentives into regulated 
markets, which allocate public goods. The necessity for thorough and proper 
evaluation of the multiple facets entailed in this experience and their integration 
into the future reorganizations is hence emphasised.
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There are also some other ways in which this study contributed to enhancing 
knowledge on the effects of the market reforms. The most important and novel 
input was the use of the example of the specialised service to serve as a tracer 
condition of changes that occurred in similar yet distinct environments of the UK 
and Sweden. This approach gave the opportunity to unearth the specific aspects 
of changes that might otherwise go unnoticed. In addition, the element of the 
study involving an international comparison provided some added legitimacy to 
the findings, which in their majority seem to function in spite of the peculiarities of 
each setting. This supports the presumptions of liberal philosophy concerning the 
universal dynamics of much human behaviour.
12.2 Policy implications of the actual findings of research
Although pro-market reforms were widely expected to promote greater choice, 
there was no greater availability of it in any respect of care. On the contrary, 
there were quite a few indications that choice of hospitals in both the UK and 
Sweden may have been curtailed. The reasons for this were many and various. 
In Sweden they seem to have resulted either from the new contractual 
arrangements and/or from the closure or merging of hospitals. In the UK, the 
confusion that was inherent to the mutually exclusive set of policies, an 
exaggerated belief in patients’ desire to be proactive under any circumstance and 
a lack of an appropriate framework that would enable them to enact their choices 
should they wish to do so, were the main reasons that impeded choice.
The implication that this research has helped to highlight is the need for 
clarification of policies as to whether choice is a desirable objective in the first 
place, and, if so, with regard to what aspects of care was it most relevant (choice 
of GP, hospital, forms of treatment). It would also be desirable to establish the 
appropriate level of input on the patients’ side and to ascertain whether this 
would vary according to the type of condition.
In addition, if an increase of choice is indeed a sought-after goal, the costs and 
the trade-offs involved in the process of its pursuit need to be defined, as do the 
organizational and other frameworks required to implement and support it. As
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this study has demonstrated, the omission of those basic requirements turned 
policies aimed at promoting choice into pure rhetoric.
The other proposition that has to be taken into account in policy design process 
and that the aspect of international comparison highlighted by this study is that 
choices are enacted where the incentives are evident (i.e. patients in Sweden) 
but this may not lead the most efficient outcomes for the publicly financed health 
systems. This experience has provided some evidence that proactive policies 
with regard to increasing patients’ choices pursued in Sweden for the first two 
years of the implementation of the Stockholm Model increased the overall costs 
of service provision beyond the point of socially desirable outcomes. In another 
words, there were indications that benefits were achieved at too high a cost, 
which was seen as being incompatible with the priorities of the publicly funded 
health care systems although no proper evaluation of how far this was happening 
in reality was ever conducted.
A further implication accruing form this study concerns the complementary 
policies necessary in this process. One of them is the existence of relevant, 
readily available and accessible information. High quality information for patients 
and purchasers is an essential and desirable objective in its own right. The 
lessons for policy makers that this study has demonstrated, and provided 
evidence for, is that patients value this aspect of care highly even if they do not 
want to use it to enact their choices. This aspect of care seems to empower them 
to undertake after and self-care, to improve their compliance and thus possibly 
speeding their recovery. Therefore, the implications for policies as to the extent, 
type and quality of information provision in health care services are several.
First, there is a great potential for improvement in all aspects of information 
provision for patients and purchasers alike, as to both its content and form. In the 
case of patients their views and expectations for information have to be taken 
into account in designing structures and even materials to ensure that they 
contain and respond to what is needed. In this context, it is worth noting that 
multiple sources of information oral and written seem to have synergy effects on 
the intended users.
398
As far as purchasers are concerned, they have to assume a more proactive role 
and request data only of use to them instead of being flooded with meaningless 
information from the providers, as seems too often to be the case at present.
Finally, various perspectives and angles have to be considered to acquire a 
sense of what relevant information consists for different categories of users and 
to tailor them in order to secure their effectiveness. As various other studies have 
suggested (Luker et al, 1996; Beaver et al, 1996; Anell et all, 1997) patients’ 
needs for information and their ability to make appropriate use of it depends on 
their age, education and severity of condition. Policies aimed at promoting this 
aspect of care should therefore be designed in such a way as to include patients’ 
requirements for knowledge while respecting their wishes for deferring some of 
this to the professionals.
The indicators of the quality of care that this study has measured - changes in 
waiting time in the outpatients’ department, the timing of information provision on 
the operation date, the availability of contact with the senior specialist doctor in 
the hospital and change of attitude of providers towards patients -  showed 
positive changes for units that were eager to implement reforms. This, on the one 
hand, implies that clearly defined and measurable issues that the reforms tackled 
explicitly were met with a relative success when the response of those who were 
to implement them was adequate. On the other hand, it indicated that the less 
tangible aspects of care related to user-friendliness and concern for patients 
needs could be positively or negatively influenced by different providers, which in 
turn depended on how successfully they have adopted the reforms.
The factors that influenced the particular type of response provide some 
guidance as to the conditions for successful implementation of the specific 
policies. They boil down to shared vision and values that provider could identify 
with, ability to recognize rewards, organizational culture and pre-existing level of 
preparedness for adopting particular changes. This in turn, suggests that a broad 
support and involvement of key actors based on an understanding of policies, in 
addition to a clear incentive structure for those who will implement them, is an 
essential precondition for their successful accomplishment.
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Finally, the results of this study in its small way demonstrated that correctly 
applied incentives could improve both the more and the less tangible aspects of 
quality of care. This was in spite of the fears that competition with its 
punishments and rewards could do more harm than good when the relationships 
among key actors are governed by the asymmetry of information on the 
specifications of the product delivered by the providers.
On a more general note, this study highlighted that policy makers in the UK and 
Sweden alike seemed to be driven by an ambivalent mixture of beliefs in the 
power of market attributes (such as incentives and competition) on the one hand 
and the reliance on target setting -  as for waiting times for example where extra 
funds were seen as instrumental in meeting them - on the other hand. This rather 
confused approach was likely to produce ephemeral gains that would wither 
away when tight monitoring and optional money ceased to apply as reduction of 
waiting times for the case study considered in this project has illustrated.
The same conclusion seems also to apply for the results expressed in terms of 
changes in waiting times, which this study uses as a proxy for responsiveness to 
patients’ needs. On the whole, here again units with an overall success in 
meeting reforms objectives presented the most marked (although not permanent) 
reduction for all waiting times. In addition, some other findings on the dynamics 
of changes in waiting times, such as, for example, their fluctuation in accordance 
to the availability or the lack of additional funds suggest together that policies 
require focus, an unambiguous formulation and consistency in their 
implementation to produce lasting results.
The modest efficiency gains that the reforms seemed to have achieved in terms 
of the overall higher throughput of operations performed and a relative (although 
uneven) reduction in prices indicate the lack of experience in costing health 
service that existed prior to reforms’ introduction and the impact that market 
oriented reforms had in initiating this process. A more optimistic and 
straightforward conclusion is that they suggest that the market achieved at least 
one of its key aims.
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However, even when moderate efficiency gains occurred (defined as increases in 
productivity for given inputs) this improvement in technical efficiency did not 
inevitably coincide with improvements in allocative efficiency, which means that 
not necessarily the resources were used in the most efficient way. For example 
the appearance of the necessity to constrain the number of operations performed 
has resulted in “dead time” in the operating theatre for weeks or even months 
(where no operations at all were performed in hospitals in the UK), which in turn 
had negative effect on the morale of the surgeons and staff and could lead to 
other inefficiencies in the long run.
One other implication of the experience with changes in efficiency under the 
reforms is that increasing efficiency or even more so the pursuit of higher 
productivity (an original goal of the Stockholm Model) cannot be taken up as a 
policy goal in isolation because it produces tangible consequences that have to 
be acted upon. Such was, for example, the realization of the excess capacity for 
performing cataract operation in the respective populations for the given public 
funds, which was especially marked in the inner cities and in the heavily 
populated urban areas in both countries.
Another implication of the study is that the criteria used for operations even when 
they are defined in medico-technical terms are subject to variations among 
surgeons and possibly units (especially in the UK). There is no input on 
indications for surgery from purchasers other than limits on budgets and in 
consequence a crude constraint on the number of operations performed without 
taking into account any appropriateness related criteria. This is a policy area that 
purchasers need to address. First, they need to acquire some understanding of 
how the decisions on whom to operate are made and, then, attempt to influence 
them in accordance to clearly defined priorities. This is a necessary course of 
action to promote appropriateness of care and to maximize the gain for 
population for the resources available, in effect fulfilling the goal of allocative 
efficiency.
A final remark on the impact of the market oriented reforms in adoption of 
innovations with cost-saving potential and its implications for policy, is that it was
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quite unclear whether this rapid increase in the implementation of day care 
procedures in cataract surgery that was clearly visible in the UK and this study 
examined, resulted from the quasi-market work or from the directives of the NHS 
Management Executive that explicitly promoted it.
If anything can be concluded from this experience, which also pertains to the 
other aspects of appraising the value of the market experiment which this study 
assessed, is that, in an environment with so many simultaneously occurring and 
complex changes, one can only cautiously assert the probability of synergy 
effects in an absence of any obvious conflict between them; but one can not 
prove that a definite positive link existed.
The straightforward implication is that this uncertain causation linkage maybe of 
rather limited value for helping the policy making process. However, more careful 
consideration suggests that that this provides a real picture of the ambiguity that 
permeates the interactions between new and pre-existing policies and highlights 
the dynamics of responses to them that occur in the real life settings. The next 
section reflects on how far the results reported in this study and policy 
implications identified above were taken up (if at all) in the subsequent 
restructuring of health care systems in the UK and Sweden, which replaced the 
internal market reforms.
12.3 Experience learned, abandoned or neither?
On first inspection, the developments in health policy in the UK and Sweden that 
followed the market reforms reflect the ideological differences of the incoming 
governments (Labour and Social Democrats respectively) with their 
predecessors. The first indications were that politicians in both health care 
systems decided to abandon market experiments in public health care provision 
and go back to the old ways, with control and planning regaining its prominence.
One of the initial and marked transformations in this direction was manifested in 
the change of language, with “competition" being replaced by “co-operation”, 
“contracts” by “care agreements" and “purchasing” by “commissioning". Although,
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the terminology of buying and selling borrowed from the commercial market 
somewhat simplified the reality and was never meant literally, this change 
signified a more important shift in policy, reaching beyond the redress of 
semantic imbalances.
Social Democratic government in Sweden made an attempt to achieve its targets 
of which the most important was to contain the cost of health care, by means of a 
literal pull-back of the system, while promising its constituency that no closure of 
hospitals would be necessary because other structural changes would resolve 
these problems.
Radical moves took place, such as the withdrawal of the private GP scheme, in 
which 25% of the total number of primary doctors had already enrolled, and the 
withdrawal of the concession given to some hospitals, which had become limited 
companies. More crucially, the government envisaged that profits and risks 
should be shared between providers and contractors, which meant that the 
system of imperfect competition would be diluted yet further. This, amongst other 
factors in Stockholm, meant that the surplus, which the hospitals were initially 
allowed to retain, was substantially reduced.
Similarly, in the UK, “The New NHS” White Paper published in December 1997 
and implemented in the spring of 1998, dispensed with the competitive elements 
in contracting procedures, which were replaced by care agreements (DoH, 
1997). The new agreements are of longer term and provide more security to 
hospitals, enabling them to foresee and plan the type of financial cuts required in 
order to follow the political mandate of the day. In both countries, contracts or 
care agreements are meant as tools to define and secure the appropriate level of 
care, as well as mechanisms for quality assessment and follow-up. The intended 
use of contracts in Sweden is as steering tools for achieving productivity, while in 
the UK they are to serve as the framework for commissioning all types of care- 
related services and activities.
The most prominent, and according to many also the most successful part of the 
reforms, the GP fund-holding scheme, has been abandoned and replaced by
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Primary Care Groups (PCGs), compulsory associations of several GP practices 
which are responsible for the joint purchasing of services for populations of 
between 200,000 and 500,000 people within a Health Authority. The integrated 
perspective is also aimed at encouraging co-operation between primary and 
secondary care, while containing the cost.
In Sweden, a similar transformation took place where the concept of the cross- 
sectional chains of care was developed. These were divided between the two 
tiers of the service with the joint management of the whole budget shared 
between the hospital and the primary health care settings. In the UK, this shift 
towards Primary Health Care was more radical as a power for shaping the 
volume and type of hospital care, with money assigned for this purpose being 
almost exclusively managed by the primary care representatives (PCGs).
This partial departure from market principles is to some degree a result of 
political motivation. According to some, the moves aimed at “turning back the 
tide” were politically driven steps, because procedures such as selling, buying 
and contracting out of services were unpopular with Social Democrats and the 
Labour government alike. Equally important however are also the increases in 
spending that reforms brought about (especially in Sweden).
This was on the one hand, caused by the higher expectations that reforms 
unleashed and provided a framework for users to articulate. On the other hand, 
the freedom given to purchasers (GP fund-holders in the UK) to refer patients to 
any hospital and the ability given to patients to chose a provider (in Stockholm 
County Council and other county areas in Sweden) created a situation where 
there was no possibility of controlling the volume of reimbursable services, with 
the only exception of more or less hard budgetary constraints. In addition, the 
political rhetoric about increases in choice, responsiveness and quality of 
services somehow managed to raise the standards against which the successes 
or failures of the reforms were measured.
Also incentives for providers had as a result that some hospitals tried to obtain 
the highest possible share of the market instead of delivering only the volume of
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care set in the contracts. This occasionally led to the phenomenon of 
expansionist hospitals, which was especially evident where per case 
reimbursement system operated such as in the Stockholm Model. The reverse 
was also true, as lack of control and follow-up on contracts resulted in hospitals 
running out of money and posed the threat of closure, which in turn caused grave 
dissatisfaction on the part of the users - something that neither government was 
fully prepared to accept.
In the event, and in order to counteract these undesirable outcomes a new 
Supervisory Hospital Board was created in Stockholm County Council to oversee 
the type and amount of services purchased and to control the management of 
each hospital’s budget. The providers were made responsible for breaking even 
within the budgetary limits and the framework of the contract. The Regional 
Boards (the political bodies of the county councils) were supposed to co-operate 
with all hospitals but only some of them could buy specialist care on behalf of all 
the others. Thus, the shift of power from the elected local politicians moved to an 
administrative body with quite extensive powers.
Similarly, in the UK, the flexible purchasers (fund-holders) have been replaced by 
cumbersome assemblies of GP practices, which had jointly to decide which 
services to purchase for their sizeable populations, while, as argued elsewhere, 
they possessed scant or no information on users’ needs and wants.
All these changes point in the direction of strengthening control in lieu of creating 
incentives, which is the emblematic device that planners notoriously resort to in 
order to solve efficiency problems, despite its demonstrated failure in most 
sectors of the economy. In this case, it is manifested as a centralisation of 
purchasing and a reinforcement of regulatory grip over these decisions. Although 
both theory and empirical evidence suggest that trust and co-operation are 
essential conditions for efficient organisation of arrangements similar to those 
under publicly provided health systems operate (Goddard et al, 1998), these can 
not alone assure that these outcomes will be accomplished.
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Thus, despite these initial and rather obvious changes, quite a few of the 
structural elements introduced by the market-oriented reforms, and even more so 
the changes they brought about, have been retained. Apart from the separation 
of providers and purchasers or planners-contractors that are to stay in both 
systems, further development of the costing and accounting procedures is 
continuing as is the establishment of quality frameworks and a refinement of the 
mechanisms for their evaluation. New features introduced by the reforms, such 
as the indexation of budgets, the freedom of choice of provider, the 
purchaser/producer split and the exchange between them to be based on buying 
and selling have, in essence, remained, but they have been renamed and 
diluted.
In addition, even staunch critics of the reforms have to acknowledge the positive 
results brought about by these relatively short-lived developments, even though 
they differed from the original predictions. The overall conclusion is that, on the 
whole, developments turned out to be different in comparison with the spirit of the 
reforms implemented at the beginning of the 1990s. However, they were possibly 
necessary in order to proceed with the changes that are now needed. The critical 
goals, then, were to move away from the command economy, to introduce 
freedom of choice for patients and to increase the efficiency and/or productivity of 
hospitals. While many, if not most, of the forecast developments failed to 
materialise, there were other important and indirect results of the reforms.
Possibly, the single most important consequence, and an indirect result of the 
changes that took place in the UK between the years 1991-97 and in Sweden 
between 1992-1996, was that the real costs involved in health care delivery were 
made more explicit to all the actors involved. This fact had several powerful 
implications.
From the start, it led to the implementation of economic mechanisms for the 
purpose of steering the system and the follow-up, for establishing a framework 
for monitoring financial activities, and for better planning of human resources. It 
also resulted in an increase in the use of information technology and in the 
auditing of clinical practice, which may have been long overdue developments,
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but which were, nonetheless, introduced to support the implementation of the 
Stockholm Model in Sweden and the quasi-market reforms in the UK. 
Furthermore, it became evident that, in order to secure the likely efficiency gains, 
there was a need to build strong management capacities into the system, which 
was achieved to a degree unknown before.
Another important and, again, indirect result was the restructuring of health care, 
which became indispensable in progressing the reforms and also in maintaining 
operational efficiency within the system. For example, it became clear that the 
real issue in the Stockholm area was over-capacity in the number of big hospitals 
and beds, which, according to an executive from the Stockholm County Council 
interviewed in this study, “was such a very politically sensitive area that no one 
dared to tackle it". Similar was the situation in central London, where a report on 
the effectiveness of the hospital sector, which used economic criteria for an 
evaluation of hospitals’ performance, posed a threat to the survival of many and 
prompted some significant changes.
Additionally, the realisation of the importance of the PHC, which has been 
reasserted through the experience of the reforms, has served as an impetus for 
initiating a debate on the need for structural changes and for implementing co­
operation between large and small hospitals to bring some of the changes into 
effect. Examples of these changes were the shift of care from specialist to 
primary care settings, the use of teJemedicine solutions in PHC, and the 
introduction of outreach clinics with a back up of specialist consultants visiting 
primary care centres.
Another complementary and related axis of change initiated as a result of the 
reforms is the shift of procedures previously carried out by hospitals to the 
surgeries of GPs and/or the clinics of private doctors providing primary care. In 
this respect, the devolution of power into fund-holders’ hands introduced in the 
UK, although abandoned, has stimulated other developments in this direction. 
One of its long term results is that General Practitioners became politically as 
well as professionally involved in quality assessment and their more proactive
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role, is being discussed in Sweden, alongside the changes taking place in the 
UK.
The experience of the reforms also showed that the principles of reimbursement 
had to be generally reconsidered. The reimbursement systems used within the 
framework of the reforms in Sweden created incentives for under-performance by 
GPs, while having the opposite effect on some hospitals specialities which over- 
performed in order to attract as many as possible per services that were 
reimbursable on the per case basis. Thus, while satisfaction with the DRGs used 
for pricing elective procedures was widespread, they proved ineffectual for the 
pricing of long-term care (e.g. cancer).
The reforms also helped to reveal that hospitals, in their turn, need to provide 
standardised information on quality and prices and need to forecast their future 
developments, all in a form that can be used easily by the purchasers/ 
commissioners and also, possibly, by the users. The reforms have highlighted 
this need and indicated the ways in which it could be achieved.
It was also made transparent that, in publicly provided and operated systems the 
first and indisputable goal of the commissioners/purchasers is to meet the needs 
of their populations within the given budget. Providers, on the other hand, may 
not necessarily agree to provide the same level of care for substantially less 
money. In this context, competitive elements and pseudo-market rhetoric can be 
an obstacle to achieving the former, as even market proponents tacitly accepted.
Additionally, the power of incentives, even those reluctantly introduced, was once 
again demonstrated, and both providers and users of services exercised them. 
As the experience made clear, providers attempted to maximise their profit, while 
the users strove to improve the conditions of service on their own, which was 
notably manifested in Sweden where the incentives were clearer and patients 
were less restricted to make use of them.
Finally, the increase in users’ expectations were realised to a greater extent than 
before by doctors and planners and also policy makers. This led to the
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establishment of a proper framework for the discussion of needs’ assessment, of 
the infinite character of the demands placed upon the health care system, and of 
the necessity for an explicit setting of priorities. As a result, a proper debate on 
this subject was initiated. The counter argument quite often articulated by the 
respondents especially doctors in this study, is that these changes would anyway 
have happened even without the reforms. Nevertheless, the role of the political 
elites in giving shape and promoting expectations by means of implementing 
appropriate policies or conversely in disregarding or worse even impeding them 
can be crucial.
The latter was especially important for the UK where no honest and open 
discussion on this subject had been possible, even though the implicit rationing 
of care had continued unabated almost from the inception of the NHS and had 
become an everyday reality for most of its users (New and Le Grand, 1997). In 
Sweden, the fundamental problem that Stockholm Model helped to reveal was 
the necessity for clarification of the goals that the public system should cater for, 
as it became apparent that the needs of the population and the services 
demanded by the population did not necessarily coincide.
One way out of this situation is a return to the old issue of rationing (UK), which, 
while being a relatively new reality for Sweden, came in explicit form into the 
political arena. There is an indication that this trend is likely to be followed. Soon 
after the shift in policy, waiting lists reappeared and started to build up in both 
countries, and in Sweden, there was increased criticism of the care guarantees, 
which could no longer be kept. The other way out for the public sector is to 
provide only for determined needs that are assessed in accordance with well- 
defined and explicit criteria.
One of the most important issues from the point of view of this thesis is 
concerned with the impact of this experience. Thus the question posed is have 
the lessons of these latest reforms been learned? Is it really only the elements 
that worked kept, and were those that did not discarded, as proclaimed in the 
most recent NHS White Paper? In another words, is this only a superficial 
semblance to the pre-existing structures or do the similarities go deeper?
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Some of the overall implications resulting from this experience is that the 
outcomes of the reforms were quite different from their proclaimed objectives and 
expectations. This happened partly because of half-hearted commitment by the 
policy makers who introduced the reforms, and partly because the goals were 
somehow readjusted during the process of implementation, as if prompted by a 
self-correcting mechanism. However, despite the fact that the outcomes of the 
reforms were the result of a compromise, the forces they unleashed made more 
explicit the structural failings of the systems in a relatively short time.
It was also demonstrated that the shift from planned system to a pro-market even 
a regulated or managed one is not a cost-less exercise. There is a need for good 
information on cost and quality specification of services both for buyers but also 
users and it is a time and resource consuming process to build such a system. 
The market oriented reforms made explicit the issue of costs involved in any 
genuine transformation of the system on the one hand and the costs that accrue 
from the specific policies (such as improvements in quality of care and freedom 
of choice) on the other hand.
The role of the pro-market reforms in this process although not direct served as a 
hallmark that highlighted the need for change while identifying some alternatives 
how this could be achieved. Most importantly, this experience reiterated the 
power and the role of incentives as policy instruments, which have to be 
appropriately used by the policy makers otherwise the other actors concerned 
may respond to them quite unpredictably. Also the need for priority setting for the 
level of care and type of services to be provided through public funds became 
explicit. It was also made clear that needs and wants of users are not 
synonymous which poses a dilemma about the role of the public health system 
and more broadly the role of the state in this process.
Despite all these rather obvious changes brought about by the market oriented 
reforms there are also crucial similarities to the pre-market reform period, which 
are attempted in the round of the latest transformations. As a result the 
developments during the post market-reform period in the UK and Sweden could
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be characterised as a compromise between proclaimed intentions and economic 
necessities.
The most important is that the state openly re-assumed its role in the provision 
and organisation of health care, something that in both the UK and Sweden 
voters largely endorse while at the same time allowing for expression of their 
dissatisfaction at the governments’ performance in the task, which they, the 
voters have delegated to it. I think this links into a broader consideration that has 
its roots in the ambivalent attachment that Western Europeans display where 
state provision of welfare is concerned. This leads to the acceptance of a "one 
size fits all" philosophy despite its incompatibility with the trends and progress in 
all other walks of life.
On the one hand, the most urgent goals in reforming the health care system, that 
the reforms made explicit in Sweden, was to increase efficiency and to find new 
ways of saving, even if it meant cutting down on the capacity of the hospitals, 
their duplicated accident and emergency facilities and out-patient departments. 
Therefore, despite the promises and commitments to the contrary, the bed 
capacity in the Stockholm County Council area decreased by approximately 40% 
during this period (Hakansson, 1999), which was achieved by shifting facilities to 
the day care service and merging and closing down some of the units, thus 
reducing the workforce employed in the health care system.
In the UK, on the other hand, the government found itself in the position of being 
strongly committed to living up at least to the promises of its predecessors and 
also to its own declarations to deliver health care of modem quality standards 
attuned to the developments and expectations of a post-industrial society. 
Initially, it was hoped that the usual “window dressing” measures, like the NHS 
Direct novelty, and the familiar centralisation of control would bring about the 
desired results in terms of savings (the latter) and increased satisfaction (the 
former). However, lengthy waiting lists for elective procedures and referrals to the 
specialists, a familiar devise of implicit rationing, have made their reappearance 
(The Economist, 1999).
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The autumn crises of 1999 in service provision of the British NHS exposed 
beyond any doubt the deep structural problems that were well known but not 
always articulated. These have their roots in the parsimonious funding and 
conceptual backwardness on which the foundations of the NHS rest, and which 
impede the functioning of the system in terms of a modem service. While the 
crises were nothing new - if anything, they were something of a cyclical and 
seasonal phenomenon - the reaction to them was novel.
It became clear that the users of health services at the turn of the century were 
not prepared to put up with the mentality of scarcity and below-standard quality in 
public service. The usual arguments of its high return, in terms of the benefits 
yielded for the money spent, could be no longer sustained, as it became clear 
that that this assertion rested on the faulty presumptions rooted in benign 
paternalism and were distant from many aspects of care that users considered 
important. This forced the government to end its procrastination and commit itself 
to more radical measures, such as sound investment and an examination of the 
different possibilities for introducing a public-private mix for both the financing 
and delivery of services.
Despite some tacit compromises, the developments of the post-market reform 
period seem on the whole to be hardly compatible with the objectives that the 
original market reforms attempted to promulgate, albeit with quite limited success 
as this study has demonstrated. Choice of provider and/or form of treatment for 
the users has been removed from the reforms’ agendas in both countries as it 
seems to be no longer an issue and less so it appears to be a desirable goal.
The arguments against choice in health care and its substitution by high 
regulatory standards securing quality of care seem to have won, although it is 
known that control over health care decisions can modify attitudes and 
behaviours and possibly also bring about the desirable shifts in the patterns of 
utilisation of health care services. As far as the provision of appropriate and high 
quality information, a glaring omission from the agenda of the quasi-market 
reforms, is concerned it has been articulated as an explicit aim in the current 
reforms. Many more of elements regarding information for patients are
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incorporated in the quality debate and patient-centred care that has achieved 
quite a high profile in the framework of recent developments (DoH, 1997).
However, one can be justifiably pessimistic on how far the latter can be achieved 
in the context of the sole reliance on the framework of targets and standards that 
are centrally enforced. Similar conclusions apply for the responsiveness to needs 
and of course they are much more reinforced when expectations of efficiency 
gains are concerned. To illustrate the self-evident nature of these predictions 
when referring to the NHS most recent changes, one cannot resist the temptation 
to reflect that if targets and directives were an effective method of achieving 
efficient outcomes than the Soviet Union’s economy would have by far surpassed 
the United States.
12.4 Concluding remarks
To sum up, the market oriented reforms in the UK and Sweden may not have 
had the impact that their advocates hoped. The changes resulting from them 
have, nonetheless, stressed the necessity for a more elaborated approach, since 
they have exposed the mechanistic nature of the theoretical assumptions that 
underlie many of the policies concerned. In addition, they have brought to light 
and articulated the need for change while stimulating developments towards 
necessary directions.
What should then the governments of the UK and Sweden do with regard to their 
experience with markets in health care?
One radical but also an untenable proposal for either of the two countries in the 
present political context, would be to take into account the results of sound 
evaluations as an input in policy formulation and genuinely let the markets fulfil 
the tasks they can instead of retreating from them in prejudice driven by irrational 
motivations. If this approach was followed it would also represent a decisive shift 
towards much needed evidence-based policy making (Viennonen et al, 1999). 
However, as the market proponents failed to embrace wholeheartedly their own 
policies and did not allow the reformed system to work properly, even in its quasi­
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market form, it would be highly unrealistic to expect that its opponents would 
adopt the market philosophy without reservations.
After all rationality is but one and possibly not the most important factor that 
determines and shapes policy making processes. Quite often it seems policy 
makers are driven by deeper and less understood motives. Despite or maybe 
because of this they are often found to be in a position of rejecting some of the 
ideas in words while having to follow at least some of the key concepts in deeds 
despite their ambivalence about them as seems to have been the experience of 
markets in health care in the UK and Sweden.
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14. APPENDICES AND ANNEXES
Appendix I Indicators of the market’s impact
Tablel Indicators used for measuring the impact of market oriented reforms
Indicators used for 
m easurem ent
Method of measurement Source o f data -  UK  
1990/91 -  1995/96
Source o f data  -  Sweden  
1990/91 - 1995/96
1. CHOICE 1. Choice over the hospital site
2. Choice over the procedure (form 
of anaesthesia, day care)
Interviews with consultants and GPs 
Interviews with managers 
Interviews with indicative sample of 
patients (15-20 persons)
Interviews with the primary care 
providers
As in the UK case where relevant
2. INFORMATION Information on available options of 
surgical procedure and details 
about the treatment
Interviews with consultants and GPs 
Interviews with indicative sample of 
patients (15-20 persons)
As in the UK excluding GPs which 
are replaced by respective PHC 
providers (house doctors and 
non-operating eye specialists)
3. QUALITY 1 .Waiting time at the outpatients
2. Timing of the operation date
3. Grade of the doctor/nurse 
seeing patient for the first time
4.Change of the attitude of doctors
Interviews with consultants and GPs 
Interviews with indicative sample of 
patients (15-20 persons) 
interviews with managers
As in the UK
Interviews with consultants and 
GPs
Interviews with indicative sample 
of patients (15-20 persons)
^RESPONSIVENESS- 
WAITING TIMES
1. Waiting times for the operation
2. Waiting time for the first 
specialist appointment
Interviews with eye consultants, 
ophthalmic nurses, GPs and managers 
Analysis and interpretation of hospital 
and departmental data if available 
Analysis of national league tables 
Interviews with purchasers and GPs
As in the UK case where relevant 
Interviews with consultants, eye 
specialists and managers 
Hospital and departmental data 
Interviews with purchasers 
(County Council representatives)
5. EFFICIENCY-
Clinical outcomes
1. Readmission and complication 
rates in relation to improvements in 
visual acuity
Departmental data (case notes audit) 
Interviews with consultants and GPs
As in UK case where relevant
Discharge policy -  
introduction of 
technology
1. Qualitative assessment of 
changes in terms of day care
2. Quantitative data on day care
Interviews with consultants and 
managers
Hospital and departmental data
As in case of UK where relevant
Throughput -  
productive efficiency
Number of operations in years 
1990-1996
Departmental and hospital data 
Interviews with consultants and 
managers
As in case of UK where relevant
Cost of the procedure Prices of service in years 1990- 
1996 (comparison of numbers)
Hospital and departmental data As in case of UK where relevant
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Table 2 Aspects of indicators asked of different respondent groups
Choice
Information
Responsiveness 
waiting times
Quality
Efficiency
Consultant eye 
surgeons__________________
Modalities of treatment 
offered to patients
-Information on the 
modalities of treatment, 
alternatives side effects 
given to patients 
-Information about the 
date of operation 
-Type of information and 
form it is given 
(oral/written)
-Waiting times for
operation 
-Waiting times for 
specialist appointment 
-Waiting at the 
outpatient's department 
-All waiting times 
-Attitude of health
providers
-Quality of outcomes
-Prices of service 
-Number of operations 
performed 
-Clinical outcomes 
-Impact on technology- 
day care_____________
General
Practitioners______________
-Modalities of treatment 
offered to patients by 
providers
-Choice of hospital 
offered to patients 
-Choice of provider 
-Information on the 
modalities of treatment, 
alternatives side effects 
given to patients 
(themselves and the 
hospitals)
-Information about the 
date of operation 
-Type of information and 
form of it (oral/written) 
-Waiting times for
operation 
-Waiting times for 
specialist appointment 
-Waiting at the
outpatient's department 
-All waiting times 
-Attitude of health 
providers
-Quality of outcomes
-Prices of service (for 
GPFH only)
-Clinical outcomes 
-Impact on technology- 
day care
Patients
-Modalities of treatment 
offered to patients by 
providers
-Choice of hospital 
-Choice of GP /family 
doctor
-Information on the 
modalities of treatment, 
alternatives side effects 
given to patients 
(themselves and the 
hospitals)
-Information about the 
date of operation 
-Type of information and 
form it (oral/written) 
-Waiting times for 
operation 
-Waiting times for 
specialist appointment 
-Waiting at the 
outpatient’s department 
-All waiting times 
-Attitude of health 
providers
-Quality of outcomes
-Clinical outcomes as 
perceived by patients
Managers
-Modalities of treatment 
offered to patients by 
providers
-Information on the 
modalities of treatment, 
alternatives side effects 
given to patients 
(themselves and the 
hospitals)
-Information about the 
date of operation 
-Type of information and 
form it (oral/written) 
-Waiting times for
operation 
-Waiting times for 
specialist appointment 
-Waiting at the
outpatient's department 
-All waiting times 
-Attitude of health 
providers
-Quality of outcomes
Prices of service 
-Number of operations 
performed 
-Clinical outcomes 
-Impact on technology- 
day care_____________
Purchasers
-Choice of provider 
- Choice of GP /family 
doctor
-Information about the 
quality specifications 
-Information about the 
waiting times 
-Information abut the 
cost of services
-Waiting times for
operation 
-Waiting times for 
specialist appointment 
-Waiting at the
outpatient’s department 
-All waiting times 
-Attitude of health 
providers
-Quality of outcomes 
-Other quality indicators 
Prices of service 
-Number of operations 
performed 
-Clinical outcomes 
-Impact on technology- 
day care_____________
Appendix II Questionnaire
Questionnaire for consuitants/GPs 
1. Choice
1.1 Have there been any changes resulting from reforms in choice over the 
procedures that are available to patients?
a) Day care surgery option b) Form of anaesthesia
c) Hotel facilities d) Other
2. Have you noticed any changes in the level of empowerment of your patients 
during the last five years, manifested for example as the wish to exercise more 
choice?
a) There is a visible difference in the level of choice that patient exercise
b) There may be a slight difference in their attitude
c) Can not see any change
3. Do you think that after the introduction of reforms your patients are given 
increased choice over the preferred hospital site where the surgery can be 
earned out? (For GPs only)
a) Yes b) No
4. If yes, which are the factors that mainly influence their choice?
a) Travelling distance
b) Waiting time
c) Other
5. What are the factors that you take primarily into consideration when buying 
a cataract surgery service from certain provider? (For GPs fund holders only)
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a) Previous patterns of co-operation
b) Price of the service
c) Waiting time
d) Travelling time
e) Other
2. Information
2.1 Have there been any changes regarding the type and amount of information 
available to patients your clinic since the introduction of reforms and if so what are 
they?
a) Yes b) No
2.2. More specifically, are patients given printed leaflet with detailed 
explanations referring to one or more of the following and if so are these leaflets 
used more commonly now?
a) The health problem and procedure of treatment
b) The likely post-operative complications
c) Available options of surgery/anaesthesia
3. Quality
Waiting time to be seen
3.1. Since the introduction of the reforms have there been any changes in the 
waiting time at the outpatients' department?
a) Waiting time has been reduced
b) Waiting time has been increased
c) There is no major change
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3.2. More specifically, could you indicate approximately what is the average 
waiting time at the outpatients' department?
a) Less than 30 min.
b) Between 30 min -1 hour
c) More than 1 hour
Timing o f the information provided to patients
3.3 Is the information also given personally by?
a) Consultant
b) Junior doctor
c) Staff nurses on the ward
3.4. How far in advance are patients informed about the date of operation? Have 
there been any changes in this policy since 1992?
a) > 2 months before
b) > 2 weeks before
c) < 2 weeks before
Change o f Attitudes to the patients
3.3 In what way has the introduction of reforms influenced your relationship with 
patients?
a) I can devote more time to my patients
b) I can't devote the time I used to because of higher productivity pressure
c) It helped me to understand that my perception of their needs may be different 
from theirs (i.e. in the form of procedure they may choose) and cater better to 
meet them.
d) Hasn’t changed
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4. Responsiveness to need (expressed as a proportion of met need - 
through analysis and interpretation of numbers on waiting lists)
4.1. Have there been any changes in the length of waiting list for the first 
appointment with consultant, which could be attributable to reforms?
a) Waiting time has been reduced
b) Waiting time has been increased
c) There is no major change
4.2. More specifically, could you indicate approximately what is the average 
waiting time for the first appointment?
a) Less than 6 weeks
b) Between 6 -10 weeks
c) More than 10 weeks
d) Other
4.3 Since the introducing of reforms have there been any changes in the length 
of waiting list for the cataract surgery at your unit?
a) Waiting time has increased
b) Waiting time has decreased
c) There is no major change
4.4. If yes, what actions have you taken to tackle this problem? (only for 
consultants)
4.5. Have the reforms affected more generally your ability to promote 
developments in your clinic? For example:
a) Launching a waiting list initiative
b) Establishing an outreach clinic
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c) Merging day care facilitates in one site
d) Other
4.6. What in your opinion is the relation between the length of waiting list and 
higher efficiency (defined roughly as throughput/cost ratio) that you may have 
achieved at your unit?
a) Waiting time decreases with increased efficiency
b) Waiting time increases with increased efficiency
c) There is no close relation between them
4.7. How far do you think can the waiting list be used as a sensitive measure of
demand for cataract surgery? Would you like to suggest any better one?
4.8. Have there been any changed (probably following changes in your policy) in
waiting time for second eye cataract surgery?
a) Waiting time has increased
b) Waiting time has decreased
c) There are no major changes
5. Efficiency
Throughput
5.1 Have there been changes in number of operations performed since the
introduction of reforms at your clinic?
a) Yes b) No
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5.2. If the former answer is yes, would you agree with the opinion that it may be 
attributed to the introduction/wider use of the day care surgery and local 
anaesthesia?
a) Entirely b) Only partly c) Not related
5.3. If the former answer is b) could you explain the reasons for this situation?
Clinical outcomes
5.4. Have there been any differences in clinical outcomes during the period 
following the introduction of reforms? If yes, can they be attributed to reforms?
a) There is no difference in clinical outcomes
b) Clinical outcomes may have improved but this is unrelated to reforms (e.g. 
advancements in technology
c) Clinical outcomes may have deteriorated and it has some links with reforms
5.5. If you agree that some organisational changes have been prompted by 
reforms (i.e. increased throughput, introduction of new techniques in surgery and 
anaesthesia), what would be the effect of those changes on quality in terms of 
clinical outcomes such as readmission or complication rates?
a) Readmission and complication rates remained the same
b) There is slight increase (please define) in readmission rates/follow-ups in day 
care surgery
c) There is slight increase (please define) in complication rates following use of local 
anaesthesia
Discharge policy
5.6. Have there been any changes in discharge policy at your unit that you could 
attribute to the introduction of reforms?
a) Yes b) No
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5.7. If a) is yes, has there been decrease of length of stay (please define) that is 
mainly due to:
a) Changes in trends of discharge policy
b) Introduction of new technology (please name)
c) Other
5.8. Is there any relation between the decrease of length of stay and 
readmission or complication rates?
5.9. Have you changed the range of treatments in comparison to what you did 
before the introduction of reforms or have you introduced or increased one or more 
of the following:
a) Day cataract surgery versus inpatient surgery
b) The use of local anaesthesia
c) Phacoemulsification technique of cataract extraction
d) Other
5.10. If the answer to the former question is positive, than how far would you 
attribute the changes in new forms of treatment to the introduction of the reforms 
and how far to the diffusion of new technology?
a) It is entirely attributed to the introduction of reforms as a) and b) have been 
proved to be more cost-efficient than previous forms of treatment and therefore 
reforms have significantly speeded up their use.
b) There is an impact of reforms on introduction/wider use of new forms of 
treatment, although there is rather indirect relation between those two
c) New forms of treatment would have been introduced regardless of the reforms
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5.11. Do you think that the element of competition introduced among competing 
self-managed trusts had enabled you to adopt and/or experiment with some new 
forms of medical technology? If yes, please specify
5.12. Have the reforms simplified/made more difficult the follow up of your work
and its evaluation? (e.g. through the use of clinical audit)
Cost o f the procedure
5.13. Do you have an idea of how reforms influenced the cost of each operation 
at your clinic?
a) Increased b) decreased c) hasn't changed
5.13. Have you put in practice different ways of saving at your clinic, which in your 
opinion result from reforms? If yes, name the main.
5.14. How have been the aspects of reforms introducing market mentality
accepted at your clinic?
a) Enthusiastically
b) Positively
c) With reservation
d) Negatively
How would you explain this?
5.15 Have reforms brought an increased profitability mentality to your clinic? If 
yes, can you give examples how this mentality has changed behaviour at your 
clinic? For example are the economic calculations made more frequently now than 
previously?
5.16. Have reforms caused your clinic to run at a profit?
If yes, what do you intend to do with this profit? For example would you buy new 
equipment?
467
Appendix III Characteristics of the samples of respondents
1. General Practitioners in the UK and Sweden
Box 1.1 Sam ple o f the site T (n=5) a ll non fund-holders, four m ale and  one female__________________________________________________________________________________
• GR a member of a practice run by two doctors with a list of 4 000 patients working there for five years in an area that is "not a very 
typical inner-city with mixed population and not very many ethnic minorities, a relatively well defined community and not high level of 
deprivation".
• bUN working for 4,5 years in a practice shared with two other colleagues who referred 1/3 of his patients to the hospital T.
• AR, single-handed practice, retired one year after reforms' introduction, a GP for 40 years, non fund-holder. He was introduced by 
one of the interviewed consultants eye surgeons and willingly volunteered to be part of the study which was considered a contribution 
to sample’s diversity.
• KS, working for 2,5 years in this particular practice but being a GP from 1985. Referring patients "always to the Moorfields (Eye 
Hospital) as it is the closest”.
• PW, working for thirteen years as a General Practitioner, in a six partners practice, s/he is also working part-time at the university 
(he sees only 700-800 patients a year)._________________________________________________ ______ _____ _
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Box 1.2 Sample o f the site S (n=5) four non fund-holders, one fund-holder and a ll male.
• RE was a General Practitioner for 14 years, from Redhill in a practice with six partners, a non fund-holder.
• TR a General Practitioner for 10 years, in a practice with three partners, worked before in another two practices in the area (one
consisted of two partners and one was single-handed), s/he is a GP in one of the deprived areas of the sample S and is a non fund­
holder.
• NO a General Practitioner from deprived part of S with five partners in the practice, non fund-holder.
• AU an Australian, a General Practitioner since 15 years, in a practice with five partners and a middle deprivation area, soon to
become a fund-holder.
• OL a General Practitioner for 30 years from a well to do part o f S in a four partners practice, is the only fund-holder represented 
in this sample._____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________
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Box 1.3 Sample of the site U (n - 6) three non-fund-holders, two fund-holders, one to become a fund-holder in April. Three
male and three females._______________________________________________________________________________________________
• DC General Practitioner from 1982, worked in two practices before, In this practice (which is situated in the residential part of U) there
are six GPs of which four are fund-holders of the second wave, they all share list of 9000 patients. She could not say whether people
moved while claiming “we do not loose too many patients because of high satisfaction".
• GG fund-holder since three yeas in a practice of three partners situated in a middle class area
• PE General Practitioner since 1969, the practice situated in an affluent part of U (“at least 50% of practice’s patients have also a
private insurance”), in April will become a fund-holder.
• LB a General Practitioner for thirteen years, single-handed practice in a middle class area, non-fund-holder and active participant in 
alternative purchasing schemes.
• CA a General Practitioner for fifteen years, in a practice situated in well to do part of U with two non-fund-holder doctors and 6000 
patients.
• HW a General Practitioner since thirty years, a non-fund-holder in a practice with three partners in the big health centre shared 
with other group practices and 8,400 patients.
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Box 1.4 Sample K  (n=5) Sweden (three male and two female)
• MK works 20 years as a GP, has some organisational experience in healthcare and teaches Community Medicine at Social Medicine 
Department Her practice has quite a lot of old people and she is also responsible for social, crisis line and preventative care.
• NB is a foreign doctor, Greek and works as a GP for 3 years. Before he was a paediatrician and specialist in internal medicine for 10
years in total. He sees a lot of ophthalmic patients, as there are many elderly in his practice.
• PG is a GP for 21 years and worked in different places (he came in 1993 from Norway. Currently a private GP in the area where the
majority of the population comes from the countryside (numerous islands of Stockholm Archipelago) with very low density of
population. He sees about 400-500 patients monthly and is assisted by one nurse. The premises are rented from County Council for 
one or two years.
• JS is a medical ophthalmologist who is specialised in medical retina. He explained that many people go to the ophthalmologists to 
check their eyes regularly and are then referred for specialist care when needed. The only cost they incur these to pay a fee of 180 
SEK with the full cost being reimbursed by the County Council.
• CH is a nurse working for about a year in the eye services and app. 20 years in health care._______________________________
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2. Consultant eye surgeons in the UK
Box 2.1 Consultants characteristics in England samples S, T, U and P
Sample S Sample T and U Sample P
1.HS is a clinical director, has 
been a consultant for 10 years. 
She is Irish, in her early forties.
2. DA has been a consultant 
for three years, is in his late 
thirties, and is an Asian male.
3. AL has been a consultant 
for one year, is in his late 
thirties, British male.
4. JO is a service grade 
associated specialist but with 
significant experience. 
Suggested by the clinical 
director. He is in his mid- 
thirties, British male.
1. BL, male, mid-forties, 
consultant since 3-4 years.
2. MJ, male, mid-fifties, 
consultant since 10-15 years.
3. CD, woman, early forties, 
clinical director, consultant 
since 10 years.
4. MH, male, early forties, a 
consultant since September 
1995.
All are of English origin and all 
except for MH worked in both 
T and U (following the recent 
merging of some of their 
functions) in 1995/96._______
Clinical Director who is working 
as consultant for more than 10 
years a woman in early-mid. 
forties, British of Caucasian 
origin with very foreign surname.
2. A woman working as 
consultant for more than 15 
years. She is a Sri Lankan app. 
50 years old.
3. The most recently appointed, 
aged 37 is a Jewish man (he 
insist on his religious identity)
4. British Caucasian male in his 
early forties recently appointed.
Box  2.2 Consultants’ characteristics -  Sweden Stockholm  Eye hospital
MH - Clinical Director since 10-12 years, already a medical director of the whole hospital in Karolinska since 1982 a male, 60-65 years 
old.
l/l/S - Anterior segment surgeon since 20 years, worked before in 3 other hospitals a male in mid-forties.
BP - Anterior segment surgeon for approximately 20 years a male in mid-fifties.
CZ - Anterior chamber surgeon for 15 years, a woman in early forties.
BC - Deputy Clinical Director, anterior chamber surgeon for 30 years, a woman in mid-fifties.
BC - A woman in mid fifties a senior eye surgeon, vice president of the hospital
All eye surgeons were Swedish. ______  ___________________________________________
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Annex I Audit results on clinical outcomes in hospital P, UK
Box 1: The impact of age, gender, technique and surgeon’s grade on clinical
outcomes____________________________________________________________________
Age Gender Pre-op. Post-op. Technique Surgeon’s Discharge Complica-
V.A. V.A grade Period tions/type
76 1 6/11 6/6 1 1 8 hours 0
70 2 6/9 6/9 1 1 8 0
79 2 6/12 6/6 1 1 2 0
84 2 6/36 6/18 2 1 9 0
62 1 C.F. 6/9 1 1 2 0
62 1 6/18 1 1 4 0
89 1 C.F 6/9 1 1 2 0
85 1 6/36 6/9 1 1 8 0
83 1 6/18 6/9 1 1 4 0
66 1 6/60 6/5 1 8 0
76 2 6/24 6/9 1 1 4 0
64 2 6/18 6/9 1 1 4 0
80 2 6/18 6/12 1 1 8 0
81 2 6/9 6/12 1 1 8 C.M.O.
61 1 9 6/5 2 8 0
81 2 6/18 6/12 2 1 9 0
81 1 6/24 6/18 1 1 8 D.R.
9 1 6/9 6/6 2 8 0
87 2 C.F. 6/12 2 1 9 0
61 2 6/18 9 1 1 9 0
78 2 6/12 6/9 2 1 8 0
61 2 6/9 6/9 1 1 8 0
83 2 6/24 6/9 1 1 4 0
68 1 6/12 9 2 1 9 0
72 1 6/24 6/9 1 1 2 0
9 2 6/12 6/24 2 8 0
64 2 6/12 6/9 1 1 8 0
82 1 C.F. 6/9 1 1 6 0
79 2 6/60 6/9 1 1 8 0
90 2 6/60 6/12 1 1 8 0
84 2 6/18 6/9 2 1 8 0
86 2 6/36 6/6 2 1 8 0
76 2 6/9 6/9 1 6 0
79 2 6/12 6/9 2 8 0
77 1 6/12 6/9 1 1 8 0
64 1 6/12 6/18 2 1 8 0
79 2 6/18 6/9 2 8 0
82 1 6/9 6/9 2 1 8 0
76 2 C.F 6/9 1 1 8 0
89 2 C.F. 6/9 1 1 4 0
60 1 H.M. 6/12 2 8 0
84 1 6/60 6/60 2 1 8 0
64 1 6/18 6/18 2 1 4 0
72 1 H.M. 6/9 2 2 2 0
71 2 C.F. 6/9 1 9 8 0
Source: Data from the Eye Unit in hospital P
C.F. Counting fingers, H.M. Hand movements, C.M.O. Cystoid macula oedema, D.R. Diabetic 
retinopathy
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Annex II Indicators o f  clinical outcomes used in Sweden
Box 2: Indicators of clinical outcomes for cataract surgery used in Sweden
> Visual acuity, which is simply translated as “sharpness of vision" (continuous recording of all patients with different visual 
acuity groups).
> Frequency of resulting complications, such as in's prolapse or vitreous loss that results in ‘leakage’, calculated as percentage 
of total operations performed (the use of special instruments for removal of vitreous defines the latter condition).
> Patients’ satisfaction survey applied in the six-month period after the operation for every tenth patient and measuring his/her 
perceived benefits from surgery.
> Clinical programmes for quality and programmes for quality monitoring which involve a follow-up of the cataract operation 
every 2-3 months
Source: Swedish Medical Association, 1994
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